Source and licence: Translated by I. Durovic, 3rd edition 2017. © Ilia Durovic. Complete text with all 315 translator’s notes.
Brief biography of Je tsün chö kyi gyeltsen
1474. Received tshe dbang from the 1st Dalai Lama, Dge ‘dun grub (1391-1474)
when he came to Chab tshan.
1475. Novices vows from Gnas rnying Chos rje Kun dga’ bde legs rin chen and name
Chos kyi rgyal mtshan.
1481. Began studies at Bkra shis lhun po. Meets Pan chen lung rigs rgya mtsho and
his main academic teacher Kun mkhyen Chos ‘byor dpal bzang.
1484. Pan chen Ye shes rtse mo comes to the throne of Bkra shis lhun po and Sera
rje btsun studies with him the Vinaya and Abhidharma.
1491. Becomes disciplinarian of Bkra shis lhun po.
Participates in the debates in Dpal ‘khor bde chen and at the time of the Gnas rnying
Gzungs sgrub.
1492. Goes to Central Tibet where he meets Sera Chos rje Don yod dpal ldan and
studies with Gnyal ston Dpal ‘byor lhun grub.
Final ordination before Rje Shes rab bzang po
.
1495. Returns to Tsang at the order of Gnas rnying Chos rje and teaches.
1511. Becomes Abbot of Sera Je replacing Mkhas grub Don yod dpal ldan.
Debates manifesting his brilliance in competitions sponsored by the Sde pa Sgar pa
at the Potala and at Gzhis ka Sne’u.
1522. Comes to the abbatial throne of Stag rtse Rin chen sgang.
1537. Becomes 12th Abbot of Sera.
1538. Replaces 2nd Dalai Lama Dge ‘dun rgya mtsho (1476-1542) on the throne of
Bkra shis lhun po (Mi sna errs in stating Sera ?).
1541. Turns over the abbacy of Sera to Shes rab sengge and retires.
Final years at Bde chen Gsang sngags mkhar
1546. According to MR, died
Gsung ‘bum in 7 vols. (printed)
According to Tshad ma’i ‘byung khungs, d. 1544
_______________________________
A Presentation of Tenets composed by Je
tsün jam pel yang chö kyi gyeltsen
Translated by I. Durovic
3rd edition 2017
The edition used for this translation is the Tibetan Buddhist Philosophical Series Book
XIII, Sera Je Library, Bylakuppe, 2001. Page numbers in bold refer to the pages of the
Tibetan text. Any additions from the translator will be placed in square brackets and
explanatory notes will be in small font letters. All marginal footnotes are from the
translator. Outlines from the root text will be in regular characters, those added by the
translator will be in square-brackets. No hypothetical retroversion from Tibetan to
Sanskrit are included.
1
I prostrate in front of all the holy ones inseparable in nature from the Guru,
Protector, Mañjuśrī.
Here, the explanation of the presentation of Tenets will be elucidated in terms of
definitions, divisions and distinctions of the individual meanings.
Regarding the first, the definition of a person asserting Buddhist tenets is:
A person who accepts completely the Triple Gem as a place of refuge
and asserts tenets which do not assert refuges other than these.
Secondly, if one divides this, from within the four-fold division into Vaibhāṣika,
Sautrāntika, Cittamātra and Mādhyamika, the two first are called the two
schools asserting objects.
Thirdly, they are explained to be the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra and
Mādhyamika schools.
2
I) The Explanation of the Vaibhāṣika school
The Vaibhāṣika school is explained in terms of the presentation of definitions,
divisions, etymologies, the mode of asserting objects, the mode of asserting
subjects, the mode of asserting selflessness and Grounds and Paths.
Regarding the first presentation, the definition of a Vaibhāṣika is:
A person asserting Lower Vehicle tenets who accepts outer objects as
truly established and does not accept reflexive consciousness .
Regarding the second presentation, if that Vaibhāṣika school is divided, there
are three categories of Vaibhāṣikas: Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika, Bahirdeśaka
Vaibhāṣika and Magadha Vaibhāṣika.
Regarding the third presentation, if one were to enquire “Why are they called
“Vaibhāṣika” ?” They are called thus since they assert tenets which follow the
detailed explanation of the Great Abhidharma. Alternatively, they are called
“Vaibhāṣikas” because they expound in detail the substances of all three
times.
Regarding the fourth presentation, the definition of a thing is “that which is
able to perform a function”. Thing, existent and object of knowledge are
synonymous. If they are divided, from within the two-fold division of permanent
objects and impermanent objects, the first would be such phenomena as
uncompounded space, analytical cessation or non-analytical cessation,
whereas the second would be such phenomena as arising, product,
impermanent phenomena.
3
Alternatively, if one divides things, there are the two categories: conventional
truths and ultimate truths.
Regarding the first, the definition of a conventional truth is:
That which is observed as a phenomenon which is discarded by the mind
apprehending it when it is destroyed or when its individual parts are
eliminated by the mind.
Instances are such phenomena as vase or woolen fabric because, when a vase is
destroyed by a hammer, it is abandoned by the mind apprehending it and because,
when the yarns of a woolen fabric are individually eliminated, it is abandoned by the
mind apprehending it.
Regarding the second, the definition of an ultimate truth is:
That which is observed as a phenomenon which is not discarded by the mind
apprehending it when it is destroyed or when its individual parts are
eliminated by the mind.
Instances are such phenomena as a directionally indivisible particle, an indivisible
instant of consciousness and uncompounded phenomena because it is said in
Abhidharma :
If that can be eliminated into another by the mind and destroyed,
That, the mind does not engage.
While phenomena like vase or water exist conventionally,
Ultimate existence is other.
Therefore, they accept the substantial existence of all three times, hence not
only do they accept that vase exists at the time of the past of vase, they also accept
that vase exist at the time of the future of vase.
Regarding the fifth presentation, the mode of asserting subjects, they assert that the
mere collection of the five aggregates is an instance of a person and they assert
mental consciousness as an instance of a person and so forth.
4
From within the two-fold division of mind into valid cognisers and invalid
cognisers, the first has two divisions into direct valid cognisers and inferential
valid cognisers. Regarding the first, from within the three-fold division into sense
direct cognisers, mental direct cognisers and yogic direct cognisers, sense direct
valid cognisers are not necessarily consciousnesses because the eye sense-organ
is a direct valid cogniser.
Moreover, there are two categories of yogic direct cognisers: yogic direct cognisers
which realize directly the selflessness of persons and yogic direct cognisers which
realize directly subtle impermanence. The first category has two divisions: yogic
direct perceivers which realize that a person is empty of being permanent, one and
autonomous and yogic direct perceivers which realize that a person is empty of
substantial existence as an autonomous entity.
Regarding the sixth presentation, the mode of asserting selflessness, they assert that
subtle selflessness and the subtle selflessness of persons are synonymous and they
do not accept the selflessness of phenomena because they accept that if something
is an established base, it is necessarily the self of phenomena. From within these,
the Vātsīputrīyā accept a selflessness of persons which is an emptiness of
permanence, unity and independence but do not accept a selflessness of persons
which is an emptiness of a substantially existing, autonomous entity, because they
accept a substantially existing, autonomous self which is inexpressible inasmuch as
it is neither of one nature nor of different nature from the aggregates and neither
permanent nor impermanent.
Moreover, regarding the seventh presentation, that of Grounds and Paths, it is
explained in terms of the presentation of the object of abandonment and the actual
Grounds and Paths. As to the first, both afflicted and non-afflicted obscurations
are accepted and the term “obstructions to omniscience” does not exist. This is the
case because the first are mainly eliminated up to the attainment of liberation,
while the second are mainly eliminated up to the attainment of omniscience.
Instances of the first are the conception apprehending the person as an
autonomous, substantial existent and the three poisons which arise through the
power of this, their seeds and so forth. Instances of the second are the karmic
imprints of the conception apprehending the person as an autonomous, substantial
existent and assumptions of bad states in the mind which arise through the power
of this.
As to the second, the actual presentation of Grounds and Paths, there is a difference
in the mode of progression on the path for the beings of the Three Vehicles because:
a. Those who have the lineage of a Śrāvaka, associate the view which
realizes the person’s emptiness of substantial, autonomous existence
6
to a small collection of merit and, through meditating during three times,
attain a lesser Enlightenment.
b. Those who have the lineage of a Pratyekabuddha, associate such a view
to a middling collection of merit and, through meditating during one hundred
aeons, attain a middling Enlightenment.
c. The Bodhisattvas, associate such a view to a great collection of merit and,
through meditating during three countless great aeons and so forth, attain a
great Enlightenment.
There is a differences in the mode of accumulation of the collections of these three
beings:
a. Bodhisattvas after accumulating the collections during three countless
great aeons and so forth on the levels beneath the Great Path of
Accumulation, actualize Grounds and Paths from the level of warmth of
the Path of Preparation up to the Path of No More Learning in one
meditative session.
b. Those of the Pratyekabuddha lineage, after accumulating the collections
during one hundred great aeons and so forth on the levels beneath the
Great Path of Accumulation, actualize Grounds and Paths from the level of
warmth of the Path of Preparation up to the Path of No More Learning in one
meditative session.
c. Those of the Śrāvaka lineage, accumulate the collections on the occasion
of all four Paths of Learning
7
however, upon reaching the Path of an Ārya, they must still train in the the
Path of Learning for fourteen lives.
Therefore these Vaibhāṣikas do not accept that the form aggregate of a Buddha is a
Buddha, since it is an object of abandonment, inasmuch as it is subsumed by the
one life of the bodily basis of the previous Bodhisattva on the Path of Preparation.
Why is this necessarily the case ? Because that bodily base of a Bodhisattva on the
Path of Preparation is an aggregate which is impelled by formerly accumulated
karma and affliction. They do not accept the existence of the Sambhogakāya and
assert that the Supreme Nirmanakāya, at the time of a remainderless Nirvāṇa, as
well as the mind’s continuum are interrupted. Although the Buddhas and Āryas
have abandoned all suffering, without exception, it is not contradictory to assert that
the Truth of Suffering exists in their continuum, because the Truth of Suffering is
posited as abandoned when all the afflictions whose object is the Truth of Suffering
are abandoned.
