1 h 10 min · 2,874 words · 24 June 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 70-minute teaching on Buddhist philosophical tenets, His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains how the four major schools of Buddhist philosophy relate to the Buddha’s three turnings of the wheel of the law. He clarifies that tenets are not merely texts but lived philosophical positions upheld by practitioners, then walks through the classical definition of what constitutes a Buddhist tenet-holder: someone who takes the triple gem as genuine refuge and rejects other sources of refuge. He explores the triple gem in detail—Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha—distinguishing between causal and resultant refuges, before focusing on the Vaibhāṣika school as the first of the four systems. The Vaibhāṣika position is unpacked through its three defining features: acceptance of lower-vehicle tenets, assertion of truly established external objects, and rejection of reflexive consciousness. The session concludes with extended Q&A in which students probe whether tenets require direct realization, how non-Buddhist systems fit within Buddhist epistemology, and the relationship between philosophical conviction and valid cognition. Suited to those with foundational familiarity with Buddhist logic and epistemology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2014-06-24.mp3
UUID: c9b88e49-6df1-4ec3-bc7d-c4318a2bcade
Teacher: HH Dalai Lama
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2014-06-24
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,878
The topic of Buddhist tenets connects with the topic of the view and therefore is related to the three turnings of the wheel of the law. The first, middling, and final turning of the wheel of the law. Well, there are three turnings of the wheel of the law. There are four systems of tenets. The way they are related to each other is that the two first systems of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika systems of tenets are included within the first turning of the wheel of the law.
And the schools of naturelessness, in other words, the Madhyamikas, which are subdivided into Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamikas, are included within the middling turning of the wheel of the law. This is the intent of the middling turning of the wheel of the law. And if we were to comment on the view of the final, the third turning of the wheel of the law, its view is the view, the mind only view. Then if we analyze the concept of tenets, tenets are actually intimately related to the person who upholds these tenets. Tenets are not, for instance, texts which are written down in books.
If we were to view tenets as texts or passages written down in books, we would have to face the strangest consequences. This is not the case at all. If, let us say, if what is written down in a book, passages in a book were tenets, then we would face the unwanted consequence that once all these books were destroyed, those tenets would cease to exist, which is not the case. Then from within the threefold subdivision of tenets of things into matter, consciousness and non associated compositional phenomena, since tenets are not matter nor are they obviously consciousnesses that are associated with persons, I think we can see them as non associated compositional phenomena. Let us take the example of these three principles of the path.
The three principles of the path are renunciation, bodhicitta, and the correct view. Now even though the three principles of the path are related to the material transcription of the three principles of the path as text on a book, on a page. Nonetheless, these letters are not the three principles of the path. Then in Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s text of tenets on page two, the definition of a person asserting Buddhist tenets is a person who accepts completely the triple gem as a place of refuge and asserts tenets which dis disagree with places of refuge other than these. Within the definition, the triple gem refers to the Buddha gem, the Dharma gem, and the Sangha gem.
Whereas the adverb completely within accepts completely refers to the fact that a propounder or such a propounder of Buddhist tenets accepts that the triple gem can completely protect against both the general sufferings of cyclic existence and specifically the sufferings of the lower realms. For that matter, such a person considers that any person which is able to protect completely against the suffering of the lower realms and the general sufferings of cyclic existence is an authentic refuge.
Therefore, the triple gem, which is an authentic refuge, refers to the Buddha gem, the Dharma gem, and the sanga gem. Specifically, the Buddha gem refers to that being which has abandoned the two first noble truths, noble truth of suffering and of the cause of suffering and who has attained the two last noble truths, the noble truth of cessation and the noble truth of the path, becoming thereby a fully enlightened being. The Dharma jewel refers in terms of its boundary, if you wish, to the attainment of the ārya path. This attainment of the ārya path, in other words, the first ground and above, is a situation where as is said, upon seeing reality, there is no longer any impelling, one no longer accumulates new karma. In other words, one no longer is reborn under the power of karma and the afflictions, in dependence on previously accumulated karma.
Finally, the Sangha gem refers precisely to such ārya beings. This is, therefore, the meaning of an authentic refuge and not of a final refuge. There is actually a distinction to be made between an authentic and a final refuge. There is a further distinction to be made in objects of refuge between objects of refuge at the time of the cause or causal objects of refuge and objects of refuge at the time of the effect. So if we were to posit the triple gem at the time of the cause, as the causal triple gem, the causal Buddha gem would be Buddha Śākyamūni himself.
The causal Dharma gem would be, for instance, the fourth noble truth, noble truth of the path within the mental continuum of Ārya Nāgārjuna. And the causal Sangha gem would be the śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddha and bodhisattvas on the paths of seeing and of meditation. An easier way of presenting the it would be to say that the causal Buddha refuge would be Buddha Śākyamūni. The causal Dharma refuge would be actual paths of seeing and of meditation, and the causal Sangha refuge would be those beings on the path of seeing and on the path of meditation. On the other hand, the triple gem at the time of the result or the resulting triple gem is a triple gem which entertains an uncommon relationship with with oneself.
