Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 69-minute talk, Kyabje Rinpoche addresses a question that could seem merely academic: why does the distinction between Buddhist schools matter? He walks through the hierarchy of the four main tenet schools—Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Madhyamaka—showing how each critiques those below it as falling into extremes. Then he reveals the actual purpose: these distinctions serve the practitioner’s goal of abandoning afflictions like anger through reasoned understanding, not faith alone. He examines the “I” and self-grasping, explaining how the self is merely imputed on the five aggregates with no independent essence. He carefully distinguishes the coarse object of refutation—the “I” as permanent and independent—from the subtle one: the “I” as substantially existent. For practitioners with prior study of Buddhist philosophy.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-03-24.mp3
UUID: 5e55d53a-a40b-42fd-8b4a-ae3966754f60
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2015-03-24
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,941
So we will generate the motivation as usual. As Judge Tsongkhapa says in The Essence of Lamrim Chenmo, the purpose of ascertaining tenets is to differentiate between the higher and the lower. This is a very helpful way of looking at things. For instance, if we posit ourselves from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika School, the Cittamātra School is seen as having fallen in an extreme of nihilism. Since the Cittamātra school asserts that form is not established as an exterior entity.
And from the standpoint of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, form is an exterior entity. Therefore, if form were not established as an exterior entity, it will become nonexistent. Likewise, if we posit ourselves at present from the standpoint of the Cittamātra school, the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka school is seen as having fallen into an extreme of nihilism. And this is the case because Svatāntrika Madhyamaka asserts that all phenomena, without exception, are non truly established. And from the standpoint of and this entails that all composite phenomena are not truly established.
Now from the standpoint of Cittamātra, all composite phenomena are truly established in as much as they arise in dependence on causes and existence. To assert their non true establishment is to fall in an extreme of nihilism and it becomes impossible to formulate a mode of existence for composite phenomena. If at present we posit ourselves from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka school is considered to have fallen into an extreme of nihilism. This is the case because Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka asserts that all phenomena, without exception, are not established from their own side nor are they established by their own characteristics. From the standpoint of Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, all phenomena are established from their own side and they are established by their own characteristics.
By asserting that they are not, Prāsaṇgika has fallen into an extreme of nihilism. It’s extremely beneficial to reflect in this way moving upwards and downwards. From the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka looking downwards at the schools of tenets below,, it is clear that the understanding of emptiness in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka is not the same as that in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, which is supreme. Nonetheless, there is great benefit in the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka view which can lead to the correct view. Likewise, from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika, there is benefit in the Cittamātra view as well as in the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika views.
Then is it the case in accordance with the statement in that merely through differentiating these higher and lower schools of tenets, one would have identified the purpose of tenets? This is not the case. In addition, one must clearly differentiate both subtle and coarse selflessnesses in the various schools of tenet. And this is done to clarify what is a suitable and an unsuitable foundation. Ascertain clearly that the supreme purpose, the supreme goal for this study of tenets is to free oneself from the afflictions.
And therefore, if we have time, what precisely is the purpose of such a study of tenets? The purpose of such a study of tenets is to abandon afflictions such as anger and so forth. Now all of us can see the faults of afflictions whether we are a dharma religious practitioner or not, whether we endorse a view or not. All of us, without exception, can see the faults of anger. All of us can see that it is an object of abandonment.
This was explicitly taught by our teacher, Buddha Śākyamūni.
Some twenty five centuries ago. It is, however, not sufficient for ordinary beings such as ourselves to accept this view out of faith. Instead, we must accept through reasoning the idea of the abandonment of the afflictions. And, therefore, we need a rationale, a reason for such an abandonment and cannot merely rely on faith. For that matter, it is difficult to abandon an affliction such as anger by faith alone.
It is through reasoning, through analysis, which lead into meditation that progressively the abandonment of anger is possible. Therefore, the ascertainment of tenets must be done rationally and analytically in this way. All of us can see the faults of anger or of jealousy. They trouble our minds. This sight of the afflictions is what leads us to wish to be free from them, and this wish to be free from them leads us to seek for means therefore.
It’s very powerful, isn’t it, to study a topic such as: thinking, thanks to these studies,, I will annihilate anger, jealousy, and envy. Then when we speak of becoming an Dra in Tibetan is enemy. Jom in Tibetan is to destroy. Who precisely is the enemy? Generally speaking, there are exterior and interior enemies.
But the foremost enemy is that fully characterized enemy which has been our foe since beginningless time, and it is anger. This is what must be overcome. So to imagine that we might annihilate anger, envy, and jealousy in a mere week, month, or even year is ridiculous and a joke. So if we were to take an example, it is obvious that when our contaminated physical aggregates, in other words, our body is afflicted by disease or ailments, In as much as these diseases or ailments arise from exterior physical entities, it is relatively straightforward to be able to abandon them. This is or these are not the means by which one can abandon the internal afflictions which are nonmaterial.