This is the case because, when Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha lineage Arhats
attain the state of an Arhat, they are posited as having attained a Nirvāṇa with
remainder for as long as they are alive and are posited as having attained a
remainderless Nirvāṇa after departing this life. This is so because, although all
obscurations which are afflicted are abandoned at the time of a Nirvāṇa with
remainder, unabandoned, unafflicted obscurationsstill exist, however at the time of
a remainderless Nirvāṇa,
8
although they are not destroyed by the power of their antidote, why don’t they exist
anymore ? Because, at that time, the continuum of their foundation, mind, is
interrupted.
When the Proponents of True Existence differentiate interpretable and definitive
Sūtras, they differentiate them by using the criterion of those which can be
accepted literally and those which cannot be accepted literally, however both
schools of Proponents of True Existence do not acknowledge the baskets of the
Great Vehicle as the Speech of the Buddha, because most Vaibhāṣikas accept that
Sūtras are necessarily definitive.
II) The Explanation of the Sautrāntika school
The Sautrāntika school is explained in terms of the seven-fold presentation of
definitions, divisions, etymologies, the mode of asserting objects, the mode of
asserting subjects, the mode of asserting selflessness and Grounds and Paths.
Regarding the first presentation, viz. definitions, the definition of a Sautrāntika is:
A person propounding Lower Vehicle Tenets who accepts both reflexive
consciousness and exterior objects.
Sautrāntikas and Exemplifiers are synonymous.
Regarding the second presentation, viz. divisions, if one divides them, there are two
types of Sautrāntikas: Sautrāntikas following Scripture and Sautrāntikas following
Reasoning.
9
The first type of Sautrāntika are for instance Sautrāntikas following
Abhidharmakośa, while the second type of Sautrāntika are Sautrāntikas following
the Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition.
Regarding the third presentation, viz., etymologies, if one were to enquire why they
are called Sautrāntikas, they are called Sautrāntikas because of being proponents of
tenets who follow the Sūtras of the Lord and they are called Exemplifiers because
they assert the teaching of all phenomena by means of examples.
Regarding the fourth presentation, viz. the mode of asserting objects, the definition of
an existent is “that which is observed by a valid cogniser”. If one divides them, they
are divided into the two categories of conventional truths and ultimate truths.
“A phenomenon which is ultimately able to perform a function” is the definition of an
ultimate truth. Ultimate truth, truly established phenomenon, thing, product,
impermanent phenomenon, compounded phenomenon, substance, self-
characterized phenomenon are all synonymous.
“A phenomenon which is ultimately unable to perform a function” is the definition of a
conventional truth. Conventional truth, falsely established phenomenon,
permanent phenomenon, generally characterized phenomenon are all
synonymous.
Alternatively, if existents are divided, there are two other categories : negative and
positive phenomena. The definition of a negative phenomenon is: “That which is
realised by means of the severance of its object of negation by the mind
apprehending it.” The definition of a positive phenomenon is: “That which is not
realised by means of the severance of its object of negation by the mind
apprehending it.”
10
Moreover, the first category, negative phenomena has two subdivisions: non-
implicative negations and implicative negations. Instances of the first would be
such phenomena as uncompounded space, the Truth of Cessation and
emptiness. Instances of the second subdivision, viz. implicative negations, would
be that which turns away from not being thing or the appearance to the conceptual
mind apprehending vase of that which turns away from not being vase.
Alternatively, if existents are divided, from within the two subdivisions the single
and the different, the first i.e., the single is is divided into the deceitfully single
and the truly single . Instances of the first i.e., the deceitfully single are objects of
knowledge and generally characterized phenomena. Instances of the second i.e.
the truly single are thing and impermanent phenomena .
Secondly, the different also is divided into two : the deceitfully different and the
truly different . Instances of the first are the two, the isolate of vase and the
isolate of pillar. Instances of the second are phenomena such as the two, vase and
pillar.
Then, both the past and the future are permanent, while the present is synonymous
with things.
Regarding the fifth presentation, the mode of assertion of subjects, Sautrāntikas
assert that the continuum of the aggregates is an instance of a person and that the
mental consciousness is an instance of a person. From within these two
assertions, the first is that of such as the Sautrāntikas following Abhidharma and the
second is that of such as the Sautrāntikas following the Seven Treatise on Valid
Cognition.
The definition of mind is: “Clear and cognitive”.
11
Mind has two subdivisions: valid cognisers and non-valid cognisers. The definition
of valid cognition is: “A new and incontrovertible knower”.
From the standpoint of the definition of valid cognition, the reason for stating that it is
“new”, “incontrovertible” and a “knower” is because :
1. Stating that it is “new” eliminates subsequent consciousness being a
valid cogniser.
2. Stating that it is “incontrovertible” eliminates correct assumption being a
valid cogniser.
3. Stating that it is a ”knower” eliminates material sense organs being a valid
cogniser.
If one divides valid cognition, there are two subdivisions: direct valid cognition and
inferential valid cognition. The definition of direct cognition is: “A knower which is
non-conceptual and unmistaken”, while the definition of direct valid cognition is: “A
new and incontrovertible, non-conceptual knower”.
If one divides direct valid cognition, there are four subdivisions : reflexive direct valid
cognition, sensory direct valid cognition, mental direct valid cognition and
yogic direct valid cognition. From among these four,
a. The definition of the first i.e. reflexive direct valid cognition is : “A new,
incontrovertible, non-conceptual knower which is oriented only internally
and is a single apprehension.”
b. The definition of the second i.e. sensory direct valid cognition is: “A new,
incontrovertible, non-conceptual knower which arises in dependence on a
material sense organ which is it’s uncommon controlling condition.”
11
c. The definition of the third i.e. mental direct valid cognition is: “A new,
incontrovertible, non-conceptual knower which arises in dependence on the
mental sense organ which is it’s uncommon controlling condition.”
d. The definition of the fourth i.e. yogic direct valid cognition is : “A wisdom
which realizes directly either subtle impermanence or the coarse or the
subtle selflessness of persons in dependence on a Samādhi which a union
of calm abiding and special insight and which is it’s uncommon
controlling condition.”
If one divides yogic direct valid cognition, there are three subdivisions:
a. Direct valid cognition realizing subtle impermanence.
b. Direct valid cognition realizing the coarse selflessness of persons.
c. Direct valid cognition realizing the subtle selflessness of persons.
The definition of an inferential valid cognition is “a new, incontrovertible knower which
arises in dependence on it’s basis, a valid reason.” If one divides inferential valid
cognition, there are three subdivisions:
a. Inference through the power of fact
c. Inference through conviction
An instance of the first is: the inferential cognition realizing that sound is
impermanent by the reason of being produced.
An instance of the second is: the inferential cognition realizing that the moon is
suitable to be called “Adorned with a rabbit” by the reason of being understood as
such in the land.
13
An instance of the third is: the inferential cognition which realizes the
incontrovertibility of the meaning taught by the quote :
“From generosity, prosperity
and from ethics, happiness”
by means of the reason of scripture purified by the three analyses.
While an inference through renown is necessarily an inference through the power of
fact, direct cognition is not necessarily direct valid cognition and inferential cognition
is not necessarily inferential valid cognition. This is the case, because the second
instant of a sensory direct cognition apprehending form and the second instant of
an inferential cognition realizing that sound is impermanent are both subsequent
consciousnesses in keeping with the quote from “The Concordant” :
Although both the first moments of direct cognition and inferential
cognition are valid cognisers, since that which arises in the continuum
of those is not different from being simultaneously established,
abandon the thought that the later moments are valid cognisers.
Secondly, the definition of a non-valid awareness is “a knower which is not new
and incontrovertible”.
If one divides this, there are five subdivisions: subsequent cognition, wrong
consciousness, doubt, correct assumption and inattentive awareness.
The definition of the first i.e., a subsequent cognition, is : “A knower which realizes
after realization has occurred”.
Moreover, from within the two subdivisions: conceptual subsequent cognisers and
non-conceptual subsequent cognisers, instances of the first would be the
recollection which recollects the color blue and which arises through being
impelled by the sensory direct perceiver apprehending blue or alternatively the
second instant of the inferential consciousness which realizes that sound is
impermanent;
14
an instance of the second i.e., non-conceptual subsequent cognisers would be the
second instant of a sensory direct cognition apprehending form.
Regarding the second i.e. wrong consciousness, the definition of wrong
consciousness is “A knower which engages wrongly”.
Moreover, this has two subdivisions: conceptual wrong consciousness and non-
conceptual wrong consciousness. From among these two, an instance of the first
would be the conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent, while an
instance of the second would be the sensory consciousness to which one moon
appears as two moons or the sensory consciousness to which a snowy mountain
appears as blue.
Regarding the third i.e. doubt, the definition of doubt is: “A mental factor which
hesitates between two possibilities of it’s own accord”.
The mental consciousness which arises in affinity with that doubt and the feeling
sensation which accompanies it do not hesitate between two possibilities of their
own accord, because they hesitate between two possibilities under the accord of that
very doubt. Moreover, from within the three subdivisions of that i.e. doubt , doubt
erring towards the factual, doubt erring towards the non-factual and equal
doubt, an instance of the first would be that doubt which wonders: “Is sound
impermanent ?”, an instance of the second would be that doubt which wonders: “Is
sound permanent ?” and an instance of the third would be that doubt which wonders
: “Is sound permanent or impermanent?”.
Regarding the fourth i.e. correct assumption, the definition of a correct assumption is
“A factually concordant conceiver which is not incontrovertible with respect to
the object it conceives.”
This has five subdivisions:
15
a) A correct assumption which does not have a reason.
b) A correct assumption which is contradictory with it’s reason.
c) A correct assumption which does not ascertain it’s reason.
d) A correct assumption which is not established by it’s reason.
e) A correct assumption which, although it has a reason, is not ascertained.
