1 h 35 min · 4,453 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen presents a detailed exploration of Vaibhāṣika tenets on the nature of mind and valid cognition in this 95-minute oral commentary. He opens with the foundational bodhisattva motivation for learning, then moves systematically through the Vaibhāṣika classification of minds into valid and invalid cognizers. The core of the teaching examines two broad categories: conceptual minds, which operate through meaning generalities and are necessarily mistaken about their appearing object even when correct about their object of engagement; and non-conceptual minds like sense and mental consciousnesses, which directly perceive phenomena without mediation. He walks through the famous Vaibhāṣika position that sense organs themselves can be valid cognizers, then explores yogic direct perceivers and the yogic path to realizing subtle impermanence. Throughout, he clarifies the critical distinction between mistaken minds and wrong minds, and distinguishes Vaibhāṣika’s assertion of only the selflessness of persons from the higher schools’ assertion of both selflessness of persons and phenomena. The teaching emphasizes connecting personal experience of how the mind functions with the systematic philosophical framework found in classical texts, aimed at serious students already engaged with tenet study.
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File: Line in 0123.mp3
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Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~4,436
So to listen to the teachings, we need to generate a good motivation. And this good motivation specifically should be a motivation which realizes that we and all sentient beings are identical in fearing suffering and wishing to be happy. And since other sentient beings are far greater in number than ourselves, that we ourselves should put ourselves in the second place and take responsibility for placing them in the state of complete happiness without any suffering whatsoever, and that this specific state is the state of full enlightenment, and that the way we ourselves can train to put them in this state is through listening to the Dharma. And with this as a motivation, we should listen to these teachings, and we will meditate on generating this motivation for one or two minutes. And generally speaking, within the context of the presentation of tenets and the subdivision of tenets into divisions, definitions, and so forth, we have reached the fifth presentation, which is on page five of your text, which is the presentation of minds, consciousnesses.
And then from within the presentation of subjects in general, subjects are divided into three categories, beings, minds, and expressive sounds. So beings and minds are presented separately in the context of tenets. So the presentation of examples or instances of persons or beings is very important in the context of tenets. All four tenets schools accept the existence of a person which transmigrates from countless past lives into countless future lives. The question is, what is posited?
What is given as an instance of this person? And the examples are very different from tenet school to tenet school. So moving back a little bit to the examples of persons, which is at the bottom of page four of your English translation. Regarding the fifth presentation, the mode of asserting subjects, they assert that the mere collection of the five aggregates is an instance of a person, and the assert mental consciousness of a person and so forth. So the main assertion of the Vaibashikas, and here this refers to the Kashmiri Vaibashikas, which is a dominant school, is that the mere collection of the five aggregates are a person.
And this is broadly speaking the viewpoint which is asserted in the root text of the Vaibashikas, the Mahavibasha, the auto commentary thereon, as well as latter commentaries such as Geshe Gendun Drup’s commentary called Illuminating the Path to Liberation, which is Tarlam Selje, a fundamental text of Buddhist logic. And these two presentations of either the mere five aggregates being posited as the basis of a person or the mind being posited as a basis of a person are the two broad presentations of the Vaibhāṣikas for beings of greater and lesser capacities. So as Geshe la explained at the beginning, generally speaking, from within the twofold division of objects and subjects, subjects are in turn divided into persons, minds and expressive sounds. We have at present reached the outline exposing the explanation of minds in the context of Vaibhāṣika. Now this presentation is actually very closely related to the presentation of minds in the context of Sautratika, and therefore, will be presented largely in that light.
Our text says that minds can be divided into minds which are valid cognizers and minds which are nonvalid or invalid cognizers. This is one of many possible divisions of minds. Minds can also be divided into conceptual and non conceptual minds. They can also be divided into minds and mental factors. They can also be divided into various other categories.
But the one we will use here is minds which are valid cognizers and minds which are not valid cognizers.
So we ourselves are quite accustomed to being with our minds, and we have, therefore, a lot of experience, firsthand experience of how our minds function, both at the mundane and at the super mundane level. So Geshe la says it is important for us to connect this personal experience of how our minds function with the presentation in these great texts, and then we will gain a thorough understanding of the topic. So for Jisunjiki Gilson’s text on tenets starts on page five of your English translation with a division of minds into valid cognizers and nonvalid cognizers. Because it is more beneficial, Geshe la will present a division of mind in terms of a division between conceptual and non conceptual minds since conceptual minds are actually those minds which are the most helpful in practice for ordinary beings. Now both conceptual and non conceptual minds themselves are subdivided respectively into conceptual valid cognizers and conceptual invalid cognizers, as well as non conceptual valid cognizers and nonconceptual invalid cognizers.
