Tenets — 2014-07-15

1 h 14 min · 3,193 words · 15 July 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets — 2014-07-15
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 75-minute talk, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen introduces the Buddhist philosophical tenets, focusing primarily on the Vaibhāṣika school and foundational concepts that apply across all four tenet systems. He begins by clarifying that there are only three paths to enlightenment and that Śākyamūni taught exactly four tenet schools with no fifth. The core of the teaching walks through the Vaibhāṣika definition across three key points: the assertion of lower vehicle tenets, acceptance of outer objects as truly established, and crucially the rejection of reflexive consciousness. Geshe explores the technical meaning of reflexive consciousness in detail, contrasts Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika views on indivisible particles and their non-contact, and then shifts to coarse and subtle selflessness of persons. He examines how Buddhists distinguish the person from the five aggregates and how the subtle self is mistakenly apprehended as independent rather than dependent on the aggregates. The session ends with participant questions and mock debate preparation, making it valuable for serious students beginning tenet study.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2014-07-15.mp3

UUID: a991c3d3-db3a-4376-ab95-f58b33e82b94

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Tenets

Date: 2014-07-15

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~3,189

And therefore, we should all generate the motivation before listening to these teachings. As is said, for full enlightenment, there is not a fourth. The meaning of this verse verse is that there are not four paths leading to full enlightenment, but only three. Indeed, when one engages initially onto the path, one can only engage on the path of a hearer, a shravaka, or of a solitary realizer, a Pratyekabuddha, or of a bodhisattva. It is, however, not the case that every being who has engaged in the path is necessarily a being who is engaging in the path of a hearer, a solitary realizer or a bodhisattva.

For instance, there are beings who have completed the hearer or the solitary realizer path, but have not yet entered into the Mahāyāna path. Such arhats are asserted to exist. They would have entered the path, but they would not be traveling the path of a hearer, solitary realizer or bodhisattva. In addition, it is asserted that there is no fifth within the thought of the muni. This refers to the fact that Muni Śākyamūni taught only four systems of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra and Madhyamaka systems of tenets.

And as was asserted previously, there is no fifth system of tenet apart from these. Just as was said previously, this does not mean that someone who is a proprietor of Buddhist tenets is necessarily one of the four. The same situation I described previously can exist. And in this context, one should reflect carefully on the definition of a Vaibhāṣika on page three of Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen’s tenets. A Vaibhāṣika is a person who asserts, number one, lower vehicle tenets.

Number two, accepts outer objects as truly established. And number three, does not accept reflexive consciousness. It is important that you familiarize yourselves with the definition of a Vaibhāṣika. Otherwise, it is a bit odd to attend a course like this one. And it is not sufficient to be able to be familiar verbally with this definition.

You must be familiar with the meaning of the terms involved. Generally speaking, the best is to memorize as much as one can. However, in the context of the presentation of tenets, it is really important for you to memorize the definition of a person who propounds Vaibhāṣika tenets. In Tibetan, the first component of the definition of a Vaibhāṣika, the sequence is different in English, is one who does not accept reflexive consciousness. The meaning of reflexive consciousness here, as for Sautrāntika, is the same as in Gelug Prāsaṇgika.

For instance, when one refers to the reflexive consciousness which experiences an eye consciousness, This reflexive consciousness which experiences an eye consciousness is a component of the eye consciousness itself.

The term reflexive consciousness in Tibetan rang rik has two components, rang, which is oneself or tsva in Sanskrit and rik, which is the cognizing component, vidya. It is rang rig or reflexive consciousness according to the Sautrāntika School because it is an element of this consciousness which is of the same substantial entity as this consciousness which cognizes this consciousness. This is not the understanding of reflexive consciousness or rang rig in the Vaibhāṣika school. For the Vaibhāṣika school, it is simply a consciousness which cognizes rang itself. This is refuted in the Vaibhāṣika school since this is at odds with the similes which are given.

A knife, however sharp, cannot cut itself likewise, a form, however beautiful, cannot behold itself. In addition, Vaibhāṣikas, in keeping with the definition, accept outer objects as truly established. Generally speaking, within the four schools of tenets, three schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrantika, and Madhyamikas, accept the existence of outer objects. The Cittamātra do not. However, one should point out that the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka understanding of outer objects is quite difficult to understand fully.

For Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, an outer object is an object which is not subsumed within the continuum of a person. An inner object is subsumed within the continuum of a person. Therefore, within the lower schools of tenets, both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrandika accept the existence of exterior objects, phyi don. Phyi is exterior, object is don. Here, exterior objects refer principally to form or matter, which is asserted by Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika as constituted of indivisible particles which cannot be perceived by the naked eye.

Form and matter arise as a result of the concatenation of these indivisible particles. And then the understanding of indivisible particles in Vaibhāṣika and Sautrantika is slightly different. Indivisible particles in Vaibhāṣika are those particles which are obtained at the end of a long process of division. And these particles which can no longer be divided are said to have four directional components, the north, south, east and west, as well as two vertical directional components, the zenith and the nadir. These indivisible particles, however, according to Vaibhāṣika, when they are concatenated, do not enter in contact with each other.

And the Sautrantikas criticize this view saying that if they were not in contact with each other, then obviously they would collapse. But the Vaibhāṣikas assert that they are supported by air. This process of concatenation of indivisible particles is extremely important because in the initial stage of generation of our cosmos, of our universe, it is not the gross elements which concatenate at first, but the subtle particles. So the Vaibhāṣika understanding of indivisible particles, Boyle has mentioned that indivisible particles have six directional components, four cardinal components, a zenith and a nadir, and that these directional particles, in addition to being indivisible, do not enter in contact with each other because if they entered in contact with each other, the directional component of one particle would fuse with the directional component of another particle nor can they enter in any contact at all since otherwise they would become one. And the Vaibhāṣikas assert, therefore, the existence of an empty component between the particles, without elaborating further.

When criticized by other schools such as the Sautrāntika who say that the particles would collapse, the Vaibhāṣika assert that they are supported by air. The understanding of the Sautrāntika school has of indivisible particles is similar in most of the main points. The Sautrāntika considered indivisible particles, have six directional components: north, south, east, west, a zenith, and a nadir. They also consider that the indivisible particles are not in contact to avoid the fallacy of the confusion of directions or the identification of the particles, but they do not assert the presence of an empty component between the particles. And when asked how precisely this happens, they tend to say this is the way it is.

There is a lot of room for debate in these topics. The Vaibhāṣika view is an extremely elegant view intellectually. The Vaibhāṣikas assert, for instance, that indivisible particles abide within the realm of the eye consciousness but are not seen by the eye consciousness. These indivisible particles, when they concatenate, eventually form larger conglomerates of particles which are perceptible by the eye consciousness. When asked how this is possible, the Vaibhāṣika retort, it is exactly the same as your hair.

When an individual hair is invisible from a distance to the naked eye, a conglomerate of hair is visible and one infers the existence of individual hairs on that basis. The Vaibhāṣikas therefore assert, for instance, that when a gong is struck with a hammer, the hammer actually never contacts the gong. If the hammer were to contact the gong, the subtle particles of the hammer would become confused with the subtle particles of the gong and would become one. It is therefore the impetus of the hammer which causes the gong to resonate. And therefore, outer objects in the Vaibhāṣika school are objects which are constituted of a concatenation of indivisible particles.

Within the definition of a Vaibhāṣika, the term truly established within accepting outer objects as truly established probably refers to things or effective entities, which as you remember are identified with composite phenomena and objects of knowledge for the Vaibhāṣika. Finally, A Vaibhāṣika is defined as a person who asserts lower vehicle tenets. The differentiation between those who assert lower vehicle tenets and greater vehicle tenets is made in terms of the view in accordance with those who do not accept a self of phenomena and those who accept a self of phenomena. Those who assert lower vehicle tenets accept a self of phenomena. Those who assert greater vehicle tenets do not accept a self of phenomena.

And therefore, both the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika accept the existence of a self of phenomena. They do not accept the selflessness of phenomena, and they continue to consider that exterior objects are truly established, inherently established and established from their own side.