An awareness which apprehends sound as impermanent in dependence on the mere
statement “Sound is impermanent” is an instance of the first i.e. a correct
assumption which does not have a reason because, although that statement uttering
“Sound is impermanent, states the thesis of the impermanence of sound, a correct
reason for the impermanence of sound is not uttered.
An awareness which apprehends sound as impermanent by means of the reason
of being empty of being able to perform a function is an instance of the second i.e. a
correct assumption which is contradictory with it’s reason because being empty of
being able to perform a function is contradictory with sound.
An awareness which apprehends sound as impermanent by means of the reason of
being an object of ascertainment is an instance of the third i.e. a correct
assumption which does not ascertain it’s reason because being an object of
ascertainment is a reason which does not ascertain sound’s being established as
impermanent.
An awareness which apprehends sound as impermanent by means of the reason of
being an object of apprehension of a visual consciousness is an instance of the
fourth i.e. a correct assumption which is not established by it’s reason because being
an object of apprehension of a visual consciousness is a reason of non-
establishment of sound’s being established as impermanent.
An awareness which apprehends sound as impermanent by means of the reason of
being a product phenomenon in the continuum of a person who has not
ascertained sound as impermanent by valid cognition is an instance of the fifth i.e. a
correct assumption which, although it has a reason, is not ascertained because,
although being a product is a valid reason for establishing sound to be impermanent,
such a person has not ascertained the valid reason of that.
16
Regarding the fifth i.e. inattentive awareness, the definition of an inattentive
awareness is: “An unmistaken knower which is endowed with a clear
appearance of it’s unascertained object”. If one divides these inattentive
awarenesses, there are three subdivisions: inattentive sensory consciousnesses,
inattentive mental consciousnesses and inattentive reflexive consciousnesses
which are that. From within these three:
a. an instance of the first i.e. inattentive sensory consciousnesses would be
an auditory consciousness which apprehends a sound at the time when there
is greater attachment to a beautiful visual form
b. an instance of the second i.e. inattentive mental consciousnesses would be
a mental consciousness which apprehends one of the five sense- objects
such as form and so forth in the continuum of an ordinary being.
c. an instance of the third i.e. inattentive reflexive consciousnesses would
be a reflexive consciousness experiencing the mental consciousness which
apprehends one of the five sense- objects such as form and so forth in the
continuum of an ordinary being.
In general, if one divides subjects, there are three subdivisions: beings, speech
and valid cognition. Moreover if one were to divide subject valid cognisers, then
from within the three, beings which are valid cognisers, speech which is a valid
cogniser and consciousness which is a valid cogniser:
a An instance of the first i.e. beings which are valid cognisers would be the
Teacher, Buddha,
b An instance of the second i.e. speech which is a valid cogniser would be
the Turning of the Wheel of the Four Noble Truths
c An instance of the third i.e. consciousness which is a valid cogniser would
be direct valid cognition or inferential valid cognition.
Regarding the sixth presentation, the mode of asserting selflessness, the coarse
selflessness of persons is asserted to be a person’s emptiness of being permanent,
one and independent and the subtle selflessness of persons is asserted to be a
person’s emptiness of being a substantially existing autonomous entity. Moreover,
inasmuch as they do not accept a selflessness of phenomena, they are similar to
the Vaibhāṣikas.
Regarding the seventh presentation of Grounds and Paths, relying on the reason that
since, when those endowed with the three lineages accumulate the collections of
merit and wisdom, they accumulate the collections at the time of all four Paths of
Learning, they i.e., the Sautrāntikas accept the form aggregate of a Buddha as a
Buddha. Otherwise, the presentation of the obscurations and the mode of
progressing on the Grounds and Paths and so forth are similar to the Vaibhāṣika
school.
III) The Explanation of the Cittamātra School
Third, regarding the explanation of the Cittamātra school, from within the seven
outlines similar to the former seven outlines whereby the Sautrāntika school was
explained, i.e. definitions, divisions, etymologies, the mode of asserting objects,
the mode of asserting subjects, the mode of asserting selflessness and
Grounds and Paths, as to the first presentation, i.e. definitions , the definition of a
Cittamātrin is:
A person propounding tenets of the Great Vehicle who does not accept the
existence of exterior objects and asserts reflexive consciousness as truly
established.
Cittamātrin, Vijñaptivadin and Yogācārin are synonymous.
Regarding the second presentation, i.e. divisions, if they are divided, there are two
categories : True Aspectarian Cittamātrins and False Aspectarian Cittamātrins.
From within these two, the definition of the first i.e. True Aspectarian Cittamātrins is:
18
They are Cittamātrins and they accept that the direct cognition apprehending
form within the continuum of an ordinary beingdoes not engage,
contaminated by the imprints of ignorance, the factor of appearance as
coarse form
and the definition of the second, i.e. False Aspectarian Cittamātrins is:
They are Cittamātrins and they accept that the direct cognition apprehending
form within the continuum of an ordinary being engages, contaminated by the
imprints of ignorance, the factor of appearance as coarse form .
There are three sub-divisions of the True Aspectarians:
a. Proponents of an Equal number of Subjects and Objects
b. Egg-Splitters
c. Non-Pluralists
They have their respective assertions, since:
a. They are called “Proponents of an Equal number of Subjects and Objects”
because they assert that, when the eye-consciousness apprehending the
mottle of colors on the wing of a butterfly, apprehends that mottle:
i. from the standpoint of the object, it focuses on the aspect of the
individual, variegated colors such as blue, yellow and so forth while
ii. from the standpoint of the subject, the aspect of the individual,
variegated colors such as blue, yellow and so forth is generated as a
true aspect.
b. They are called “Egg-Splitters” because they assert that at such a time:
i. from the standpoint of the object, it focuses on the aspect of the
individual, variegated colors such as blue, yellow and so forth and
ii. from the standpoint of the subject, the aspect of the individual,
variegated colors such as blue, yellow and so forth is aspectlessly
generated.
c. They are called “Non-Pluralists” because they assert that at such a time:
i. from the standpoint of the object, while focusing on the aspect of a
mere mottle, it does not focus on the aspect of the individual,
variegated colors such as blue, yellow and so forth and
19
ii. from the standpoint of the subject, there is an aspectless generation
of the aspect of a mere mottle without the aspectless generation of
the aspect of the individual, variegated colors such as blue, yellow
and so forth.
If one divides the second category, False Aspectarians, there are two sub-divisions:
Tainted False Aspectarians and Untainted False Aspectarians
Regarding the third presentation, i.e. etymologies, if one were to enquire : “Why are
they called Cittamātrins “Proponents of Mind –Only” ? It is because they assert that
phenomena are merely of the nature of mind that they are called Cittamātrins
“Proponents of Mind-Only” and because they assert that all phenomena are merely
of the nature of cognition that they are called Vijñaptivadins “Proponents of
Cognition”.
Regarding the fourth presentation, the mode of assertion of objects, if one divides
objects of knowledge, there are two subdivisions: ultimate truths and conventional
truths. The definition of the first i.e. an ultimate truth, is: “That which is realized by a
direct valid cogniser realizing it directly through the setting of dualistic
appearances.”
Ultimate truth, suchness, the core of phenomena and final mode of subsistence
are all synonymous.
If one divides ultimate truths, there are two subdivisions: the subtle selflessness of
phenomena and the subtle selflessness of persons. If one were to subdivide in turn
the subtle selflessness of phenomena from the standpoint of the basis of emptiness,
there are divisions of emptiness into : the twenty emptinesses, if one summarizes
these, the eighteen emptinesses, if one summarizes these the sixteen emptinesses
and if one summarizes these, the four emptinesses.
20
Instances of the subtle selflessness of phenomena are:
i that emptiness which is an emptiness of form and the valid cogniser
apprehending form being different substances
and
ii that emptiness which is an emptiness of form being established by it’s own
characteristics as the basis of engagement engaging the sound “form”.
Instances of the subtle selflessness of persons are:
i that emptiness which is the emptiness of a person’s substantial existence
as an autonomous entity.
The definition of a conventional truth is: “That which is realized by a direct valid
cogniser realizing it directly in a manner endowed with dualistic appearances.” If
one divides conventional truths, there are two subdivisions¡:
ii Imputed phenomena which are included within conventional truths.
The first i.e. other-powered phenomena and compounded phenomena are
synonymous; while the second i.e. imputed phenomena and uncompounded
phenomena which are not ultimate truths, are synonymous. They accept all things
as truly established and as a common locus with the deceptive and they also
accept all suchnesses as truly established and as a common locus with the true.
On the other hand, they accept that all uncompounded phenomena which are not
suchnesses are deceptively established and have a common locus with the
deceptive.
Suchnesses are necessarily non-implicative negations, the other instances of non-
implicative negations are in keeping with the Sautrāntikas.
imputations. Since Prāsaṇgika is a higher school than Cittamātra, with respect to the view,
such a difference necessarily exists, but postulating it is fairly subtle.
Fundamentally, the Cittamātrins accept that other-powered natures (gzhan dbang, Sk.
Paratantra) are :
1) established by their own characteristics (rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa)
2) but are not established by their own characteristics as the basis of
engagement which is engaged by the sound referring to them.
21
However, although the five sense objects such as form and so forth arise upon the
substance of an interior counsciousness, in dependence upon the placement of
both common and uncommon karmic imprints onto the mind-basis-of-all, they
are not established as exterior objects because :
a. from the standpoint of the True Aspectarians, form, etc, the five sense-
objects are accepted as coarsely established, even though they are not
exterior objects
b. while from the standpoint of the False Aspectarians, form, etc, the five
sense- objects are not coarse, because, if they were coarsely established,
they would necessarily be established as exterior objects.
Regarding the fifth, the presentation of the mode of asserting subjects, from the
standpoint of the True Aspectarians, it is accepted that there are eight collections
of consciousness, since they assert eight collections of consciousness by adding to
the six collections of consciousnesses accepted by the other Propounders of Tenets,
a mind-basis-of-all and an afflicted mind.