So regarding conceptual minds, conceptual minds are minds which can either reflect on the infinite past of countless past lives or on our present situation or on infinite future lives. However, all of the aspects of the path we reflect on at present, such as the two truths, the four noble truths, and so forth, are all reflected upon with conceptual minds our present state. And generally speaking, from within the various categories of mind, conceptual minds are not only sense consciousnesses nor mental consciousnesses. They are consciousnesses which have an uncommon mode of apprehending exterior phenomena. All minds which apprehend exterior phenomena constitute some sort of an inner representation of the exterior phenomena which is apprehended.
In the case of conceptual minds, this occurs with a mediation of what is known as a meaning generality or a dön ji in Tibetan. A meaning generality is, Geshe la says, somewhat akin to a helper, which helps the conceptual mind understand the exterior situation. And to give a specific example, the conceptual mind apprehending the color blue apprehends the color blue through the meaning generality of blue. Now this conceptual mind engages the color blue correctly correctly, so it is not mistaken with respect to the color blue. It is, however, mistaken with respect to its appearing object because its appearing object, the meaning generality of blue, which as Geshe-la explained, is what helped the conceptual mind apprehend the color blue.
This meaning generality appears as the color blue itself, which it is not. For this reason, conceptual minds are all without exception said to be mistaken minds. It is important to make a clear distinction between mistaken minds and wrong minds. In other words, between Khrul she in Tibetan and Log she. Conceptual minds are mistaken minds, but they are not wrong mind wrong minds.
And we will see as an instance of this later on a presentation of inferential valid cognizers, inferentially valid cognizers are conceptual minds. So they are minds which are mistaken with respect to their appearing object because they use a meaning generality, but they are not necessarily wrong minds. In as much as they are valid cognizers. They are not wrong minds, and therefore, that matter extraordinarily beneficial minds, which are used to analyze the two truths, the four seals such as the fact that all composite phenomena are impermanent, or contaminated phenomena of the nature of suffering and so forth. So if we consider the set of conceptual minds, as Geshele explained, they are divided into inferential valid cognizers and conceptual minds which are not inferentially valid cognizers.
Now inferentially valid cognizers are all valid cognizers, and all conceptual minds which are not inferentially valid cognizers are non valid cognizers, invalid cognizers, in other words. And therefore, we have finished the first general presentation of conceptual minds, which as Geshe la explained, are divided into conceptual minds, which are valid cognizers, inferential valid cognizers, and conceptual minds which are not valid cognizers. The second category of minds are non conceptual minds. Non conceptual minds are divided into three broad categories, sense consciousnesses, mental consciousnesses, and what is called reflexive consciousnesses, which are actually not accepted by the Vaibhāṣika school, but accepted by the Sautrāntika school. So we will enter into those later.
Now regarding sense consciousnesses, sense consciousnesses can either be sense consciousnesses which are valid cognizers or sense consciousnesses which are not valid cognizers. Likewise, mental consciousnesses are mainly mental consciousness which can be valid cognizers, and for yogic consciousnesses, the same thing. All of these non conceptual mental non conceptual consciousnesses are called non conceptual because they are minds which arise without depending on a meaning generality as an appearing object. Therefore, because they don’t depend on a meaning generality as an appearing object, they are non mistaken minds. And putting aside the uncommon Vaibhāṣika assertion that sensory organs can be valid cognizers, which is a very particular uncommon Vaibhāṣika position, all valid cognizers can, broadly speaking, be divided, as Geshe la explained, into conceptual and non conceptual valid cognizers.
And all valid cognizers, all pramāna, in other words, or tsema in Tibetan, satisfy the definition that they are knowers which are new and incontrovertible. What precisely is understood by a new and incontrovertible knower, the definition of a pramāna. New refers to the fact that it’s the first instant of a mind. Only the first instant of a mind in all tenets up to Prāsaṇgika qualifies as a valid cognizer. Incontrovertible means that this is a mind which cannot be changed or turned back with respect to its object of engagement.
It’s a mind which position will not change. For instance, if you were to take the case of valid conviction, valid conviction is indeed a mind which is concordant with its object. It is not, however, a valid cognition because it is a mind which can change its position with respect to its object. And finally, the third element in the definition of valid cognizers or parmana is that they are knowers, which means that they are mind. So they have the three characteristics.
