57 min · 2,952 words · 20 October 2015 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 57-minute teaching, the Dalai Lama provides a detailed philosophical analysis of the object of refutation in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, one of the highest Buddhist schools of philosophical interpretation. He establishes the fundamental distinction between how the self appears to ordinary minds—as inherent, autonomous, and independent—and its actual nature as mere conceptual imputation dependent on the aggregates. Using precise examples such as the moon’s reflection in a pond and a cup cover resting on a glass, he illustrates how phenomena exist within objects of knowledge yet appear falsely as self-established. The teaching compares how different Buddhist philosophical schools (Cittamātra, Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka) define and refute this false appearance, emphasizing that genuine liberation requires realizing the specific emptiness taught in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka. He concludes with questions from students seeking clarification on technical terminology and the relationship between lower-school views and the elimination of afflictions.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-10-20 – KR.mp3
UUID: 34d59e9f-a0cc-48d5-ba0c-5369163dd99e
Teacher: HH Dalai Lama
Collection: Emptiness
Date: 2015-10-20
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,942
So in the context of an explanation of the object of refutation of emptiness, the object of refutation of the selflessness of persons within the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka system. The quote which is most illuminating is that drawn from Candrakīrti’s commentary on Āryadeva’s 400, the Chatuhshataka as quoted in Je Tsongkhapa’s Legs Shad Nyingpo, the essence of eloquence which says, that nature which is not obtained, that is what is referred to by mere nominal and conceptual imputation. So, it is important to understand that emptiness or the selflessness of persons exist, their existence. However, their object of refutation is a non existent, it cannot be found within objects of knowledge. So here we should focus on our own eye as an instance of the person we are examining and ascertain the mode of existence of this I.
On the one hand, when we look at the way in which it appears, it appears as if it were to exist beginninglessly from the beginning within the aggregates which are its basis of imputation. That mind which cognizes this is none other than the ignorance which apprehends the self. The object of refutation is that self which is apprehended, in other words, that self which is seen as existing inherently within the aggregates. So, the conception or the predilection which apprehends the existence of the object of negation within the aggregates. In other words, the conception or the predilection for which this object of negation, the I exists independently, exists autonomously, exists from its own side.
This conception or predilection is the basis under the power of which the sense of oneself and the sense of others arise and in dependence on this arise in turn anger and desire. So it is precisely this self which is the object of refutation referred to by Je Tsongkhapa in his essence of eloquence in his Legs Shad Nyingpo when he says that nature which is unfound and adds later on, what is seen as existing in reality. In other words, existing beginninglessly or existing autonomously, existing independently of causes and conditions, that is the object of negation. So this covers the presentation of the object of negation from one’s own side. Now, as far as the object of negation from the standpoint of exterior phenomena such as houses, chairs, objects and so forth, that mere appearance of exterior phenomena as existing out there, as being established inherently, as being established from their own side, that is the object of refutation according to Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka.
So from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, therefore what is the object of refutation as far as exterior phenomena are concerned? The object of refutation is that appearance of exterior phenomena to the sensory consciousnesses as being established from their own side, as being established beginninglessly, or as simply existing out there. Then if that is the object of refutation, do material phenomena perceived by the senses become non existent? They do not. They still do exist within objects of knowledge.
However, their mode of appearance is mistaken. Their mode of appearance is false, not true. And the example which enables us to understand this best is that of the reflection of a moon within a pond. The reflection of the moon within a pond exists, but that reflection of the moon within the pond is not the moon. In other words, it is not true.
So it is not the case that houses, tables and the objects which we use in daily life and struggle to obtain are non existent. However, when they appear to our sensory consciousnesses, how do they appear? They appear as if they existed beginninglessly. In other words, what is meant here by existing beginninglessly is that they appear as if they do not depend in the slightest on causes, on conditions, on parts and so forth. That and nothing else is the object of refutation according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.
So, His Holiness frequently when he explains these topics, explains that one has to counter the ordinary mind. Now what is meant by this is that an understanding of the object of refutation is very difficult. However, the mind to which the object of refutation appears sees the object of refutation as existing beginninglessly. What is meant here by existing beginninglessly is that it exists or it seems to exist independently of causes and conditions. So, it is important to make a distinction between the understanding of this topic within Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.
For Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the object of refutation of emptiness does not appear to sensory consciousnesses. For Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the object of refutation of emptiness does appear to sensory consciousnesses. This is a fundamental difference between the two schools of tenets. Now, should the object of refutation appear to sensory consciousnesses for Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, then Svatantika Madhyamica would become one and the same as Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka. And for instance, even though Svatāntrika Madhyamaka accepts that all phenomena are established by their own characteristics, are established from their own side and are inherently established, these would have to become at that point for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika also objects of refutation.