There are instances of the mind basis-of-all and of the afflicted mind because:
i. a consciousness which is an other object than the six collections of
consciousness and which does not depend upon an organ as it’s controlling
condition is [an instance of] the first [i.e. the mind-basis-of-all]; while
ii. a consciousness which observes the mind-basis-of-all as it’s object of
observation and in aspect, apprehends it as a substantially existent,
autonomous mine, is asserted to be [an instance of] the second [i.e. the
afflicted mind].
That mind-basis-of-all is asserted to be the instance of a person which is the base
of causality. From the standpoint of the False Aspectarians, six collections of
consciousnesses are asserted
22
and the mere mental consciousness is posited as the instance of a person which is
the base of causality.
Minds are asserted to be divided into two categories: valid cognisers and mind which
are invalid cognisers. Valid cognisers are asserted to be two-fold: direct valid
cognisers and inferential valid cognisers. Direct cognisers are four-fold : reflexive
direct cognisers and yogic direct cognisers are necessarily unmistaken
consciousnesses, while a sense direct cogniser in the continuum of an ordinary
being is necessarily a mistaken consciousness and a mental consciousness in the
continuum of that ordinary being can either be a mistaken or an unmistaken
consciousness.
Direct cognisers are not necessarily direct valid cognisers since, although a direct
mental cogniser apprehending form exists in the continuum of an ordinary being, a
direct valid mental cogniser apprehending form does not exist in the continuum of
that ordinary being. This is the case because, in the continuum of that ordinary
being, neither the reflexive consciousness experiencing the mental direct cogniser
apprehending form nor the second instant of the sense direct cogniser apprehending
form are valid cognisers.
Yogic direct cognisers are four-fold :
i. Yogic direct cognisers realizing directly subtle impermanence.
ii. Yogic direct cognisers realizing directly the subtle selflessness of
persons
iii. Yogic direct cognisers realizing directly the coarse selflessness of
persons
iv. Yogic direct cognisers realizing directly the selflessness of
phenomena.
23
While inferential valid cognisers are necessarily conceptual, if something is an
inferential valid cogniser with regards to a phenomenon, it is not necessarily a
conceptual mind with respect to that phenomenon. This is the case because
although the inferential cogniser realizing that sound is impermanent is an inferential
cogniser with regards to sound’s emptiness of permanence it does not realize that.
This is the case because if something is a conception with respect to a given
phenomenon, the aspect of that phenomenon necessarily dawns to it and the aspect
of sound’s emptiness of permanence does not dawn to the inferential cogniser
realizing that sound is impermanent because it i.e. the inferential cogniser in question
does not realize that directly. This is the case because it realizes indirectly that i.e.
sound’s emptiness of permanence by means of the direct realization that sound is
impermanent.
Regarding the sixth, the presentation of the mode of asserting selflessness, the
mode of positing instances of the coarse and subtle selflessness of persons is
similar to that in the schools beneath the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. That emptiness
which is an emptiness of form and the valid cogniser apprehending form being
different substances is and instance of the selflessness of phenomena.
Regarding the seventh the presentation of Grounds and Paths, this will be explained
in terms of objects of abandonment and the actual presentation of Grounds and
Paths. Regarding the first i.e. objects of abandonment: grasping to a self of persons,
it’s karmic imprints and so forth as well as the three poisons which arise through the
force of that and it’s seeds and so forth are posited as the obstructions to
liberation; while, on the other hand, grasping to true existence, it’s seeds and so
forth as well as it’s karmic imprints and all the mistaken dualistic appearances which
arise through the power of those are posited as obstructions to omniscience.
24
Regarding the second i.e. the actual presentation of Grounds and Paths, the view
realizing the selflessness of persons is conjoined by those of the Śrāvaka lineage,
for their own specific sake, with a small collection of merit and is conjoined by
those of the Pratyekabuddha lineage, for their own specific sake, with a middling
collection of merit. However, the Boddhisattvas, actualize their own enlightenment
through training for three ages i.e. three countless aeons and one hundred aeons,
conjoining, for the specific sake of others, the view realizing that subject and
object are empty of being different substances with a great accumulation of merit
and, in dependence upon training for three countless aeons and so forth, realize their
own Enlightenment.
From the standpoint of the True Aspectarians, when Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas
and Arhats attain a remainderless Nirvāṇa, it is asserted that their mental continuum
is severed, however it is asserted that it is impossible for the mental continuum of
Ārya Buddhas to be severed, because it is asserted that Bodhisattvas manifest as a
Sambhogakāya in the Pure Land of Akaniṣta and that the Sambhogakāya performs
uninterruptedly, in various types of aspects, the welfare of others through various
emanations appropriate to the good fortune of the individual trainees, for as
long as cyclic existence is not emptied.
The specific lineages of the three Vehicles are definite, because sentient beings
have since beginningless time
25
three lineages or three dispositions, hence they have three different wishes,
hence three different realizations, hence three different results, hence the
attainment of three different results.
From the standpoint of the False Aspectarians, when Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas
and Arhats, attain a remainderless Nirvāṇa, it is not asserted that their mental
continuum is severed, because it is asserted that, at that time, the continuum of the
mere mind which is included within the Noble Truth of Suffering and the Noble Truth
of the Origin of Suffering is severed, but since a mere mind is asserted to
progress to the state of Buddhahood, a Final Vehicle established to be unique is
asserted.
IV) The Explanation of the Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika School et al.
Fourthly, regarding the explanation of the Mādhyamika, it is explained in three
outlines: definitions, divisions and the meaning of the various distinctions. Regarding
the first i.e. definitions, the definition of a Madhyamaka is:
A being who is a propounder of Great Vehicle Tenets and who does not
assert, even semiotically, actual true existence.
Regarding the second explanation, i.e., divisions there are two subschools: the
Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika and the Prāsaṇgika-Madyamika.
Regarding the third explanation, i.e. the meaning of the various distinctions, from
within the two subschool, there is a presentation of the Svatāntrika school and of the
Prāsaṇgika school.
26
Regarding the first i.e. the presentation of the Svatāntrika school in the context of the
third explanation, there are seven outlines: definitions, divisions, etymologies, the
mode of asserting objects, the mode of asserting subjects, the mode of
asserting selflessness and the presentation of Grounds and Paths.
From within these, the first outline, i.e. definitions, the definition of a
Svatāntrika-Madyamaka is:
A Madhyamaka who does not assert, even semiotically, actual true
existence by means of a verbally formulated autonomous reason.
This Svatāntrika-Madhyamaka and “Madhyamakas who assert inherent
existence” are synonymous.
Regarding the second, i.e. divisions, if one divides them, there are two
subschools: the Sautrāntika-Svatāntrika-Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāra-
Svantantrika-Mādhyamikas.
The definition of the first i.e. a Sautrāntika-Svatāntrika-Madhyamaka is:
A Madhyamaka who propounds a presentation of conventional
phenomena mainly in keeping with the Sautrāntika Svatāntrika school,
while the definition of the second i.e. a Yogācāra-Svatāntrika-Madhyamaka is:
“conventional” thus obscuring the nuances between these two terms which are quite present
in Tibetan. In Tibetan, tha snyad refers to the broad application of signifiers to phenomena,
mainly, but perhaps not on;y linguistically, as evinced by the existence of terms such brda’i
tha snyad hence our decision to translate it as “semiotically”.
A Madhyamaka who propounds a presentation of conventional
phenomena mainly in keeping with the Cittamātra school.
Instances of the first i.e. Sautrāntika-Svatāntrika Madhyamakas are:
Bhāvaviveka or Jnanagharba. Instances of the second i.e. Yogācāra-
Svantantrika Madhyamakas are: Śāntarakṣita, Haribhadra, Kamalaśīla or
Padmasambhava.
Regarding the third, i.e. etymologies: “There is a reason for which the subject,
Bhāvaviveka, is called a Svatāntrika-Madhyamaka, because such is stated by
reason of his being a Madhyamaka who accepts autonomous reasons”.
27
Regarding the fourth, i.e. the mode of asserting objects: established by it’s own
characteristics, established from it’s own side, inherently established are
all synonymous.
Uncompounded space, the Noble Truth of Cessation, the past, the future and
the subtle selflessness of persons are both asserted to be non-implicative
negations and conventional phenomena.
Ultimate truths, suchness, the subtle selflessness of phenomena are all
synonymous.
From the standpoint of the Sautantrika-Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika, the five sense-
objects such as form and so forth are different in nature from consciousness
and coarse external objects constituted of partless particles are asserted, while
from the standpoint of the Yogācāra-Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika, the five sense-
objects such as form and so forth are asserted to be of one nature with the
consciousness apprehending them.
Regarding the fifth i.e. the mode of asserting subjects, mental consciousness is
asserted to be an instance of a person and a six-fold collection of
consciousness is asserted. Mind has two subdivisions into valid cognisers and
mind which are not valid cognisers. The first i.e. valid cognisers, in turn, has two
subdivisions : direct valid cognisers and inferential valid cognisers.
From the standpoint of the Sautantrika-Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika, reflexive direct
perceivers are not asserted, while from the standpoint of the other i.e.
Yogācāra-Svatāntrika-Madhyamaka, all four direct perceivers are asserted.
While reflexive direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers are necessarily
unmistaken, the other two i.e. sense direct perceivers and mental direct
perceivers can be either mistaken or unmistaken.
This is the case because both Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, as well as
Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika accept that direct perceivers are necessarily non-
conceptual consciousnesses;
28
that subsequent cognitions are necessarily non-valid consciousnesses while
consciousnesses which are mistaken with respect to their conceived object
are necessarily wrong consciousnesses; that if a consciousness is mistaken
regarding a given phenomenon, then it is cannot be a valid cogniser regarding
that phenomenon and if it is an inferential cogniser, it cannot be a valid cogniser
with respect to it’s appearing object.
Regarding the sixth i.e., the mode of asserting selflessness, a person’s
emptiness of being permanent, one and autonomous is asserted to be the coarse
selflessness of persons and a person’s emptiness of being a substantially existing
autonomous entity is asserted to be the subtle selflessness of persons.
