1 h 18 min · 2,827 words · 16 September 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 78-minute talk on Buddhist tenets, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen explores the critical distinction between implicative and non-implicative negations, foundational to understanding the Buddhist philosophical schools’ differing views on emptiness. Using concrete examples—a table’s emptiness of permanence, a place bereft of water, the statement “bhikshus do not drink alcohol”—he walks through the key definitions: negations understood by directly eliminating their object of negation versus affirmations grasped without such elimination. He then subdivides implicative negations into direct (a plain lacking mountains), indirect (the plump Devadatta who doesn’t eat by day, implying he eats at night), mixed, and contingent categories, before contrasting these with non-implicative negations that merely exclude something without implying an affirmation. A substantial Q&A session addresses subtle cases where the subject appears to be implied, clarifying when a negation remains non-implicative despite containing a conceptual reference to the subject. Suited to practitioners studying Buddhist logic and the Gelug tenet system.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2014-09-16.mp3
UUID: 6412dfb8-260a-4dce-9a26-513ef0f1d202
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2014-09-16
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,824
So as usual, we will generate the motivation for receiving these teachings. Today we will present the profound but difficult topic of negations, implicative and non implicative negations. Generally speaking, the Buddhist view within tenets is presented in terms of the views of the respective schools of tenets, and the differentiation between subtler and coarser views are differentiations between subtler and coarser views of emptiness. Emptiness is an emptiness of something. It is an emptiness of its object of negation.
Therefore, the identification, the meaning of the object of negation is extremely important. This can only be done through introducing initially the distinction between affirmations and negations. As you remember, when we talked of phenomena, existence or objects of knowledge, we said that objects of knowledge were divided into permanent and impermanent phenomena and this was an exclusive division. Likewise, objects of knowledge can also be divided into affirmations and negations or affirmative and negative phenomena. There is not a single object of knowledge which is not either a permanent or an impermanent phenomenon, nor which is not either an affirmation or a negation.
And the definition of a negation is that which is realized by means of the conception which apprehends it directly eliminating its object of negation. Likewise, the definition of an affirmation is that which is realized by means of the conception which apprehends it, not directly eliminating its object of negation. Now it is best to understand this through examples and let us take therefore the example of the small table in front of myself. When we say that this small table is empty of being permanent, empty of being permanent is a negation. It is a negation which has an object of negation or a negandum.
This object of negation is the table’s being permanent. Therefore, we say that the table is empty of being permanent, we are saying that the table is not permanent. Therefore, when we assert that this table is empty of being permanent, this is indeed a negation. As a negation, it is that which is realized by means of the mind which apprehends it directly eliminating its object of negation. What is the object of negation which is directly eliminated here?
It is the table’s being permanent. This is directly eliminated by the negation, the table is empty of being permanent. What is indirectly eliminated by this negation? In other words, what is implied? What is implied here is the tables being impermanent.
The table on the other hand is an affirmation or an affirmative phenomenon because we do not need to understand it to exclude a negation. It satisfies the definition of an affirmative phenomenon which is that which is realized by means of the mind apprehending it, not directly eliminating its object.
Of negation, and we can therefore understand the table as a support on which cups and so forth can be placed. Negations are subdivided into two, and this subdivision is an exhaustive subdivision. Negations are subdivided into implicative and non implicative negation. Whatever is a negation is necessarily either an implicative or a non implicative negation. So what is the definition of an implicative negation?
An implicative negation is a negation of the conception or the sound of which it is being apprehended by. After negating it impels one to understand an affirmation. This is the definition of an implicative negation. It will be easy to understand if it is explained like this. As was mentioned, negation is a phenomenon which is understood through the direct exclusion of its object of negation.
If after the direct exclusion of its object of negation, what is left is an affirmation or an affirmative phenomenon, then we are dealing with what has been called an implicative negation. If on the other hand what is left is not an affirmation but a mere negation, then we are dealing with a non affirming with a non implicative negation. So if we take as example the tables being empty of being permanent, this is a negation whose object of negation directly is the tables being permanent. However, the process of negation whereby we eliminate the tables being permanent indirectly implies something else. It indirectly implies that the table is impermanent.
This impermanence of the table is an affirmative phenomenon and therefore the table’s emptiness of being permanent can be called an implicative negation. Implicative negations can be subdivided into four categories in function of the implied phenomenon. There are direct implicative negations, indirect, implicative negations, indicative negations which are both direct and indirect, and contingent or occasional implicative negations. So let us give examples for the two first categories. A direct implicative negation’s example would be, for instance, a plain which is bereft of mountains or a place which lacks water.
If we take the example of a place which lacks water, the object of negation is water. When we negate the presence of water, we however directly understand the existence of the place, which is an affirmation. Therefore, this is a direct implicative negation. Now the example of an indirect implicative negation would be the fat Devadatta who does not eat by day. The fat Devadatta who does not eat by day is a negation.
