Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Kyabje Rinpoche unpacks the central claim of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka—that all phenomena depend entirely on conceptual imputation—by first dismantling Svatāntrika’s position that phenomena maintain independent characteristics. In this 63-minute teaching, he avoids abstract philosophy in favor of lived experience: the inseparable blend of the sense of “I” with conceptuality whenever we think, act, or feel. This understanding resolves the Middle Way between eternalism and nihilism. The session includes substantial Q&A on dependent arising, why Prāsaṇgika (rooted in the second turning) stands as the highest system despite Cittamātra claiming the third turning, dream consciousness versus memory, and the apparent paradox of how a non-existent object of negation can itself be a mere conceptual imputation. For serious practitioners studying Madhyamaka.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-09-15 – KR.mp3
UUID: 12c0a615-9192-4e84-9ef0-89d76f1fc1ae
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Emptiness
Date: 2015-09-15
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,597
So as Je Tsongkhapa says in Drang Nges Legs Bshad Snying Po, the essence of eloquence differentiating the definitive and the interpretable, the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas are unable to posit all phenomena from the standpoint or under the power of conceptuality. What this means is that the Svatantika Madhyamikas are unable to posit all phenomena in dependence on conceptuality. To take for instance a case of form. Form and all phenomena in that category are phenomena which for Svatantika Madhyamaka appear to the sense consciousnesses, to the eye consciousness and in dependence on their appearing to the eye consciousness eventually a conceptual consciousness apprehending them arises. This is not the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka viewpoint.
So the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamikas have a different perspective regarding this. Now as far as the Svatantika Madhyamikas are concerned, Je Tsongkhapa asserts in Legs Bshad Snying Po that the Svatantika Madhyamikas are Madhyamikas. Since they are Madhyamikas, we must be able to posit clearly a distinction between Madhyamikas and Cittamātrins and this distinction is made in terms of other powered phenomena. In other words, impermanent phenomena. For Cittamātra, all other powered phenomena, in other words all impermanent phenomena are truly established.
For Madhyamaka, no other powered phenomenon is truly established. This is the core distinction between Madhyamaka and Cittamātra. Now regarding Svatantika Madhyamaka, Svatantika Madhyamaka is subdivided as you know into two schools. The Svatantika Madhyamaka and the Cittamātra or Yogachara Svatantika Madhyamaka. The instance given of the Yogachara Svatāntrika Madhyamaka would be for instance Haribhādra or Śāntaraksita and his disciple Kamala Śīla.
Now if we were to analyze a bit their position, as they are Svatāntrika Madhyamikas, they are necessarily Madhyamikas. As Madhyamikas, they do not accept that phenomena are truly established. One then has to posit a rationale for they’re not accepting that phenomena are truly established. To say that they consider phenomena are not truly established because they are not established by their own characteristics is inappropriate since all Svatāntrika Madhyamikas consider phenomena to be established by their own characteristics. So as was said, therefore the distinction between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka hinges on the status of other powered phenomena.
For Cittamātra, powered phenomena are truly established. For Madhyamaka, other power phenomena are not truly established. And Svatāntrika Madhyamaka is subdivided into two schools. The Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and the Yogachara Svatāntrika Madhyamaka of whom the foremost instances are Shāntarakshita and his disciple Kamalaśīla. Now in as much as Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla are Madhyamikas, they do not accept that other powered phenomena are established by their own characteristics.
And if one were to inquire why for Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla, the other-powered phenomena are established by their own characteristics, excuse me, are not truly established. One cannot give us rationale because they are established by their own characteristics. So you can see that the viewpoint of the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka School is a very problematical viewpoint. Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla consider that other power phenomena are not truly established and at the same time they assert that they are established by their own characteristics. So from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, if one accepts that phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, it seems very difficult to accept that phenomena are established from their own side since this immediately entails that they are established by their own characteristics and are inherently established.
The issue therefore is what precisely is the mode of imputation of phenomena by mere conceptuality within Prasanika Madhyamaka. So clearly, if Svatāntrika Madhyamaka accepted mere phenomena being merely imputed by conceptuality in the sense in which Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka accepts phenomena being merely imputed by conceptuality. The Svatāntrika Madhyamaka school would go to waste. Would be impossible to differentiate it from Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka. So what is important for us is to understand what precisely is meant in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka by phenomena being merely imputed by conceptuality.
And the key here is that when Prasanika Madhyamaka says phenomena are merely imputed by conceptuality, What they mean is that phenomena depend on conceptuality. So when we therefore speak of phenomena being merely established by conceptuality in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, we mean that phenomena depend upon conceptuality. We actually mean that the mere existence of phenomena depends upon conceptuality. Now in this context, we use conceptuality quite casually and we must discriminate between conceptuality within our own continuum and conceptuality within the continuum of others. So if we take the case of the eye, when we assert that the I is a mere conceptual imputation, what precisely do we mean?
