Tenets — 2015-09-08

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)

Tenets — 2015-09-08

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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 63-minute teaching, Kyabje Rinpoche maps the four Buddhist tenet schools by how they interpret successive dharma turnings, then focuses at length on Svatāntrika Mādhyamika—a philosophical position long considered difficult to ground. The difficulty: Svatāntrika claims phenomena depend on mind yet resists taking the second turning literally, while Prāsaṇgika takes precisely that turning as both definitive and literal. He examines this tension in detail, then shifts to the nature of consciousness itself. He distinguishes sensory consciousness from mental consciousness, explaining why paranormal powers like telepathy arise only when the meditator’s mind becomes independent of sensory consciousness, and how subtle clear-light consciousness relates to meditative attainment. For advanced practitioners with philosophical training.

So regarding tenets, basically there is no difference as far as the Buddhist schools are concerned in the presentation of love and compassion? So as you remember, there are four Buddhist schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Cittamātra and the Mādhyamika. There are probably no differences in the presentation of the method aspect of the path, in other words love and compassion within these four schools of tenets. It is a very different matter regarding the view. Now regarding the two lower schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika both ascertained the existence of exterior objects.

And in this respect from the standpoint of the threefold subdivision of the teachings in the three turnings of the wheel of the law, the first, the middle and the last turning of the wheel of the law, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika are rooted in the first turning of the wheel of the law. Irrespective of whether this view is a correct one or not, the view of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika is a view rooted in the Sarvastivada. Now Cittamātra on the other hand refutes this view of the existence of exterior objects which is taught in Vaibhāṣika and in Sautrāntika. And in this respect, the view of Cittamātra is rooted in the Samdhinirmochana sūtra which is a sūtra of the third turning of the wheel of the law. As for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is rooted in a literal interpretation of the extensive middling and lesser Prajñāpāramitā sutras, the sutras of the perfection of wisdom in which it is taught that phenomena are not inherently established, are not established by their own characteristics and are not established by their own side.

This is taken literally in Prāsaṇgika. Then the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view is an eccentric one. Since Svatāntrika Mādhyamika accepts indeed that the middle turning of the wheel of the law is definitive but does not consider that the middle turning of the wheel of the law is literal. Since Svatāntrika Mādhyamika considers that all the statements in the greater middling and lesser perfection of wisdom sutras that phenomena are not established by their own characteristics, not established from their own side, are not inherently established, refer to phenomena not being truly established. Then what makes this extremely interesting is that Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, through accepting the first turning of the wheel of the law literally, accept that exterior phenomena exist.

Cittamātra, through accepting that the third turning of the wheel of the law is literal, accept the existence of the three natures and do not accept the existence of exterior phenomena. Prāsaṇgika, through accepting that the middling wheel of the law is definitive and literal, accepts that phenomena are not established by their own characteristics. But Svatāntrika Mādhyamika does not accept the middle turning of the wheel of the law as literal even though it accepts it as definitive. So the establishment of the view of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika is an extremely solid and stable establishment of the view. Likewise for Cittamātra and likewise for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.

As far as Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is concerned, Svatāntrika Mādhyamika asserts that phenomena are posited in dependence on mind. So as you remember, Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is subdivided into two sub schools, Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. The foremost proponent of Sautrāntika Mādhyamika is Bhāvaviveka. And as is defined on page 26 of your translation of Jetsunpa’s Grub mtha’, definition of the first, I. E.

Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, paragraph three is a Mādhyamika who propounds the presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in keeping with the Sautrāntika school. Now in the definition of a Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, a Mādhyamika who propounds the presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in keeping with the Sautrāntika School. Since one of the foremost tenets of the Sautrāntika School is the existence of exterior objects, then such a Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika would have to accept the existence of exterior objects in accordance with the Sautrāntika School. Whether this is possible for refuting the existence of truly established objects is open to question. If we take for instance a case of Bava Viveka.

If Bhāvaviveka accepts the existence of exterior objects in keeping with the Sautrāntika school, what this means according to Sautrāntika is that Bhāvaviveka accepts that the relation between let us say, the five sense objects and specifically the color blue and the visual consciousness which perceives the color blue is one in which the color blue exists previously and after that the visual consciousness perceiving the color blue arises. If this is the case, how is it possible for Bhāvaviveka to say that the visual consciousness perceiving the color blue is that in dependence on which the color blue exists. So the difficulty is that according to Svatāntrika Mādhyamika Sattrathandika, Sautrāntika Mādhyamika in general actually phenomena are posited in dependence on mind. Now if we take the color blue, in dependence on which mind is the color blue posited? We cannot say that the color blue is posited in dependence on the visual consciousness perceiving the color blue since according to Sautrāntika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika this visual consciousness arises after the color blue.