From the standpoint of the Yogācāra-Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika, the emptiness of
form and the valid cogniser apprehending form from being different substances is
asserted to be the coarse selflessness of phenomena, while all phenomena’s
emptiness of truth is asserted to be the subtle selflessness of phenomena.
Although both selflessnesses are differentiated from the standpoint of the object of
negation, they are not differentiated from the standpoint of the basis of
emptiness, because :
a. That refutation, on the basis of a person, of the object of negation, true
establishment, is the subtle selflessness of phenomena, while
b. That refutation, on the basis of a person, of being a substantially existing,
autonomous entity is the subtle selflessness of persons.
The two ignorances which are apprehensions of a self are differentiated from
the standpoint of the mode of apprehension, but not from the standpoint of the
object of observation,
29
because:
a. that apprehension of true establishment which arises through
observing the basis, a person, is the apprehension of a self of
phenomena, while,
b. that apprehension of being established as a substantially existing,
autonomous entity through observing the basis, a person, is the
apprehension of a self of persons.
Regarding the seventh i.e., the presentation of Grounds and Paths, from the
standpoint of the Yogācāra-Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika, the differences between
the persons of the Three Vehicles are posited by means of:
a. the main objects of abandonment, the three different obscurations
and,
b. the main object of meditation, the three different views.
a. those of the Śrāvaka lineage, through taking as principal object of
abandonment the conception apprehending being established as a
substantially existing, autonomous entity and it’s surrounding factors,
take in turn as principal object of meditation the view which realizes the
emptiness of a person’s being established as a substantially existing,
autonomous entity, which is it’s antidote and attain a lesser
Enlightenment.
b. Those of the Pratyekabuddha lineage, through taking as principal
object of abandonment the conception apprehending form and the valid
cogniser apprehending form as different substances, take in turn as
principal object of meditation the view which realizes the emptiness of
object and subject being different substances, which is it’s antidote and
attain a middling Enlightenment, and
30
c. Bodhisattvas, through taking as principal object of abandonment the
apprehension of true existence, it’s imprints and so forth, take in turn
as principal object of meditation the view which realizes the
truelessness of all phenomena, which is it’s antidote and attain a great
Enlightenment.
From the standpoint of the Sautrāntika-Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika, there is no
difference between the main object of abandonment of both Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas and the main object of meditation of both Śrāvakas and
Pratyekabuddhas, since they are both similar in taking as principal object of
abandonment the obstructions to liberation as well as taking as principal object
of meditation the selflessness of persons.
However, there is a reason for these two the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas
being differentiated in terms of supreme and lower result, because this
difference is a difference which arises through the power of a greater and
lesser collection of merit and a longer or shorter period of time.
Although they are similar to the Cittamātra in asserting a two-fold division of
Sūtras into Lower and Greater Vehicle Sūtras as well as asserting a two-fold
division into an interpretable and a definitive part, the instances thereof are
different. While the Cittamātrins assert that the first two Turnings of the Wheel
of the Law are interpretable Sūtras and the last, definitive Sūtras; in this context
i.e. for the Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika school, both the first and the last Turning of
the Wheel of the Law are interpretable Sūtras and the middle i.e. the second
Turning of the Wheel of the Law comprises both interpretable and definitive
parts. This is the case because those Sūtras or portions thereof which present a
difference in terms of ultimate truths with respect to the object of negation are
definitive Sūtras and those Sūtras in the middle Wheel which do not present
such a difference are asserted to be interpretable Sūtras.
31
Explanation of the Prāsaṇgika school
Secondly, regarding the explanation of the Prāsaṇgika school, from within the
seven-fold previous outlines, viz: definitions, divisions, etymologies, the mode of
asserting objects, the mode of asserting subjects, the mode of asserting
selflessness and the presentation of Grounds and Paths, the first i.e.,
definitions, the definition of a Prāsaṇgika-Madyamika is:
A Mādhyamika who does not accept true existence even semiotically by
means of the verbal statement of a mere consequence renowned to
others.
Regarding the second i.e., divisions: Ācārya Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti
and Śāntideva are instances of Prāsaṇgikas.
Regarding the third i.e. etymologies: “The subject, Buddhapālita, is a
Prāsaṇgika because he asserts the generation of an inferential cogniser
realizing the predicate in the continuum of an opponent through a mere
consequence.”
Regarding the fourth, the mode of assertion of objects, there are two types of
objects: hidden objects and manifest objects. Objects which must be
realized in dependence on a reason are posited as hidden objects and objects
which can be ascertained by an ordinary being through the force of experience,
without depending on a reason, are posited as manifest objects.
Instances of the first are: sound’s impermanence or sound’s emptiness of true
existence. Instances of the second are: vase or a piece of fabric. Directly
perceived and manifest phenomena are synonymous.
32
Alternatively, objects have two other divisions: conventional truths and ultimate
truths. The definition of it’s being a conventional truth is: “It is the object found
by a valid cogniser engaged in conventional analysis and the valid cogniser
engaged in conventional analysis becomes a valid cogniser engaged in
conventional analysis for it”.
Regarding conventional truths, it is unsuitable to divide them into real and
false conventions because real conventions do not exist. This is so
because if something is a convention, it is necessarily not real, since, if it is a
convention it is necessarily false.
It is appropriate to divide conventional truths, from a worldly standpoint, into
real and false conventional truths since, from a worldly standpoint, this form is
a real conventional truth while the reflection of a face in a mirror is, from a
worldly standpoint, false.
If something is real from a worldly standpoint, it is not necessarily an existent
because the true establishment of form is that.
Regarding the second i.e. ultimate truths, the definition of it’s being an ultimate
truth is : “It is the object found by a valid cogniser engaged in ultimate analysis
and the valid cogniser engaged in ultimate analysis becomes a valid cogniser
engaged in ultimate analysis for it”.
Divisions are similar to those presented on the occasion of the Cittamātra
school and, on this occasion i.e. for the Prāsaṇgikas, truths of cessation are
necessarily ultimate truths.
33
Regarding the fifth, the mode of presentation of subjects: the mere “I” imputed in
dependence on the five aggregates is asserted to be an instance of a person.
Moreover, persons are necessarily non-associated compositional phenomena.
Minds in turn are divided into the two categories : valid and non-valid cognisers.
Valid cognisers are divided into two : direct valid cognisers and inferential valid
cognisers.
Reflexive direct cognition is not accepted and sense consciousnesses in the
continuum of sentient beings are necessarily mistaken, while mental direct
cognition and yogic direct cognition can be either mistaken or unmistaken.
Direct valid cognition includes both conceptual direct valid cognition and non-
conceptual direct valid cognition. An instance of the first i.e. conceptual direct valid
cognition is the second moment of an inferential valid cogniser realizing that sound
is impermanent or a memory which remembers in a factually concordant way
the colour blue and which arises impelled by the sense consciousness
apprehending blue. An instance of the second i.e. non-conceptual direct valid
cognition is the sense direct cognition apprehending form.
All direct valid cognitions are not necessarily direct cognitions because yogic direct
cognition is not necessarily direct cognition. This is the case because directly
perceived and manifest phenomena are synonymous.
All subsequent cognitions are necessarily direct valid cognitions.
34
If one divides inferential cognitions there are four subdivisions:
i) Inference through the power of fact
ii) Inference by renown
iii) Inference through example
iv) Inference through conviction
Inference by renown and inference through example are both included within
inference through the power of fact.
Valid cognisers are not necessarily unmistaken with respect to their conceived
object, because the inferential cognition realizing that sound is impermanent is a
mistaken consciousness with respect to the object: sound is impermanent.
Consciousnesses necessarily realize their object of ascertainment, because
the meaning-generality of the horn of a rabbit is the object of ascertainment
of the conception apprehending the horn of a rabbit and the meaning-
generality of sound is permanent is the object of ascertainment of the
conception apprehending sound is permanent.
Regarding the sixth, the mode of asserting selflessness, the Prāsaṇgika-
Mādhyamika assert that:
i) A person’s emptiness of being a substantially existing
autonomous entity is the coarse selflessness of persons and
ii) A person’s emptiness of true establishment is the subtle
selflessness of persons.
The emptiness of a coarse accumulation of partless particles and the valid
cognition apprehending it from being different substances is posited as the
coarse selflessness of phenomena and the emptiness of true existence of the
basis of imputation, the aggregates, is posited as the subtle selflessness of
phenomena.
Although the two selflessnesses are differentiated in terms of the basis of
emptiness, they are not differentiated in terms of the object of negation,
because:
i) Refuting true establishment, the object of negation,
upon the basis of a person, is the subtle selflessness of
persons; and
35
ii) Refuting true establishment, the object of negation, upon
the basis of the aggregates and so forth, is the subtle
selflessness of phenomena.
Although the two apprehensions of a self are differentiated in terms of their
observed object, they are not differentiated in terms of their mode of
apprehension because:
i) That apprehension of the person as truly established
through observing the basis, a person, is posited as
grasping at a self of persons and
ii) That apprehension of the aggregates and so forth as truly
established through observing the basis of imputation, the
aggregates and so forth, is posited as the subtle grasping
at a self of phenomena.
Regarding the sixth, the explanation of the presentation of Grounds and Paths,
it is explained in terms of the presentation of the object of abandonment and of
the presentation of the Grounds and Paths. Regarding the first i.e. the
presentation of the object of abandonment, one posits coarse and subtle
apprehension of a self, their seeds and so forth; the afflictive obstructions such
as desire arisen by the power of that apprehension of a self, it’s seeds and so
forth and, principally, the obscurations which interfere with the attainment of
Liberation. The karmic imprints of apprehension of a self and all the parts of
the mistaken, dualistic, appearances which arise through the power of these are
posited as the obstructions to omniscience as well as, principally, the
obstructions which interfere with the attainment of omniscience.
There is no distinction of higher or lower regarding the view which is meditated
upon among the persons of all Three Vehicles because these three i.e.
Śrāvakas, Pratyekkabuddhas and Bodhisattvas are similar in taking the subtle
selflessness of phenomena and the subtle selflessness of persons as their
principal object of meditation.
