Tenets — 2015-11-03

45 min · 2,360 words · 3 November 2015 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets — 2015-11-03
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 45-minute teaching on the four Buddhist schools of tenets, Kyabje Rinpoche addresses a core challenge: which philosophical school to study first and in what order. Rather than a sequential requirement, he explains that sharp practitioners can begin with Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, while those of coarser capacity benefit from starting with lower schools. The talk explores how all four schools agree the person depends on the aggregates but radically differ in understanding how. He distinguishes between coarse and subtle selflessness, clarifies the object of negation, and walks through the Prāsaṇgika view that the person exists only through conceptual imputation—the key insight that nothing is established from its own side. Q&A dialogue helps students identify these distinctions in their own experience.

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File: 2015-11-03 – KR.mp3

UUID: d0d77e1a-fe44-4335-bb06-a78b69973c97

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Tenets

Date: 2015-11-03

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~2,359

So there are four schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra and Mādhyamika. It is however not the case that one must initially gain realization of the view of the Vaibhāṣika School of Tenets to then move upwards to an understanding of the Sautrāntika School of Tenets gain realization in that school before gaining realization in the Cittamātra School. It is important to understand that whereas for instance when one progresses upwards on the five paths, the path of accumulation, of preparation, of seeing, of meditation and no more learning, one must first have gained the realizations of the path of accumulation to then train in the path of preparation and gain its realizations, to then train in the path of seeing meditation and no more learning. This is not the case for the four schools of tenets. It is not necessary to have gained realization of the Vaibhāṣika School of Tenets to then engage in Sautrāntika.

However, it is perfectly appropriate to study the view of the various schools of tenets. One should not do this however, for instance taking the case of Cittamātra because one happens to like the Cittamātra school. Instead, one should do this because one has a sense that the Cittamātra teachings are ultimate teachings and one accepts the uncommon assertions of Cittamātra. What is therefore the mode of proceeding through the various systems of tenets? Much depends on the trainee.

There are two types of trainees, trainees of sharp acumen and trainees of coarse acumen. A trainee of sharp acumen can definitely start immediately by studying the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view. However, for a trainee of coarser acumen, such a trainee would initially start by familiarizing himself or herself with the presentation of these subtle selflessness of persons according to these schools of tenets from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards. So what is the presentation of the selflessness of persons in the various schools of tenets? In Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the subtle selflessness of persons is persons not being established from their own side.

There is a coarse selflessness of persons, but the coarse selflessness of persons in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is what is called the subtle selflessness of persons in all the lower schools of tenets. In other words, it is persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities. What is the purpose of teaching the coarse and subtler selflessness of persons? In all schools of tenets, it is to enable one to abandon the afflictions. Coarse and subtle substances of persons are taught because they enable us to abandon respectively coarse and subtle afflictions.

In as much as the coarse and subtle selflessness of persons counter respectively coarse and subtle afflictions, which in turn arise from coarse and subtle understandings of the grasping of a self. Then if you are trainees of sharp acumen, you can start immediately with the study of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. You yourself know who precisely you are. However, for those of more middling capacity, it is better to start studying the presentation of these subtle selflessness of persons in the lower schools of tenets. In other words, persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities.

So the best is to initially understand the difference for instance between coarse and subtle selflessness in the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika School and then the differences in the presentation of the subtle selflessness of persons in the various schools of tenets. If one does not proceed in this systematic fashion, there is ground for tremendous confusion. Since Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is itself subdivided into two, Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. Divided into a dizzying 18 sub schools. So merely from the standpoint of study alone, there are already dizzying possibilities of studying as far as Buddhist tenet systems are concerned.

If one’s stance is however that one wishes to counter the afflictions within one’s mind stream to attain durable happiness, then one must understand the basis of the afflictions and in turn one must target this basis with the appropriate counter force which is in brief, the wisdom realizing emptiness. Therefore, to summarize, Prāsaṇgika accepts the existence of the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons. The subtle selflessness of persons is persons not being established from their own side. The coarse selflessness of persons is none other than the subtle selflessness of persons according to the lower schools of tenets. In other words, it is none other than persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities.

