Tenets

1 h 53 min · 5,607 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 113-minute commentary on Vaibhāṣika tenets, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen provides a detailed exploration of how this early Buddhist philosophical school understands selflessness, the structure of the path, and liberation. He begins with the two levels of personal selflessness—the coarse emptiness of permanence, unity, and independence accepted by all Buddhist schools, and the subtle emptiness of substantial independent existence accepted only by higher schools. He explains the uncommon Vatsiputriya position that persons are neither permanent nor impermanent, then moves into the seventh outline covering grounds and paths, distinguishing between the objects of abandonment and the actual progression for the three types of practitioners: śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas. Key themes include the nature of non-afflicted obscurations unique to the Vaibhāṣika view, why Vaibhāṣikas do not accept a Buddha’s form body as Buddha, the distinction between remaindered and remainderless nirvana, and how Vaibhāṣikas differentiate interpretable and definitive sutras based on literal acceptability rather than deeper meaning. The teaching is dense and technical, suited to serious students of Buddhist philosophy.

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File: Line in 0125.mp3

UUID: bd99fa7a-981e-45d1-a9b5-f2341aaf267f

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Tenets

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~5,614

# Line in 0125

**Collection:** Audio Recordings — Tenets
**Duration:** 113.5 minutes
**Words:** 5,633
**Model:** Deepgram Nova-3
**Corrections applied:** 10
**Transcribed:** 2026-03-09 03:20

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Good morning, everybody. And I have a few announcements, and there is a very interesting development. You know, after the teaching, if anybody wishes to join and to stay back and to have a discussion on tenets, Ilya and Joe will be very happy to stay. Ilya will be very happy to stay back and to discuss format, you know. And if you wish, maybe you have a bit of time to think about if you wish to stay and have a discussion after the teaching.

You know, we have, after teaching, a fifteen-minute break, fifteen to twenty minutes, then come back and discuss—discussion, you know, starts. That’d be fantastic. And if you wish, you know, to join in the discussion, that would be fantastic too. We’ll learn and further verify and everything. And so if you wish to join, then please make sure you put your name down.

I will pass the pen and paper, and put your name down, and that would be good. Every Sunday teaching, after teaching, be a discussion. It’ll be fantastic. And that’s all. Thank you.

So in keeping with the tradition which has been established, we must generate initially, before listening to the teachings—or in the case of Geshe-la, before explaining the teachings—a good motivation. And when we speak of a good motivation, it is not any good motivation. It’s actually that motivation which wishes to place all mother sentient beings, as vast as space, which are infinitely close to us, in a state of perfection, a full enlightenment. And to do this, we ourselves aspire to attain that state of full enlightenment that is replete with all qualities and bereft of all faults. And we shall meditate on this for a couple of minutes.

So last time, we reached the sixth outline, and we will enter in detail an analysis of the sixth outline on page five of your translation, which is an elaboration of the presentation of the two selflessnesses presented at the end of the fifth outline, which is at the bottom of the second paragraph of page five. The coarse emptiness of persons, which is a person’s emptiness of being permanent, one, and autonomous, and the subtle emptiness of persons, which is a person’s emptiness of substantial existence as an independent entity. Generally speaking, all Buddhist schools accept the coarse selflessness of persons. In other words, they all accept that persons are empty of being permanent, one, and independent entities. But only some Buddhist schools accept the subtle selflessness of persons. And then regarding the presentation of the coarse selflessness of persons, there are three superimpositions or three wrong imputations on the basis of imputation of the five aggregates, which are the superimpositions or the imputations of permanence, of oneness, and of independence.

And of these three, the coarsest and the most dangerous is the superimposition of permanence, which is a belief that instead of the person’s changing day by day, hour by hour, and for that matter, instant by instant, the person is a permanent entity. And this belief in the permanence of the person is superimposed on the basis of imputation of the impermanent aggregates. And that realization that the superimposition of permanence on the basis of the impermanent aggregates is wrong leads in turn to a realization of impermanence, which is a realization of the subtle impermanence of persons. In other words, the fact that they are transient and change instant by instant. Dependent on this realization of the subtle impermanence of persons, in turn, one will quite easily realize that persons are not one, but are constituted of parts which constitute them.

And the last element in the realization of the coarse emptiness of persons is a realization of the non-autonomous existence of persons. What is meant here by the non-autonomous existence of persons is that persons arise dependent on their causes. In other words, dependent on the previous instance in their continuum. Therefore, this belief in the emptiness—the selflessness of persons at the coarse level—is shared by all Buddhist schools. And it is dependent on the realization of the coarse selflessness of persons, in other words, persons being empty of being permanent, one, and autonomous, that eventually a realization of the subtle selflessness of persons—in other words, persons being empty of substantial existence as an independent entity—can be realized.

Yeah. And generally speaking, all of the Buddhist schools beneath the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka accept that the subtle selflessness of persons is a person’s emptiness of substantial existence as an independent entity. It remains to be clarified, however, what meaning they give to this. So the terminology is accepted. The meaning, however, attributed to these terms is indeed somewhat different from school to school.