From the standpoint of the view, the Vaibhāṣikas, just as the Sautrantikas assert the selflessness of persons but not the selflessness of phenomena. Within the selflessness of persons, the Vaibhāṣikas distinguished the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons. The coarse selflessness of persons is persons being empty of being permanent, one and independent. The subtle selflessness of persons is persons being empty of being substantially existing autonomous entities. Then the presentation of the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons is the same from the Vaibhāṣika all the way up to the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka.

The majority of schools of tenets assert, therefore, the coarse selflessness of persons. In other words, that persons are empty of being permanent, one and independent. The object of negation of persons being empty, of being permanent, one and independent is persons being one, permanent and independent. This is not a position which is asserted by the Buddhist schools of tenets, but it is asserted by the non-Buddhist Indian schools of tenets. The non-Buddhist Indian schools of tenets assert first that the person is permanent.

What is meant by this is that observing the process of transmigration from life to life, they see that real persons do indeed change bodies. For instance, when they transmigrate from the god realms to another realm, they give up their body of the god realms or if they transmigrate from the lower realms to another realm, they give up their body of the lower realms. Nonetheless, the person itself, the consciousness is the same and therefore they consider that this person is permanent, meaning by this that this person is causeless and is not dependent on conditions. In addition, they assert that this person is partless. My own understanding of this is that whereas for instance, when we look at Chris’ writing, we would say Chris’ writing based on the fact that Chris’ hand is writing, such a differentiation would not be made in terms of the person or the Ātman transmigrating from life to life for the non-Buddhist Indian traditions.

This is not something I find in text, but my own understanding. Buddha. There are therefore three characteristics of the ātman. The first is that it is permanent. The second that it is one, and the third that it is independent.

From our standpoint, such an understanding is quite coarse since it is not sufficient to differentiate between a body which is abandoned life after life, a form aggregate in other words, and a person which is permanent and transmigrates from life to life. We subdivide the person not into two, but into five components, the form aggregate as well as the aggregates of sensation, of discrimination, of compositional factors and of consciousness. Then subdividing the person into five aggregates, this understanding of the person as permanent one and independent is one which is seen as quite coarse and to be rejected. So this is what is meant by the person or the ātman being permanent, one, and independent. And since Buddhist scriptures do not assert such a person, one refers to the emptiness of such a person.

So this completes the presentation, the coarse selflessness of persons. Regarding the subtle selflessness of persons, is defined as persons being empty of a substantial existent which can be apprehended as autonomous. This assertion of the subtle selflessness of persons is also endorsed by all of the Buddhist schools of tenets. What is the meaning of the subtle selflessness of persons, in other words, persons being empty of being substantial entities which can be apprehended as autonomous? This can best be understood in terms of an example.

The relationship between the self or the relationship between the person and its aggregates is mistakenly seen as that of a king and his entourage. Where the king does not depend on his entourage, the entourage of the king, the court, depends on the king. Likewise, we spontaneously and mistakenly consider that even though a person does not depend on the aggregates, the aggregates themselves naturally depend on the person. This mistaken viewpoint runs counter to the fact that the person depends on the aggregates as much as the aggregates depend on the person. This is a difficult topic, which will become easier over the weeks as you become more familiar with the other schools of tenets.

To repeat, generally speaking, in society at large, a king is considered independent of his court, but the court is seen as dependent or relying on the king. We mistakenly perceive the relationship between our person and our aggregates on this model. In other words, we see our person as the king which is independent or does not have to rely on our aggregates and we see on the other hand our aggregates as having to depend on our person. This mistaken view is what is referred to as the apprehension of a subtle person. And the emptiness of this is the emptiness of the subtle emptiness of persons.

And therefore, even though the person appears to exist without having to rely upon its aggregates and even though the person is conceived as existing without having to rely upon its aggregates. This mode of apprehension of the person which exists without having to rely on its aggregates is a mistaken mode of apprehension, and it is a mode of apprehension which we must counter.