On the other hand, there is a distinction regarding the principal object of
abandonment
36
since the Śrāvakas and Pratyekkabuddhas take as their principal object of
abandonment the two self-apprehensions, their seeds and so forth, while
Bodhisattvas take as their principal object of abandonment their i.e., the
apprehension’s karmic imprints. That specific Suchness whereby the two self-
apprehensions, their seeds and so forth are abandoned in the continuum of
meditative equipose of a Śrāvaka, Pratyekkabuddha or Arhat is a remainderless
Nirvāṇa while such a Suchness in the continuum of subsequent attainment of
a Śrāvaka, Pratyekkabuddha or Arhat is a Nirvāṇa with remainder.
From the very beginning, those of the Great Vehicle lineage who are definite in
lineage abandon the obstructions to Liberation and attain the Eighth Ground at
the same time; abandoning the obstructions to omniscience and actualizing the
Four Bodies are simultaneous.
Svasti
Supreme essence of the churning of the ocean of Scriptures,
Complete Tenets of the scholars of India and Tibet,
Form which has clarified without confusion the systems
Of the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, Cittamātras, Mādhyamika
Prāsaṇgika and Svatāntrika,
This treatise on Tenets, a bejewelled mirror of elucidation,
Explains clearly in few words, how extraordinary !
___________________________________
Notes
1. Courtesy of Gene Smith, Tibetan Buddhist Research Center (TBRC), New York.
2. Emending ma gzhag to rnam gzhag
3. The Tibetan term Grub mtha’ (Sk.: Siddhānta) generally translated as “ tenets ”, means literally “ the boundary of establishment ”, in other words, the outer limits of philosophical schools.
4. Rje btsun ‘jam dpal dbyang chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546)
5. They may be placed slightly above or below their actual position so as not to impede too much the flow of the English translation.
6. Mtshan nyid (Sk. Lakṣaṇa). The Tibetan term mtshan nyid generally translated as definition in English actually means “ characterics ”
7. Dbye ba
8. Dphye ba
9. Skyabs gnas
10. Ngo bo nyid med par smra ba (Sk. Niḥsvabhāvavādin), literally : “Proponents of Naturelessness”
11. Ngo bo nyid med par smra ba
12. Bye brag smra ba, literally “ Propounders of particulars ”
13. We have systematically translated the Tibetan chapter headings in our text and underlined them, although it is far from clear whether they are of the hand of Je tsün chö kyi gyel tsen or additions of a modern Tibetan editor. We suspect the later, as they are often redundant.
14. Gang zag (Sk. Pudgala)
15. Rang rig (Sk. Svasaṃvedana). Rang rig simply refers to the mind’s act of cognizing itself at any given instant of cognition of any other phenomenon. For those Buddhist schools which accept the existence of rang rig, such as the Cittamātra school, it provides unity to the continuum of consciousness and is the foundation of memory. Those schools which do not accept its existence, such as the Vaibhāṣika, or, for that matter, the Prāsaṇgika-Mādhyamika, consider it’s existence problematical inasmuch as it would lead to an infinite regress.We feel “ reflexive consciousness ”, in the sense Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) used the term as “ a self-givenness of consciousness ” which “ does not place a content over against the subject of consciousness ” is closest , although by no means identical, to the meaning of rang rig and the term which is semantically neutral provides a much clearer translation than the misleading “ self-cognition ”, which seems to imply the cognition of some type of self, let alone the dismal and hazy “ apperception ”, which can only be accepted to a very limited degree in the original sense Leibniz (1646-1716) gave to the term. For Leibniz every instance of consciousness is not eo ipso caracterized by apperception, the term being used in the sense of the French verb “s’ appercevoir ”, to distinguish between inattentive and attentive consciousnesses.
16. This subdivision seems to correspond to the second subdivision of Vaibhāṣika given by Bhāvaviveka in his Tarkajvālā
17. Kha che
18. Nyi ‘og pa
19. Yul dbus
20. The Mahāvibhāsā, translated in Chinese but not in Tibetan.
21. viz., past, present and future.
22. Dngos po (Sk. Bhāva)
23. Yod pa (Sk. Bhāva)
24. Shes bya (Sk. Jñeya)
25. So sor brtags ‘gog (Sk. Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha)
26. So sor brtags min gyi ‘gog pa (Sk. Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha)
27. Skyes pa (Sk. Jāti)
28. Byas pa (Sk. Kṛta)
29. Mi rtag pa (Sk. Anitya)
30. Kun rdzob bden pa (Sk. saṃvṛtisatya). Literally, the Tibetan kun rdzob bden pa means “ Utterly deceitful truths ”. The root rdzob exists to this day in the term rdzob po “ liar ”.
31. Don dam bden pa (Sk. Paramārthasatya). The Tibetan term don dam (paramartha) means “ holy object ”
32. ‘Dor ba
33. Sel ba
34. Mtshan gzhi
35. Snal ma
36. Sel ba
37. Loosely translating cing.
38. Or more loosely : “ not only do they accept vase’s existence in vase’s past but also vase’s existence in vase’s future ”
39. Yid kyi rnam shes (Sk. Mano-vijñāna)
40. Phyir left untranslated as the grammar is deficient.
41. Tshad ma (Sk. Pramāṇa). Generally we will translate Pramāṇa as valid cogniser/valid cognition in keeping with the English usage of distinguishing the particular instance from the general category. We prefer the translation “ valid cogniser ”used by J. Hopkins in the early editions of “ Meditation on Emptiness ” to “ prime cognition ” used by J. Hopkins et al. in some later works, such as “ Cutting through Appearances ” even though there is undeniable elegance in finding an adjective with an equivalent English root for the Sanskrit “ Pra ”, largely because it reduces the risk of confusion when valid cognisers are studied in the context of the Prāsaṇgika school, in which a valid cogniser does not have to be the first instant of a consciousness.
42. Tshad min gyi blo (Sk. Apramāṇa)
43. Mngon sum tshad ma (Sk. Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa)
44. Rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma (Sk.-pramāṇa)
45. Ma khyab. We will translate throughout the Tibetan logical terms khyab (Sk. Vyāpti) and ma khyab, which were generally translated in the past by J. Hopkins’ team at the University of Virginia as “ pervade ” and “do not pervade ”, to preserve the spatial connotation of the terms, as “ necessarily is ” and “ necessarily is not ” which are congruent concepts in western logic and more readily accessible. There is generally complete isomorphism between Boolean logic and set theory and while Western logic has generally preferred the Boolean formulation, Tibetan Buddhist logic has privileged set-based concepts, such as inclusion, exclusion, intersection, etc.
46. This is an uncommon Vaibhāṣika assertion.
47. Rang dbang can
48. Rang skya
49. Gzhi grub (Sk. Āśraya-siddhi/vastu) defined in the Sautrāntika tradition as : “ that which is established by a valid cogniser ” and synonymous with phenomena in general.
50. gnas ma bu pa.
51. Nyon mongs can
52. Nyon mongs can ma yin pa
53. Shes sgrib (Sk. Jñeyāvarāna)
54. i.e. afflicted obscurations
55. i.e. non-afflicted obscurations
56. Sa bon (Sk. Bija)
57. Bag chags (Sk. Vāsanā)
58. Gnas ngan len (Sk. Dauṣṭhulya), often translated as “trace-faults”.
59. Rigs, (Sk. Gotra)
60. Tshe
61. Should probably be corrected to “ great aeons ”, in keeping with Kon chog jig me wang po’s presentation of tenets.
62. Tshog lam chen po (Sk. Mahā Saṃbhāramārga)
63. Drod (Sk. Ūṣman)
64. Sbyor lam (Sk. Prayogamārga)
65. Mi slob lam (Sk. Āśaikṣamārga)
66. Instead of “ one hundred aeons a couple lines above ”
67. I.e. all Paths except the Path of No More Learning
68. Skye srid
69. Spang bya (Sk. Hāyin)
70. Lus rten
71. Nyon mongs (Sk. Kleśa)
72. Lhag med mya ngan las ‘das pa (Sk. Nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa)
73. In other words, the Vaibhāṣikas assert that upon passing on, when a Buddha enters Parinirvāṇa, he ceases to exist. This remains, to this day, a concept present in the Theravada tradition and begs the question Mahayana polemicists addressed to the Vaibhāṣikas from Nāgārjuna’s time onwards : “Why pray to a being whose continuum has been interrupted and who exists no more ?”
74. Nyon mongs can ma yin pa
75. Dngos smra ba (Sk. Vastusat-padārtha-vādin)
76. Sgo, literally “ door ”.
77. Dpe ston pa (Sk. Dārṣṭantika)
78. Lung gi rjes ‘brang gi mdo sde pa
79. Rigs pa’i rjes ‘brang gi mdo sde pa.
80. Vasubandhu’s magnum opus.
81. Dharmakīrti’s “Seven Treatises”: 1) Saṃbandhaparīkṣa (“Analysis of Relations”) 2) Pramāṇaviniścaya (“Ascertainment of Valid Cognition”) 3) Pramāṇavarttika, (“Commentary od Dignaga’s “Compendium of Valid Cognition””) 4) Nyāyabinduprakarana (“Drop of Reasoning”) 5) Hetubindu (“Drop of Reasons”) 6) Santānāntarasiddhi (“Proof of the existence of other Continuums”) 7) Vādanyāya (“Reasoning for Debate”)
82. Bcom ldan ‘das (Sk. Bhagavan)
83. Bden grub (Sk. Satya-siddhi)
84. Byas pa
85. ‘Dus byas (Sk. Saṃskṛta)
86. Rdzas (Sk. Dravya)
87. Rang mtshan (Sk. Svalakṣaṇa)
88. Rdzun par grub pa
89. Rtag pa (Sk. Nitya)
90. Spyi mtshan (Sk. Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)
91. Dgag pa (Sk. Pratiṣedha) Alternatively translated as “ negation ”, however it is important to understand that this not a verbal statement but a phenomenon. For instance emptiness is a negative phenomenon or a negation, but is in no way a verbal statement.