Here referring to the innate I, let us take the example of the students attending this teaching. Some of you are taking notes and some of you are listening attentively. Now those of you who take notes, when you take notes, are you aware that you are taking notes? There’s a sense is a sense of I present within your mind stream. Definitely, you think to yourselves, I am taking notes.
Therefore, the sense of I is blended or mixed with conceptuality. The same thing is the case for those of you who are listening carefully. You are listening to an explanation of Prāsaṇgika and Svatandika Madhyamaka and you ask yourself, have I understood or not? Clearly, that experience is blended with a conceptual notion of I. Then some of you perhaps don’t have a clue what we’re talking about but you were writing down very very carefully and very beautifully all these words and Prāsaṇgika and swatantika but as you were doing this, you also have an experience.
I am writing down very prettily and making little drawings in my booklet. Then when you do this, clearly you have a conceptual experience of the eye which is blended with your experience and this and nothing else is what is meant by the statement that the I is a mere conceptual imputation. Now this viewpoint which is explained by Je Tsongkhapa and Gyaltsab Je in the essence of eloquence can be traced back to Candrakīrti and from Candrakīrti back to Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna. We shall not enter into details because there is no time for this. Then, we can assert unambiguously that despite their great scholarship, Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla were totally unable to posit such an I as a mere conceptual imputation.
For the simple reason that if they had done so, their tenet systems would become null and void since it is impossible to posit an I which is a mere conceptual imputation at the same time as one asserts that the I exists from its own side or by its own characteristics. So set aside all phenomena when you assert all phenomena established by their own characteristics or not established by their own characteristics characteristics and focus on the eye since we all have direct experience of the I. Then when you think I did, I did not do, I forgot, I did not forget, I am good, I am bad. In every single case, that conceptual experience is blended with the I. Then what I apart from that can there be?
And therefore, when Prasanika asserts that the I exists only in dependence on conceptuality, this is formulated technically by saying the I is a mere conceptual imputation or you can also say the I is a conceptual imputation only. This has exactly the same meaning. We know that when we have experiences, we have a sense of an I deep within ourselves. This is recognized by all the lower schools of tenets, but they all assert that under analytical investigation, such an I is found and the instance given of it is none other than the mental consciousness. You can see how different their viewpoint is that from the higher school of tenets for which such an I is unfindable under ultimate analysis.
So when one is endeavoring to identify the object of negation, one must cause this I to appear forcefully. And when it has appeared forcefully, one must ask what its mode of existence is. Now when Prāsaṇgika asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, the term mere refutes the eye specifically being established from its own side. And what it refers to precisely is the basis of imputation of the eye being established from its own side. Now the basis of imputation of the I being established from its own side is a position which is endorsed by all of the lower schools of tenets which identify it with the mental consciousness.
This is refuted within Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka and this is why it is said within Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka that through appearance the extreme of existence is refuted whereas through emptiness the extreme of non-existence is refuted. So when we speak therefore of the I being a mere conceptual imputation or being merely imputed by conceptuality alone within Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, what we mean is that that I which appears for instance, when we have strong emotions, strong experiences, when we experience difficulties and so forth, that I is merely existent in dependence on conceptuality. So if you have understood how the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka presentation of the I as a mere conceptual imputation or as a mere imputation out there counters and refutes the Svatantika view of the I as being established from its own side. Then you will fully understand the presentation of the elimination of the two extremes in Je Tsongkhapa’s Three Principal Aspects of the Path in which Je Tsongkhapa says that through appearance, the extreme of existence is refuted whereas through emptiness, the extreme of non existence is refuted. At present, in the context of generating the motivation or meditation, try to understand the mode of imputation of the I by conceptuality alone based either on my own explanations or on your own understanding and analysis.
We shall meditate on this during a couple of seconds. So clearly it is very much one thing to when we speak of the eye explain its mode of existence in keeping with Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka. It is a totally different matter however, to try to gain an authentic experiential understanding of the mode of existence of the eye. What is the mode of existence of the I? What is the mode of existence for that matter of this house, of a car and so forth?
This mode of existence is intimately blended or mixed with conceptuality. So we shall stop here for today. If you have questions at present, Geshe-la will take a couple questions, short precise questions please. This is in reference to the verse from the Three Principal Aspects of the Path. If appearance eliminates the extreme of permanence and emptiness eliminates the extreme of nihilism, I am Is it is it because it is on the basis in both cases of dependence, a dependent arising?