How can we eliminate the afflictions? In as much as the afflictions are related to our consciousness which is an interior phenomenon arise, in other words, in dependence on the mind and are counted as such, the target is a mental phenomenon, and the mental means must be used to eliminate it. Exterior physical means cannot do this. This is how one should look at it. There is food for thought in this, and it is important.
So when we study the Buddhist texts, it is with this as a goal that we should study them and then practice. It is difficult for the mere recitation of one’s commitments and wandering around with the rosary in one’s hands to amount to practice. So all of us have anger within our mental continuum. And once we can see its faults,, the desire to eliminate it, to annihilate it arises. This is, as was said, however, not something akin to exterior physical ailments which can be eradicated by physical means.
Instead, it must be eradicated through thinking, through reasoning and by tracing it back to its root, which is self-cherishing, which abuts or encounters ignorance and grasping at itself. And when we speak of meditation, meditation amounts to this worthy thinking. Apart from such worthy thinking, there is none of this so called meditation. Meditation is nothing else but targeting the afflictions. Apart from targeting the afflictions, there is no such thing as meditation.
You understand? Good. So this is a particularly pleasant way of looking at things and one will definitely gain the accumulation within the two accumulations of wisdom and merit of wisdom. So when we refer to the grasping or the apprehension apprehension of a self, the critical question is whether this is a factually concordant or factually discordant mind. In other words, is this a right or a wrong mind?
When we ask how the predilection or the conception I I arises within our mind stream, At this juncture, when we investigate what is the I, the person, or the self, If we ask ourselves who is engaging in activities when we say I ate, I slept, or I meditated? That I is none other than the nominal or semiotic I. What is its mode of existence? That I is merely imputed on the basis of the aggregates. It is posited or placed on that basis.
Listen carefully. This is important. And if one reflects on it carefully, it is possible to understand it although it is difficult. So if we set aside the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka system for the time being, all the systems of tenets from Svatāntrika Madhyamaka downwards consider that the subtle selflessnesses of persons, in other words, persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities, is a core concept within the selflessnesses of persons. This is actually the uncommon Buddhist Dharma.
If one does not understand this, it is difficult to understand the uncommon Buddhist position. So this I is, in other words, posited, imputed, placed on a basis of imputation which is none other than the five aggregates. So what is the mode of imputation here? In other words, in dependence on what and how is the imputed phenomena imputed on its basis. Let us take an example.
Let us imagine I have gone for a walk for one hour. Then when I say I have gone for a walk, the I is imputed on the walking form aggregate. So we can see without any particular study that when we say I went for a walk, the I in question is imputed on a part of the form aggregate which which engage in the activity of going for a walk. This is something which is self evident. How is that?
It is difficult to understand a topic like this at once. It is through reading about it and studying it carefully, thinking about it for a long time that progressively understanding arises. It doesn’t arise at once. So this is how the I is imputed on the basis of the form aggregate. Now within the five aggregates form, sensation, discrimination, compositional factor and consciousness the second is sensation.
How is the I imputed on the aggregate of sensation? When we experience sensations such as suffering or happiness and let’s say we experience a great feeling of happiness and we say I feel happy, at that point the I is imputed on the aggregate of sensation. Then the imputation of the I on the three remaining aggregates, in other words, discrimination and compositional factor and consciousness proceeds in the same way. Then it is clear that the I arises in dependence on a basis of imputation. It is an imputation on a basis of imputation.
There is therefore no eye which does not arise in dependence on a basis of imputation. If this is the case, then that sense that the I is independent apart from its basis of imputation, that is what we refer to as self grasping or ignorance. And if this is the case, then we can understand through reasoning that the apprehension of an I, self grasping, in other words, is a mistaken state of mind. Then what exactly is this mode of appearance of an I which is not posited in dependence on the aggregates, which does not arise in dependence on the aggregates? This can best be understood through an example, The example of a herd and a herder.
There are numerous herd animals such as horses, oxen, yaks, and so forth. The great pundits of ancient India gave numerous examples such as a herder and his herd, a king and his court, and so forth. So if we take the example of a herd and its herder whether it be, for instance, a flock of sheep and a shepherd or a herd of horses, what is their relationship? In reality, their relationship is one where the herd, let us say of horses, depends on the herder but the herder himself does not depend on the herd. He has power over the herd.