So in keeping with the stanza from Āryadeva’s Chatuhshataka, the 400 which I have quoted repeatedly at the beginning accumulate merit in the middle of the path, generate doubt regarding the self and finally dispel all views. This refers clearly to training in sequence. The first verse does not need to be explained. The last verse however refers specifically to the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view. So to understand the meaning of persons being empty and being substantially existent autonomous entities in the lowest schools of tenets, we must understand what persons are.

In other words, we must understand what the experiencer of pleasant and unpleasant sensation, the experience of pleasant and unpleasant experiences is. Once we have understood this, we will then understand better the ignorance which apprehends these as being substantially existent autonomous entities. Now in general, the person is something which relies on the aggregates and hereby aggregates, we do not refer just to the body, we refer to the five aggregates. Now all of us are mammals. In other words, all of us are born from a womb, the womb of our mother.

The mode in which the I is imputed on the aggregates is that the I is imputed in function of the stage of the form aggregate. Initially, we would say I am a child, then I am a teenager, then I am a young adult, an adult and eventually an old person. We have direct experience of the fact that the person is posited in dependence on the aggregates. The person, in other words, the experience of pleasant and unpleasant sensations, the experience of pleasant and unpleasant experiences. It is obvious that the I or we are established in dependence on the aggregates.

So think carefully then if it is self evident that we exist in dependence on the aggregates, then obviously our being independent of the aggregates is a non existent and therefore someone who eats, who walks, who sleeps, who meditates independently of the aggregates is obviously non existent, isn’t it? Then since it is evident that a, an experience of pleasant and unpleasant sensations, an experience of pleasant and unpleasant experiences, someone who sleeps, who walks, eats, and who does not depend on the aggregates cannot exist, it is evident that this is our object of negation. This is the autonomous person which is refuted. The non-Buddhist philosophers of ancient India on the other hand, taught that there existed such an autonomous person which was the experiencer of pleasant and unpleasant sensations, which was the experience of pleasant and unpleasant experiences and which did not depend in the slightest on the aggregates. Such an I, such a person, such an experience of pleasant and unpleasant sensations, an experience of pleasant and unpleasant experiences, which does not depend on the aggregates was taught by the non-Buddhist philosophers of India and such an entity was taught to be one, in other words not to be composed of parts, was taught to be permanent, in other words it was taught not to be transitory and was taught to be independent.

So such a person which does not depend on the aggregates, which is permanent one and is said to be independent. This and nothing else is the autonomous person which is the object of refutation. The existence of such a person is what is taught by the non-Buddhist philosophers of ancient India. The distinction between the lower schools of tenets from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards and Prāsaṇgika lies not in the assertion that the person depends on the aggregates, everyone agrees on this, but in the mode of dependence which is taught. And it is here that one must engage in very careful analysis.

Therefore, all of the schools of tenets without exception agree that the person depends, the person relies on the aggregates. They differ in their understanding of the mode of reliance or the mode of dependence. All of the schools of tenets from Vaibhāṣika to Svatāntrika Mādhyamika assert that the person depends on the aggregates in the same way. What is this mode of dependence? Can you explain?

So when we have this powerful sensation of I within ourselves, we say I, I, then it is precisely this, which actually in reality depends on the aggregate. Can you explain the mode of dependence on the aggregates in function of the lowest schools of tenets? So what’s the mode of dependence of the person on the aggregates according to the lowest schools of tenets? So that’s not quite the case, set the object of refutation. What is the mode of dependence?

That’s how it should be explained. So it’s not a straightforward matter to present the person according to the lowest schools of tenets. One should study and reflect carefully and then speak in terms of one’s own experience. So what you said Molly is precisely the answer to be given. We all have this intuitive sense that somehow the person exists within the aggregates and if we were to seek for it we could find it.