Then in dependence on what mind is a color blue posited. This is why other Svatāntrika Mādhyamika such as Haribhādra, Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla adopted a position which is known as Yogachara Svatāntrika Mādhyamika in which the conventional presentation of phenomena is mainly in keeping with Cittamātra and in which they accept the emptiness of duality. This is also problematical. Now clearly Svatāntrika Madhyamikas accept that phenomena are not truly established. Difficulties arise when we ask why they accept that phenomena are not truly established.

If we say that they consider phenomena are not truly established because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions, then all of the schools of tenets consider that impermanent phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions. So what is the Svatāntrika view in this matter? I myself do not know. I’m sure there is a presentation of this. It is for this reason that many scholars of the three great seats consider that grounding the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view is difficult.

It is difficult because whereas Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika are grounded in the sutras of the turning of the first wheel of the law, which they accept to be literal. And Cittamātra is grounded in the Samdhinirmochana sūtra, a sūtra of the third turning of the wheel of the law, which it considers literal. And Prāsaṇgika is grounded in the extensive middling and lesser perfection of wisdom sutras of the second turning of the wheel of the law which they consider literal. Svatāntrika Mādhyamika all considering the second turning of the wheel of the law to be definitive, does not consider its sutras to be literal. A second important and difficult point is that all Svatāntrika Mādhyamika does not accept that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations.

It does not accept as Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there. This is a critical difference. The question which arises is what precisely is the mode of conceptual imputation within Svatandika Mādhyamika? It is necessarily different from the mode of conceptual imputation within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. All phenomena are linked to conceptuality.

And this is why Jetsunpa Rolpe Dorje in his great treatise on tenets identifies the innate mind which attributes inherent existence to phenomena to that discrimination which says this is this, this is that, this is blue, this is yellow. So it is precisely because of this that Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations. They are mere imputations of the innate conceptual mind which identifies phenomena saying this is this, that is that, this is yellow, this is blue. So the problem which arises is that of discriminating between the mode of imputation by conceptuality within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika and the mode of imputation by conceptuality within Svatantica Madiamica. And if one asks how are phenomena or why are phenomena imputed conceptually within Svatāntrika Mādhyamika?

The answer is very difficult to provide. As I mentioned previously, the traditional answer is this table in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is conceptually imputed because it is an object of conceptuality. However, such an answer is highly unsatisfactory since this table is an object of conceptuality within Sautrāntika and Sautrāntika does not assert that this table is a mere conceptual imputation. So I’m not sure but I believe that this is not the position of the other monastic colleges such as Loseling, Gomang and Jangste. I think they do not accept that in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations.

If they did, they would face this difficulty of distinguishing between mere conceptual imputation in Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika. This seems to me to be an uncommon position of Jetsunpa Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenet texts and we encounter it also in the general presentation of Now the source for the position that for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations is to be found in one of their foremost texts Haribhādra’s Abhisamayālamkāra, the presentation of the elaborate meaning in which it is said, it is precisely on the basis of the fact that all phenomena are conceptual imputations that one engages in generosity and so forth. And there is also another quote to this effect in Gyaltsab Je’s Namshé Nyingpo Gyen, the ornament of the essence of explanations. In brief, if one is going to assert that for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, one must explain what the mode of conceptual imputation in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is and how it differs from that in Now regarding the imputer, we must distinguish between conceptual consciousnesses and mental consciousnesses.

The distinction is that conceptual consciousnesses have an uncommon controlling object, an uncommon controlling condition which is the five sense organs whereas conceptual consciousnesses do not. In other words, the sensory consciousnesses perceive their condition of observation, which is the exterior object, in dependence upon their uncommon controlling condition, which is their corresponding sense organ. Mental consciousness on the other hand has numerous levels of coarseness and subtlety. Generally speaking, the definition of a mental consciousness is a consciousness which arises in dependence on its uncommon controlling condition which is a mental consciousness. Now when we speak of imputation, it is in this context the operation of the mental consciousness not of the sensory consciousnesses.