92. Sgrub pa.(Sk. Vidhi/siddhi) Same comment as above.
93. Med dgag(Sk. Prasajya-pratiṣedha)
94. Ma yin dgag (Sk. Pariudāsa-pratiṣedha)
95. ‘Dus ma byas kyi nam mkha’
96. ‘Gog bden (Sk. Nirodha-satya)
97. Stong nyid (Sk. Śūnyatā)
98. Dngos po ma yin pa las log pa a terser translation is here non-non-thing.
99. i.e. the meaning generality (don spyi) of vase.
100. Gcig
101. Tha dad
102. Rdzun pa’i gcig
103. Bden pa’i gcig
104. Spyi mtshan
105. Rdzun pa’i tha dad
106. Bden pa’i tha dad
107. Ldog pa (Sk. Vyatireka)
108. Yid kyi rnam shes
109. Gsal. The term “clear” in the definition of mind eliminates mind’s being a material phenomenon.
110. Rig pa (Sk. Saṃvedana/vid/saṃvid)
111. Cf. note 37.
112. What is implicit in the Sautrāntika definition of a valid cogniser is that the first instant of a stream of consciousness is a privileged moment of consciousness characterized by an uncommon freshness which separates it from the other, subsequent instances of consciousness, even though they may still be incontrovertible. The Prāsaṇgika do not accept this distinction between the first and later moments of consciousness as one of the criteria for being or not a valid cogniser.
113. Mi slu ba. “ Incontrovertible ” refers to that sense of rock-solid certainty which characterizes a valid cogniser and prevents it from changing in it’s understanding of it’s object of engagement as in Gendün Chöphel’s famous example of the black goat. Obviously, we end up having to translate the opposite slu ba as “ not incontrovertible ”. Cf note 150
114. Rig pa
115. Dpyad shes
116. As per the Prāsaṇgika understanding of pramāṇa.
117. Yid dpyod
118. As per the Vaibhāṣika understanding of pramāṇa.
119. Mngon sum tshad ma (Sk. Pratyakṣapramāṇa)
120. Rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma (Sk. Anumānapramāṇa)
121. Ma ‘khrul ba
122. Rang rig mngon sum tshad ma (Sk. Saṃvedanapratyakṣa)
123. Dbang po’i mngon sum tshad ma (Sk. Indriyapratyakṣa)
124. Yid kyi mngon sum tshad ma (Sk. Manasapratyakṣa)
125. Rnal ‘byor mngon sum tshad ma (Sk. Yogipratyakṣa)
126. Kha nang
127. Yan gar
128. Bdag rkyen (Sk. Adhipati-pratyaya)
129. Ye shes (Sk. Prajña/Jñāna)
130. Zung ‘brel (Sk. Yuganaddha)
131. Zhi gnas (Sk. Śamatha)
132. Lhag mthong (Sk. Vipaśanā)
133. Rtags yang dag(Sk. Samyak-liṇga)
134. Dngos stobs rjes dpag
135. Grags pa’i rjes dpag
136. Yid ched rjes dpag
137. It was a traditional metaphor of Sanskrit poets to see a rabbit in the moon.
138. The grammar of this sentence is very packed, but this is the meaning.
139. The second instant of a sensory counsciousness of any type cannot be a valid cogniser because it does not satisfy the definition of a valid cogniser, it is not “ a new and incontrovertible knower ”. It is not “ a new and incontrovertible knower ” because only the first instant of a consciousness can be called “ new ”.
140. Rtogs pa.
141. ‘Thad ldan. A commentary on Dharmakīrti’s “ Ascertainment of Valid Cognition ” (Pramāṇaviniścaya) tentatively identified as Tshad ma rnam nges ‘thad ldan gyi ‘grel bshad composed by Chos dbang grags pa (1404-1469), one of Mkhas grub rje’s students.
142. Reading grub bde cig as the meaning of grub bde.
143. Tshad min gyi blo
144. Dpyad shes (Sk. Paricchinnajñāna)
145. Log shes (Sk. Viparyajñāna)
146. The tshom (Sk. Vicikitsā)
147. Yid dpyod
148. Snang la ma nges pa’i blo , literally, as Hopkins translates it “ an awareness to which an object appears without being noticed ”, in other words an “ inattentive awareness ”
149. Dran shes. Recollections or memories are necessarily conceptual consciousnesses.
150. Rtog pa log shes
151. Rtog med log shes
152. Mtha’, literally “ boundary ”
153. Rang stobs kyis, literally “ by it own strength ”
154. Mtshungs ldan
155. Tshor ba
156. Don ‘gyur gyi the tshom
157. Don mi ‘gyur gyi the tshom
158. Cha snyoms pa’i the tshom
159. Don mthun
160. Zhen rig. Every conceiver is necessarily a conceptual consciousness.
161. Zhen pa
162. Rgyu mtshan med pa’i yid dpyod, more elegantly “ an ungrounded correct assumption ”
163. ‘Gal ba
164. Ngag,
165. Dam bca’ (Sk. Pratijñā)
166. Rtags
167. I.e. every sound is able to perform a function and everything which is unable to perform a function is not a sound : sound and unable to perform a function have no common denominator.
168. Gzhal bya (Sk. Prameya)
169. Gtan tshigs, (Sk. Hetu)
170. Byas pa
171. Ma ‘khrul ba, i.e. a non-conceptual knower.
172. Gsal snang can
173. All mental consciousnesses in the minds of ordinary beings are inattentive consciousnesses, because there is only one instant of mental consciousness separating, for instance, the visual sense consciousness perceiving the colour blue from the conceptual consciousness apprehending blue. That solitary instant of mental consciousness (which is neither one of the 5 sense consciousnesses nor a conceptual mind) cannot be noticed by an ordinary being.
174. Clearly, since the reflexive consciousness experiencing a non-reflexive consciousness is of one nature with it, if the second consciousness is an inattentive mind, so is necessarily the first.
175. We are still within the presentation of the 5th outline from the beginning of p. 10., “ subjects ”. An alternate division is being presented.
176. Skyes bu
177. Yul can tshad ma
178. i.e. the Sautrāntikas
179. Unlike the Vaibhāṣikas as was explained previously.
180. Rnam bden pa, (Sk. Satyākaravādin)
181. Rnam brdzun pa (Sk. Alikākaravādin)
182. Tshur mthong. Literally, “ one who is looking on this side ” ( an ordinary being who has not had direct percpetion of emptiness) instead of “ one who is looking to the far side (i.e. anĀryabeing).
183. i.e., when the eye-consciousness which apprehends the mottle of colors on the wing of a butterfly, apprehends the mottle of colors.
184. reading confirmed by op. cit. p. 476
185. Dri bcas rnam brdzun pa, literally “ Smelly False Aspectarians ”.
186. Dri med rnam brdzun pa, literally “ Odorless False Aspectarians ”.
187. Rnam par rig pa
188. Nub pa , Exactly the same verb used to refer to the “ setting of the sun ”.
189. Gnyis snang
190. Chos nyid (Sk. Dharmatā)
191. Chos dbyings (Sk. Dharmadhātu)
192. In other words, since for the Cittamātra, form and the valid cogniser apprehending form are of one substance (and one nature), they are eo ipso empty of being of different substances (or different natures).
193. A major topic of debate, and a very difficult one, is to explain the difference in depth between this second instance of the subtle selflessness of phenomena according to the Cittamātra school and the Prāsaṇgika understanding of phenomena as mere nominal
194. Ergo the Cittamātras accept the same terminological presentation of the subtle selflessness of persons as the Sautrāntika school (cf. p. 17), it is to be debated whether the meaning is the same, even though the terms are identical.
195. Gnyis snang dang bcas pa
196. Gzhan dbang (Sk. Paratantra)
197. Kun btags (Sk. Parikalpita)
198. The qualification “ which are included within conventional truths ” is added, because this excludes those imputed phenomena which are non- existents such as the horn of a rabbit, etc (a non-existent is not a conventional truth).
199. Rdzun pa (Sk. Mṛṣa/alikākāra). i.e. all things are both truly established and deceptive. As Geshe Yama Rinchen, the great Sera Je scholar, put it : “ If something is deceptive, it’s mode of appearance and it’s mode of abiding are necessarily discordant. ” It is therefore important to be aware of the distinction between the two pairs : true/deceptive and truly established / deceptively established , for the Cittamātra school : i) that emptiness which is an emptiness of form and the valid cogniser apprehending form being different substances (i.e. the subtle selflessness of phenomena) is both true and truly established. ii) Things (dngos po) are both deceptive and truly established. iii) The horn of a rabbit is both deceptive and deceptively established.
200. i.e. are both true and truly established.
201. Med dgag (Sk. Prasajyapratiṣedha)
202. Nang shes pa’i rdzas. The grammar here lends itself to several possible readings, this one makes the most sense.
203. Bag chags (Sk. Vāsanā)
204. Kun gzhi rnam shes (Sk. Ālayavijñāna).
205. The line of reasoning followed here is that since the Cittamātrins are exhaustively divided in True and False Aspectarians and that neither, for their own reasons listed above, accepts the existence of exterior objects, then the Cittamātra school as a whole does not accept the existence of exterior objects.
206. According to Kon chog jig me wang po it is actually the Followers of Scripture who assert an eight-fold division of consciousness (viz. “ Cutting through appearances ”, p. 267)
207. Nyon yid (Sk. Kliṣṭamanas)
208. According to Geshe Yama Rinchen.
209. According to Geshe Yama Rinchen.
210. A contrario to Kon chog jig me wang po’s “ Tenets ” in which both the mind-basis-of-all and mental consciousness are asserted to be instances of a person, which is a rather unorthodox position.
211. The Tibetan is probably corrupt here as the phyir ending the sentence has no clear referent and is awkward. This is unfortunately a recurring problem in this edition. One would have to verify the readings in the Collected Works of Je tsun cho kyi gyel tsen to which, regrettably, we do not have access.
