Tenets

51 min · 2,923 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets
Loading
/

Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 51-minute teaching, Kyabje Rinpoche resumes his study of the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy. He begins by establishing proper motivation for practice—progressing from concern for beneficial rebirth, through the wish for liberation from saṃsāra, to the aspiration for full enlightenment to benefit all sentient beings. Rinpoche then methodically works through the sevenfold division: the school’s definition and distinguishing characteristics, its two main sub-schools, the etymology of its name, the presentation of conventional and ultimate truths, consciousness as the basis of personal identity, and the spiritual grounds and paths. Throughout, he emphasizes the Svatāntrika view of emptiness—phenomena lack true existence yet arise from the meeting of mind’s labeling and partial inherent existence. Key masters discussed include Bhaviveka and Shāntarakshita. For practitioners with foundational knowledge of Buddhist tenets.

File metadata (for organising)

File: Line in 0170 – KR.mp3

UUID: 16698235-3261-4850-8df7-57ed0242c936

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Tenets

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~2,922

So in keeping with Khensur Rinpoche’s tradition in the matter, we will generate first a appropriate motivation for listening to these teachings. Now generally speaking, the smallest such motivation is the awareness that since this life of ours is transient and that there is no guarantee that we can obtain a rebirth as a human being or a being of the higher realms, we have to accumulate merit for such a rebirth. A middling motivation would be the awareness that even if we put effort in these matters, there still is no guarantee to indefinitely obtain a higher rebirth and therefore we must strive for liberation from the cycle of lives. However, this is still somewhat inappropriate if we reflect on the fact that all infinite Mother sentient beings as vast as space are suffering. And therefore, we should generate the wish to attain a state where we have actualized all qualities and eliminated all faults and all defects, which is that state of full enlightenment we are striving for for the benefit of all sentient beings.

And we will meditate one or two minutes on this. So we are continuing with the teachings on tenets, which were interrupted a month or so ago. And in keeping with the famous quote which says, for Buddhahood, there is no fourth, and for tenets, there is no fifth, Geshe-la will gloss the text. So this quote means, when it says that for Buddhahood there is no fourth, that there is no fourth vehicle apart from the three vehicles of the hearers, the Shravakas, the solitary Buddhas or the Pratyekabuddha, and the Bodhisattvas. And for tenets that there is no fifth, the meaning of that second part of the quote is that the Buddha did not teach an additional school of tenets apart from the four, the Vaibhāṣika, Sattrantika, Chittamata, and Mādhyamika schools which he taught.

Now we have reached the Mādhyamika school and within the Mādhyamika school from within the twofold division of Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamikas on page 26 of your text, we have reached the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas, and there is a sevenfold division of the explanations of this school, of which the two first have been completed. And then we will start again with the explanation of the Svatāntrika schools with the middle paragraph of page 26. Fourthly, regarding the explanation of the Mādhyamika. This is the common Mādhyamika, both Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. It explained in three outlines, definitions, divisions, and the meanings of the various distinctions.

Regarding the first, the definition of a Mādhyamika is, this is a Mādhyamika which can either be a Svatāntrika or a Prāsaṇgika. So it’s a common definition for the two schools. A being was a proponent of great vehicle tenets and who does not assert even semiotically actual true existence. So this definition can be broken down into two parts. Such a being is firstly being who does not even nominally assert actual true existence.

The meaning here is that this is a being who does not even assert at the level of terms, at the level of names, a true existence of phenomena. Therefore, this is a being for whom the apprehension of true existence is an object of abandonment. And in that sense, from within the two fold division of propounders of smaller vehicle tenets and greater vehicle tenets, it is a propounder of greater vehicle tenets. And this is therefore the definition of what literally our Tibetan text calls a propounder of naturelessness, which I have translated as Mādhyamika because that’s the meaning. And then moving onwards with our text, the bottom of page 26, regarding the third explanation from within the two sub schools of Mādhyamika.

There’s a presentation of the Svatāntrika School and the Prāsaṇgika School. So the Mādhyamika School is divided into two, Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika. And as formally, the Svatāntrika school will be explained in terms of a sevenfold division, which is listed on the beginning of pay first paragraph of page 27. Definitions, divisions, etymologies, objects, mode of asserting subjects, the mode of asserting selflessness, the presentation of grounds and paths. And generally speaking, Geshe-la says, one of the uncommon features of this text of tenets is that it presents each of the philosophical tenet schools in terms of the sevenfold division, which is extremely helpful for the mind.

Because the first division, which is definitions, clearly defines what the school’s core position is and what the positions of a member of the school are. The second divisions gives the sub schools of the school. The third which we call etymologies is actually the reason for which a member of a such a school is given this name. The reason for which a Mādhyamika is called a Mādhyamika for instance. The fourth object is a general presentation of all phenomena.

