Tenets — 2014-07-08

2 h 26 min · 2,813 words · 8 July 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets — 2014-07-08
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. His Holiness the Dalai Lama presents a detailed examination of the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhist philosophy, one of the four major tenet systems. Over nearly two and a half hours, he establishes the foundational framework through which all schools analyze reality: the base, path, and result. He then walks systematically through the Vaibhāṣika’s presentation of the two truths—conventional and ultimate—explaining how objects are classified based on whether they remain established when analysed by the mind. Using concrete examples such as vases, cloth, and milk transforming into yogurt, he illustrates the coarse understanding of impermanence characteristic of this school. He addresses the Vaibhāṣika acceptance of directionally indivisible particles as the ultimate constituents of matter, their view of substantial existence across past, present, and future, and their position on valid cognition. The second half opens into extended discussion with students, who raise challenging questions about causality, the nature of consciousness, and how two observers perceive the same object differently. This teaching is pitched at serious practitioners with prior study of Buddhist philosophy.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2014-07-08.mp3

UUID: ae348978-feda-41ce-83a4-50062e6421a4

Teacher: HH Dalai Lama

Collection: Tenets

Date: 2014-07-08

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~2,807

As usual, we will generate the motivation for receiving these teachings first. Then if one wishes to differentiate Dharma from the world, Dharma from loca, and one investigates probably Dharma is what heals the mind, what extirpates the mind from the afflictions. And since dharma is a means to purify the mind and specifically the antidotes to the afflictions or dharma, then dharma probably as a whole must be counted within wisdom from within the twin division of method and wisdom since it seems difficult for method alone to be able to act as an antidote to the afflictions. Dharma, therefore, is intimately related with the view. And therefore, the differentiation between Dharma and the mundane must be formulated in terms of the view.

It is difficult to see how behavior such as love, empathy, ethics, or generosity could differentiate the realm of Dharma from the mundane. This differentiation must be formulated in terms of the view. Therefore, since Dharma is a means to eliminate inappropriate afflictions, dharma acts from deep within the mind. Since the main obstacle to satisfying this curiosity about the inner functioning of the mind, which is dharma, is ignorance, we must counter ignorance. And the means to counter ignorance is through the wisdom which realizes selflessness and through an understanding of the object of apprehension of this wisdom.

The majority of the tenet systems are formulated in terms of a presentation of the base, the path and the result. And in this context, the base is the first two noble truths, the noble truth of suffering and of the cause of suffering. The path is the means whereby these two noble truths are obviated, which is the fourth noble truth, the noble truth of the path, and the result is the third noble truth, the noble truth of cessation. The fourth noble truth, the noble truth of the path, is specifically the wisdom realizing selflessness, which is called noble truth of the path because it is a path to the attainment of the Noble Truth of cessation. And all tenet systems are formulated therefore in terms of basis of path and of result.

The basis in turn is expressed in terms of five features and these five features are found within the Vaibhāṣika system. They are first, what appears, which is form. Then the mind, what are affective mental factors, non-associated compositional phenomena, and what is non composite. As you remember, in the Vaibhāṣika system, all objects of knowledge are synonymous with effective things.

In addition, in the Vaibhāṣika system, these five bases are subdivided within the two truths. And since these five bases are subdivided within the Vaibhāṣika system into the two truths, conventional and ultimate truths, we must present the definition of the two truths, which is on Page four of your translation of Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets. Regarding the first, the definition of a conventional truth is that which is observed as a phenomenon which is discarded by the mind apprehending it when it is destroyed or when its individual parts are illuminated by the mind. Instances of conventional truths, for instance, are in the Vaibhāṣika system, vases or woolen fabric. A vase would be an instance of a conventional truth for the Vaibhāṣika because when a vase is shattered by a hammer, the mind which apprehends the vase is destroyed and discarded.

Then let us assume that the small tablecloth in front of Geshe-la is a woolen fabric. This woolen fabric would be an instance of a conventional truth for the Vaibhāṣikas because if one separates this woolen fabric into its constituent threads, the nature of the woolen fabric is lost for the observer. And the passage in the definition when its individual parts are eliminated by the mind at the end of the definition probably refers to this process, whereas the part of the definition in when it is destroyed by the mind refers to destroying objects like vases. Now the definition of an ultimate truth in the Vaibhāṣika system is that which is observed as a phenomenon which is not discarded by the mind apprehending it when it is destroyed or when its individual parts are eliminated by the mind. Instances would be, for instance, an indivisible instance of consciousness, uncompounded phenomena, and a directionless particle.

Vaibhāṣika system accepts the existence of particles which are directionally indivisible. These are seen as the ultimate constituent of matter. Such particles which are directionally indivisible would clearly satisfy the definition of an ultimate truth phenomenon, which are not discarded by the mind apprehending them when they are destroyed or when their individual parts are eliminated by the mind. Such particles which are directionally indivisible have neither an eastern nor a southern nor a northern nor a western direction. Then clearly, such a directionally indivisible particle, if we accept the Vaibashika system, satisfies the definition since it cannot be destroyed, and inasmuch as it is directionally indivisible, it cannot be separated into individual parts.