212. Mngon sum (Sk. Pratyakṣa)
213. Ma ‘khrul ba’i shes pa
214. According to Geshe Yama Rinchen, a sense direct cogniser in the continuum of an ordinary being is necessarily a mistaken consciousness, because exterior objects appear to such a consciousness and since, according to the Cittamātra school, exterior objects do not exist, the mode of appearance of phenomena to that consciousness and the actual mode of existence of the phenomena perceived are discordant. Hence such a consciousness is necessarily mistaken (that sensory consciousnesses in the continuum of ordinary beings are necessarily mistaken is endorsed by Prāsaṇgika but rejected by Svātantrika Mādhyamika).
215. In the mindstream of ordinary beings, the mental direct cogniser apprehending form is necessarily an inattentive mind, therefore it cannot be a valid cogniser. Cf note 173.
216. There are two types of impermanence : coarse and subtle impermanence. The fact that the continuum of some composite phenomena , such as the human body, is interrupted (in the case of the human body by death or in the case of a vase by being broken) is what is referred to as “ coarse impermanence ”. The fact that all composite phenomena change instant by instant is what is referred to as “ subtle impermanence ”. By no means all composite phenomena are characterized by coarse impermanence : for instance, the subtlest mind of all, the mind of clear light, is an impermanent phenomenon, but it’s continuum is never interrupted . It does however change instant by instant. This has led to considerable terminological disagreement between some of the Tibetan schools. The Kagyü tradition, for instance, asserts that mind is permanent. What they mean is that mind is not characterized by coarse impermanence, i.e. it’s continuum is not interrupted. They clearly assert that mind changes instant by instant, the disagreement is therefore purely terminological.
217. Emending the genitive pa’i to an instrumental.
218. According to Geshe Yama Rinchen, this is an instance of the subtle selflessness of phenomena, in keeping with the Cittamātra school. There is no specific presentation here of the coarse selflessness of phenomena.
219. Sa bon (Sk. Bija)
220. Nyon sgrib (Sk. Kleśāvarāna)
221. Shes sgrib (Sk. Jñeyāvarāna)
222. Ched du bya ba is the adjective qualifying “ trainees ” in the expression ched du bya ba’i dul bya, in other words “ the specific trainees intended to be tamed by a specific teaching ”. The subtle and elegant use of such an adjective, in another context, to imply a trainee, without actually using the term , would have delighted a Tibetan scholar of Je tsün pa’s age.
223. ‘Dzin pa (Sk.√grah / gṛhyate) literally “apprehender”
224. Gzung ba (Sk. Grāhya) , literally “apprehended”
225. Sprul pa
226. Gdul bya (Sk. Vineya)
227. i.e. until the end of samsara
228. Theg pa (Sk. Yāna)
229. Khams (Sk. Dhātu)
230. Mos pa (Sk. Adhimokṣa)
231. Sgrub pa
232. ‘Bras bu (Sk. Phala)
233. i.e. the afflicted minds included within the two first Noble Truths.
234. Referred to throughout in Tibetan as ngo bo nyid med par smra ba (Sk. Niḥsvabhāvavādin), the “ Propounders of Naturelessness ”
235. Tha snyad (Sk. Vyavahāra) Hopkins, although aware of the scope of the term tha snyad frequently translates it as “ conventional ”, which is indeed the broad philosophical meaning of the term. It is rather unfortunate that Hopkins also translates kun rdzob as
236. While the actual terms “ Svatāntrika ” and “ Prāsaṇgika ” are not attested in Indian sources as names of subschools of Mādhyamika, Je Tsong kha pa indicates clearly that the meaning underlying the terms was implicit in Candrakīrti’s major works (cf. the excellent English translation by J. Cutler and his team “ Lam Rim Chen Mo. The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path ” ,p. 116, Vol. 3) : Scholars of the later dissemination of Buddhist teachings to the snowy land of Tibet use the terms “ Prāsaṇgika ” and “ Svatāntrika ” for different types of Mādhyamikas. Since this agrees with Candrakīrti’s Clear Words (Prasanna-padā), you should not suppose this is their own fabrication ”
237. The school’s Sanskrit name is the “ Mādhyamika ” school, but the proponent of such a doctrine is a Madhyamaka.
238. Zhal gyis bzhes pa’i
239. Rang rgyud kyi tags (Sk.* Svalinga / Svatantra)
240. Reading slob dpon for dpon slob.
241. Rang gyi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa (Sk. Svalakṣaṇasiddhi)
242. Rang ngos nas grub pa (Sk. Svarūpasiddhi).
243. Rang bzhin gyis grub pa (Sk. Svabhāvasiddhi)
244. This is one of the stranger positions of Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika, since most other schools, such as Cittamātra, assert that the subtle selflessness of persons is an ultimate truth.
245. Ngo bo tha dad
246. Even though Sautantrika-Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika is supposed to agree mainly with Sautantrika in its presentation of conventional phenomena and the existence of reflexive consciousnesses is central to that school of tenets.
247. The pyir in the middle of the next page clearly indicates a continuative is missing at the end of the previous sentence which should read : … khrul ma ‘khrul gnyis ka yod de . . . instead of … khrul ma ‘khrul gnyis ka yod . Thereby a unity of meaning is maintained.
248. Tshad min gyi shes pa
249. Zhen yul (Sk. Adhyavasāya)
250. An informal translation of ma yin pas khyab “ it is necessarily not . . . ” or “ it is pervaded by not being ”
251. Snang yul (Sk. Pratibhāsa-viṣaya)
252. Bden pas stong pa
253. Phyir left untranslated as not in keeping with the previous context.
254. Dgag bya
255. Stong gzhi (unlike in the Prāsaṇgika school where the difference between the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons is posited in terms of the base of emptiness).
256. Bkag pa , literally “ to block ”, “ to prevent ”.
257. Bdag ‘dzin
258. ‘Dzin stangs (Sk. Muṣṭi-bandha)
259. Dmigs pa (Sk. Ālambana)
260. i.e. even though the basis of a. is a person and the basis of b. is a person as well, in the first case the ignorance apprehending a self is an ignorance apprehending a self of phenomena and in the second case an ignorance apprehending a self of persons.
261. The phyir is at the beginning of page 30, the next page . . .
262. The Tibetan does not mention, but it is implied “ a person’s . . .being established etc ”
263. Gnyen po (Sk. Pratipakṣa/vipakṣa)
264. Bden ‘dzin
265. Bden med du
266. Mchog. While a Pratyekabuddhas enlightenment cannot be called supreme in the context of the the Three Vehicles, it is supreme within the context of just the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha vehicle.
267. Thal ba (Sk. Prāsaṇga)
268. In keeping with the outlines of the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and other schools, the present outline should present the divisions of the Prāsaṇgika school, but instead gives instances of Prāsaṇgikas.
269. 470-540
270. Ca. VIIth cent.
271. Ca. VIIIth cent.
272. Literally “ regarding him, there is a reason for stating “ Prāsaṇgika ” ”
273. Bsgrub bya (Sk. Sādhya)
274. Phyi rgol (Sk. Pūrva-pakṣa/ pūrva-vādin)
275. We have loosened the Tibetan syntax for the sake of clarity.
276. Lkog gyur (Sk. Parokṣa)
277. Mngon gyur (Sk. Pratyakṣa/abhimukhi)
278. We prefer this term to Hopkins’ “ obvious object ”, since the Tibetan term mngon ‘gyur (Sk. Pratyakṣa) is used by other schools such as the Sautrāntika to refer to minds which are direct perceivers. An uncommon feature of the Prāsaṇgika school is that this same term is used for objects.
279. Yang dag
280. Log pa
281. Kun rdzob
282. ‘Jig brten shes ngo la ltos te
283. i.e. form’s being truly established is real from a worldly standpoint, but actually does not exist.
284. Unlike Svatāntrika-Mādhyamika for which the Truth of Cessation is a conventional truth.
285. Ldan min ‘du byed
286. Rang rig mngon sum (Sk. Svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa)
287. ‘Khrul shes (Sk. Bhrāntijñāna)
288. Unlike Sautrantika, a valid cogniser is not necessarily the first moment of a consciousness and therefore, all subsequent cognitions are necessarily valid cognisers.
289. Dran shes (Sk. Smṛti)
290. Don mthun
291. Drangs ba
292. Mngon gsum
293. Dngos stobs rjes dpag
294. Grags pa’i rjes dpag (Sk. Prasiddhānumāna)
295. Dpe nyer ‘jal gyi rjes dpag
296. Yid ches rjes dpag (Sk. Āptānanumāna)
297. Don spyi . Hopkins translates as “generic image” which is the meaning of the term.
298. The standard example for a non-existent in texts of Buddhist logic
299. “Sound is permanent” is also a non-existent, since sound is not permanent, but impermanent.
300. bsags pa’i rags pa
301. Rdul phran cha med
302. It is extremely difficult to formulate the difference between the coarse selflessness of phenomena in Prāsaṇgika and the subtle selflessness of phenomena in Cittamātra. The main difference hinges upon Prāsaṇgika’s acceptance of partless particles and Cittamātra’s rejection of their existence.
303. Phyir left untranslated as it is meaningless in the context of the sentence. Perhaps a textual error.
304. i.e. the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena
305. Bkag pa
306. Dmigs pa (Sk. Artha)
307. Perhaps on should read gdags gzhi instead of zhi in keeping with the following line, the “basis” would here refer to the “basis of imputation”.
308. Cha
309. i.e. the Vehicle of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekkabuddhas and Bodhisattvas.
310. Reading the genitive de gsum kyi as an instrumental de gsum kyis in keeping with the parallel sentence on the next page regarding the objects of abandonment.
311. De bzhin nyid
312. Rjes thob (Sk. Pṛṣṭha labdha)
313. Phyir left untranslated. Perhaps a textual error.
314. The Four Bodies of a Buddha: the Emanation Body ( Nirmāṇakāya), Manifestation Body (the Saṃbhogakāya), Wisdom Truth Body ( Jñānakāya) and Nature-Truth Body ( Svabhāvavikāya).
315. Reading gi instead of gis