While the fifth, the mode of asserting subjects is a general presentation of perceivers of phenomena. The sixth, which is the most important, is the view, the mode of asserting selflessness. And the presentation is the seventh is a presentation of grounds and paths. Then the second paragraph on page 27, the definition of a Svatāntrika Madiamica is a Mādhyamika who does not assert even semiotically or even verbally actual true existence by means of a verbally formulated autonomous reason. So this definition can be broken up into two broad categories.

The first is that this is a Mādhyamika, and we skip to the end of the definition, who does not assert by means of a verbally formulated autonomous reason. Such a verbally formulated autonomous reason or autonomous syllogism would be a statement such as the subject X of A’s, for instance, is not inherently established because it is a dependent arising. Now this is a syllogism as opposed to the consequence which would be formulated as follows. It follows that the subject X is not a dependent arising because of being is not inherently existent because of being a dependent arising. In the case of the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika school rejects the true existence of all phenomena and considers that it’s possible to establish within the continuum of another being the non true existence of phenomena using such a syllogism.

So this is the uncommon characteristic of this school. In addition to this, the second feature of this school, which is shared with the other Mādhyamika schools, is that it does not assert even verbally the true existence of phenomena. This means it does not assert the true existence of phenomena at all. And then moving onwards with the division of this school, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika school in the middle of page 27, regarding the second, divisions, if one divides them, there are two sub schools, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, and the Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. The definition of the first, a Mādhyamika who propounds the presentation of conventional phenomena meaning keeping with the Svatāntrika School.

The definition of the second, a Mādhyamika who propounds a presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in keeping with the Cittamātra school. So all both of these schools or these sub schools, Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and Yogacarasvatantrika Mādhyamika are Svatāntrika Mādhyamika schools. Therefore, both accept that phenomena are not truly established. They differ however in terms of their presentation of conventional phenomena. And the first of these schools presents conventional phenomena mainly in terms of the Sautrāntika presentation.

In other words, they present phenomena such as forms, which are the object of the eye consciousness, sounds, smells, taste, and tactile objects, mainly in keeping with the presentation of the Sautrāntika school, even though they do assert them to be non truly existing. The second school, on the other hand, the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, presents phenomena conventionally mainly in terms of the Cittamātra or Yogacāra School. In other words, they present phenomena conventionally as non exteriorly existing phenomena. Sautrāntika School considers phenomena exist outside of the consciousness perceiving them. They exist as exterior phenomena.

The Yogacarra School does not. So in terms of the presentation of conventional phenomena, the Svatāntrika school is divided between these two alternate presentations. And now moving on to instances or examples of these practitioners, which is at the bottom of page 27. Instances of the first Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Madhyamikas are Bhaviveka or Jnanagarbha. Bhaviveka was the great Svatāntrika Mādhyamika who is considered in the Tibetan tradition to be a direct disciple of Nāgārjuna.

Instances of the second, in other words Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamikas, are the great teacher Shāntarakshita and his two students, Haribhādra and Kamalaśīla. So, in your text, I I added Padma Sambhava. You should bar that out. The Tibetan reads the inverted syllables of Padmasambhava. It actually refers to Kamalaśīla, the teacher.

To Shāntarakshita, the teacher, and Kamalaśīla, the student. And then, at the bottom of page 27, regarding the third, I e, etymologies, subject Bhāvaviveka, in other words, the great practitioner Bhaviveka, there is a reason for which he is called a Svatāntrika Mādhyamika because it is stated thus, by the reason of his being a Mādhyamika who accepts autonomous reasons. So as a Mādhyamika who accepts autonomous reasons, in Sanskrit autonomous reasons is Svatantra. Bhaviveka is said to be a Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. An instance of autonomous reason would be for instance, the syllogism, the subject sound.

It follows that it is an impermanent the subject sound is an impermanent phenomenon because it is a made or a manufactured phenomenon. The Svatāntrika Mādhyamika School considers that phenomena are actually established by their own characteristics, even though it does not accept that they are truly established. And because it considers that phenomena are indeed established by its own characteristics, it would consider that this syllogism is also established by its own characteristics. And this would be why one who states such syllogisms such as Bhaviveka would be considered to be a Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. And now we have reached the fourth division, the mode of asserting objects.

In other words, as Geshe-la explained, the general presentation of phenomena. This lists some synonyms established by its own characteristics, established from its own side, and inherently established are all synonymous. In other words, the meaning is the same. And then on page 28, uncompounded space, in other words, space which has no parts, the noble truth of cessation, the third noble truth, past future, and the subtle selflessness of persons are both asserted to be non affirming negatives and conventional phenomena. And uncompounded space, the first example given here, which is both a non affirming negative and a conventional phenomena, is to be understood as follows.

Uncompounded space is that mere non obstructiveness of space which enables, for instance, light to travel through it or which enables the hand to be moved without any obstruction to the right or to the left. Is that mere unobstructiveness of this phenomenon which is called uncompounded space. Now, this is a conventional phenomenon and it is said to be a non affirming negative. What we mean when we say that it is a non affirming negative is that the mere term uncompounded space, the verbal designation uncompounded space states nothing else than that mere absence of obstructive contact. It does not state the presence of an affirming phenomenon.

