54 min · 3,421 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 54-minute teaching, Kyabje Rinpoche expounds the four progressive levels of selflessness within Svatāntrika Madhyamaka. He establishes coarse selflessness of persons—our lack of permanence, singularity, and independence—as foundation for subtle selflessness, the recognition that persons exist as designations dependent on mind and body rather than independent entities. He then presents two modes of selflessness of phenomena: coarse (object and subject not different substances) and subtle (emptiness of inherent existence). Central is how these four selflessnesses map to the four Buddhist schools and yield different results: meditating on subtle selflessness of phenomena with bodhicitta leads to full enlightenment; meditating on subtle selflessness of persons leads to liberation. Rinpoche clarifies how Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika interpret Buddhist scriptures differently. For practitioners with foundational knowledge of Buddhist philosophical systems.
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Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Tenets
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,416
So we will reflect as usual on the series of meditations to generate the motivation to listen to these teachings, which are specifically teachings on the view from within the view, the view and method aspect of the path with our aim to increase our understanding of the view and thereby to attain the state of full enlightenment for the benefit of all sentient beings. Therefore, from within the presentation of the four schools of Buddhist philosophy, we are now studying the fourth school, the Madhyamaka School. And from within the two fold division of Madhyamaka, the Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika, we are studying the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka School. And within the sevenfold subdivision of the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka School, we have reached the sixth outline. And on page 29, second paragraph, the two modes of the selflessness of persons which I explained respectively the coarse and the subtle selflessness of persons.
I explained in that sequence because it is easier to understand the coarse selflessness of persons than the subtle selflessness of persons. Regarding the coarse selflessness of persons, it is a person’s emptiness of being permanent, one and autonomous. And this refers to the fact that if we reflect in this case upon ourselves, it is most beneficial. We ourselves are not permanent because we change it by instant. We are not one because we are constituted of many parts and we are not autonomous, independent of that.
Now, in dependence on an understanding of the coarse selflessness of persons, one can then generate the understanding of the subtle selflessness of persons which depends on that. The subtle selflessness of persons is the fact that persons do not exist apart from the mind and body on which they are imputed. In other words, they are not as a definition of the subtle selflessness of persons says, substantially existing independent entities. They are instead imputedly existing dependent entities, imputed on which basis? Imputed on the basis of the mind and the body.
So generally speaking, the coarse selflessness of persons is accepted by all the schools from the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka downwards. And then, with regards to the second category of selflessness, the selflessness of phenomena, the third paragraph of page 29 of your text. This is presented here from the standpoint of the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, and two selflessnesses of phenomena are posited, a coarse and a subtle selflessness of phenomena. The coarse is the emptiness in the case of form. The emptiness of form in the valid cognizer apprehending form being different substances, and this is a coarser level of the selflessness of phenomena, in dependence on which it is possible to understand the subtle selflessness of phenomena, which is all phenomena’s emptiness of truth.
For instance, if Geshe-la were to take his knee as an example, his knee’s emptiness of difference in nature between itself and the valid cognizer apprehending it would be the knee’s coarse selflessness of phenomena. And his knee’s subtle selflessness of phenomena would be his knee’s emptiness of true existence. And the following is a difficult point. The difference between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena in the Svatāntrika and in the Prāsaṇgika school are posited in different ways. In the Svatāntrika school, the difference between the selflessness of persons and of phenomena is posited in terms of the subtlety of the object of negation.
So for instance, if we take the subtle selflessness of persons, and the subtle selflessness of phenomena in the Svatāntrika school, specifically the Yogacarasvatantrika school, then the object of negation of the subtle selflessness of phenomena, which is the subtle selflessness of persons, which is the persons existing as a substantially independent entity is actually coarser than the subtle object of negation of the subtle selflessness of phenomena, which is emptiness of true existence. This is specific to the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka School, since in the Prāsaṇgika School, the difference between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena is posited in terms of the basis on which emptiness is determined. If the basis is a person, one speaks of the selflessness of persons. And if the basis is a phenomenon in general, one speaks of the selflessness of phenomena. So therefore, two types of selflessnesses, the selflessness of a person and the selflessness of phenomena, according to Svatāntrika, differ in terms of their subtlety, and their respective subdivisions into two each, which makes four, also differ in terms of subtlety.