Likewise, what is the mode of appearance of this I? The I appears as if it were independent of the aggregates which are its basis of imputation. So such an I which is blended with the object of refutation such an I, excuse me, is the object of refutation. We can therefore clearly distinguish between this I which appears to be the ruler and the aggregates, its basis of imputation, which are the ruled. Such an I which exists or appears to exist independently of the aggregates, which are its basis of imputation, is none other than the object of refutation.
It’s also very important to reflect on the fact that when we say I, I, this I which is apprehended as existing without relying on the aggregates which are its basis of imputation which gives rise to the predilection of the conception perceiving self in this way, is none other than the object of refutation. Its nonexistence is what is referred to by persons being empty, of being substantially existent autonomous entities. Then this I which appears to exist independently, which appears to exist without relying on anything else as opposed to the I which is imputed on the basis of imputation. This eye is the object of refutation. As this I or this mine increases in strength, likewise, anger and all the afflictions increase as well.
It is this self of a person which is a substantially existent autonomous self whose apprehension exists both within our minds and that of the non-Buddhists and which gives rise to the theory of the self as permanent one and independent. Precisely, when we refer to this I, which is perceived as independent, it is this which is understood by the non-Buddhist Indian philosopher, the Tīrthikas, as both the accumulator of karma and the experience of the fruition of karma. In other words, it is this independent autonomous person which experiences this. Through identifying this, the theory of the person as permanent, one, and independent was developed. In my opinion, the foundation of the distinction made by the lower schools of tenets between the coarse selflessnesses of persons, in other words, persons being empty of being permanent, one, and independent, and the subtle selflessnesses of persons, in other words, persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities, is rooted in reasoning.
So I have finished what I wanted to explain. This is the topic I would like you to reflect upon when you have a moment. It is precisely for this reason that we study tenets since meditation must be targeted against the afflictions and there is no higher meditation than one targeted against the afflictions. And if this is the goal of the study of tenets, the study of tenets becomes a very weighty topic. If you have good questions, please ask them.
Yours is a good question, but you must be aware of the fact that in the Cittamātra system, it is not the case that whatever is truly established necessarily arises in dependence on causes and conditions. For instance, the truth of cessation is truly established but does not arise in dependence on causes and conditions. On the other hand, what the Chitamatros do say is that what arises in dependence on causes and conditions is necessarily truly established. In other words, all of the other powered phenomena or the composed phenomena are necessarily truly established. So when you say that the person rises from its basis of imputation, this is quite problematical.
The person is posited on its basis of imputation. The person is imputed on its basis of imputation. Therefore, the person is of one nature with its basis of imputation. If it is of one nature with its basis of imputation, it is not possible to say it arises from its basis of imputation. Another question?
Would you you repeat your question in a more concise form? So I will re explain this. It is a difficult topic. It arises from a misunderstanding between the notion of establishment by its own characteristics in Cittamātra and establishment by its own characteristics in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka. For the Cittamātra School of Tenets, establishment by its own characteristics means that a phenomena is not a mere conceptual imputation but arises in dependence on causes and conditions.
This is not the understanding establishment by its own characteristics in the Svatantika Madhyamaka school. Even though exactly the same term is used, the meaning is completely different. For Svatantika Madhyamaka, as I explained, the meaning of establishment by its own characteristics is that phenomena are the collection of, on the one side, the mind imputing something on phenomena and from the other side, phenomena existing by their own characteristics. There can be no, in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, no existence of phenomena by their own characteristics without a mind imputing the designated object on its basis of designation and there can be no imputation of the designation on its basis of designation without the own characteristics of the phenomena. The two are inseparable.
Then the metaphors which are used for emptiness in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka are different, and this is quite significant. In Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, the mode of existence of phenomena is said to be akin to a magician’s illusion. Whereas in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, the mode of existence of phenomena is said to be akin to a multicolored rope mistaken for a snake. Your question arises from a confusion between the Cittamātra understanding of establishment by its own characteristics and Svatāntrika Madhyamaka’s understanding of the same, I will cover the topic again because it’s a difficult one. So your topic of discussion for today is the distinction between the coarse and the subtle object of refutation in the context of the selflessnesses of persons for the lowest schools of tenets, in other words, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika.
The coarse object of refutation is persons being permanent one and independent. The subtle object of refutation is persons being substantially existent autonomous entities. And I would like you to differentiate independence and autonomy in this context. Then we will start these discussions by two different groups as last time.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- self-grasping dag dzin (Tib)
- The mind that apprehends the self as inherently existent. This refers to both the self of persons and the self of phenomena. LYWA
- Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- two accumulations sambharadvaya (Skt); tsog nyi (Tib)
- Also called the two collections or two types of merit, they are: the merit of virtue, which develops the method side of the path by practicing generosity and so forth, and the merit of (transcendental) wisdom... LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.