58 min · 3,536 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Kyabje Rinpoche guides a 58-minute systematic exploration of Mādhyamika philosophy through the Svatāntrika school’s analysis of consciousness and valid cognizers. Working through five key outlines, he clarifies how different Buddhist schools understand direct perception, particularly the distinction between Svatāntrika and Yogacāra-Svatāntrika positions. The session pivots to Buddhism’s core insight: two types of selflessness. The coarse selflessness shows that persons are impermanent and composite. The subtle selflessness reveals that persons exist only as imputation, not as autonomous entities. This latter insight is critical—our deeply rooted belief in an independent self generates the mental afflictions that cause suffering. Rinpoche stresses mind as Buddhism’s fundamental subject of study and proposes that Buddhist philosophical analysis and modern science might fruitfully converge. Pitched at practitioners with prior tenet training.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Line in 0173 – KR.mp3
UUID: 046a4ec8-fc34-45d4-ad82-7b31b4596304
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Tenets
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,538
So we will meditate for one or two minutes on generating the motivation and keeping with Khensur Rinpoche’s approach to teaching. And in this context, we have to understand that at first one should generate a motivation, then engage in whatever activities one wishes to engage in, such as prayers or reflecting and so forth, and then dedicate the merit one has accumulated. Now, generally speaking, with respect to the dedication of the merit, and therefore the goals we are pursuing, while it is indeed a good thing to wish to be reborn as a God or a human being, it is, however, important for us to realize that these states are not permanent, and there’s no guarantee regarding what will come afterwards. If we try to rise above this and to wish for actual liberation from the cycle of lives, we will attain undiluted happiness and bliss. But this will not be the supreme state, because it is a goal we are pursuing only for our benefit and we are not being of help to others.
Therefore, we should set ourselves as a goal, the state of complete enlightenment for the sole benefit of others and dedicate all our merits to this. And therefore, there are broadly speaking, three vehicles of the lesser and greater vehicles, and four schools of tenets. Of the four schools of tenets, we have reached the fourth, the Madhyamaka School, and within the Madhyamaka School, we have started presenting the Svatāntrika School. Now the Svatāntrika School, as is made clear on page 27 of your text, has seven outlines: definitions, divisions, etymologies, objects, the mode of asserting subjects, the mode of asserting selflessness and the presentation of grounds and paths. And we have reached the fifth of these outlines in the middle of page 28, the mode of asserting subjects.
So generally speaking, from within the two broad schools or systems of tenets, those of the lower and of the greater vehicle, those of the greater vehicle are for practitioners of sharper or more acute mental faculties. And these are the two systems, the Cittamātra and the Madhyamaka system. Within the Madhyamaka system, there is a twofold division of Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, with the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka view being considered the supreme view. Generally speaking, the distinction between all systems of tenets, the two broad systems of the lower and greater vehicle, and the four divisions of these two systems is made in terms of the view and the ever greater subtlety of the view. For instance, if we take the basis of the person, the person is first asserted in the lower systems of tenets to be empty of being permanent, one, and independent.
And then as one moves upwards, it is asserted to be actually empty of being an autonomous substantial existent, which is more difficult to understand. And one keeps moving upwards to ever more subtle presentations of the emptinesses of the self and eventually of phenomena, until one reaches the level we have reached here of Sautantrika Madhyamaka School. And generally speaking, as Geshe-la explained, within the Madhyamaka School, we have a twofold division of Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka. Svatāntrika Madhyamaka is divided into seven subdivisions as is each of the schools presented. So you can compare the view of each of the schools by just comparing the view of each of the subdivisions for a given school.
And the fourth subdivision, which is a presentation of objects of knowledge, of objects in other words, has been completed. And we now are studying the fifth subdivision of Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, the presentation of subjects. Now generally subjects or knowers are divided in many categories. For instance, a sound is considered to be a subject because it expresses the meaning of an object. However, the principal category of subjects here are consciousnesses.
And as our text says, regarding the fifth, mental consciousness is asserted to be an instance of a person, middle paragraph of page 28. And what is meant here is that in every system of tenets one has to posit an instance of what it is which transmigrates, which goes from life to life. What is the person in other words? Clearly, Geshe-la says the body does not qualify since the body is destroyed at death. So in the Sautantrika Madhyamaka, what is offered as an instance of a person, is mental consciousness.
