Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 69-minute teaching, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen unpacks the competing claims to the “middle way” across four major Buddhist philosophical schools — Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. For each school, he maps out which extremes (eternalism or nihilism) it accuses the others of falling into, what each claims as the true middle ground, and what each identifies as the subtle object of refutation. The core teaching focuses on Svatāntrika Mādhyamika’s unusually abstract position: that phenomena exist through both appearing to mind and possessing uncommon characteristics from their own side — a view neither Cittamātra’s realism nor Prāsaṇgika’s radical non-affirmationism accepts. The discussion includes a live Q&A in which students work through the logical tensions between these positions. For serious students of Buddhist philosophy and tenet study.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-03-17.mp3
UUID: 8079a9f7-30c4-4fe4-aed3-988081c7fe32
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2015-03-17
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,132
Us generate the motivation for these teachings. So each system of tenet has its own presentation of a middle way from freed from both extremes? For instance, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika system of tenets have their own presentation of a middle way free from the extreme of eternalism and nihilism. If we take, for instance, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika schools, what would be the extreme of permanence in which one would fall for these two schools? The extreme of permanence in these two schools would be someone who does not accept death and impermanence and who asserts the establishment of a self, one who has succumbed to that extreme would have fallen in the wrong view of the extreme of permanence.
And in as much as asserting the establishment of self is none other than the apprehension of a self, one who has asserted this is not in the middle way. Then if we take the Cittamātra school of tenets, it would be seen probably as having succumbed to an extreme of nihilism by the Sautrantikas since Cittamātra asserts the nonexistence of exterior objects. In other words, asserts that forms are not established as exterior objects From the standpoint of Sautrāntika, if one asserts that form is not established as an exterior object, one probably asserts that it does not exist. Therefore, karma and causality cannot exist either. And therefore, from the standpoint of both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, which is the middle between the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism, precisely the view of their own school, which enables one to attain both liberation and full enlightenment.
And therefore, for Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, the subtle most object of refutation is the self of a person, and likewise, the subtle most selflessness is the subtle selflessness of persons, persons being empty, of being substantially existent autonomous entities. Now passing onwards to Cittamātra, Cittamātra also asserts the existence of a middle way path, a middle between the extremes. And therefore, from the standpoint of the Cittamātra school, there are two extremes, the extreme of permanence and nihilism one should not succumb to. Who would have succumbed to the extreme of permanence or eternalism from the standpoint of Cittamātra? Precisely the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas in as much as they assert the existence of exterior objects, of form constituted of exterior objects, and of form composed of a conglomerate of indivisible atoms.
And therefore, in this system, the assertion of the non exterior existence of forms, of forms not establishment, not being established as an exterior entity, is critical for the attainment of full enlightenment. Then according to Cittamātra, who would have succumbed to the extreme of nihilism? Precisely the Madhyamikas. Since the Madhyamikas assert that other powered phenomena, in other words, things or composite phenomena, are not truly established and are not established by their own characteristics. Then such a view from the standpoint of Cittamātra is a particularly obnoxious view since through refuting that other powered phenomena are established by their own characteristics or are truly established, one refutes that they arise independent on causes and conditions.
If one refutes that they arise independent on causes and conditions, then one eliminates the totality of what is to be abandoned and what is to be practiced. In other words, the totality of what is to be abandoned and practiced within the Four Noble Truths. So whose view precisely according to Cittamātra is the middle way bereft of the extremes of permanence and nihilism? None other than the very view of the Cittamātra school of an emptiness of nonduality of form and the consciousness perceiving form. And therefore, is the object of refutation within the Cittamātra school?
None other than the existence of exterior objects. In other words, forms establishment as an exterior object. And what is the subtle most emptiness? None other than the subtle emptiness of phenomena. It is therefore extremely important when one studies tenets to be able to clearly understand for each school of tenets the formulation of a middle way bereft of the extremes of permanence and nihilism.
Then let us move onwards to the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika School. What is within the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika School? The school which asserts the mere conventional existence of phenomenon, the path which is bereft of the extremes of permanence and nihilism. For Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, who has first succumbed to the extreme of permanence? The Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrantikas and the Cittamātrins.
Since all three assert the existence of other powered phenomena or composite phenomena, in other words, impermanent phenomena, are truly established. In the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika school, this assertion that other powered phenomena are truly established is considered as a very low assertion. It is a low assertion because it is fallacious. And as for so long as one accepts such a fallacious assertion, one will be unable to attain full enlightenment. The view of the emptiness of duality, in other words, non duality, does not enable one to attain full enlightenment in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika.
Now within the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika system of tenets, what is the extreme of nihilism? The extreme of nihilism is none other than the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view, since Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika asserts that not only other powered phenomena, but all phenomena without exception are not only not established from their own side, but they are not established by their own characteristics nor are they inherently established. Then from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, this entails that all phenomena without existence are non existent. If they are non existent, there is no foundation for the practice of virtue and the abstention from sin. In other words, there is no basis for basis, ground and path.