Is a negation, and it obviously negates Devadatta’s eating by day. But unless one is mentally incompetent, it is self evident that if Devadatta is plump and is not eating by day, he must be eating by night, and this is what is indirectly implied. The an example of the third subdivision of implicative negations are implicative negations examples of implicative negations, are both direct and indirect. The example traditionally given is the fat Devadatta who doesn’t eat by day and, in addition, is not goat. The fat Devadatta who does not eat by day is a clear instance, as previously mentioned, of an indirect implicative negation and who is not a goat is a clear instance of a direct implicative negation.
The final example, contingent implicative negations would, for instance, be king Akhtarjuna, this refers to Buddha Śākyamūni, who is neither of the Brahmin or of the Kshatriya or royal caste and excuse me. King Ashoka, in other words, Buddha Śākyamūni, who is neither of the Brahmin or of the royal caste and is not of the Brahmin caste. Now moving onwards to non implicative negations, the definition of a non implicative negation would be a negation which implies only a negation and does not imply an affirmation, unlike implicative negations in other words. And a good example of a non implicative negation would be the following case. The negation In this temple there is no elephant merely excludes there being an elephant in this temple.
It in no way implies anything else. It does not imply that we are in the temple. It does not imply that there are donkeys or horses or dogs in the temple. It merely states the absence of elephants in this temple. Therefore, if we now analyze the difference between nonimplicative and implicative negations, Both are similar in as much as both are negations which negate an object of negation.
The difference arises within our minds whether this process of negation in the case of implicative negations implies another affirmation or whether this process of negation does not imply another affirmation. So at present, it is up to us to apply these definitions to cases we know, and we will find numerous examples.
Then there is one difficult case which I would like to address at present. It is mentioned in texts of Buddhist logic. It is a following example. Brahmans do not drink alcohol or bhikshus, that is Buddhist monks, do not drink alcohol. Now generally speaking, when we say bhikshus do not drink alcohol, clearly, this is a negation.
And when we utter this negation, bhikshus do not drink alcohol, what do we negate? We negate bhikshus drink alcohol. This is the object of negation. But it is clear that the mind which apprehends the negation, Bhikshus do not drink alcohol, does encounter the concept of Bhikshus, whether this is apprehended by a conceptual mind or verbally uttered. In this case, can one say that the negation bhikshus, do not drink alcohol implies bhikshus?
And if it does, instead of being a non implying, a non implicative negation as is taught in our text, it would become an implicative negation. So analyze this carefully. There is no difference between the two examples. Brahmins do not drink alcohol and bhikshus do not drink alcohol. It’s the same principle at work.
But what you can see if you analyze is that one, the mind which apprehends bhiksus do not drink alcohol does ascertain bhikshus; bhikshus are not implied by the force of the negation bhiksus do not drink alcohol. For this reason, one can say that this is a non implicative negation. Then it is clear that to the mind which apprehends the negation do not drink alcohol, the act of negation of bhikshus drinking alcohol in no way causes the appearance of the conception bhikshus drink water or bhikshus drink milk. It merely causes the appearance of the conception bhikshus do not drink alcohol. Therefore, the negation itself in no way implies an affirmation over and beyond what it initially contains.
If this is the case, it can be said to be a non implicative negation. Then if you have questions, please ask your questions now. Chris? Let me pass it. You don’t have to stand up all the time.
Yeah. That’s okay. I’m just a very bit a bit of a slow student. Please, could some of the definitions just be repeated? So the ones that I missed the entire sentence of were the definition of negation, the definition of affirmation, and also the definition of the implicative negation.
So the definition of a negation is that which is realized by means of the conception which apprehends it, directly eliminating its object of negation. Now there are numerous other definitions of negations. For instance, there’s a different definition of negation in Gyaltsab Rinpoche’s clarifying the path to liberation, thar lam gsal byed, but I would not enter into these other definitions here. The meaning is however always the same. If we take the example of the tables being empty, of being permanent, this is a negation because it directly eliminates what?
It directly eliminates the tables being permanent. Therefore, it is a negation. The definition of an affirmation, on the other hand, is that which is realized by means of the conception which apprehends it, not directly eliminating its object of negation. For instance, the table in front of me is an affirmation because to understand this table, it is unnecessary to eliminate objects of negation such as the tables not being permanent, the tables being permanent and so forth. So what is the definition of an implicative negation?
An implicative negation is a negation and in addition either the conception the sound apprehending it implies with respect to the mind another affirmation. Now if we take the example, for instance, of the table in front of myself being empty of being permanent, then what is directly negated by this negation is this table’s being permanent. However, indirectly, the statement the emptiness of the table’s being permanent implies the table’s being impermanent, which is an affirmation. Therefore, the emptiness of the tables being permanent is an is an implicative negation. Finally, if we take non implicative negations, or the example I gave of a non implicative negation is the absence of an elephant in this temple.