So in the Vaibashika system, these directionally indivisible particles are what constitutes the coarser subdivisions of substance. And in this system, it is considered that these directionally indivisible particles conglomerate to eventually form coarse objects such as houses, dwellings and so forth. So in the Vaibhāṣika system, when one refers to a partless form, one refers to form which does not have directional constituents. When, however, one refers to a partless instant of consciousness, one is referring to that instant of consciousness which is solitary and is not composed of a previous and a latter instant. For instance, in grounds and paths, the last instant of the fourth stage, the supreme Dharma, of the stage of the path of preparation of a hearer, is a partless instant of consciousness since even though it has a substantial continuum, it does not have a previous instant nor a latter instant.

And this is a presentation of conventional ultimate truths in the Vaibhāṣika system in keeping with Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu in which it is said, ultimate is that which can neither be shattered nor separated into parts. Ultimate refers to ultimate truths here. And then as is said at the bottom of Page four of your tenet texts, therefore they, in other words, Vaibhāṣikas, accept the existence of substance in all three times. Hence, not only do they accept that vase exists at the time of the past of vase, they also accept that vase exists at the time of the future of vase. And you should correct your English translation on the bottom of Page four.

Therefore, they accept the substantial existence of all three times and not the existence of substance in all three times. The meaning of this passage is that the Vaibashikas consider that irrespective of the substance a vase might be made of, whether it’s a golden vase, a silver vase or a clay vase, as long as that vase is not destroyed, that vase can be said to exist. Therefore the past, the present and the future of that vase exist. In that light, the Vaibhāṣikas probably do not accept the subtle impermanence of phenomena. They do accept the coarse impermanence of effective phenomena.

In the system, impermanent phenomena are said to experience three instances: an instance of generation, which is followed by an instance of abiding, which is followed by an instance of destruction. When the Vaibhāṣikas refer to impermanence, they refer to phenomena such as fire and water, which are seen to the naked eye as changing instant by instant. It is unclear whether for the Vaibhāṣikas, phenomena such as these houses would be called impermanent phenomena or subtle impermanent phenomena. And an example which is given of this process of transformation is that of the transformation of milk into yogurt or curd. When milk transforms into curd, it is not the fundamental properties of milk, its shape, and its color which transform into curd.

Those are constant. Instead, it is the taste and the smell of milk which transform into those of curd. In brief, they probably assert that after being cast, a vase remains until it is destroyed. It’s a fairly coarse way of thinking. And then after the vase has been shattered, then one can speak

Of impermanence. Then there is no definiteness that someone who is a Vaibhāṣika would accept that all three times are substantially existent since there are scriptural quotes referring to bodhisattvas who have endorsed the Vaibhāṣika view, and therefore beings who have entered on the path who have adopted the Vaibhāṣika view. And therefore, while in general, it is true that the Vaibhāṣika School propounds the substantial existence of all three times, past, present and future, it is not the case that everyone who is a Vaibhāṣika propounds the substantial existence of all three times. For instance, Atisha’s teacher, Dharma Rakshita, was a bodhisattva and therefore it would be very odd if he had not realized subtle impermanence. Yet he was a Vaibhāṣika and clearly did not propound the substantial existence of all three times.

And therefore, the Vaibhāṣika view is a view which is quite close to the mundane view. Phenomena are seen as abiding until they are destroyed. Now regarding their presentation of minds, that is broadly speaking quite similar to the other schools of tenets. They do accept the existence of valid cognizers, inferential and direct valid cognizers. They reject the existence of reflexive cognizers but accept the existence of yogic direct valid cognizers.

And they have one uncommon position which is a difficult position regarding sense cognizers. Vaibhāṣikas consider that valid cognizers, as you remember, the definition of a valid cognizer is a clear incontrovertible knower. The Vaibhāṣikas consider that valid cognizers are necessarily clear, in other words non obstructive, but they do not consider that they are necessarily cognizers or knowers. And therefore they assert that subtle non obstructive forms are valid cognizers. Then if you have some questions, please ask them now.

Ralph? What is the difference between being empty of being independent and being empty of being a substantially existent autonomous entity, under coarse and subtle selflessness. Coarse and subtle selflessness. Yes. The reason being for me in the English language, autonomous is synonymous with independence.

So I cannot differentiate the two. With your permission, I will reflect on your question and answer next time. Natalie? My question is actually from my discussion with Anne last week, so we came up with this actually together. It was how does cause and effect operate within the Vaibhāṣika system?

Because we were talking about the past, present and future the three times being seen as the same. So we couldn’t understand if that’s how they see past, present and future, how do they understand cause and effect? The past, the present, the future of vase for the Vaibhāṣikas are not simultaneous. The formulation of cause and effect in Vaibhāṣika is the same basically as in the other systems. If we take the example of sleeping, the past of sleeping exists, the present of sleeping exists, and the future of sleeping exists.

Geshe-la last week, Geshe-la said that refuge within the sevenfold division of knowledge and awareness is a form of conviction but with a component of wishing. Given that the definition of conviction incorporates incontrovertibility, it doesn’t realize its object. How does that reconcile with the definition of a person asserting Buddhist tenets who accepts completely the triple gem as a place of refuge? In fact, last week Geshe la said that he emphasized the importance of having total conviction in the Buddha’s capacity to protect one, but that doesn’t quite fit with the definition of conviction. In our case, refuge is based exclusively on conviction.