They are new, first instant, incontrovertible, and they are minds. So after this brief introduction in the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual minds, we will return to the first line on page five of your text from within the twofold division of mind into valid cognizers and invalid cognizers, in which it is pramāna and non pramāna. The first, in which valid cognizers, has two divisions into direct valid cognizers and inferential valid cognizers. Regarding the first from within the threefold division into sense cognizers, mental direct cognizers, and yogic direct cognizers. And Geshe-la says here, reflexive valid cognizers are not mentioned since they precisely do not accept such a mind.
So this is the presentation of direct valid cognizers, which Geshe la has given.
Mhmm. And then Geshe la says, our text is not terribly clear on the presentation of Pramanas in Vaibashika, so he himself will elaborate considerably on this basis. And reading onwards in the text on line five of page five, sense direct valid cognizers are not necessarily consciousnesses because the eye sense organ is a direct valid cognizer. This is the uncommon Vaibhāṣika assertion, and it is important to understand why it arises. Generally speaking, all sense consciousnesses arise in dependence on a sense organ, which is their uncommon controlling cause.
This sense organ is not in the case of the eye consciousness, for instance, the coarse visual organ, in other words, the eyeball. It is actually a subtle form of matter which is present within the eye. It’s a subtle organ which Geshe la says in many respects can be compared in terms of its subtlety to light. And it is dependent on this subtle sense organ that the eye consciousness arises. Because this subtle sense organ can only detect forms and shapes, but cannot, for instance, detect smells or tastes, it is not possible to taste with or to smell with the eye sense organ.
So this sense organ, in the case of the eye, the visual sense organ, because it is an extremely subtle form of matter or form, would probably not be perceptible to direct observation, for instance, by an outside observer checking in the eye to see this eye sense organ. And it itself is considered to be the result of karmic imprints in the mind of the being in which eventually a body with eyes endowed with the eye sense organ arises. It, in turn, gives rise to minds. It gives rise specifically to the visual consciousness. So, for instance, the eye consciousness observing a house is generated in the shape and colors of a house, in dependence on an eye sense organ, which itself is generated in the shape and colors of a house.
And for this reason, the uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas is that such an eye sense organ, which arises from karmic imprints and gives rise itself to a mind, can be called a Pramāna. This is a position which is not accepted by the higher schools from Sautrāntika upwards. And the principal reason the Vaibhāṣikas advance for asserting that the eye organ is a valid cognizer, is a parmana, is that the eye consciousness, which is nonmaterial, cannot perceive phenomena through, for instance, obstructions such as the walls of a house. And they cannot it cannot perceive phenomena through obstructions such as the walls of the house because of the limitations which are imposed on it by the eye sense organ, which is material and which is impeded by such obstructions. Therefore, the eye sense organ possesses an extraordinarily close connection with the mind which it generates, and for this reason, it is an uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas that it can be called a valid cognizer.
However, if one wanted to qualify this in the context of debate, it would be necessary to say that the eye sense conscious sense organ is not in general a valid cognizer, but is only a valid cognizer at the time of visual perception because it is only at that time then this that this particular line of Vaibhāṣika reasoning applies. But then I asked Geshe-laa whether the same line of reasoning would apply to the ear sense organ. And he said, well, it is not mentioned in the text. And since the goal is to present these uncommon and rather eccentric Vaibhāṣika assertions, we won’t develop anymore. And then the this will be greatly developed in the section on mind in the Sautrāntika section of this text.
The sense consciousnesses are themselves divided into five categories of sense consciousness, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and bodily sense consciousness. The first instant instant of each of these consciousnesses, if it is incontrovertible, is a valid cognizer. So the first instant of the eye consciousness would be a valid cognizer if it’s incontrovertible. First instance of the ear consciousness, nose, tongue, and body. And in addition to the five sense consciousnesses of which the first instance is a valid cognizer if incontrovertible, The mental consciousness is also a non conceptual consciousness, which can be a valid cognizer.
However, the mental consciousness is an inattentive mind in the mental stream of ordinary beings. And Geshe la says this refers specifically to beings who have not developed the direct perceptions, And most probably, one would only become aware of mental consciousness when one gained direct realization of impermanence. Before that, Geshe la thinks it is probably difficult for those minds to be anything but inattentive minds. So if they’re inattentive minds, by definition, they’re not valid cognizers. And therefore, moving onwards with our text, there are two categories of yogic direct cognizers.