And as far as conceptuality is concerned, there is indeed conceptuality which is induced by the sensory consciousnesses but such conceptuality is not stable. Now, if we take the example of sleep, not necessarily deep sleep, sleep can only occur when the sense consciousnesses have ceased operating. This is self evident. And we have passages in Buddhist texts which indicate that what remains in the context of sleep is mental consciousness. Now whether consciousnesses such as the dream consciousness are induced by sensory consciousnesses or not is a bit of an open question.

If dream consciousnesses were mental consciousnesses induced by sensory consciousnesses, then probably when the sensory consciousnesses are ceased, the resulting dream consciousnesses would have to cease as well. Now if we take the dream consciousness probably at the time of death, the dream consciousness would necessarily cease. Now, we analyze the three wisdoms, the wisdom arisen from hearing, thinking, and meditating within the context of mental consciousness. All three are mental consciousnesses. Generally speaking, it is a given that if we take the object emptiness, realization of emptiness by a valid cognizer occurs within the context of the wisdom arisen from hearing But both the wisdom arisen from thinking and the wisdom arisen from hearing are mental consciousnesses which are induced by sensory consciousnesses since should the sensory consciousnesses cease, they would cease as well.

Now regarding the wisdom or the mind arisen from meditation, if we were to take it focused on emptiness, then such a mind arises as a result of the wisdom arisen from thinking and has no direct relation probably with the sensory consciousnesses. Therefore, even should these be absent, such a wisdom arisen from meditation can nonetheless be present. Such a wisdom arisen from meditation is the prerequisite for the appearance of the paranormal powers such as telepathy, the recollection of past lives, clairaudience and so forth. Now, why is it the case that the paranormal powers arise within the context of the wisdom arisen from meditation? This is simply the case because the wisdom arisen from meditation is not dependent on sensory consciousnesses.

And sensory consciousnesses themselves are heavily dependent on their object. So we know very well that for ourselves, when sensory consciousnesses are occulted, we sleep. This is something we have direct experience of. Do you understand? Uh-huh, really?

Okay. That’s good. Now in our own case, since we are heavily habituated to sensory consciousnesses, in turn our conceptual activity is induced by sensory consciousnesses. And therefore when sensory consciousnesses cease, in turn we are unable to maintain conceptual activity and we simply fall asleep. The reason for which it is within the context of wisdom arisen from meditation that paranormal powers such as telepathy occur is because it is within this context that the mind is independent of the sensory consciousnesses.

And if one were to generate a motivation wishing for instance to know the thoughts within the mind stream of another person with the requisite concentration this would be possible. It is in dependence on this mind arisen from meditation that one can posit the subtle person specifically within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika this is the position. It is also such a mind arisen from meditation which is said to be the innate mind which can posit phenomena. Specifically as is said, within mental consciousness, the fundamental is the clear light. It is the subtle most consciousness within the various gradations of coarseness and subtlety of mental consciousness. Now, we were to give an injection, let us say of morphine to someone who has generated such a mind arisen from meditation, then the morphine would cause the cessation of all of these sensory consciousnesses.

And obviously someone who had no experience of the mind arisen from meditation would sink into a stupor or a coma. But for someone who has an experience of the mind arisen from meditation, this is not the case. Such a mind is not affected. This is not our case obviously. Then obviously such a mind arisen from meditation implies the person has attained calm abiding.

And clearly such a mind arisen from meditation as was explained could not cease for instance upon receiving an injection of morphine. But this would only be the case if the meditator was focused on the object of meditation. Otherwise, if the meditator was not focused on the object of meditation but was just in a normal state, then an injection of morphine would put an end to awareness which obviously otherwise would be a very strange situation. Now in the context of the generation of the motivation, please reflect on the fact that for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika phenomena exist in dependence on appearing to mind. In other words, phenomena exist as conceptual imputations and please reflect also on the other topics which we covered today.

Generate the motivation within the context of the recitations. First, we do a short meditation Yeah. And then the recitations. Yeah. If you have questions, I will take only two questions tonight.

Please short clear questions. By innate, I mean a mind which arises in someone who is not affected by tenets, which arises naturally. Within mind and mental factors, where does conceptuality fit? There are various types of conceptuality. There is conceptuality which is a main mind and there’s also conceptuality which is a mental factor.

Both exist. Generally speaking within the twin subdivision of sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousnesses, conceptuality is a mental consciousness. So I explained this in the context of sensory consciousnesses and mental consciousnesses so that you could link the conceptuality and see where it fits within these two. And at present discussion by groups of two different from last time please.