The resulting Buddha gem would be our own attainment in the future of full enlightenment, which is the result of the capacity we definitely have at present of attaining full enlightenment through abandoning non virtue and training in virtue. Then the resulting dharma jewel, the dharma jewel at the time of the result would be the future wisdom of our own realization of selflessness. And it is appropriate to posit as a resulting sangha or sangha gem at the time of the result, one’s own future attainment after progressing through the grounds and paths of the path of seeing and of meditation. We definitely have this possibility. We definitely have the possibility of attaining the resulting refuges.
We, however, do not engage at present in these practices nor do we believe in them sufficiently to do so. This is a result of our extreme laziness and sloth. The second part of the definition of a person asserting Buddhist tenets in the middle of page two of the translation of Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s tenets is one who asserts tenets which disagree with places of refuge other than these. And this refers to someone who does not take refuge in what cannot provide refuge against the general sufferings of cyclic existence or the sufferings of the lower realms. And then moving downwards in the text on page two, the propounders of tenets are subdivided into four, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Madhyamaka Schools.
And the text continues by asserting that the two first are called the two schools asserting objects. The two first here refer to the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools. They are called schools asserting objects because not only do they assert the external existence of exterior objects, they assert the existence of truly existent exterior objects. The first of the four schools is the Vaibhāṣika School, which is explained in terms of a presentation of definitions, divisions, etymologies,, the mode of asserting objects, the mode of asserting subjects, and the mode of asserting the base as well as grounds and paths. From page three three.
Now this is a very elegant way of presenting the positions of the various schools of tenets. Now passing onwards on page three, second paragraph, to the definition of a Vaibhāṣika. A Vaibhāṣika is a person who asserts lower vehicle tenets accepting outer objects as truly established and not accepting reflexive consciousness. Now today, your homework will be to reflect on the meaning of this definition, which is subdivided into three parts. The Vaibhāṣikas are, number one, persons who assert lower vehicle tenets.
Number two, they accept outer objects as truly established. Number three, they do not accept reflexive consciousness. Then what are the Tibetan’s different in English? We will start with the third feature of the definition. Vaibhāṣikas do not accept reflexive consciousness.
What is meant here by reflexive consciousness? Generally, as you remember, in the context of Lorig, which presents the Sautrāntika view, direct perception is subdivided into four. Sensory direct perception, mental direct perception, reflexive direct perception, and yogic direct perception. The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept a third subdivision, reflexive direct perception. What is reflexive direct perception?
The schools who accept the existence of reflexive direct perception, reflexive consciousness, svasamvedana, state that every consciousness must actually know itself. If we take for instance the eye consciousness, since the eye consciousness exists there is necessarily a consciousness which knows the eye consciousness and it cannot be the eye consciousness itself. In the self same way, as a sword cannot cut itself or a needle cannot sew itself. Then the second feature of the Vaibhāṣika school is that they accept outer objects as truly established. As you remember, we mentioned they do not accept reflexive consciousness.
When it is said they accept outer objects as truly established, this refers to accepting the five subdivisions of form as truly established. And the Vaibhāṣika school considers that it is the indivisible, partless particles which are ultimately existent.
And the first characteristic of the Vaibashikas is that they assert lower vehicle tenets. The distinction between those asserting lower vehicle tenets and those asserting greater vehicle tenets is made in terms of whether or not the selflessness of phenomena is accepted. Those which assert lower vehicle tenets do not accept the selflessness of phenomena. Those who assert greater vehicle tenets accept the selflessness of phenomena. It is not necessarily the case that someone who asserts lower vehicle tenets is a practitioner of the lower vehicle.
For instance, there are bodhisattvas who assert lower vehicle tenets. So the uncommon position of the Vaibhāṣika school is that it is Buddha Śākyamūni himself who in one lifetime attained full enlightenment. And specifically, Buddha Śākyamūni entered into one uninterrupted meditative session during the stage of heat of the path of preparation and remained in this meditative session until the attainment of full enlightenment. So we shall stop here, the teaching for today. And if you have questions, specific questions from last time, please ask them now.
Natalie? Excuse me, Geshe la. Could you please just I just wanna double check what was just said that Buddhist the Vaibhāṣikas maintained that Buddha Śākyamūni entered into was it an interrupted meditative session? Mhmm. Mhmm.
So it was interrupt they maintain it was interrupted. I’m sorry. I can’t hear you. Was familiar that they were I’m just checking to see whether what was just last said was that the Vaibhāṣikas believe that Buddha Śākyamūni entered into an uninterrupted meditation session. Uninterrupted.
Oh, uninterrupted. That Buddha Śākyamūni entered at the level of heat of the path of preparation into one uninterrupted meditative session during which he eventually attained full enlightenment. Vishal, I would like to address last week’s questions, especially from your debate. Question. I said to Geshe-la, maybe you forgot.
And he’s very surprised. Do proponents of a tenet have to have attained the realizations of that tenet? There is no definiteness. Someone who is a propounder of tenets will train his mind through analysis in his tenets and eventually may realize them. But for such a person, his tenets are grub pa.