Geshe la says, with respect to yogic direct cognizers, all of the Buddhist schools of tenets from the Madhyamaka Svatāntrika included downwards consider that they are only attained at the level of the path of seeing and above. The Prāsaṇgika presentation is slightly different. And in this context, in the context of the Vaibhāṣika school, the first yogic direct cognizer we will be considering is a yogic direct cognizer realizing directly impermanence. The yogic direct cognizer realizing directly impermanence realizes direct impermanence of the basis of the five aggregates of the person, which are its object of observation. And first, it has to generate śamatha or zhi nä, single pointed concentration, calm abiding, on the impermanence of these five aggregates.
The criterion for the generation of śamatha is the appearance of mental or bodily pliancy. And when this mental or bodily pliancy has abided, has arisen, the mind of calm abiding, which focuses on the impermanence of the five aggregates, can remain focused on the impermanence of these five aggregates as long as it wants. It is, however, a conceptual mind. And then in dependence on this mind of calm abiding, in turn, one engages again and again in the practice of Vipashyana, trying to conjoin calm abiding and Vipassana together in one mind. And as one proceeds in this conjunction of calm abiding Shamatha and Vipashyana, progressively, the meaning generality of the impermanence of the five aggregates, which was present at first since this was a conceptual mind, fades and becomes lesser and lesser and eventually completely disappears.
At the moment when it completely disappears, that yogic direct perceiver, which is focusing on the impermanence of the five aggregates through the conjunction of Shamatha and Vipassana has gained direct perception of impermanence.
So the somewhat uncommon assertions of the Vaibhāṣikas are that the yogic direct perceiver itself, when it realizes impermanence, becomes the Sangha jewel, and that the realization of the four noble truths in dependence on that yogic direct perceivers realizing impermanence is the dharma jewel for obtaining a state of omniscience. And Geshe la then corrected himself and said, it is to be understood as a state of omniscience in the Vaibhāṣika understanding of omniscience, which is a mind which is unobstructed with respect to any object it wishes to investigate. Obtaining such a state of mental unobstructedness is the Buddha jewel. So this would be the Vaibhāṣika presentation of the generation of the Three Jewels of refuge, in other words, through practice on the path. On the other hand, will all of the tenet schools accept that yogic direct perceivers are necessarily paths Paths, grounds and so forth are mental states.
These are not physical paths. So while all schools accept that yogic direct perceivers are paths, it is only the higher schools, which means the schools from the Sautrāntika up to the Prāsaṇgika, which accept that a yogic direct perceiver is ipso facto necessarily the Dharma jewel. The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this. And we are now on the second paragraph of page five of your English translation. The first category has two divisions.
Yoga direct perceivers which realize that a person is empty of being permanent one and autonomous, and yogic direct perceivers which realize that a person is empty of substantial existence as an independent entity, as well as yogic direct perceivers which realize directly subtle impermanence. So Geshe la says we will defer the presentation of the yogic direct perceivers which realize the selflessness of persons until later on in the text when the selflessness of persons is explicitly explained. And in this context, when we speak of yogic direct perceivers realizing the subtle impermanence of the person, it is important to understand the distinction between the coarse and subtle impermanence of the person. When we speak of the coarse impermanence of a person, for instance, of ourselves, we mean the actual termination of our continuum. In other words, death, the end of the bodily aggregate in our case.
When we are talking of the subtle impermanence of persons, of ourselves, in other words, five aggregates, we are talking of the fact that they change literally instant by instant. This is something we do not perceive. And the yogic direct perceiver which realizes this, realizes the subtle impermanence of persons. So we have therefore presented the three divisions of yogic direct perceivers, yogic direct perceivers of emptiness as a first broad division, and the two yogic direct perceivers of the selflessness of persons, the coarse and subtle selflessness of persons. And this in turn is explained, in the following outline, the sixth outline, which is on the third paragraph of your text, the mode of asserting selflessness.
They assert, and those are Vaibhāṣikas assert, that subtle selflessness and the subtle selflessness of persons are synonymous and do not accept the selflessness of phenomena. And the selflessness of persons which are asserted are regarding the core selflessness of persons, the fact that the person is empty of being permanent one and autonomous. And regarding the subtle selflessness of persons, the fact that that person is asserted to be empty of being an independently existing substantial existent. So we have to understand that the two lower schools of tenets, which means the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika, assert only a selflessness of persons. They do not assert a selflessness of phenomena.
And it is only the two higher schools, the Cittamātra and the Madhyamaka, which assert both a selflessness of persons, which is similar to the two selflessness of persons presented here with some differences, and as well a selflessness of phenomena. Moreover, moving onwards with our text, it is said the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept the self lessness of phenomena. The reason for this is that actually Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrantikas are similar in that they accept the existence of a self of phenomena. They obviously do not accept the existence of a self of persons. The reason they accept a self of phenomena is because they accept that phenomena have a threefold qualification of being truly established, of being established as exterior objects, and of being established as being established through their own characteristics.
