Tenets

53 min · 2,912 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets
Loading
/

Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 53-minute session, Kyabje Rinpoche completes the Mind-Only School presentation, using sound’s impermanence as his primary example to show how practitioners progress from conceptual understanding to non-conceptual direct realization of emptiness. He clarifies Cittamātra’s central doctrine: form and its cognizer arise from a single karmic imprint in the perceiver’s mind, not from independent external objects. Moving to the structure of Buddhist practice, Rinpoche outlines the three vehicles—Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva—explaining their distinct objects of abandonment, merit accumulations, and practice durations: 14 lives, 100 eons, and countless eons respectively. He then presents a key philosophical debate: whether beings possess three definite lineages established since beginningless time (the True Aspectarians’ view) or whether all beings can eventually reach Buddhahood (the False Aspectarians’ position). The session concludes by introducing Madhyamaka School. Pitched at practitioners already engaged in systematic tenets study.

File metadata (for organising)

File: Line in 0158 – KR.mp3

UUID: 94968dea-7401-4272-a4e5-30960327b256

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Tenets

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~2,912

So, as usual, we will meditate for one or two minutes on generating the motivation, and then do the prayers. So as usual, we will meditate on generating the motivation reflecting that attending to Dharma appropriately for the benefit of all suffering mother sentient beings who are cycling in cyclic existence. So, as you remember, we have been covering the twofold division of mind in Cittamātra between valid and non valid cognizers. And in that context, Geshe-la had explained last time the fourfold division of direct cognizers in the context of Cittamātra, which is in terms of the division similar to Sautrāntika, which is a division into sense direct cognizers, reflexive direct cognizers, mental direct cognizers, and yogic direct cognizers. And it is said in the context of Cittamātra that sense direct cognizers and reflexive direct cognizers, generally speaking, are mistaken and that mental direct cognizers have both mistaken and non mistaken subdivisions, while yogic direct valid cognizers are unmistaken.

Now Geshe-la would like to expand a little bit on the division of mental direct cognizers into mistaken and non mistaken. And I would like to point out that, generally speaking, mental direct cognizers in the continuum of ordinary beings, in other words, that first instant of immediate mental perception between a sense perception and a conceptual mind, are always mistaken. However, when we say that mental direct cognizers also have an unmistaken component, what this actually refers to is to yogic direct cognizers. Since yogic direct cognizers are actually mental direct cognizers, or belong to that category, within the continuum of superior beings. So we are in the presentation of the fifth outline of the Mind Only School at the very end of Page 23 and the beginning of Page 24 of your text.

And Geshe-la had last time explained in detail the fourfold division of yogic direct valid cognizers into yogic direct valid cognizers, which cognize subtle impermanence, which cognize the coarse selflessness of persons, the subtle selflessness of persons, and the selflessness of phenomena. And generally speaking, the selflessness of both persons and phenomena will be explained in greater detail in the sixth outline, which is coming up. Regarding the yogic direct valid cognizer, cognizing subtle impermanence. Subtle impermanence here refers to the transitory or the impermanent nature of phenomena, which is the fact that both exterior phenomena and the human body person change at the rate of what is said to be one sixty fifth of the time it takes for a healthy undiseased person to snap their fingers. This is a measure of transience.

And this is one of the forms of impermanence which is realized at this point. And then on Page 24 of your text, Page 22 of the Tibetan text in the middle, all inferential valid cognizers are necessarily conceptual. So in this context, we have a presentation of inferential valid cognizers, which is broadly similar with that in the Sautrāntika school. An inferential valid cognizer is a fresh and incontrovertible conceptual mind, relies on a valid reason. Generally speaking, conceptual cognizers are divided into valid and invalid conceptual cognizers.

Inferential cognizers are necessarily valid cognizers. Nonvalid conceptual cognizers would be, for instance, conceptual minds which rely on an invalid reason. And then in dependence on the generation of an inferential valid cognizer, for instance, of a topic such as emptiness, one would initially know emptiness conceptually. And then after reaching the level of the path of seeing and upwards, one would gain non conceptual direct realization of emptiness. So for beings below the path of seeing, conceptual minds are dominant.

