Tenets — 2014-09-09

1 h 16 min · 2,781 words · 9 September 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets — 2014-09-09
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 76-minute lecture on Sautrāntika tenets, Kyabje Rinpoche focuses on reflexive consciousness—the principle that distinguishes Sautrantikas from Vaibhāṣikas and explains how we know we are perceiving. He structures the teaching through three outlines: why reflexive consciousness must exist (consciousness itself requires something to perceive it, just as external objects require consciousness to perceive them); its definition—an inward-oriented consciousness that apprehends consciousness itself non-conceptually and unmistakably; and its proofs, grounded in memory. He illustrates this with a concrete example: when we encounter a watch we saw years before and remember it, something must have experienced that original perception—the reflexive consciousness. The Q&A addresses major objections, including the infinite-regress problem and how reflexive consciousness relates to neurobiology and to Madhyamaka critiques. Suited to students of Buddhist philosophy with prior study of the four schools of tenets.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2014-09-09.mp3

UUID: e634ec28-0321-4293-a79d-1306db419e30

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Tenets

Date: 2014-09-09

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~2,781

Within human beings which are propounders of tenets, there are two schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika Schools of Tenets. The Vaibhāṣika School of Tenets has already been explained. We are now passing on to the Sautrāntika school of tenets. And within the definition of the Sautrāntika propounder of tenets, Part of the definition is similar to that of the Vaibhāṣika propounder of tenets. This is a propounder of tenets of the Hīnayāna.

The definition of a Sautrāntika is given on page eight of the translation of Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets. Definition of a Sautrāntika is a person propounding lower vehicle tenets who accepts both reflexive consciousness and exterior objects. It is critical to understand carefully the definition of a Sautrantikas since this is what differentiates Sautrantikas from Vaibhāṣikas. The principal difference between Sautrantikas and Vaibhāṣikas is that whereas Vaibhāṣikas do not accept the existence of reflexive consciousness, Sautrantikas do accept the existence of reflexive consciousness. For that matter, reflexive consciousnesses are central to both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra or mind only school of tenets.

Just as the differentiation between non Buddhists and Buddhists is formulated in terms of the view, likewise, within Buddhist schools of tenets, there are four schools of tenets, and the differentiation between the four schools of tenets is also formulated in terms of the view. The differentiation between the lower two schools of tenets, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, is formulated in terms of whether they do not or they do accept reflexive consciousness. So there are no substantial differences in the presentation of the method aspect of the path from the standpoint of the four schools of tenets. There are important differences in terms of their understanding of the view. The distinction between non-Buddhist and Buddhist is made in terms of the view and specifically in terms of whether or not selflessness is accepted.

The distinction between Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika is contingent on whether or not reflexive consciousness is accepted. The topic of reflexive consciousness is a difficult topic, and it is one we can only understand through going through it carefully and quietly. I was initially going to start by presenting the difference between non implicative and implicative negations. But this topic is presented later on in tenets and therefore we will present it later. However, the topic of reflexive consciousness is central from the very beginning of the presentation of the Sautrāntika School.

It is central to the Sautrāntika school and to the Cittamātra school. A substantial proportion of Madhyamikas do accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses, whereas the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamikas refute their existence extensively. This is therefore an important topic we must understand. Therefore, I think we shall present analytically reflexive consciousnesses or svasaṃvedana in the Sautrāntika school in terms of three outlines. The first is the reasons therefore, the second is their nature or their definition, and the third is their proofs.

So regarding the first topic,

The reasons or the purpose for reflexive consciousness. The Sautrāntika system is a system for which all composite phenomena are truly established and that in general exterior objects are not only truly established but their mode of abiding is independent of conceptuality. They are not mere conceptual imputations. For instance, for the Sautrāntika, a form which gives rise to an eye consciousness truly exists externally from the eye consciousness which perceives it. So what would be some of the rationales for this existence of exterior objects?