And moving onwards in the middle paragraph of page 28, a sixfold collection of consciousness is asserted. The sixfold collection of consciousness here are the five sensory consciousnesses. In other words, the eye, ear, nose, tongue and bodily consciousness, and in addition the mental consciousness. Of these sixfold collections of consciousnesses, only the last the mental consciousness is posited as an instance of a person. The others are not.
Moreover, mind has two subdivisions into valid cognizers and minds which are not valid cognizers. Now, this was studied in detail in the presentation of the Sautantrika School. Valid cognizers are Pramanas, which are generally speaking defined, as you remember, as minds which are new and non-deceptive or incontrovertible. So these are obviously minds, in other words these are subjects which cognize their objects. The fact that they are new refers to the fact that it is the first instant of a consciousness and the fact that they are incontrovertible was clearly explained also, the mind does not turn away from its object.
Mind generally speaking can only be divided into these two categories. And then moving onwards with our text, from the standpoint of the Sautantrika Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, reflexive direct perceivers are not asserted. So generally speaking, Geshe-la says the Svatāntrika school is divided into two, as you remember, the Sautantrika Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, which differ in terms of which system predominates in their presentation of conventional phenomena. The first present conventional phenomena mainly in terms of the Sautantrika school, the second mainly in terms of the Yogacāra school. So the first of these sub schools of Sautantrika Madhyamaka does not accept the existence of reflexive direct perceivers.
As you remember, the Yogacāra School and some sub schools of Sautantrika assert that every consciousness is accompanied or is characterized by having a component which experiences itself and this is called a reflexive consciousness. The Sautantrika Svatāntrika Madhyamaka do not accept the existence of this consciousness or from the standpoint of the other, in other words, the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, all four direct perceivers are asserted. All four direct perceivers here refer, as you remember, to sensory direct perceivers, mental direct perceivers, reflexive direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers. Moving onwards, while reflexive direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers are necessarily unmistaken, the other two can be either mistaken or unmistaken. So the meaning of this passage is that when we talk of necessarily unmistaken consciousnesses, we talk of consciousnesses to which phenomena can be said to exist in the way in which they appear.
Now, this is a characteristic according to Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka of both reflexive direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers. They are consciousnesses to which it can be said phenomena exist in the way in which they appear. The other two types of direct perceivers can either be mistaken or unmistaken. And then moving onwards with our text. This is the case because both Sautantrika and Cittamātra, as well as Sautantrika Madhyamaka, accept that direct perceivers are necessarily non-conceptual consciousnesses.
This is a group of tenets which is shared by all of the schools up to Prāsaṇgika. Prāsaṇgika, however, has a somewhat different perspective on this matter, since Geshe-la will develop this a little bit later, and that subsequent cognitions are necessarily non-valid consciousnesses. This is also a tenet which is accepted by all the lower schools up to Prāsaṇgika, but which is not necessarily accepted by Prāsaṇgika. Moving onwards, all consciousnesses which are mistaken with respect to their conceived object are necessarily wrong consciousnesses. This is a position which is universal for all schools of tenets.
And that if a consciousness is mistaken regarding a given phenomenon, then it cannot be a valid cognizer regarding that phenomenon. This is a position which is specific to our system of tenets, and there is a considerable amount of debate among scholars regarding this. But Geshe-la says, since we are relying on this text, then this is a position which we will accept and take on board. And if it is an inferential cognizer, it cannot be a valid cognizer with respect to its appearing object. But clearly inferential cognizers are valid cognizers with respect to their main object, their object of engagement, since conceptual minds can know phenomena.
But an inferential valid cognizer, although it’s a valid cognizer with respect to its main object, its object of engagement, is not a valid cognizer with respect to its appearing object, which is a meaning generality of the object of engagement. And now we have completed the presentation of minds and we’ll be broaching at the beginning of page 29, the presentation of the sixth outline, the mode of asserting selflessness. Michelle I would like to resume the issue of minds for us. Fundamentally, mind is the fundamental or the core phenomenon which is studied in all of the Buddhist schools of tenets and this is the case because mind is that which transmigrates from life to life. Therefore, this has to be the main focus of our study.