So the coarse selflessness of phenomena is easier to understand than the subtle selflessness of persons. This in turn is easier to understand than the subtle selflessness of persons, which in turn is easier to understand than the subtle selflessness of phenomena. And as Geshe-la has explained, the differentiation between these four levels of selflessness is posited not in terms of the basis of emptiness, but exclusively in terms of the object of negation. So for instance, even though we use the basis of a person, if we speak of the emptiness of true existence of a person, actually this is a selflessness of phenomena, although the basis is a person. As such, one would say, it is a selflessness of persons.
Likewise, if we were to speak for instance, using the object of negation of the coarse, selflessness of persons, of for instance, a phenomenon in general such as a vase being empty, of being one, permanent and autonomous, then this actually is a case of the selflessness of persons posited on the basis of a vase. The reason for which the Svatāntrika makes this distinction is because the actual abandonment of the last of the objects of negation of the subtle selflessness of phenomena, which is the true existence of phenomena, when conjoined with bodhicitta, leads actually to full enlightenment. Whereas the abandonment of the subtle selflessness of persons, in other words phenomena being substantially existing independent entities, the abandonment of this subtle selflessness of persons, when conjoined with renunciation, actually leads to liberation. So the four selflessnesses represent progressive means to attain the various realizations of the path. So we will have thereby basically completed the presentation of the core of the sixth outline.
And the reason for which the view in the context of Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka is presented in this incremental way, is because each of the four presentations of the view, the coarse selflessness of persons, the subtle selflessness of persons, the coarse selflessness of phenomena, the subtle selflessness of phenomena correlates actually to one of the schools. So we are led incrementally from the lowest to the highest schools, all the way through Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, then Cittamātra, and ultimately the Madhyamaka view. Now the view of Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka in particular, gives preeminence to the mind, and there is a fine difference in the understanding of the process of mental imputation between Svatāntrika Madhyamaka in general, and Prāsaṇgika. While the Prāsaṇgika school considers that all phenomena lack establishment by their own characteristics, The Svatāntrika school considers that all phenomena are established by their own characteristics. Therefore, for the Prāsaṇgika school, as opposed to the Svatāntrika school, phenomena are mere imputations by the mind.
There is nothing which arises from the side of phenomena. It is a mere imputational process on a basis of designation. This is not the case from the standpoint of the school, which accepts an uncommon basis from the side of the object. Generally speaking, one should opt for whichever schools one’s karmic imprints predispose one towards. If one has strong karmic imprints towards Prāsaṇgika, one will have a natural inclination for Prāsaṇgika.
However, within the four schools of tenets, it is generally said there are five views, because the Madhyamaka view itself is divided into these two broad views of Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika. And one should choose whichever view one feels the strongest affinity with, in function of one’s own karmic proclivities. The reason for this is that in dependence on this view, one can then progress progressively upwards towards the highest view, which is considered to be the Prāsaṇgika view in the Geluk tradition. On the other hand, if one does not do this, and from the beginning strives to make one’s own, a view with which one does not have a karmic affinity one may not be able to understand it, and one not have habituated one’s mind to a lower view, and may end up without any view whatsoever. Generally speaking, Geshe-la says, you should have seen by now that the differentiation between the Buddhist schools of tenets is made from the standpoint of the view, and from within all of the schools of tenets, the one uncommon school is the Prāsaṇgika school, because unlike of all other tenets schools, the Prāsaṇgika school does not accept that phenomena are established by their own characteristics, which all other schools of tenets without exception accept.
So, generally speaking, if one is a Buddhist by view, one must subscribe to one of the five views which Geshe-la is in the process of explaining. If one does not subscribe to one of the five views, any of the five is okay. Then one is not a Buddhist by view and one situation is rather awkward. So he will now quietly turn towards the Prāsaṇgika view. So as the famous quote Geshe-la gave at the beginning of the tenets teaching runs, there is no additional vehicle from the three vehicles, and there is no additional view apart from the four views.
We have finished the material on page 29 of your text, and we have also completed the sixth outline, passing to the seventh outline, which is a presentation of grounds and paths in keeping with the Svatāntrika School. Geshe-la would like to point out that while the sixth outline is considered the most important, the seventh outline presents the results of the sixth outline. In other words, the results of actually meditating on the view. If we meditate on the view, how do we progress, How do we eliminate the afflicted obstructions which prevent one from attaining liberation? How do we eliminate the obstructions to omniscience which prevent one from attaining full enlightenment?