As they start progressing above the path of seeing, non conceptual direct cognizers become dominant, and eventually, they attain full enlightenment. Moreover, our text reads onwards, if something is an inferential valid cognizer with regards to a specific phenomenon, phenomenon. It is not necessarily a conceptual mind with regards to that phenomenon. It’s a case because although the inferential cognizer, realizing that sound is impermanent, is an inferential cognizer with regards to sound’s emptiness of permanence, it does not realize that. The meaning of this passage is that the mere fact that a valid inferential cognizer realizes that sound is impermanent does not mean necessarily that it realizes explicitly sound’s emptiness of permanence.

It realizes that implicitly. Because it realizes that implicitly, it cannot be said to be a conceptual mind with respect to that, even though it is a conceptual mind with respect to sounds being impermanent. In other words, it is a conceptual mind which does realize that sound is impermanent. And the remainder of the fifth outline is a development of this. So the thrust of the argument here is that explicit realization of one aspect of phenomena does not entail the implicit realization of that aspect, even though the implicit realization does arise from that.

Now regarding the sixth outline, this is the main outline, which is rather summarized here because it’s a presentation of selflessness, specifically the selflessness of persons, which is in common with the lower vehicles, and the selflessness of phenomena, which is specific to the greater vehicle. So regarding the selflessness of persons, this has been explained in great detail in the context of the explanation of Sautrāntika. So it’s not elaborated in this text. Geshe-la will cover, however, the material briefly again for our benefit. Regarding the presentations, they are the same as in Sautrāntika.

So the coarse selflessness of persons and the subtle selflessness of persons are posited in the same way as in the context of the Sautrāntika School. The coarse selflessness of persons is persons’ emptiness of being permanent, one. And I believe I translated this as independent. What is meant specifically here by the person’s emptiness of being permanent, one, and independent is, with respect to permanence, it refers to the person’s being empty of being a permanent phenomenon. In other words, the person’s being an impermanent phenomenon, which is changing instant by instant.

With respect to the person’s being one, it refers to the person’s emptiness of being one. It refers to the person’s being composed of multiple multiple particles, multiple components. And with respect to the person’s being empty, of being independent, It refers to the person’s not being totally autonomous, but instead arising as an imputation on the basis of the continuum of the four or the five aggregates which constitute it. Now generally speaking, if one understands the persons being an imputation on the basis of the aggregates, since this is the most subtle level of understanding at the level of the understanding of the coarse selflessness of persons, one will have understood the other aspects of the coarse selflessness of persons.

When it comes to an understanding of the impermanence of the person and it is implied here, the subtle impermanence of persons, then this would naturally lead to an understanding of the coarse selflessness of persons, but it would not be equivalent with such a realization. Then regarding the subtle selflessness of persons, which is persons being empty of existing as autonomous substantial existence, what is referred to here is persons existing as mere imputations on the basis of the aggregates and not existing as independent phenomena from that basis of imputation. So a realization of the subtle selflessness of persons leads quite naturally to realization of the coarse selflessness of persons. The realization of the coarse selflessness of persons does not lead automatically to a realization of the subtle selflessness of persons. Generally speaking, the coarse selflessness of persons, which is presented here, which is persons being empty of being permanent, one, and independent, is a view which is accepted by all of the Buddhist schools from Svatāntrika Madhyamaka downwards through Vaibhāṣika.

On the other hand, the view which is common to all four Buddhist schools with the exception of Vaibhāṣika is a view of the subtle selflessness of persons. In other words, a view of persons lacking or persons being empty of autonomous existence as a substantial entity. This view is accepted by all Buddhist schools except the Vaibhāṣika schools, which obviously do not accept that level of subtle selflessness of persons. And then regarding the selflessness of phenomena at the second paragraph at the bottom on page 24. That emptiness, which is an emptiness of form and the valid cognizer apprehending form being different substances, is an instance of the selflessness of phenomena.