Therefore, is not merely a negative phenomenon, it’s a non affirming negative. However, it is not an emptiness because it is not an ultimate truth. It is merely a conventional truth. The next paragraph on page 28, ultimate truths, suchness, the subtle self selflessness of phenomena are all synonymous. Now generally, these three are synonymous.

It is important here, however, to understand the uncommon presentation of emptiness from the standpoint of the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika School. From the standpoint of the Svatāntrika Madhyamica School, while indeed the true existence of all phenomena including persons is refuted. What is understood by true existence is somewhat different from what is understood in the Prāsaṇgika school. What is understood by the true existence of phenomena is that phenomena do not exist completely from their own side. However, for the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas, phenomena do exist partly from their own side.

And they consider that phenomena arise at the intersection or from the collection of, on the one hand, the mental imputations from the mind imputing designations on phenomena, and on the other side, from the actual existence or partial existence of phenomena from their own side. This is therefore the meaning of ultimate truth, suchness, and the subtle selflessness of phenomena for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. And then the following paragraph, the third paragraph on page 28. From the standpoint of the Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the five sense objects such as form and so forth are different in nature from consciousness. And coarse external objects constituted of partless particles are asserted.

So this is a problematical passage, Geshe-la says. Generally speaking, the first part of the paragraph poses no particular problems. The Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, as we explained previously, Svatāntrika Madhyamica’s who assert conventional phenomena in keeping with the Svatāntrika school. That’s why the term Svatāntrika is placed before. And therefore, they assert that the five sense objects such as visual objects, sounds and so forth, are different in nature from the sense consciousness which perceives them.

So for instance, a visual object such as a table according to this school would be different in nature from the eye consciousness perceiving it. Therefore, it is an exterior object. What is problematical is the second part of the line referring to the Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika which says that they accept coarse external objects constituted of partless particles. Now, Geshe-la actually does not agree with this passage. While indeed in general, the Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika do accept coarse external objects, it is somewhat awkward to say that they are certain that they are constituted of partless particles.

If you were to say, that they are constituted of partless particles, these partless particles, since they are completely partless, would probably have to be asserted as truly existent, which would be at odds with the core assertion of the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas. And therefore, one cannot speak here of partless particles in the sense in which they’re spoken of in the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika school. Geshe-la thinks that the passage here referring to there being constitute of partless particles refers to the fact that this school does accept the existence of final partless particles which are partless in the sense that they are not composed of other particles, but they are not partless in the sense that they are directionless because they would have a northern, southern, eastern, and western direction. So he thinks that is how this path passage has to be understood. And the remainder of the paragraph referring to tenets of the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is problemless.

The five sense objects for this school, such as form and so forth, are certain to be of one nature with the consciousness apprehending them. So, for instance, for this school, a an object of an eye consciousness would be of one nature with the eye consciousness apprehending it. And then the fifth, which is the middle of page 28, the mode of asserting subjects, in other words, mainly minds. Mental consciousness is asserted be an instance of a person. Now, this is the broad assertion accepted by most of the Tenet schools.

Most of the Vaibhāṣikas accept mental consciousness as an instance of the person, all of the Sautrantikas, one half of the Chitamatras, and all of the accept mental consciousness as an instance of the person. What is meant here by an instance of the person is that with which you present when you are asked what exactly accumulates karma, what experiences the results of karma, and what transmigrates. When you ask that question, you have to present something as an instance of the person which is experiencing, accumulating, and transmigrating. And what you present according to the schools who accept this position is the mental consciousness. Now, generally speaking, you could say that one could present all five aggregates, but the form aggregate is an aggregate which would be discarded at the end of this life.

The body is discarded at the end of this life. So the best instance of a person, generally speaking, is the mental consciousness. Now, as Geshe-la explained previously, according to the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas, when we speak of a person, we are speaking of the intersection of the mental imputation of the term person on the collection of the five aggregates form, feeling, sensation, recognition, volition, and consciousness, and also on the existence from the side of these five aggregates of these five aggregates, excuse me, of the person. So this collection of the two is according to the Svatantrikas what we call the person. And then, in addition, still in the middle paragraph of page 28, a six fold collection of consciousness is asserted by the Svatantrikas.

The six fold collection of consciousness are the five sense consciousness, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and bodily consciousness, and the mental consciousness. Now generally speaking, mental consciousness in this paragraph is synonymous with a main mind or with mind in general, with tsempa or sem in general. This means that mental consciousnesses are accompanied by their respective mental factors. And we will stop the presentation here for today. And then we will continue as before the break.

In other words, we have a short tea break, then a half an hour for discussion between yourselves, and then Geshe-la will return and answer questions.

Key terms in this teaching

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
The Sutra Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Sautrantika (Sutra school). LYWA
selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
The Yogic Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Cittamatra (Mind Only school). LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Scroll to Top