So this is clearly explained in Jnanagarbha’s autocommentary on the Two Truths which is translated in English. That for Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, the object of refutation does not appear to the sensory consciousnesses whereas for Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, it necessarily does. It’s a bit difficult, isn’t it? Only natural. No worry. No worry about very important.
So these are difficult topics and one must study them again and again. It is said that one should have enthusiasm or perseverance like the flow of a great river. Then in Tibet we have our own rivers. In Australia, you have the Murray Darling River. Then we need perseverance akin to that of a great river as it says in the Three Principal Aspects of the Path, persevere in the imperative with great enthusiasm.
This means don’t just focus on things lackadaisically from time to time. Then we are not referring or we refer to the realization of the view to the elimination of some type of exterior problems and difficulties. We’re referring to the elimination of interior problems and difficulties which is a task of another order of magnitude and ultimately this connects with the elimination of the ignorance which grasps at the self. So, this is what is to be said regarding the object of refutation as far as exterior objects are concerned. Now regarding the object of refutation as far as the I is concerned, as has been explained, it is certain that all of us have a clear sense of an I which exists within the aggregates, which are its basis of imputation.
An I which is an experiencer of the sensations of happiness and unhappiness and of their maturation. And that this I is perceived as existing from its own side, as existing beginninglessly, as existing autonomously. Now this and nothing else is the object of refutation according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. So, there is therefore a fundamental difference as far as the object of refutation of the subtle selflessness of persons in the lower schools of tenets, and the object of refutation of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka is concerned. If there is a difference in the object of refutation, there is necessarily a difference in the emptinesses as well.
What is the difference in the emptiness? So at present, you might have the following doubt. We have been talking almost endlessly about emptiness. Emptiness in the lower schools of tenets. Emptiness in Cittamātra, emptiness in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, emptiness in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.
Now in every single case, the purpose of this study of emptiness is that the realization of emptiness leads to the abandonment of ignorance and thereby to the elimination of afflictive obstructions. Now this elimination of afflictive obstructions is what is known as liberation. If there are all these presentations of emptiness, is it the case that the wisdom realizing the emptiness of the lower schools of tenets is a wisdom according to Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka? Or is it the case that the wisdom realizing emptiness according to the lower schools of tenets, according to Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka is a wisdom according to the lower schools of tenets? This is a doubt which could arise in your minds.
So, such doubts are not only legitimate, they are necessary if you didn’t have doubts when you presented this topic, then the presentation would be irrelevant and useless to you. So if we position ourselves from the standpoint of prasanika Mādhyamika, what is the Prāsaṇgika outlook on the understanding of emptiness in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika or on non duality in Cittamātra. Probably Prāsaṇgika would accept the presentation in Cittamātra, in other words non duality, but whether it was possible in dependence on such a presentation of emptiness in Cittamātra or in dependence on the presentation in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika to attain liberation, that is another question altogether. That seems very difficult. Now setting this aside to make it easier for both yourselves and myself, let us look at the presentation of the subtle selflessness of persons within the lower schools of tenets.
In other words, persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities. So the question from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika is therefore what exactly is the status of these emptinesses which are taught in Cittamātra and Svatāntrika Mādhyamika? Definitely from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika, non duality as taught in Cittamātra probably exists. Whether such a non duality is able to eliminate ignorance which grasps at the self, that is another question altogether that seems difficult. This is why his Holiness the Dalai Lama when he taught at Ganden monastery said, we have to address the question of how the Cittamātra view functions as an antidote to the afflictions.
This is a fundamental question. It is rather meaningless to say the Cittamātra view or the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika views are good, they are beneficial. That is a meaningless statement. If we take the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view, if we actually like the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view, then we must understand first the system of tenets of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. Then we must be able to identify the object of negation according to Svatāntrika Madhyamaka.
Then on that basis, we must understand the emptiness of that object of negation according to Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. This is very difficult. Then the same thing is true for Cittamātra. It is a rather meaningless even silly statement to say I like Cittamātra. Instead, one must study Cittamātra.
Then we must understand the object of negation according to Cittamātra. Then we must understand the emptiness of that object of negation. So therefore, as is said in the 400 at the beginning train in merit in the middle of the path, deepen your understanding and at the end, train in the conjunction of method and wisdom. This refers to training at the various levels of the path. Now here, it is necessary at the beginning to gain an understanding of the subtle selflessness of persons of the lower schools of tenets.
