Entering the Middle Way — 2015-08-25

Entering the Middle Way (Khensur Rinpoche)

Entering the Middle Way — 2015-08-25

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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen delivers a 65-minute detailed exploration of how Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika—the highest Buddhist philosophical school—understands emptiness and the conceptual imputation of the self. Opening with a verse from Candrakīrti and Tsongkhapa, he systematically distinguishes Prāsaṇgika’s understanding of conceptual imputation from lower schools (Svatāntrika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra), showing why each school means something fundamentally different by the term. Using concrete examples—a teacher drinking tea, hearing speech, a student renamed after ordination—he demonstrates how the personal I arises through the conjunction of sensory experience and a conceptualizing mind, and how this understanding directly opposes the Svatāntrika view. He walks through the critical investigation of whether an inherently existing I can be found within the aggregates, and how its unfindability becomes an antidote to desire and anger. The session concludes with Q&A, where practitioners probe tensions between ultimate analysis and conventional validity, and whether a merely imputed I can accumulate karma. Pitched at serious practitioners already familiar with Buddhist tenets debate.

As is said in Āryadeva’s, excuse me, in Candrakīrti’s commentary on Āryadeva’s Chatuhshataka quoted in Tsongkhapa’s Essence of Eloquence, That very nature which is not found is a mere, that mere normal and conceptual imputation that is the object excuse me I repeat the translation that very nature which is not found a mere nominal and conceptual imputation that is the position of our own school. This passage indicates that the object of refutation according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is none other than what actually appears to the sense organs, what appears to exist from its own side. So what precisely is the understanding of real existence in truth according to the other schools of tenets. This real existence in truth is the foremost object of negation of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. Now if we try to understand what this means in the context of the I, we can see that the I’s existing from its own side is the object of negation for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.

On the other hand, if we try to understand what precisely this I is from the standpoint of the lower schools of tenets, we can see that for the lower schools of tenets a Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika understanding of the I entails that the accumulator of karma and the experience of the fruition of karma would not exist. The lower schools of tenets merely refutes the person’s being permanent one and independent. Therefore, the lower schools of tenets assert without exception, and this refers to Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards, an I which is linked to the basis of imputation, the aggregates. And in addition, they assert an I which exists within the basis of imputation, which is none other, generally speaking, than consciousness. Therefore, all the schools of tenets beneath Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika assert an I which exists within the basis of imputation of this I, generally identified with mental consciousness.

They also assert an I which is established by its own characteristics. This very I which is said to be established by its own characteristics is the object of refutation of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. So it is important when one analyzes the positions of these groups of tenets beneath Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, other words from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards, to distinguish clearly what they actually mean by conceptual imputation. Whereas, Svatāntrika Mādhyamika asserts that all phenomena are conceptual imputations and that in addition, the basis of imputation of all phenomena is established by its own characteristics and that therefore phenomena occur at the intersection of a basis of imputation established by its own characteristics and mental imputation. This is not the understanding of conceptual imputation within either Sautrāntika or Cittamātra.

For Sautrāntika, all phenomena are not conceptual imputations. It is only uncompounded phenomena, in other words permanent phenomena, which can be said to be conceptual imputations. Compounded, in other words, impermanent phenomena are not conceptual imputations. For Cittamātra, likewise, all phenomena are not conceptual imputations. Only thoroughly imputed phenomena are said to be conceptual imputations.

It is therefore critical here to differentiate the schools in terms of what is understood by conceptual imputation. Therefore, when we take for instance Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and its assertion that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations and that these conceptual imputations occur at the intersection with the basis of imputation, which is established by its own characteristics. The understanding of conceptuality in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika cannot be the same as the understanding of conceptuality in Sautrāntika or Cittamātra because if this were the same, the understanding of conceptuality were the same, then the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika position would become absurd. Likewise, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika understanding of conceptuality cannot be the same as the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika understanding of conceptuality, because in that case it would be impossible to have a Prāsaṇgika assertion, a phenomenon being mere conceptual imputations from their own side. It is therefore critical to differentiate between the understanding of conceptuality in the various schools of tenets.

So if we take mere conceptual imputation in Sautrāntika and Cittamātra and take as an instance of mere conceptual imputation space, uncompounded space. Uncompounded space is said to be a mere conceptual imputation in Sautrāntika and Cittamātra because it is said to be for those schools merely constructed by the mind, there is nothing from its own side. This is in no way the understanding of conceptual imputation in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika for instance, for which the assertion that an object is a mere conceptual imputation also involves a basis of imputation established by its own characteristics. Likewise, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika assertion that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations implies that phenomena also are established by their own characteristics. Such an understanding of conceptuality is totally incompatible with the Prasanika Mādhyamika understanding of conceptuality since in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika one asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there and this in no way entails phenomena being established by their own characteristics or being established from their own side as in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika.