So generally speaking, as Geshe-la explained for this for the Cittamātra school, there are no exterior phenomena. Exterior phenomena and actually the mind, for instance, apprehending form and form, specifically the visual consciousness apprehending form and form, both arise from one karmic imprint implanted in the mind of the perceiver. Therefore, for the Sautrantikas consider that exterior phenomena such as form are the cause of the visual consciousness perceiving form, the Cittamatras do not accept that exterior phenomena such as form or form in general is the cause of the visual consciousness perceiving form. This is the case because form and the visual consciousness perceiving form in the cittamatra system are simultaneous, whereas form and the visual consciousness perceiving form in the Sautrāntika system are not simultaneous but subsequent since one is the cause of the other. Generally speaking, the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas do not accept the existence of ultimate particles.

They consider that all phenomena are part, ultimate particle less, and therefore consider all phenomena as arising through the mere process of mental imputation on the basis of that which is designated. On the other hand, the themselves consider that phenomena are necessarily composed of findable particles. And then we pass directly to the seventh outline, which is a presentation of grounds and paths. So this is explained in terms of the object of abandonment and the actual presentation of grounds and paths. The objects of abandonment are basically what one must abandon as one progresses spiritually up the paths.

And regarding the first, I. The objects of abandonment, at the bottom of page 24 of your text, these are grasping to a self of persons, its karmic imprints and so forth, as well as the three poisons which arise through the force of this and the seeds, in other words, the karmic imprints and so forth, which are posited as the obstructions to liberation. Now, the second part of this paragraph at the beginning of page 25 refers to the selflessness of phenomena. Now, the self of phenomena is one of the objects of abandonment. So on the other hand, grasping to true existence, its seeds and so forth as well as its karmic imprints and all the mistaken appearances which arise through the power of those are posited as obstructions to omniscience.

These are the two broad categories of objects of abandonment. So the objects of abandonment are developed much more. The presentation is developed much more in the context of Madhyamaka. But the same notion of there being two broad categories of objects of abandonment, The objects of abandonment which enable one to attain liberation and the objects of abandonment which enable one to attain omniscience are present both in Cittamātra and Madhyamaka And then moving onwards to the presentation of the vehicles. Generally speaking, the Chitamatras assert, as all of the Mahāyāna schools, three broad categories or three vehicles, which is the vehicle of the Śrāvaka, the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddha, and the vehicle of the Bodhisattva.

The objects of abandonment and the accumulations of merit of the respective vehicles are different. The accumulation of merit necessary to engage in the vehicle of the Bodhisattvas is highest because it leads to a great enlightenment, the enlightenment of the bodhisattvas, which is full enlightenment. The accumulation of merit necessary to engage in the vehicle of the Pratyekabuddha is a middling accumulation of merit, It leads to a middling enlightenment, which is the enlightenment of a Pratyekabuddha. And the accumulation of merit necessary to engage in the Śrāvaka vehicle is a lower accumulation of merit, because it leads to a lower level of enlightenment, that of a Śrāvaka. Likewise, the principal objects of abandonment are different.

The principal object of abandonment of a practitioner of the bodhisattva vehicle is that selflessness of phenomena, which is taught in Cittamātra to be the emptiness of form and the valid cognizer perceiving form being different substances. In other words, the unity in nature of form and the valid cognizer perceiving form. Whereas the emptinesses, which are the main objects of meditation, and the which are therefore the main object of abandonment of both the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha vehicles, are the emptinesses of selflessness of the or the subtle selflessness and coarse selflessness of persons. In other words, the object of abandonment are the subtle and coarse assertions of a self, of persons. And in addition, one should practice on these three vehicles for different periods of time.