Then it is another matter to formulate this. Therefore, what is the mode of dependence of the person on the aggregates according to the lower schools of tenets, in other words, Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards, all assert that this mode of dependence is that the person is findable within the aggregates and it is generally identified with the mental consciousness. The majority posit the mental consciousness as is person which is found. There are however various ways of positing the person. Then this is the way the lower schools of tenets Svatāntrika Mādhyamika down to Vaibhāṣika posit the person’s dependence on the aggregate.

Prāsaṇgika also teaches that the person depends on the aggregates, but the mode of dependence is different. Prāsaṇgika asserts that the person depends on the aggregates through the conception which imputes the person on the basis of imputation, which is the aggregates. Do you understand this a bit? Then slowly slowly slowly there is no rush. One should study, practice, study, practice and over time one will understand the view.

When you close your eyes like that all these doubts disappear, you don’t have to study and when you wake up after fifteen minutes maybe you have fresh doubts. Then obviously if you keep putting your mind like this on the text, sometimes one becomes plain dumb. I’m just joking. Yes, that is quite appropriate. All of the lower schools of tenets assert that the aggregates are established from their own side.

Prāsaṇgika alone asserts that the aggregates and actually nothing is established from its own side. Therefore, Prāsaṇgika asserts that the mode of dependence of the person on the aggregates is that the person is imputed by conceptuality on the basis of imputation which is the aggregates. However, it is insufficient to just state this. At present, one must identify the conception which does the imputing and the mode of imputation. Now here, the term conception in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika refers to an innate conception and I gave numerous examples of this in previous teachings when I mentioned the experiences when one rode, when one meditated.

For instance, when one meditates freshly anew, and meditation goes well, then one thinks to oneself, Ah, I am meditating well. Now, at that moment that conception is actually imputing I. This is a conception we refer to here. If you are meditating at all. Then obviously, if you don’t meditate a lot, then you could think for instance, when I’m doing something, then obviously that conception which thinks I arises.

And here, it is that conception which must be clearly identified. Then when we say that in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the person or the I is imputed by conceptuality on the basis which is of imputation, which is the aggregates. This refers to the various parts of the aggregates and the conception which thinks I then blends in my opinion this I with the aggregates and this is what is meant by imputing. Now since in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, conceptuality imputes the person or the I on the basis of imputation which are the aggregates. Then this person or this I depends exclusively on conceptuality and therefore according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, there is no person or no I which is established from its own side, which exists from its own side.

Then this is what is referred to in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika as the subtle selflessness of persons or emptiness. Then if you have questions, will take only one question tonight and then we will stop. Is the mode of existence as critical to the presentation of the selflessness of persons in the lower schools as it is to the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika? And if so, how would you, for example, say describe the mode of existence of the self person in the Vaibhāṣika school? Generally speaking in Vaibhāṣika within the 18 schools, there are two different modes of presentation of the mode of existence of persons.

One set of schools assert that it is the composite of the five aggregates, the collection of the five aggregates which is the person. Another set of the 18 schools assert that it is the mental consciousness which is the person giving this as an instance of the person. The importance accorded to the person is identical in all of the schools of tenets as well as in the non-Buddhist schools of Indian philosophy since it is the person which is bound in cyclic existence and the person which is freed from cyclic existence. They all differ in their understanding of what is bound and what is freed. Then we shall stop here today.

Then we have talked today, it’s

Key terms in this teaching

basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
cyclic existence samsara (Skt); khor wa (Tib)
The six realms of conditioned existence, three lower - hell, hungry ghost and animal - and three upper - human, demigod and god. LYWA
five paths lam nga (Tib, Wyl)
The five stages of spiritual progress - the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation and no more learning - set out for each of the three vehicles; the Mahayana five paths culminate in buddhahood. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
object of negation gag cha (Tib)
An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
The Yogic Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Cittamatra (Mind Only school). LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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