They are something beyond which there is nothing. Mhmm. I think following on from that, given that a propounder of tenets does not qualify as having a mind of conviction within the sevenfold division of awareness and knowledge with respect to the view, would a materialist proponent of tenets be regarded as having a wrong consciousness with regards to his view? Definitely a propounder of materialist tenets is someone who propounds wrong views since materialism is a wrong view. I guess that’s the point of argument from their view.
They would argue that it wasn’t a wrong view. Obviously, yes. How could they? For themselves, their views are most agreeable. How could they accept that they have used the wrong views?
However, these Charvaka materialist views are the coarsest views among the coarse. Just following on from those two last questions, so last week we would, in the teaching it was said that each position of tenets needs to be from a stable mind. So obviously stable mind is different to a mind of conviction or mind of realization. So in terms of the tenets, do the minds fit at all with the seven awarenesses? Are they posited in the seven awarenesses in any way?
The way to analyze this is as follows. If we pause at the the debate from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣika school, then from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣika school, the minds of a Vaibhāṣika propounder of tenets apprehending Vaibhāṣika tenets are valid cognizers. Since from the standpoint of every school of tenets, the position of that school of tenets is the correct and ultimate position. Chris? Okay.
So is it just in relation to Buddhist tenets? Because there can be many other positions of tenets that are non-Buddhist, and they would be in the position of wrong consciousnesses. Well, for instance, if we set ourselves from the standpoint of a Buddhist propounder of tenets, then the tenets of the Indian materialist, Cārvākas, but of the other Indian schools of tenets such as the particularists, the Vaisheshikas, enumerationists, the Samkhyas, so forth would all be wrong views, mistaken. I think that was behind my question as to whether somebody that we would regard as having a wrong view from their point of view, could they have an inferential cognizer of their view or you know direct perception of their view. Think what Geshe-la is saying from within their own framework, they would say that they had inferential cognition of their view.
So what Geshe-la is saying, it’s really depending on which particular position you take, the argument pivots around. To start with, the Indian materialists to begin with, they do not accept the existence of inferential valid cognizers. Then they wouldn’t be interested in them. They only accept the existence of direct valid cognizers. Buddhists consider that materialists have inferential valid cognizers within their mind stream, but the materialist himself doesn’t accept the existence of what exists in his own mind stream.
What about the questions you were debating about last time? Mark? I believe it was answered tonight, but the question that I that I had, last week was around whether or not the informational content of a tenant can stand alone from the proponents of it. And we talked about that and you discussed it with us earlier. And tonight it was sort of answered in way that it’s neither mind nor matter.
It’s a non associated compositional phenomena that is related. Yes. I mean, if a proponent of tenets does not exist, those tenets do not exist. This is what I was thinking about, turning away from. Perhaps a little abstract, but I was thinking, for example, the sun has no intent or conviction to produce light, and yet there is light.
And still water has no intent or conviction to produce a reflection and yet there is a reflection. For example if Geshe la had a parrot in his room and it repeated something he had said, informational content of what the parrot is saying might still be valid, but because the parrot doesn’t know what it’s saying, does that invalidate or negate the truth of what he’s actually said? And? That was my line of thinking leading up to tonight, and I was trying to work through, as I said, the informational content, the meaning of what was produced separate from the person who was producing it.
No. I mean, the parrot is obviously not a proponent of tenets. Because there are no tenets in the parrot’s mind stream. [inaudible]. So the validity of the truth of a statement only exists when it is said from a position of conviction.
What you’re saying makes no sense in Buddhist philosophy or in Tibetan. Could you repeat what you’re saying? What is the minimum requirement for it to become a tenet? What level of conviction or what kind of mind must it come from? From the standpoint of Vaibhāṣika, the mind which apprehends Vaibhāṣika tenets is a valid cognizer.
So we will now have discussion by groups of two of these tenets for half an hour. Please note down your doubts to ask them next week. Mhmm. . Have a good night.
Thank you, And sleep well. Thank you. And see you tomorrow. Excuse me. Just excuse us.
Elliot is just saying something. And, if you can register for his holiness’s birthday, lunch on the, by Wednesday or July 2, that’s his birthday is the July 6. That’s when we’re celebrating it. Sunday ’11 thirty approximately until 02:30 and TBI will be providing lunch. So you’re welcome to come and just let us know for catering purposes.
Thank you.
Key terms in this teaching
- grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
- Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
- lorig
- Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
- lower realms ngen dro (Tib)
- The three realms of cyclic existence with the most suffering: the hell, hungry ghost and animal realms. LYWA
- path of preparation prayoga-marga (Skt); jor lam (Tib)
- The second of the five paths leading to buddhahood. LYWA
- right-seeing path darshana-marga (Skt); tong lam (Tib)
- The third of the five paths to buddhahood; attained with the direct perception of emptiness. Also called the path of seeing. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- Three Jewels triratna (Skt); kon chog sum (Tib)
- Also called the Triple Gem or the Three Rare Sublime Ones. The objects of Buddhist refuge: Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. Lama Zopa Rinpoche prefers “Three Rare Sublime Ones” as a more direct translation of kon chog sum. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.