The Bodhisattva practices for three countless eons, the Pratyekabuddha for 100 eons, and the Śrāvaka for 14 lives or less. With respect to the uncommon view of the true Aspectarians, as you remember, the Cittamātra are divided into true and false Aspectarians. The true Aspectarians have the uncommon assertion that both Shravakas and Pratyekabuddha when they attain their respective enlightenment, attain a state where their continuum is interrupted. In other words, they cease to exist. They, however, assert that the practitioner of the bodhisattva vehicle, when he attains the great enlightenment of a bodhisattva practitioner, in other words, full enlightenment, does not cease to exist but works endlessly for the benefit of being as a fully enlightened Buddha.

Moreover, the two aspectarians have an uncommon assertion regarding the three lineages. Whereas, generally speaking, the Mahāyāna vehicle asserts that all beings have the Buddha nature, the true Aspectarians say that this is not the case. And as mentioned at the bottom of page 25 of your text, they assert that the specific lineages of the three vehicles are definite because sentient beings have since beginningless time three lineages or three dispositions. What is meant by this is that some sentient beings from beginningless time have the wish to become fully enlightened for the benefit of others. Therefore, they have the Buddha nature, and they can become fully enlightened.

Others have, from beginningless time, no wish to become fully enlightened for the benefit of others, but wish either to become Pratyekabuddha, in which case they would have the lineage or the nature of the Pratyekabuddha or have the wish to become Shravakas, in which case they would have the seed for becoming Shravakas. In this case, if they have the seed for becoming Shavakas, they cannot enter into another vehicle than the Śrāvaka vehicle, and they would not enter into another vehicle. Therefore, our text reads, they have three different wishes, in other words, three different motivations, hence three different realizations. These are the realizations of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and fully enlightened Buddha. Hence, three different results.

Hence, the attainment of three different results. This is only a viewpoint which is accepted by the true aspectarians. It is not accepted by the false aspectarians. And therefore, at the bottom of page 25, the three different wishes are the three different motivations. The three different realizations or three different trainings are the three different paths, the paths of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva.

And the three different results, as we mentioned, are the three states of becoming a Śrāvaka, in other words, hearer, a Pratyekabuddha, a solitary realizer, or a fully enlightened being. And now, at the beginning of page 26 of your English translation, The the false Aspectarians, on the other hand, do not accept the existence of three definite types of beings and do not accept specifically that the mental continuum of a Śrāvaka and a Pratyaka Buddha is interrupted when the Śrāvaka or the Pratyekabuddha attains the remainderless nirvana, that is nirvana, of their respective vehicle. They assert that at the time when a Śrāvaka or a Pratyekabuddha attains a remainderless nirvana of their respective vehicle, what is interrupted is that mental continuum of the truth of suffering and the truth of origination, the first two of the noble truths. In other words, that mental continuum of karma and klesha. But that the mind itself goes on and moves onwards until they attain a state of full enlightenment.

They, therefore, assert that the mental continuum of all being remains uninterrupted. This concludes the presentation of the cittamatra view. And now with respect to the presentation of the Madhyamaka School, although your Tibetan text actually reads section four, page 26, the explanation of the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka School, actually, it gives first a general explanation of Madhyamaka, which is divided into three outlines, and then gives later on the explanation of the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka School. Now, generally speaking, Madhyamikas are explained in terms of the definitions of the school, the divisions, and the meanings of the school. The definition of a Madhyamaka is a being who is a propounder of great vehicle tenets and who does not assert even conventionally, even in terms of designation, actual true existence.

In other words, a Madhyamaka is a being who, whether he is svatantrika or Prāsaṇgika, does not assert a, the true existence of phenomena, does not assert it even conventionally, which means even verbally, and in addition, is a propounder of great vehicle tenets. In other words, is a Mahāyāna tenets, propounder.

Key terms in this teaching

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
pratyekabuddha rang sang gye (Tib)
A solitary realizer or self-realizer; a Hinayana practitioner who attains liberation from cyclic existence autonomously, without relying on an external teacher or teachings. Cf. shravaka. LYWA
right-seeing path darshana-marga (Skt); tong lam (Tib)
The third of the five paths to buddhahood; attained with the direct perception of emptiness. Also called the path of seeing. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Scroll to Top