If we take the example of the visual or the auditory consciousnesses, it will become quite clear. Let’s take for instance the visual consciousness. It is actually dependent on the visual consciousness that we perceive form. There is this contact between visual consciousnesses and form. In the same same way as the eye consciousness perceives form or exterior objects, and therefore, form is understood by the means of that which understands it, which is the eye consciousness.

Likewise, the eye consciousness must be understood by something, and that which understands the eye consciousness is the reflexive consciousness which experiences the eye consciousness. In this way, we can see how incrementally one moves from objects to consciousnesses to reflexive consciousnesses. In the same same way as the field of form is truly established and not a mere conceptual imputation and is perceived by the eye consciousness. In the self same way, the eye consciousness is truly established and not a mere conceptual imputation and is perceived by the reflexive consciousness experiencing it. This is the reason.

The second subdivision of the presentation of reflexive consciousness is the nature of reflexive consciousness. First, one must analyze the etymology of reflexive consciousness. svasaṃvedana in Sanskrit or rang rik in Tibetan. Rang means self or one’s own. Rik is cognizer.

Therefore it is cognizing oneself. What is or reflexive consciousness cognizing? If the eye can’t if something must know the eye consciousness, then the object of that something is the eye consciousness. And that something, which is, quote, the reflexive consciousness, is a part of the eye consciousness. It is not the eye consciousness itself, but its relation to the eye consciousness is similar to that of mental factors to main minds.

As you remember, mental factors included intention, discrimination, and so forth. So the definition of reflexive consciousness in the Sautrāntika school is an inward oriented consciousness which is an apprehension which has perceived non conceptually and unmistakably an aspect. So we have three components to this definition: inwards oriented, number one apprehension, number two and number three perceiving an aspect non conceptually and unmistakably. So let us take the instance of the visual consciousness perceiving the color blue. The visual consciousness perceiving the color blue has this visual consciousness has two components.

The first is outward oriented, and this actually perceives the color blue, which is an exterior object or an exterior phenomenon. There is, however, a second component within the conglomerate of the the visual consciousness, which is an inward oriented consciousness, which is also part of this conglomerate. The second characteristic of reflexive consciousness is that reflexive consciousness is a non contingent perceiver. a non-contingent perceiver can best be understood in terms of the following example. If we take once again the eye consciousness perceiving the color blue, the color blue is the object condition of the eye consciousness without which the eye consciousness perceiving the color blue would not exist.

In addition, the visual material sense organ through which the color blue is perceived is the controlling condition of the visual consciousness perceiving the color blue. Without this visual material organ, the perception could not occur. In the case of the reflexive consciousness which perceives as eye consciousness, this reflexive consciousness does not depend on either the object condition or on the controlling condition. This is the first meaning of the fact that this consciousness is called a non contingent apprehender. A second reason for which it is called a non contingent apprehender is that it is neither a main mind nor a mental factor.

And the final part of the definition is and you have to correct my translation. It is a non conceptual unmistaken factor of apprehension. Non conceptual is self evident here. The fact that it is a factor of apprehension, gzigs pa in Tibetan, is stated to oppose it to, for instance, form which is perceived by the eye consciousness. In this case, it is consciousness itself which is an object.

The third subdivision, the presentation of reflexive consciousnesses, are the proofs of the existence of reflexive consciousness both for the Sautrāntika and for the Cittamātra or mind only schools. The proof of the existence of reflexive consciousness is the existence of the basis of memory. Let’s take an example. Let’s imagine we fly from Australia to India via Singapore or Malaysia, and on the trip over, we stop in Singapore and we see a new model of a watch. Then we go to India, spend however long in India, and on the way back to Singapore, when we land in Singapore, we see this watch again.

When we see this watch, the memory thinking this is the watch I saw arises within our consciousness. Then when we see this watch and we think, I saw this watch, this is the memory of the watch. But at the same time, there is another conviction associated with this memory, which is it is me who saw this watch. And

Nobody else. It’s important not to mix these two. And at this point, when we see the watch again, two minds arise. The first, the memory thinking, I saw this watch. And the second, the subject thinks, I remember myself seeing this watch.