Now, there are many levels of mind from the coarser to the most subtle. The coarse levels of minds, which are those we all are accustomed to live with, depend very heavily on human physiology, and specifically on the nervous system and on the brain. Any damage to the nervous system or the brain leads to an immediate impairment of the coarser levels of the mind. However, as the mind becomes more subtle, its dependence on the coarser material parts of the human body dwindles, and the subtlest levels of mind are almost completely autonomous. Now this can be seen, for instance, in the fact that, while most of us when we die just experience the mere departure of our mind from our body, great meditators at the time of death enter the death meditation, and in the death meditation, even though physiologically they are for practical purposes dead, their mind may remain in their body for sometimes twelve, sometimes twenty-one, and in the longest cases twenty-eight full cycles of twenty-four hours, so twenty-eight full days and nights.
So this is a very clear indication that their mind is broadly speaking independent of their bodies. Likewise, a subtle level of mind we are all accustomed to is the mind of the dream state. The mind of the dream state is little connected to the human body because it is one of the subtle states of mind. So, generally speaking, Dharma can be said to be those practices which aim to develop the positive or beneficial sides of the mind and which aim to eliminate the negative aspects of the mind. And since mind is basically that which transmigrates from body to body, mind has to be our main subject of study, and mind is the main subject of study of all four Buddhist schools of tenets, irrespective of whether some consider mind to be a truly existent phenomenon or not.
They nonetheless focus exclusively on the functioning of mind. And this is the case because if we check our own mind and we look backwards in time, we will find that there is an uninterrupted stream of our own mind which goes into our childhood, and then at the time of birth which enters into the embryo in our mother’s womb, and then obviously we are not aware of this, but moving backwards this germ of consciousness is still there, and eventually before the time of conception we spring back into the former life. And we can go back like this indefinitely, there is no beginning. So this is what is meant when we say that the mind has no beginning. And the mind has no end in the sense that broadly speaking two broad roads are open to the mind: the road to perfection or the road to ever lower states of existence.
The road to perfection is one where positive states of mind are cultivated until one reaches eventually the state of full enlightenment, which is the mind’s natural heritage. And the road of degeneration is the one where the mind spirals down. And these two paths are what we study when we study Buddhist tenet systems. Now, there is a specific text which is dedicated exclusively to the study of mind, which is called Lorig, or Mind and Mental Factors, and it would be very beneficial if you should choose to study this text later on. And therefore, as Geshe-la would like to point out again, the mind has to be our main object of analysis.
Now, generally speaking, to understand the ultimate nature of the mind on the basis of reasoning alone is difficult. So the ultimate nature of the mind is best understood at the conjunction of reasoning on the one hand and reliance on scripture on the other hand. It is through this that we can understand the ultimate nature of the mind. Generally speaking, mind has been explained in greater detail in the Buddhist tradition, perhaps in greater detail than in any other tradition. On the other hand, much of the modern scientific investigations have focused on material phenomena and have analyzed them with extraordinary detail and carefulness.
Therefore, the road for the future, which has been pointed out by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and a bevy of great teachers, is for these two approaches to be conflated, for the Buddhist analysis of the mind and its function to be conjoined with the modern scientific understanding of matter, since science basically does not acknowledge the existence of non-material phenomena, and the Buddhist philosophers have focused on the analysis of the functioning of these phenomena. And we have now reached on page 29, the sixth outline, the mode of asserting selflessness, which is the most important outline of each of the schools of tenets. The reason for this is that, as Geshe-la tried to convey in the previous explanations, the main place in which we experience happiness and suffering is the mind. The main perceiver, main experiencer of happiness and suffering is the mind. The point is the mind which has to be transformed.
Now happiness and suffering come from an unrealistic, an inaccurate assessment of the nature of phenomena. Phenomena appear to exist in a way in which they actually do not exist and we engage with them in this mistaken way. This is at the root of all of the mental afflictions, desire, hatred and so forth, which in turn cause suffering within our mind. So it is capital to turn our minds away from this mistaken and unrealistic understanding of persons and phenomena. Generally speaking, those minds which turn away from this mistaken apprehension of phenomena are called the view.