So if phenomena are established on the basis of these three criteria, then they can be said to have a self. And this assertion is an assertion which is shared with the Sautrantikas. The Cittamātra and the Madhyamaka, on the other hand, do not accept that phenomena are truly established in general, do not accept that phenomena are established as outer objects for the case of the Chittamatras, and do not accept that phenomena are established by their own characteristics for some of the subschools of the Madhyamaka. Therefore, since all of them do not accept all three characteristics of phenomena, all of them do not accept that phenomena have a self. So Geshe la says we will stop here for today.
He is quite ready to acknowledge with you that this was difficult material, and he begs for your patience and would like to convince you that an understanding of this will be of a great benefit later on. So we will go over and over this material again. And now if there are questions, we will ask them. And there is one here. So we have a very good question here.
In the teaching last week, said that the accept the existence of partless particles but do not accept their true existence. Is that correct? So Geshe la says it’s probably an error in transcription. The Vaibhāṣikas accept the existence of partless particles. The Madhyamaka do not.
And then I asked Geshe la, there is this very awkward quote at the end of Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen’s text, which says the coarse is constituted of the collection of partless particles, which seems to imply that Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen accepts the existence of partless particles. And Geshe la said, this quote does not imply this. The quote implies that if the coarse existed, then it would be constituted as a collection of partless particles. But since the coarse doesn’t exist of any way, it can’t be constituted as a collection of partless particles. However, it is very difficult to know whether it would be straightforward to realize the absence of partless particles since that realization would entail realizing that it was impossible to find a final particle.
And Geshe la says it is quite difficult to see when the process of investigation would stop. Mhmm. Yes. That Are there any other questions? Yes.
And the question was, how is inference possible without an individual? So if something is an inferential cognizer, it is necessarily a valid cognizer. A green field or a blue field in Tibetan, if you remember a blue field you saw in the past, then this remembrance of the blue field you saw in the past proceeds through a meaning generality of the color blue. This meaning generality is a permanent phenomenon. What is meant by a meaning generality is that appearing factor to the conceptual mind which eliminates all of the individual instances of the phenomenon perceived, keeping as it were its bare essence.
And to the conceptual mind which recollects this blue field, what appears is a blue field even though the green field may no longer be in existence. So in that respect, it is mistaken. However, it is not engaging its object of recollection in a mistaken way. So in that respect, it cannot be said to be wrong. So it’s a very important distinction to posit between a mistaken consciousness and a wrong consciousness.
Otherwise, there is no basis for conceptual analysis. Geshe-la thinks it is quite helpful to look at the presentation of tenets with the idea that the supreme view is the Prāsaṇgika view, which has two components, the Sutric and the Tantric component of the Prāsaṇgika view, and that the other views are mere preliminaries or preparations to an understanding of the prasangika view. They are not, therefore, not goals in themselves. They are merely stepping stones upwards. My doubt, it’s a it’s a doubt from the baby.
At the time of the first instance of the color blue, right, the question is what is the eye consciousness apprehending the first instance of the color blue? The eye consciousness apprehending the first instance the first instance of the color blue is the eye consciousness of the second instance of the color blue. So if the eye consciousness of the second instance of the color blue apprehends the first instance of the color blue at the time of the second instance of the color blue, then my doubt was it would ipso facto be mistaken because it assumes that the first instance of the color blue is actually the second instance of the color blue. Geshe la’s answer is that the eye consciousness apprehending the first instance of the of the color blue doesn’t need exist at the time of the second instance of the color blue, but it apprehends the first instance of the color blue as blue. Therefore, it is not mistaken.
Otherwise, all sense consciousnesses would necessarily be mistaken. Excuse me, everybody. Could you
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- four noble truths denpa zhi (Tib)
- The subject of the Buddha's first turning of the wheel of Dharma. The truths of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path to the cessation of suffering as seen by an arya. LYWA
- insight meditation vipassana (Pali); vipashyana (Skt); lhag tong (Tib)
- The principal meditation taught in the Theravada tradition. It is based on the Buddha’s teachings on the four foundations of mindfulness. It is sometimes called mindfulness meditation. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- shamatha zhi nä (Tib)
- Calm abiding; a state of concentration in which the mind is able to abide steadily, without effort and for as long as desired, on an object of meditation. There are nine stages in its development. LYWA
- two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
- The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.