Since this is then used as a gateway to an understanding of the selflessness of persons in keeping with Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. So the selflessness of persons as explained in the lower schools of tenets is one in which the person is seen as not existing within the aggregates and whereas there is a relationship between the person and the aggregates. It is not the case that the person is a ruler of the aggregates and the aggregates are ruled by the person without the person depending in the slightest on the aggregates. Now from the standpoint of this viewpoint of the lower schools of tenets is not only not an antidote to ignorance but is even the foundation of ignorance. So the lower schools of tenets therefore consider that the person is not autonomous and independent from the aggregates.
Instead, the person depends on the aggregates and this dependence on the aggregates counters the person’s autonomy. This is the meaning therefore of the selflessness of persons in the lowest schools of tenets in which it is taught that the person is empty of being a substantially existent autonomous entity. So the lower schools of tenets teach that the person exists in dependence on the aggregates. The question which does arise is what is the mode of this dependence as taught by the lower schools of tenets? The lower schools of tenets consider that when the person is said to exist in dependence on the aggregates, it is said to exist within the aggregates.
It is therefore said that the person which is the experiencer of the sensations of happiness and unhappiness and of the maturation of karma is found within the aggregates. This precisely is the object of refutation of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka which asserts that the person is not beginninglessly established or established from its own side. So in brief, the lower schools of tenets consider that the person, in other words, the experiencer of the sensations of pleasure and of suffering and of the maturation of karma exists. In other words, is to be found within the aggregates. It is therefore established within the aggregates.
According to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, such a person is not to be found or is not established within the aggregates. It is a mere conceptual imputation on the basis of the aggregates. And therefore in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, this person which is the experiencer of suffering and of happiness and of the maturation of karma is not to be found within the aggregates. When it is said that it depends on the aggregates, how is it said to depend on the aggregates? It is a mere conceptual imputation on the basis of the aggregates.
It is in that sense that it is said to depend on the aggregates. So therefore when it is said in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika that the person depends on the aggregate, this dependence is not understood as it is understood in the lower schools of tenets that the person is to be found within the aggregates. Instead, what is meant by this is when one says that the person depends on the aggregates, the person depends on a conceptual imputation out there on the basis of designation, which are the aggregates. As I explained already, the conception which is referred to here is that innate conception, that discrimination which is for instance involved in the process, if we take the example of writing, when we think I write, we’re looking simultaneously at what we write and at the handwriting that conception which thinks I is the imputing conception. So to give an example of the dependence of the I on the aggregates according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, it is akin to what happens when I place the cover of my cup against that glass.
The glass on the aggregates and the cover is the I. Now when I place the cover against the glass, it stays there. In other words, the I imputed on the aggregates exists. But this I is not to be found within the aggregates as is taught in the lower schools of tenets. So we shall stop here.
If you have questions, I will take two short questions. Thanks, Geshe-la. It’s me, Leah. I just wanted to clarify what I think you said halfway through that the subtle selflessness of persons of the lower schools is actually the foundation of ignorance according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. I was wondering if that’s what was said.
So, selflessness of persons according to lowest schools of tenets is not the foundation of the afflictions but the mind which realizes the selflessness of persons according to the lower schools of tenets can only cause the afflictions to become non manifest but cannot cause them to be eliminated according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. Another. So from time to time when you take notes, you will think, am I writing correctly? Is the topic well explained and so forth. And at that point, the combination of the conception which is focusing on the writing and the conception which thinks I is what gives rise to the sense of I.
I listened to the topic but I didn’t understand the word. What is the object of negation And what is the ref what does refutation and what does imputation means? So here, when we speak of the object of negation or the object of refutation, it’s the same thing. In Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, we are referring to the object of negation of emptiness. This refers to the sense that the I exists within the aggregates and its appearance as existing from its own side.
So when we speak of imputation, what we mean when we say for instance that the I is imputed on the aggregates, is that the I exists in dependence on the aggregates. And the way this is best understood is with the example I gave of writing. So when one takes notes for instance, while one is taking notes with one’s hand, one thinks am I taking notes correctly? At this point, the conception which thinks I, as well as the parts of the body, which are taking notes such as the hand and so forth, blend if you wish, and in dependence on that, a sense of I arises. So we shall now have a discussion.
I’d like you to talk about the following topics, the object of refutation within the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka and to distinguish between the selflessness of persons within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika and its object of refutation, and the selflessness of persons within the lowest schools of tenets and its object of refutation. Then, by pairs, different from last time.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- three principal aspects of the path lamtso nam sum (Tib)
- The three principal realizations of the lamrim path: renunciation, bodhicitta and the right view (of emptiness). Also the title of a short prayer composed by Lama Tsongkhapa that is commonly recited during prayer services. LYWA
- two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
- The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.