So Svatāntrika Mādhyamika debates Prāsaṇgika asserting that with such a viewpoint as yours, in other words, the one that all phenomena are not inherently established or not established by their own characteristics, there is no liberation. And even though Prāsaṇgika does not accept this, these are the oppositions Svatāntrika addresses to Prāsaṇgika. Then according to Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, which is the middle way bereft of the extremes of permanent nihilism, none other than their own view, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view, according to which all phenomena without exception are not truly established. There is much food for thought when one reflects on assertions such as the assertion that theirs is the middle way bereft of the extremes of permanence and nihilism. Who precisely has succumbed to the extreme of permanence?
Who precisely has succumbed to the extreme of nihilism? Why precisely and in which way is their view the middle way between these two extremes? Now when one tries to understand this middle way from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, one must understand the ultimate view of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. In other words, one must understand what the object of refutation for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is. It is true establishment.
Now this is not something which must merely be understood verbally. This is something which must be understood from within the mind. As Śāntideva says in Bodhicaryāvatāra, there is no hope to understand emptiness without understanding initially its object of refutation or negation. And therefore, to understand the emptiness of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, one must in this initially from within one’s mind understand its object of refutation. Now from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika school, what is the subtlest emptiness?
None other than the subtle selflessness of persons. What is its object of refutation? The self of persons. Who asserts the self of persons, the non-Buddhist outsiders? From the standpoint of the Cittamātra school, what is the object of refutation?
None other than the exterior establishment of other powered phenomena. Who asserts this? None other than Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. And if we analyze in this way, there is food for thought in understanding what the subtle most object of refutation of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika is and what the subtle most object of refutation of Cittamātra is. Then moving onwards to the Svatāntrika Madhyamica system, when it is said that the extreme of permanence from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is precisely that assertion of Cittamātra, that other powered phenomena are truly established, the question arises, is the true establishment of other powered phenomena the object of refutation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika or not?
Then, if it were the case if it were the case that the object of refutation was precisely that assertion of Cittamātra, that other powered phenomena are truly established. Since what Cittamātra means when it says that other powered phenomena are truly established is that they are established independent on causes and conditions, this is after all something which Svatāntrika Mādhyamika accepts too. So Svatantika Mādhyamika would be taking some of its own tenets as objects of refutation. And so what precisely is the subtle most object of refutation within Svatāntrika Mādhyamika? Is it the Cittamātra assertion that other powered phenomena are truly established?
And if it is, does this mean that Svatāntrika Mādhyamika does not accept that other powered phenomena are established in dependence on causes and conditions? So since we are at present studying Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, what interests us is the uncommon position of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. Svatāntrika Mādhyamika’s uncommon object of refutation. In other words, the uncommon object of the view of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika or if you prefer that of which emptiness is empty of in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. Let us therefore reflect for two and three two or three minutes on the uncommon object of refutation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika and try to identify it.
So the transcribers can get their questions, please speak into the microphone loudly. The mere imputation of objects. I was trying to refute the the the view that objects are just mere imputations. And the the both the Svatāntrika and Mādhyamika say that they’re established, I think, by their own characteristics. Another question.
Another person. Actually, it’s been bothering me as well, but the the the the only thing I can work out is that from the Cittamātra perspective, they don’t deny that that phenomena can be established by their own characteristics, at least from what Geshe la has presented. So I’m assuming that’s what the difference is. So with other power phenomena, that that can arise with Chitamatrins and with Svatāntrika Madhyamikas. The difference is that with the latter, they don’t believe that you can identify it through establishing both their own characteristics.
They don’t believe that other powered phenomena are established by their own characteristics. It cannot be established by their own characteristics. Understanding from what you told us last week is that the the view is that an an object has something from its own side and also from the imputation of the apprehender. And therefore, it’s a conjoining of the two, in which case, there must be something there. You can’t say that there isn’t.
Otherwise, they wouldn’t you can’t say there’s a conjoining of any sort. Was the question the object of refutation for the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas? So the object of refutation for the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas seems to me assigning true existence for for any reason. So in other words, naming something as truly existent, that naming of true existence seems like it might be the object of refutation. So the ultimate The ultimate viewpoint, the ultimate object of refutation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is rather strange.
If take Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the view of prasanika Mādhyamika, the ultimate view, is completely rooted in the 100,000 verse, the 25,000, and the 8,000 verse Perfection of Wisdom sutras. The ultimate view of Cittamātra on the other hand is completely rooted in the third turning of the wheel of the law. In other words, specifically in the Samdhinirmochana Sūtra. The ultimate view of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is not rooted in one specific sūtra or the other. And therefore, an understanding of the view of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika necessarily passes through an understanding of its object of refutation.
This is very important. So the question which arises is whether the Cittamātra assertion of other powered phenomena as truly established is the object of refutation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika or not. Now if we posit ourselves from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, then we would say to a Chitamatrin, it follows that this subject space is established And then the doubt which arises from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is that it takes the subject space and posit Cittamātra assertions on the basis of space. Does Cittamātra understand that space is truly established because it arises in dependence on causes and conditions? If it does, Cittamātra has moved towards a misunderstanding of space.