And then, reading on with your text regarding the seventh, the presentation grounds and paths, from the standpoint of the Yogacāra, Svatāntrika Madhyamaka. The difference between the persons of the three vehicles, these are the Shravakas or the solitary hearers, the Pratyekabuddha or the solitary realizers, and the Bodhisattvas are posited by means of the main object of abandonment, the three different obscurations, and the main object of meditation, the three different views. So the object of abandonment of each vehicle is posited, followed by the object of meditation, in other words, the antidote by which this object of abandonment is abandoned, and ultimately the result, which is what result they can hope to attain through this. This is a case because, and we have the first of the three vehicles, those of the Śrāvaka lineage, the solitary, excuse me, the Shravakas, who taking as principal object of abandonment, the conception apprehending, being established as a substantially existing independent entity. So this is one of the forms of the selflessness of persons, and its surrounding factors, take in turn as principal object of meditation, the view which realizes the emptiness of a person’s being established as a substantially existing independent entity.
This in turn is the subtle selflessness of persons, which is the antidote to the view of the existence of a subtle self of persons. And as a result, they attain a lesser enlightenment. The lesser enlightenment here refers to their attaining the state and liberation of an arhat, of a Śrāvaka. The second lineage, those of the Pratyekabuddha lineage, in other words, the solitary realizers. So taking as, and here once again we have the threefold presentation of the object of abandonment, the antidote to that, and what is realized, in dependence on meditation on that antidote.
Through taking as principle object of abandonment, the conception apprehending form and the valid cognizer apprehending form as different substances, this is the object of abandonment. Take in turn as principle object of meditation, the view which realizes the emptiness of object and subject being different substances. This is the object of meditation or the antidote. And then in turn, realize a middling enlightenment, which is the liberation of a Pratyekabuddha. So here, the Pratyekabuddha is therefore meditating on the coarse, selflessness of phenomena.
And finally, at the bottom of page 30 of your text, Bodhisattvas, the third vehicle, through taking as principal object of abandonment, the apprehension of true existence, its imprints and so forth, taken turn as principal object of meditation, the view which realizes the true existencelessness of phenomena, which is its antidote to attain a great enlightenment. So once again we have the presentation of the object of abandonment, the apprehension of true existence, the antidote thereagainst, which is the apprehension of non-true existence, and the result obtained which is the state of full enlightenment. So this was a presentation specifically of the path from the standpoint of the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamikas. Now at the bottom of page 30 of our text, we have a presentation of the path from the standpoint of the other Svatāntrika school, the Sautrāntika Madhyamikas. And with respect to this school, the doubt arises, in as much as this school does not accept regarding conventional phenomena, the view of the Cittamātra School, that there is no difference in nature between phenomena and the valid cognizer apprehending them, then the two objects of abandonments of both the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha practitioner would actually be the same.
They would be the two selflessnesses of persons, the coarse and subtle self of the persons to be abandoned through the coarse and subtle selflessness of persons. If that is the case, how can we posit the difference between the Shravakas and the Pratyekabuddha? So as you remember in the presentation of the Yogacāra Svatāntrika School, there is a clear difference, there is a possibility to clearly differentiate the Shravakas and the Pratyekabuddha. And Geshe-la says, this is done, as is explained as well in your text, the bottom of page 30, the beginning of page 31, through positing a difference in terms of the greater or shorter period of practice of Shravakas and Pratyekabuddha, and the greater or lesser accumulation of merit to engage in this practice. So now finally, paragraph three on page 31 of your text presents the hermeneutics of the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka school in comparison with the hermeneutics of the other schools.
So generally speaking, Geshe-la says, there is no difference in the general presentation of the framework, the hermeneutical framework, or the framework of interpretation between the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and the Cittamātra, in that both the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and the Cittamātra accept the existence of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Sutras and they both accept in turn that Sutras are divided into Sutras of definitive meanings and Sutras which are interpretable, which have to be interpreted. Both also accept, in other words both Svatāntrika and Cittamātra accept three turnings of the wheel of the law. In other words, accept that there are Sutras of the first turning of the wheel of the law, which was turned by the Buddha mainly in Varanasi, in the area of Varanasi, turning of the law of the four noble truths. Then the second turning of the wheel of the law, mainly at Rajagriha, where the perfection of wisdom sutras were taught. And the third turning of the wheel of the law, mainly at Shravasti, where a third category of Sutras such as the Samdhinirmochana sūtra were taught.