The first of these memories, the memory which says I saw this watch, arises dependent on the perception of the watch. The second is something which arises in dependence on our recollection of the act of perception of the watch, and this is related to the reflexive consciousness experiencing the eye consciousness perceiving the watch. So to repeat this explanation, the way the Sautrantikas understand this is that the thought, I saw this watch, is the memory of this watch. And the thought, I remember that I saw this watch, I remember the act of perception is actually the reflexive consciousness experiencing the eye consciousness having perceived this watch. Likewise, in general, we know that we see, we hear, and so forth.

This is self evident. But who actually experiences or recollects this seeing and this hearing? It is the reflexive consciousness. So returning to the Sautrantikas on page eight and nine. The Sautrāntika school is subdivided into two, the Sautrantikas following scripture and the Sautrantikas following reasoning.

The Sautrantikas following scripture are Sautrantikas which rely on the Sutras of the Buddha. Generally, the term in Tibetan means one who relies on Sūtra. Excuse me, the Sautrantikas following scripture also rely on Abhidharmakośa. The Sautrantikas following reasoning, on the other hand, rely on the seven treatises on valid cognition. In addition, the Sautrantikas following reasoning are also known as exemplifiers because they give instances to illustrate the intent of Buddha Śākyamūni in his scriptures.

And through giving these instances, they differentiate within the scriptures. So this completes the presentation of the three first outlines of the Sautrāntika school, and next time, we will approach the fourth outline, the presentation of the base, in other words, of affirmations and negations. And at present, if you have questions, Geshe la will be very glad to take your questions. Is it reasonable to assume that the Sautrantikas therefore accept some level of a self existing? And the reason I state this is because if it is that someone remembers themselves seeing the watch, it requires an experiencer.

And therefore that experience leads to the reflective consciousness. In order to have an experience, you have to be a self. Yes, both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas emphasize greatly the true existence and the true establishment of the base. Generally speaking, when the Madhyamikas counter the proponents of entities, dngos por smra ba, in Tibetan, they are countering mainly the Sautrantikas. When the Prasangikas counter the proponents of true existence, they counter mainly the Cittamātrins.

Chris? How does one get over the problem of a continuous regression of reflexive consciousness? Seems to me it it could be an English song. It’s a main objection against reflexive consciousness. But reflexive consciousnesses can only perceive consciousnesses which are not reflexive consciousnesses, and therefore it stops.

So this is a critique which is addressed by the higher schools of tenets to the Sautrantikas which say that the higher schools of tenets say, well, if you assert the existence of a reflexive consciousness experiencing the eye consciousness, you must assert the existence of a reflexive consciousness experiencing the reflexive consciousness experiencing the eye consciousness. Natalie has a question. So what would be the Sautrantika response to that Madhyamaka stance? The main response both Sautrāntika and Cittamātra give, let us say, to Prāsaṇgika critiques of the existence of reflexive consciousness is that an eye consciousness, this is an example, does not understand itself by itself. To remember seeing something, something must have experienced an eye consciousness, and that is a reflexive consciousness.

Otherwise, there can be no memory of experience. If sometimes it has existed today, I think we have a problem with computers because computers have the ability to a rudimentary extent to record whether they’ve actually, quote unquote, experienced something before. So I guess according to them, they would have reflective consciousness. And mother? I don’t really understand why they’ve come up with reflective consciousness when it sounds like what they’re talking about is just a mental process, a mental consciousness.

So it’s important to understand what the Sautrantikas are about. The Sautrantikas say that when we have consciousnesses such as I remember or I feel, someone must also understand these consciousnesses. Someone must also experience them for us to remember them, and this is the reflexive consciousness. On the other hand say that this is unnecessary. We don’t need a separate part of the consciousness which understands itself.

The consciousness alone itself doesn’t have to be subdivided. It does the job by itself. I’m just noticing from the text, Ilya, that the Sautrantikas follow Vasubandhu’s text and also Dharmakīrti. So were those two teachers from the Sautrāntika Tenet Schools? And who?