In this respect, Jamyang Shepa Dorje’s Great Treatise on Tenets gives a critically important point for the understanding of the Prāsaṇgika view of mere conceptual imputation out there or mere conceptual imputation. Jamyang Shepa Dorje says that the conceptuality which is referred to in mere conceptual imputation refers to that mind which has been beginninglessly present within our mind stream and which identifies phenomena saying this is this, this is that, this is blue, this is yellow. This is critically important because it encounters the concept of the I, the innate sense of the I. Now let us take an example, let us for instance take Geshe-la’s drinking a cup of tea. When Geshe-la starts to drink a cup of tea, in dependence on, on the one hand, the hand which is part of the basis of imputation, and on the other hand the conception which thinks I am drinking a cup of tea, there is a connection with the I, isn’t there?

This is the Prāsaṇgika understanding of This is why this mode of generation of the I from conceptuality is something which is totally absent and unexplained within Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. It is specific to Prasanika Mādhyamika and actually dispels the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view. It is precisely because of these contradictions, these inner contradictions in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika that many scholars have said that not all phenomena in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika are mere conceptual imputations and that only uncompounded phenomena are, this is obviously not our dominant position. And therefore, there is a lot of food for thought in this analysis of mere conceptual imputation according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. Once it has been thoroughly understood, there is really no place left for this Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view and it becomes very difficult to understand how to posit basis, path and result according to Svatāntrika Mādhyamika.

So there is a mistake you must be very wary of. It is that of confusing conceptuality in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika with sound conceptuality as it is understood in Sautrāntika. Let us take for instance the case of Lobsang Nima. Before Lobsang Nima was ordained, he was known as Aaron. After ordination, he became known as Lopsanima.

Someone knowing of this mentally refers to Lopsanima as Lopsanima and utters the sound Lopsanima referring to him. This is not in the slightest conceptuality as it is understood within Prasanika Mādhyamika. This is Sautrāntika understanding of conceptuality. If this was Prāsaṇgika’s understanding, Prāsaṇgika would become Sautrāntika. So when you understand that when Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, they are not saying that all phenomena are imputations by sound and conception in the sense of Sautrāntika Mādhyamika or Sautrāntika, excuse me, then you will have progressed in your understanding of Prāsaṇgika.

At this point, referring back to the quote in Candrakīrti’s commentary on Āryadeva’s Chatuhshataka quoted by Tsongkhapa in Drang Nges Legs Bshad Snying Po, which identifies the object of negation according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika with none other than phenomena being established from their own side or phenomena being established by their own characteristics. We can see that contrary wise the position of the lower schools of tenets, in other words Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards is that that I which appears within our consciousness is actually to be found within the basis of imputation. At present what is critically important is to after asserting the existence of the terminological I, understand precisely how such an I exists, what is the mode of existence of this I, and to do this, one must investigate within the basis of designation to find whether or not such an I is found found within the basis of designation. The unfindability of an I established from its own side, of an I which is established by its own characteristics within the basis of designation, is none other than the absence of an inherently existing I. So is this terminologically existing I the self which is sought for within the basis of imputation or not?

Obviously not. This terminologically existing I does exist whereas the self is unfindable within its basis of designation, the aggregates. Therefore, without elaborating extensively, when one seeks for the I within the basis of designation, the aggregates, investigates, investigates, one investigates, and that I remains unfindable. That unfindability of the I does not refer to an unfindability of the terminologically existing I, but an unfindability of the self, the I which is inherently existent within the aggregates. So when upon investigation such an I is not found, what is not found is an I which is autonomous, an I which is inherently existent, an I which is established by its own characteristics.

At this point, this unfindability of the I acts as an antidote or a counter to desire, to anger and so forth. That unfindability under analysis of the I, that is none other than the non-inherent existence of the I, the non-existence of the I from its own side, the non-establishment of the I by its own characteristics. This in turn leads us to the understanding of the terminological I. And in this way the two truths, the subtle conventional truth and the ultimate truth are posited on one basis. At present therefore, what is critical is to understand what the actual mode of existence of this I is and when we assert that this I is a mere conceptual imputation, what exactly is to be understood here by a conception within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika?