This is a negation. It directly negates what? It directly negates the presence or the existence of an elephant in this temple. However, indirectly, it does not imply anything. Therefore, it is a non implicative negation.
What are the other questions? For Sam, if you could pass the microphone back. With the, question around bhikshus who do not drink alcohol, is the corollary opposite valid in which if you do drink alcohol you’re not a bhikṣu, and does that make it a negate does that negate? We can’t make an implicative statement. Does it turn into an implicative negation is what you ask?
Even if that were the case, your reverse proposition, if one drinks alcohol, one is never a bhikṣu, is a negation and therefore this would not be an implicative negation. Since it is a non-implicative negation, what is implied must be an affirmation. I’m afraid you lost me towards the middle. Alright. Now Maybe stop.
Think carefully and repeat your question in in in few terms. Right. Now you said that So let us take the example. The monk does not drink alcohol. That’s a negation.
So let us take the negation. The monk does not drink alcohol. The object of negation is the monk drinks alcohol. And then we had a question about affirming negations. So the negation, the monk
Does not drink beer in no way implies the existence of the monk because if that were the case, every single negation would actually become an affirming, an implicative negation. It’s contingent on the muck drinking alcohol to imply that the muck exists. So how the monk must always be doing something, so it’s contingent on an activity. The object is contingent on activity for it to be negated. How is that not a contingent negation?
No. The negation, bhikshus do not drink alcohol is not a contingent indicative negation because it is always true. A contingent indicative negation is a negation which is contingent on time. Sometimes it’s true, sometimes it’s not true. The statement, Bhikshus, do not drink alcohol is a general prescriptive statement.
So there really can be a little debate about monks not drinking alcohol not being an implicative negation. Then one must analyze whether it is contingent or not. Just to clarify a response that you gave earlier to Sam. So were you stating that the comment, the statement that the monk does not drink beer in no way establishes the existence of the monk? Okay.
Therefore, if you make the statement, Romans do not drink alcohol, that does not also establish the existence of Romans. In order for it to establish the existence of the subject matter, if we have to make an extra statement such as Brahmans are sentient beings. And some and then you can say Brahmans do not drink alcohol. Some and the conclusion would be some people do not drink alcohol. And that would therefore establish the existence of of of Brahmins.
So the sound stating or the verbal statement, Brahmins do not drink alcohol or the conception apprehending Brahmins do not drink alcohol in no way implies that Brahmins are observed by a valid cognizer, in other words that Brahmins exist. Nor does it imply that Brahmins are not observed by a valid cognizer and that Brahmins do not exist. This statement Brahmins do not drink alcohol is a negation because it negates Brahmins drinking alcohol. If it were an implicative negation at the time of the negation of Brahmins do not drink alcohol, when of Brahmins drink alcohol excuse me. I will I will start again.
If it it is indeed a negation and the statement Brahmins do not drink alcohol, when the object of negation Brahmins drink alcohol is negated, if at that point Brahman’s existence were to arise within the mind as a direct result of this negation, then the negations Brahmins do not drink alcohol would be an implicative negation. But this is not the case. Generally speaking, your question about the existence or nonexistence of the Brahmin in this context is a good question, but it is not the real focus of the debate. The focus of the debate is whether statements or thoughts such as Brahmins do not drink alcohol imply Brahmins or not. Then clearly the statement Brahmins do not drink alcohol verbally states Brahmins.
The question which arises is are Brahmins implied or not and this is a topic of debate. In the self same way, for instance, when the example was given of plains which are bereft of mountains being an implicative negation. Mountains are the object of negation. In such a case, plains are the implied object. This is why Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen said in his text, the Essence of Eloquence, differentiating the interpretable and the definitive. In the statement, Brahmins do not drink alcohol, the basis of the debate is whether or not Brahmins are implied or not.
And therefore, at present, please start debating on the topic of implicative and non implicative negations, their respective objects of negation, and in the case of implicative negations, what they imply. By twos, as usual, not with the same person as last time. So I just keep the October two days in mind. The teaching on dependent origination. Thank you.
Key terms in this teaching
- dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
- Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
- Gelug
- The Virtuous Order. The order of Tibetan Buddhism founded by Lama Tsongkhapa and his disciples in the early fifteenth century and the most recent of the four main schools of Tibetan Buddhism. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- tenet system drubtha(Tib)
- A general term for a religious and/or philosophical system, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist. It is often used as shorthand to refer to the four major Buddhist tenet systems that emerged from India. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.
Questions answered in this teaching
What are the definitions of negation, affirmation, implicative negation and non-implicative negation in the Tenets teachings?
A negation is that which is realized by the conception apprehending it by directly eliminating its object of negation. For example, the table's being empty of being permanent is a negation because it directly eliminates the table's being permanent. An affirmation is realized by the conception apprehending it without directly eliminating an object of negation; the table itself is one. An implicative negation is a negation that also implies another affirmation. The emptiness of the table's being permanent implies the table's being impermanent.