Where the Cittamātra and the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka differ is within this framework in what they consider to be the definitive and the interpretable Sutras, and also which turnings of the wheel of the law they consider to be definitive and interpretable. Now with respect to the Cittamātra, first, as you may remember, the Cittamātra consider that the first turning of the wheel of the law, of the four noble truths, is interpretable. The second turning of the wheel of the law, the teaching of the perfection of wisdom sutras at Rajagriha, is also interpretable, and actually was intended for extremely sharp trainees, and teaches indirectly the Cittamātra view. The third turning of the wheel of the law is actually the turning of the law which explicitly teaches the Cittamātra view, and is therefore for the Cittamātra definitive. Now regarding the present presentation of the differentiation of the turning of the wheels of the law in the Sutras, and interpretable and definitive according to the Svatāntrika view.
For the Svatāntrika, the first turning of the wheel of the law is interpretable, because it teaches that phenomena are truly existent. The last turning of the wheel of the law is also interpretable because it teaches that some phenomena, not all, but some phenomena are truly existent. And the middle turning of the wheel of the law, which is the teaching of the perfection of wisdom Sutras at Rajagriha, has both interpretable and definitive components. The reason for this is that some of the texts and some of the quotes from the middle turning of the wheel of the law, teach a non true existence of phenomena, and this is accepted by Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, and these passages are considered to be definitive. Whereas other passages teach that phenomena are not established by their own characteristics.
This is not accepted by Svatāntrika Madhyamaka who consider these passages to be interpretable. So the second turning of the wheel of the law for Svatāntrika has both interpretable and definitive components. Now, the Prāsaṇgika view of hermeneutics is the following. For the Prāsaṇgika, generally speaking, the first turning of the wheel of the law is interpretable. There are Sutras of definitive meaning and passages of definitive meaning, in the first turning of the wheel of the law.
The second turning of the wheel of the law of the perfection of wisdom sutras is always definitive. All of the passages in the second turning of the wheel of the law are definitive. And the third turning of the wheel of the law is interpretable. So, for instance, if we were to k take the case of the Heart Sūtra, which all of us have recited at times, the Heart Sūtra is a sūtra of the second turning of the wheel of the law. It’s one of the perfection of wisdom Sutras, and the Heart Sūtra would be considered by the Prāsaṇgika as a sūtra of definitive meaning.
Whereas the Svatāntrika would consider the Heart Sūtra as a sūtra of interpretable meaning, because of the passage in which it is said, all of the aggregates must be seen as natureless. Now the Prāsaṇgika understand natureless as referring to true existence, and therefore say that whenever the sūtra refers to natureless, it is denying the true existence of phenomena, this is a statement of definitive meaning. The Svatāntrika on the other hand understands natureless as referring to phenomena being established by their own characteristics, and since they accept that phenomena are established by their own characteristics, they say that this passage is interpretable, therefore the sūtra itself is interpretable. The Prasangikas in general consider that Ārya Nāgārjuna, who developed the wisdom and profound aspect of the teachings, drew from the collected perfection of wisdom sutras, perfection of wisdom in 100,000, 25,000, 8,000 verses and so forth to develop his teachings on the wisdom aspect of the path and that these were explicitly present in the Sutras. Whereas the teachings on the vast aspect of the path which are imparted by Maitreya to Asaṇga and developed by Asaṇga were implicitly present also in the perfection of wisdom Sutras.
For this reason, both Nāgārjuna and Asaṇga are called founders for having drawn the very essence of the Buddhist teachings from these great Sutras and propounded them. And then after Ārya Nāgārjuna, these lineages of the profound and the lineages of the vast coming from Ārya Asaṇga were transmitted to the great monastery of Nālānda in India, where they were extolled, and from Nālānda were eventually transmitted to Tibet from which we have received them. So Geshe-la says, with this final presentation of Svatāntrika, we will stop here for today. So we will have a very short five minute break, and then we will have a discussion session of half an hour as usual.
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- definitive meaning nitartha (Skt); ngedön (Tib)
- One of two main ways of understanding a Dharma teaching, this one is where the content is be taken literally and not open for interpretation, as opposed to the interpretive meaning. LYWA
- grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
- Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- pratyekabuddha rang sang gye (Tib)
- A solitary realizer or self-realizer; a Hinayana practitioner who attains liberation from cyclic existence autonomously, without relying on an external teacher or teachings. Cf. shravaka. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.