In addition, it is not easy for us to understand the object of refutation or negation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika because Svatāntrika Mādhyamika asserts that all phenomena are established by their own characteristics, established from their own side, and inherently established. In addition, to assert that the object of refutation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is in accordance with Cittamātra’s understanding of mere conceptual imputation is difficult. This is why it is said that the object of refutation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is the uncommon mode of abiding of phenomena in addition to being mentally imputed. In other words, Svatāntrika Madiameka asserts that its uncommon refutation of object of refutation is phenomenas abiding by their own uncommon characteristics uncommon mode of abiding, excuse excuse me, without being merely without merely appearing to the mind since the view of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is precisely the opposite of this. Then difficulties arise since is asserting that the object occurs at the intersection of merely appearing to the mind while having a mode of abiding.
So you must reflect on the meaning of appearing to the mind. So what is to be understood for positing through appearing to the mind is to be analyzed in the context of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. This is best understood through an example. Let us take the example of an illusion. An illusion arises in dependence on pebbles and sticks.
On the one hand, the pebbles and the sticks are the substance which have the capacity or the potency to give rise to the illusion. But in addition, these pebbles and sticks which have the capacity to give rise to this must be perceived by the eye consciousness. The illusion arises at the intersection of the two. So the substances, the pebbles and the twigs on the basis of which a magician causes horses and elephant to appear must exist for this act to occur. Likewise, it is also necessary for the eye consciousness of the perceiver who observes a spectacle to be affected for instance by mantra so that pebbles and sticks are seen as elephants and horses.
Therefore, from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, both the mode of abiding of phenomena from its own side as well as being posited by the mind to which they appear is necessary for the existence of phenomena. This is rather difficult, isn’t it? So you can understand that phenomena exist through being posited by the appearance to the mind which perceives them as well as through existing in dependence on their own characteristics from their own side and so forth. Therefore, the uncommon object of refutation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is phenomena merely existing in dependence on their own characteristics without existing in dependence on a mind to which they appear. As I said in clarifying the thought, the fact that a vase is established by a valid cognizer is not sufficient for the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika to establish that the vase is posited through appearing to a mind.
When one understands this, one has understood the crux of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. If you have questions about this, now is the time to ask them. So the debate in Clarifying the Intent is a debate between those who or the realists, we would say. In other words, from the Buddhist standpoint, the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and Cittamātra and the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. The realists assert that phenomena are established by a valid cognizer because they appear as being posited through appearing to a mind.
The Svatāntrika Mādhyamika asserts that there is a provision. Then if one does not read this several times, one will not understand it. So what is important to understand the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view is to understand what mind is being referred to when one says that phenomena are posited through appearing to mind. It is clearly not a valid cognizer. There is no provision as was said in Clarifying the Intent.
Is it or is the mind being referred to here conceptuality or not? This is something one must analyze. And if you have questions, please ask your questions. I have a lot of problem with the idea of the co joining of the mind apprehending the object and the object being the interaction between the two. What I just don’t understand is on what basis do the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas assert that the object has some mode of abiding, in particular, its own characteristics?
Because I just don’t understand how they can say that yet also say objects aren’t truly established. Yes. In Cittamātra, whatever is established by its own characteristics is truly established. Obviously, in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, nothing is established by its own characteristics nor is anything truly established. Another?
Yeah. Perhaps I need to rephrase my question. I do not understand the basis of the of the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika argument, how they assert objects have an uncommon mode of abiding. That is the crux of my question. So when we speak of the common mode of abiding of a phenomenon such as a table in front of me, we are referring to from the standpoint of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, this table existing at the intersection or at the conjunction of appearing to the mind which posits it from the one side and being established by its own characteristics from the other side.
However, when we refer to the uncommon mode of abiding of the table, we are referring to the table existing exclusively by its own characteristics, which is not accepted in this system. Whereas in Cittamātra, for instance, the table is asserted to have an uncommon mode of existence with it which is it’s being established by its own characteristics. If it if it has its own characteristics, then it has to be truly established. That is true both in Cittamātra and in Prāsaṇgika. Both Cittamātra and Prāsaṇgika consider being established by its own characteristics and being truly established as synonymous.
Svatāntrika does not consider them as synonymous and considers there’s a difference. So we shall stop here and at present have the discussion sessions two by two. And the topic is present the extremes of permanence and the extreme of nihilism in all of the schools of tenets, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. Then by groups, by twos, as usual, different partners from last time.
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- four noble truths denpa zhi (Tib)
- The subject of the Buddha's first turning of the wheel of Dharma. The truths of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path to the cessation of suffering as seen by an arya. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- mantra ngag (Tib)
- Literally, mind protection. Mantras are Sanskrit syllables usually recited in conjunction with the practice of a particular meditational deity and embody the qualities of that deity. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
- two extremes tha nyi (Tib)
- Eternalism, seeing things as having an intrinsic reality, and nihilism, seeing things as having no reality at all. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.