Now as I explained previously with the example of drinking a cup of tea, we can extend this example to hearing speech. Let us imagine I hear something. I find during that experience of hearing two events conjoined, hearing and an inner sense I hear. These two lead to the experience of the I. This is the Prāsaṇgika understanding of conceptuality.

So when this understanding of the I as a mere conceptual imputation acts to counter the sense of the I as truly established, that understanding of the I as a mere conceptual imputation counters the understanding of the I as inherently established. So now during a couple of minutes, while we generate the motivation, we should reflect on conceptual imputation within the various schools of tenets, specifically the understanding of conceptual imputation in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika as opposed to the understanding of all phenomena as mere conceptual imputations within Svatāntrika Mādhyamika as opposed to the understanding of conceptual imputation within Sautrāntika and Cittamātra. in dependence on this, we should try to understand the mode by which emptiness entails dependent origination and the mode by which dependent origination entails emptiness, this is said to be the foremost difficulty of Prāsaṇgika. So after this short meditation, we should have the recitations. And after this, I will take questions tonight, only two questions because we’ll run out of time and after that questions and answers.

Sort of questions. Then if you have no questions to ask, we move on because time passes. Is the terminological I findable under ultimate analysis? No. It’s the same thing.

If you seek for the terminologically existent I with an ultimate investigative consciousness, it’s unfindable. Thank you, Geshe-la. On that basis, I have a doubt that the establishment of the terminological I is based on nothing more than an assertion of common sense. Look, we eat. Look, we walk.

Look, we sleep. So there is an I of some sort that exists when in fact, under ultimate analysis, we have destroyed the validity of common sense. If that means that the terminological I is a mere assertion, then how does a mere assertion accumulate karma? Indeed, when we seek for the I with an ultimate investigative or ultimate analytical consciousness, that I is unfindable, what is not found is an I which exists from its own side, an inherently existing I. Yet, based on our experience, we do know that an I exists, this is what walks, what speaks, it is what we know as a terminological I based on your own experience for instance, you know that when you ask a question, someone is asking a question.

You have answered your own question because when you ask a question, ask yourself do you have the experience of yourself asking a question? Is there a conceptuality thinking I ask a question? Now this is connected to the I. Why is experience not a valid basis for ultimate analysis but it is a valid basis for construing a nominal I. It’s like in one situation, experience is not valid, but in another situation, it is valid and I don’t understand who decides that or how that’s decided.

There is no benefit in presenting the view of the lower schools of tenets, which indeed in keeping with what you are saying will assert the existence of an I which is established from its own side. At present we are trying to understand the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view, which says that such an I does not exist at all yet functions. That’s it, not a lot? No half time. Because we went to the Prāsaṇgika system, I don’t want to hear about the lowest grades of tenets.

Another question? So I’m not going to try and refute the Prāsaṇgika view. So Prāsaṇgika says that the So the a mere conceptual imputation appears to the sense you put me off now. The object of refutation appears to the sense consciousnesses, which and the object of refutation is an inherently existent something or other. Now what appears to the sense organs and the sense powers?

It seems that my understanding of this conceptuality thing breaks down at that point because something must appear to the sense power and the sense organ and it follows to me that that something could not be a mere conceptual imputation. So basically your position is correct. It is difficult to see how So while the object of refutation appears to these sensory consciousnesses, it is difficult to see how phenomena being mere conceptual imputations could appear to these sensory consciousnesses. It can only appear to the mental consciousness. Bev, have you a question?

Another, just one. There’s a lot of food for thought in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, a lot. So generally speaking what you are saying is okay, but basically it is heavily connected to Svatāntrika understanding and lower and this is alright, but it’s basically a product of our own experience. Chris? If emptiness entails dependent origination and dependent origination entails emptiness, is emptiness a non implicative negation?

And if so, how can it imply the other? Your doubt is a good one basically under ultimate analytical investigation. The eye is not found and what is not found is the eye which is established from its own side. When one focuses on this unfindability, the terminological eye is entailed. Then indeed, if the terminological I were an affirmative phenomenon, this emptiness of an inherently existing I would no longer be a non affirming or non implicative negation, but would become an implicative negation.

However, I don’t think we can consider the terminological I to be an affirming or affirmative phenomenon. It seems difficult for this to be the case. Then if it were an affirmative phenomenon, clearly the assertion of emptiness as an implicative negation would become very strange. So at present we will have debate or discussion by groups of two as usual different from last time. The two topics are the difference in conceptuality between Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.

When Svatāntrika asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations and Prāsaṇgika asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, what is the difference in conceptuality? The second topic will be the difference in the understanding of conceptual imputation between Sautrāntika and Cittamātra. No? By twos? Yeah.

Yeah.