The view is the mind which turns away from a mistaken mental understanding of the nature of phenomena. For instance, we have a series of mistaken apprehensions of the person. The person is apprehended as permanent, one and independent. Now this mistaken mind gives rise to great suffering. The view of the person as not established as permanent, one, and independent is a mind which turns away from this perspective, which actually destroys this mind, and for this reason it is called the view of the coarse selflessness of persons.
Likewise, the view that the person is an autonomous, substantially existing entity is thwarted by that mind which realizes the subtle selflessness of persons. They are not established as substantially existing autonomous entities. Then, the first mode of selflessness which is explained is the coarse selflessness of persons, the second paragraph of page 29, a person’s emptiness of being permanent, one and autonomous or independent. Now, this is a view which is shared by all four schools of Buddhist tenets. There is not a Buddhist of any tenet who does not accept that the person is empty of being permanent, one and independent.
Generally speaking, one should understand that the measure of being a Buddhist is actually the act of taking refuge. So by taking refuge out of a fear of lower rebirths, and by going for protection to the triple gem in the hope of higher rebirth, liberation, or full enlightenment, one becomes a Buddhist. One is not a Buddhist without refuge. However, even among those who are Buddhists, there is a difference between those who are Buddhists by faith and those who are Buddhists by reason. So on the basis of having taken refuge, acceptance of the selflessness, the coarse selflessness of persons, which is a person’s emptiness of being permanent one and independent, is a measure of being Buddhist through reasoning or in terms of the view.
So what do we mean here by a person’s emptiness of being permanent one and autonomous? We covered this material considerably in the explanation of the Sautantrika School, but Geshe-la will cover it again here. Generally speaking, when we speak of a person, what is to be understood by a person? If we break down the individual into body and mind, we can clearly find that the body is not the person because it is destroyed at death. And it is difficult to say of the mind alone that it is a person.
The person has to be posited or imputed on the basis of both body and mind. What is meant by this is that there is no person aside of body and mind. It is a term which englobes the collection of the two, And therefore in the same way as the collection of the two body and mind is an impermanent phenomenon, which changes instant by instant, in the same way the person is an impermanent phenomenon, which changes instant by instant. Now specifically here, when we say that the person is not permanent one or independent, what is meant is, when we say that the person is not permanent, that the person is impermanent, in other words, that the person actually is a phenomenon which is changing instant by instant, or to put it more brutally, as the Buddhist tradition puts it, which dies and is being destroyed instant by instant. Secondly, the person is not one.
The person is not one because it is constituted of parts, the body and mind and the parts of the body and mind. Finally, the person is not independent because it arises in dependence on causes and conditions, its previous instance, the parents which gave rise to the body of the person and so forth. And regarding the second selflessness in the middle of the second paragraph of page 29, the person’s emptiness of being a substantially existing autonomous entity. The meaning of this subtle selflessness of persons is that one asserts that there is no person which exists independently of an imputation or a positing on the basis of the five aggregates which constitute the person. So a person apart from the five aggregates of body, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness does not exist.
And specifically, what is being referred to here are the mistaken views which identify, for instance, the body with the person or which identify the person with the mind. Now generally speaking, from a Buddhist standpoint, to identify the person with the body is a foolish position, which does not withstand analysis since the body is destroyed at death. With respect to the identification of the person with the mind, issues are more complicated since some Buddhist schools identify the person with components of the mind. However, when it is spoken here of a subtle selflessness of persons, which is a person’s being autonomous, of being a substantially existent phenomenon, what is being referred to specifically is the person’s existence as an overlord, as a master of both body and the mind. So it is this deep rooted belief we have that there is an overlord which the Hindus called an Ātman, which is a master of body and mind, which is transmigrating from life to life, which leads to a profound attachment to this life and to future lives and is the source of all delusions and all sufferings.
This is what is negated by the subtle selflessness of persons. So this is a presentation of the subtle selflessness of persons, and then the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamikas present an emptiness of form and the valid cognizer apprehending form from being different substances, which we will not cover today since the time has elapsed. So as usual, we will have a short break and then we will engage in a discussion period of half an hour and then Geshe-la will come back to address your doubts.
Key terms in this teaching
- atman dag (Tib)
- Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
- Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
- lorig
- Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
- Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.