And, therefore, the object of refutation here is the person which exists autonomously without relying on its aggregates. And one asserts the refutation of the subject of refutation through the emptiness of the person existing autonomously without relying on its aggregates. There is therefore a difference in subtlety between the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons, both from the standpoint of the apprehender, in other words the subject, and from the standpoint of the object apprehended, the emptiness concerned. From the standpoint of the apprehender or the subject, the mind which apprehends the person’s being empty of being a substantial existent which can be perceived as autonomous, is a mind which understands that the person exists dependently upon its aggregates. This is a more subtle form of mind than the mind which merely understands that the person is not permanent, one and independent.

In addition, the conviction in a coarse self of persons is overwhelmingly artificial or imputed, whereas the conviction in the subtle existence of a subtle self excuse me, the conviction in the existence of a coarse self of persons, in other words, a person being permanent one and independent is generally artificial, whereas the conviction in the existence of a subtle self of persons, in other words, a person being substantial existent which can be apprehended autonomously, is overwhelmingly innate. Now these topics are topics which we will understand through being familiarized with over and again. I will take at present only one question. And after this, we will start our mock debates. I would ask you to discuss the state of subtle particles on the one hand and the difference between coarse and subtle selflessness of persons on the other.

Thank you. First, I’d like to thank Geshe for illuminating more clearly the difference between subtle and coarse selflessness. But from that definition, I have a following question. I must ask you to increase because I have a problem with hearing as well. I have a question following from Geshe la’s distinction between coarse and subtle selflessness.

That being that previously he stated that the Vaibhāṣika state that there is an existence of the self of phenomena. At the same time, we were told to believe that that self is the entity which accepts or understands that the five aggregates somewhere within the five aggregates is the self. That self of phenomena understands. That’s not a person who doesn’t understand anything. Forget about whether they understand or not.

From my understanding, subtle selflessness implies that there is an existence of the self which is amongst the five aggregates. Because what we are claiming is empty, what the self is empty of, is that the self is not a substantially existent autonomous entity amongst the five aggregates. For the subtle selflessness of persons. Yes. So my question therefore follows that let’s say someone dies.

Well of those five aggregates, at least we can definitely say the form no longer exists. Therefore, how can they maintain that there is a self contained within the aggregates when we can immediately dismiss one of them? Did I understand your question correctly? I’m not quite sure I understood your question correctly. You were saying that your doubt is how can the Vaibhāṣikas assert a subtle selflessness of persons since if they are asserting that at the time of death, since a continuum of the form aggregate and the other aggregates is interrupted, what might transmigrate?

Is that your doubt? So first, whether one is a Buddhist or a Hindu, in other words, whether one accepts the existence of an Ātman or not, transmigration does occur, and the person does transmigrate all along lacking a coarse and a subtle self of persons. Then from the Buddhist standpoint, what transmigrates is consciousness. And this consciousness which transmigrates lacks both the course and the subtle self of persons simply because such a coarse and subtle self of persons are at odds with logic, with reason. I’m sorry.

I I I just have to just clarify something. But my understanding is that the subtle selflessness of a person is the understanding that the I, the self, is not a substantially existent autonomous entity within the five aggregates. But from what you’re now stating, it is actually not the five aggregates, but one single aggregate which is the consciousness. So how do the Vaibhāṣikas state that one has five aggregates, but now suddenly it becomes one? The issue is not the aggregate of consciousness, which one could assert is a substantially existent autonomous entity in the Vaibhāṣika system.

The issue is the person. Your position is dead on. The aggregate of consciousness is a substantially existent autonomous entity. It is the person which is not a substantially existent autonomous entity. Alright.

No problem. Think about it and it will become clearer over time. Then please group up for discussion. Change partners from last time. Two by two.

Two by two. Oh, No. No. No.

Key terms in this teaching

atman dag (Tib)
Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
pratyekabuddha rang sang gye (Tib)
A solitary realizer or self-realizer; a Hinayana practitioner who attains liberation from cyclic existence autonomously, without relying on an external teacher or teachings. Cf. shravaka. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
shravaka nyen thö (Tib)
A hearer; a Hinayana practitioner who strives for liberation from cyclic existence on the basis of listening to teachings from a teacher. There are four divisions: stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner and arhat. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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