And Dharmakīrti.

No. Neither Vaibhāṣika nor Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti were Sautrantikas. Their final view was all the Cittamātra view. However, the Sautrāntika’s following scripture do rely on one of Vasubandhu’s works, the Abhidharmakośa, and those following reasoning rely on the works of Dignāgā and Dharmakīrti, the Seven Treatises on Reasoning, which are listed at the bottom of page eight of your translation. Just following up from Ralph’s question about the computer.

Does the Sautrāntika view correlate with modern neurobiology where if we take the example of a watch at the airport, the first time that watch was sighted, a neural cluster is registered, and then on recollection the same neural cluster is registered. Is that suggestive of the presence of reflexive a consciousness? Yes, Sautrāntika understanding of reflexive consciousness is that the justification for reflexive consciousness is memory. Likewise, in the case of neurobiology, the justification of recollection would be the neural coordinates of consciousness connected with memory. Yeah.

Yeah. According to my understanding, Sautrantikas following scripture don’t believe in reflexive consciousness. Don’t believe. Don’t. And so why aren’t they Vaibhāṣikas?

No. The Sautrantikas following scripture accept the existence of reflexive consciousness simply because they are Sautrantikas. Otherwise, they wouldn’t fulfill the definition. There are many texts of tenets like has its own position. Not everyone agrees.

Then I would like to suggest to you to set aside the books and look inside your own minds and see for yourselves whether this is true or not. Do we have a mind or not? When we look inside ourselves, we have a mind, a consciousness. If we have a mind or consciousness when we look inside ourselves, who knows this? The consciousness itself does not know it, so who knows it?

It’s the reflexive consciousness which knows it. That’s the rationale for reflexive consciousness. Thank you. I just wanted to confirm if I got the parts of the definition or the nature correct. First, Geshe la explained the etymology, and then it seems like there are three parts to the definition.

One is regarding inwards oriented consciousness. Mhmm. One is the noncontingent perceiver, which has two reasons. And the third is because it’s nonconceptual factor of apprehension. So they have three parts of the definition.

Forgot one term, unmistaken. Yeah. In which bit? At the end. It’s an unmistaken, non conceptual Unmistaken, non conceptual.

Okay. Aspect perceiver. Conceptual aspect perceiver. Then as usual at present, we will have a discussion or debate by pairs to different pairs than last time. And the topics are the reasons or the purpose of reflexive consciousness in the Sautrāntika school.

Secondly, the nature or the definition of the reflexive consciousness. And thirdly, the proofs of the existence of reflexive consciousness. Next week, Geshe la will explain the topic of negation subdivided into non implicative and implicative negations. This will be covered over seven weeks since it is an extremely important topic for the understanding of emptiness. Then try to attend since it is much better than to waste one’s time.

Just a quick announcement, if you haven’t got a In Praise of Dependent Arising, the two days over the long weekend in October, it’s going to be a great couple of days. So book early before the rush.

Key terms in this teaching

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
Hinayana theg mäen (Tib)
Literally, Small, or Lesser, Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. The Hinayana practitioner's motivation for following the Dharma path is principally the intense wish for personal liberation from conditioned existence, or samsara. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
principal consciousness vijnana (Skt); nam shë (Tib)
The main cognition posited by means of apprehending the entity of its object. Synonymous with main mind, it is one of the two divisions of mind, the other being mental factors. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Questions answered in this teaching

How is the objection of an endless regress of reflexive consciousness (self-cognizers) answered in the tenets?

The regress is a main objection against the assertion of reflexive consciousness. It is raised by the higher schools of tenets against the Sautrantikas. They argue that if one asserts a reflexive consciousness experiencing the eye consciousness, one must also assert a reflexive consciousness experiencing that reflexive consciousness, and so on. The answer is that reflexive consciousnesses can only perceive consciousnesses which are not reflexive consciousnesses. Because of this restriction, the regress stops.

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