That appearance is a depending a dependent arising, therefore it is not permanent. And emptiness is a dependent arising therefore it is not nihilism. That’s the question. Is that, is, how does dependence work within that? Broadly speaking, yes, but it is not any dependent arising which is involved.
It is subtle dependent arising. So when one asserts that the I is a dependent arising, dependent here is dependent on what? It is dependent on conceptuality. And this I’s dependence on conceptuality, in other words, its existence in dependence on conceptuality refutes what? It refutes precisely the I being established from its own side.
Further to that, I then have difficulty understanding why emptiness eliminates the extreme of nihilism. So it’s the same thing in the same way as appearance counters the extreme of existence likewise emptiness counters the extreme of non existence or nihilism because once we have understood or posited emptiness, the issue which arises is how do phenomena nonetheless exist. They nonetheless exist terminologically and we have to explain terminological or nominal existence. So in this context, it is really important to start by understanding what the eye is and the mode of existence of the eye. And once we have established that the eye is a mere conception imputation, what we have refuted is precisely the eye existing from its own side.
Then this leads one to an understanding of how emptiness can refute the extreme of eternalism. Extreme of nihilism, excuse me. Okay and another. Geshe-la, this question relates to last week please. I think you talked about the three turnings of the wheel and generally PraPrasangika is regarded as the highest system of tenets but it follows the second turning of the wheel and in the text it says that I don’t think always but at times the third turning of the wheel is considered the highest.
So could you comment on, could you explain that Geshe-la? How the highest system of tenets doesn’t follow the highest turning of the wheel if indeed it is the highest, regarded as the highest turn. I suspect that what you are referring to is the Cittamātra understanding. For Cittamātra indeed as Cittamātra is rooted in the Samdhinirmochana sūtra and the Samdhinirmochana sūtra’s explanation of the three characteristics, the third turning of the wheel of the law is supreme. So you have the famous passage into Tsongkhapa’s in which he quotes the Samdhinirmochana sūtra the passage in which in in which it is said, lana me pa, peerless and so forth.
Okay. Another? Some of us after the teaching last week were discussing issues that came up from the teaching. And we were talking about dream state and how sometimes when you dream, things sense consciousnesses seem to be involved. So how does that does that fit with what Geshe-la was teaching about the dream state being neither a mental nor a sensory consciousness?
It’s like it seems to combine both at sometimes in dreams where there are certain experiences in dreams that seem connected to sense consciousnesses? So how would it be possible to dream let alone to sleep if these sensory consciousnesses were operative? What happens when we fall asleep is that we first enter a state of a state without, within which there is no recollection which is deep sleep. And when we arise from that state of deep sleep, we arise into the dream state. At this point indeed, we have experience such as seeing in the dream, hearing in the dream, we see our parents and so forth.
But this is not based on functioning sensory consciousnesses in the dream state. This is based on previous sensory experiences which have occurred in the waking state which have implanted their potency in the mind and this potency is activated when we dream. These are memories in other words. Memories which are implanted in our mind stream during the waking state. In other words, they arise as conceptions.
And just one question. Thank you. My question is about the object of negation. It seems that the object of negation can’t be a mere conceptual imputation because it doesn’t actually exist. But if anything was gonna be a conceptual imputation, this nonexistent object of negation would seem to be it because it is created entirely by thought.
So I find this difficult to understand. Mere conceptual imputations do not have to be existent. Mere conceptual imputations include both existence and non existence. Therefore, the object of refutation here is a mere conception imputation and is non existent. So during discussion, the topic will be the mode of conceptual imputation of the eye.
In other words, when we have an experience of the I, what is its mode of existence? Let us try to blend this with our own experience. Then by pairs.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- merely labeled tag tsam (Tib)
- The subtlest meaning of dependent arising; every phenomenon exists relatively, or conventionally, as a mere label, merely imputed by the mind. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- three principal aspects of the path lamtso nam sum (Tib)
- The three principal realizations of the lamrim path: renunciation, bodhicitta and the right view (of emptiness). Also the title of a short prayer composed by Lama Tsongkhapa that is commonly recited during prayer services. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.
Questions answered in this teaching
How can dreams include seeing and hearing if the dream state is neither a sensory nor a mental consciousness?
Sleep and dreaming would not be possible if the sensory consciousnesses were operative. When we fall asleep, we first enter deep sleep, a state in which there is no recollection. When we arise from deep sleep, we arise into the dream state. There we have experiences such as seeing and hearing, and seeing our parents. But these are not based on functioning sensory consciousnesses. They are based on earlier sensory experiences from the waking state, which implanted their potency in the mind, and this potency is activated when we dream. These are memories implanted in the mind stream during waking life, so they arise as conceptions.