But refuge can be based on a valid reason. And such a refuge is no longer a conviction. It is an inferential valid cognizer. It’s important to understand that when we refer to controvertibility in the context of conviction, this really means that convictions are minds whose object is not established by a valid cognizer. It does not mean that these are changeable minds.

Okay. My question pertains to valid cognition, from the Vaibhāṣika perspective. So, I’m under the assumption that, regardless of who the entity is, for example, myself and a honeybee, if we both were able to, see a directionless particle, we would perceive it as being the same. However, if we look at compounded phenomena such as a flower, then clearly what I see the flower as would be very different from the honeybee. So the honeybee doesn’t see colors as we do.

They see ultraviolet light, etcetera. So from the Vaibhāṣika perspective, how do they explain that two valid cognitions perceive the flower differently? Krishna, we’ll also think about your question and answer next week. Just in relation to that example about milk being turned into yogurt, it was said that the Vaibhāṣikas accept two features, taste and smell. So they wouldn’t accept that there might be other reasons, for example time, temperature, and a causing agent, those are the three other possibilities why milk would turn into yogurt that I can just think of on the top of my head, that are different to taste and smell.

Those are not the reasons we’re advancing. Right? The Vaibhāṣikas fully accept that under certain conditions such as exposure to heat, milk will transform into yogurt. What they are saying, however, is that the fundamental features of milk which are color and

Shape do not change. It is subsidiary features such as smell and taste which change. It’s an example. Right? Yes.

But what’s why why The whole point, you see, is that is the mode of substantial abiding of impermanent phenomena. So don’t think too much about the cooking aspect of milk transforming into yogurt. This is a debate in Western philosophy between identity and difference. How do you preserve identity when you have change? Right?

You’re the same person I met yesterday. If I say you’re a different person, everyone thinks this is strange. Yet if we analyze atomically, you have changed. Right? So the Vaibhāṣika contention is that the main characteristics don’t change, the subsidiary characteristics change.

That’s it with that contention. Thank you, Geshe la. Regarding reflexive consciousness or awareness, I assume that the Vaibhāṣikas accept all the mental factors that Vasubandhu explains, which include vigilance and so on. So how is this vigilance or the mind’s ability to notice what it’s doing different from reflexive consciousness? When the Vaibhāṣikas reject reflexive consciousness, what they are rejecting is a consciousness which perceives itself totally.

And they say if reflexive consciousness existed, then the eye could perceive the eye itself, nakedly.. Which it cannot. Just wanted clarity, so the eye can’t perceive itself totally, and then he said which it cannot, is that just the Vaibhāṣika view that the last little bit of the sentence? So you’re saying it can’t do that and it can’t. That I added for clarity.

Right. So you ask what is your question then? Who’s added? I just want to clarify the mental factor of wishing with respect to the conviction regarding refuge. Mhmm.

Is that sufficient to protect one from rebirth in the lower realms? Last Wednesday, Geshe la spoke about that it was only having reached the level of forbearance on the path of preparation that a practitioner could have enough control of the mind not to be reborn in the lower realms. So presumably until one reaches that point one is wishing, which in English is sort of akin to hoping. Is that correct? So the Triple Gem has the capacity to protect us from rebirth in the lower realms.

From our own side, however, setting aside the Buddha gem, until we have realized the Dharma gem, we are not guaranteed protection from rebirth in the lower realms. And therefore, until we have reached a level of forbearance on the path of preparation, it is not guaranteed that we will not be reborn in the lower realms. Then for some thirty minutes, we shall debate Mhmm. And if possible, partners as last time. And please debate on the two truths in Vaibhāṣika, conventional and ultimate truths, and the mode of substantial existence of the three times, past, present, and future in Vaibhāṣika.

Mhmm.

Mhmm. Mhmm. Tomorrow. Yeah. You tomorrow.

Thank Thank you. We have some posters and flyers for the symposium, which is going to be a cracker. And so if you’d like to take some if you if you can make use of them, we don’t want to just take a bundle and stick them in the drawer. And so yeah. So they’re available now.

Thanks. And I think there’s some cake from his holiness’ birthday from Sunday. You’d like to help yourself and do some push ups or something.

Key terms in this teaching

compounded phenomena samskrta (Skt); du jä kyi chö (Tib)
Phenomena that arise due to causes and conditions. LYWA
conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
lower realms ngen dro (Tib)
The three realms of cyclic existence with the most suffering: the hell, hungry ghost and animal realms. LYWA
mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
path of preparation prayoga-marga (Skt); jor lam (Tib)
The second of the five paths leading to buddhahood. LYWA
Three Jewels triratna (Skt); kon chog sum (Tib)
Also called the Triple Gem or the Three Rare Sublime Ones. The objects of Buddhist refuge: Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. Lama Zopa Rinpoche prefers “Three Rare Sublime Ones” as a more direct translation of kon chog sum. LYWA
two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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