This is, for all these schools, the principal object of abandonment, which is abandoned at the level of liberation. Now generally speaking, if we analyze what is meant by the subtle selflessness of persons, and if we analyze the terms, it may make things a little bit easier, Geshe-la says, to wonder what exactly would be the subtle selflessness of a human being. Now generally speaking, a human being is an imputation on the basis of the constituents of body and mind. And that imputed being, on the basis of the basis of imputation body and mind, is an existent. It is an existent which exists in dependence upon its basis of imputation.

However, that imputation which is not seen as existing in dependence on its basis of imputation, in dependence on body and mind, but which is instead seen as being completely independent of the basis of imputation—that is negated, and that is what is referred to in the statement “a person is empty of substantial existence as an independent entity” by the last two words, “independent entity.” It is that idea that the person, the being, or in this case, the human being, is an independent entity which arises independently of the basis of imputation, which may be the five aggregates or the body and the mind. So Geshe-la has finished explaining in detail the first part of the first line of paragraph three on page five. Regarding the sixth presentation, the mode of asserting selflessness, they assert that subtle selflessness—in other words, the subtle selflessness of persons—and the subtle selflessness of persons are synonymous. Moving onwards, and they do not accept the selflessness of phenomena.

All of the lower vehicle schools of tenets, which means the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika schools, do not accept a selflessness of phenomena. On the other hand, the two highest schools of tenets, Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, accept a selflessness of phenomena. And our text moves onwards reading: they do not accept the selflessness of phenomena because they accept that if something is an established base—in other words, a phenomenon—it is necessarily endowed with a self of phenomena. This is the case because the two lower schools of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika consider that all phenomena which are not persons are truly established. Because they consider them to be truly established, they consider that all phenomena which are not persons—which are not sentient beings, in other words, or enlightened beings—are necessarily endowed with a self of phenomena.

The two higher schools of tenets, the Cittamātra and the Madhyamaka school, on the other hand, accept a selflessness of phenomena. The Cittamātra school specifically accepts a selflessness of phenomena because it says that phenomena are not truly established inasmuch as other-powered phenomena arise dependent on the karmic imprints which are implanted in the mind-basis-of-all. So for this reason, from the Cittamātra school upwards, a self of phenomena is not accepted. Moving onwards in our text, we have the presentation of one of the highly uncommon Vaibhāṣika schools. It is one of the 18 schools which are divided in four groups of seven, five, three, and three.

It’s in the last group of three. This is called the Vatsiputriya school. The Vatsiputriya school accept a selflessness of persons, but they accept only a coarse selflessness of persons, and unlike the other Vaibhāṣikas, do not accept a subtle selflessness of persons. In other words, they consider that persons are empty of being permanent, one, and autonomous, but they do not consider that persons are empty of substantial existence as an independent entity. And this is presented in your text at the bottom of page five.

From within these, they accept the selflessness of persons, which is an emptiness of permanence, unity, autonomy, but do not accept the selflessness of persons, which is an emptiness of a substantially existing independent entity, and so forth. So the position of the Vatsiputriya school is a rather awkward position because they do accept that persons are empty of being permanent, one, and autonomous. So a priori, one might assume they would accept that persons are impermanent and changing instant by instant. If they accepted this, then it’s very difficult to see how they could not accept a subtle selflessness of persons, which they do not accept. So the uncommon position of the Vatsiputriya school—this is the only school in the Vaibhāṣika school which asserts this—is that whereas persons can be said to be empty of being permanent, one, and autonomous, persons in actuality are neither permanent nor impermanent.

And this is what is explained in the final part of the paragraph: but do not accept the selflessness of persons with an entity of a substantially existing independent entity because they accept a substantially existing independent self, which is inexpressible inasmuch as it is neither of one nature nor of different nature from the aggregates and neither permanent nor impermanent. And we have, at present, finished the sixth outline, which is a presentation of the selflessness of persons according to the Vaibhāṣika School. We are now passing to the seventh outline on page six of your translation. Moreover, regarding the seventh presentation, that of grounds and paths, it is presented or explained in terms of the presentation of the objects of abandonment and the actual grounds and paths.

The reason for this twofold division, Geshe-la says, is that for each stage of the upward progression on the grounds and paths, there is one specific object of abandonment. So it is important preliminarily to present first the object of abandonment whose abandonment leads to its respective ground and path. And then regarding the first, as to the first, both afflicted and non-afflicted obscurations are accepted, and the term “obstructions to omniscience” does not exist. Generally speaking, it is one of the uncommon tenets of the Vaibhāṣika that there are such things as non-afflicted obscurations. Since the Vaibhāṣikas consider that all five aggregates are actually objects of abandonment, and specifically that one’s own body is an object of abandonment, which is abandoned at the time of parinirvāṇa.

And moving onwards, and the term “obstructions to omniscience” does not exist. The term “obstructions to omniscience” does not exist because the Vaibhāṣika understanding of the state of omniscience, if one can call it that, is very particular. It is not an omniscience in the Mahāyāna sense of the term, and therefore, the statement that obstructions to omniscience do not exist is actually in terms of meaning an identical statement with a statement on the previous page that the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept a selflessness of phenomena. So in the middle of the first paragraph on page six, this is the case because the first are mainly eliminated upon the attainment of liberation, while the second are mainly eliminated up to the attainment of omniscience. Instances of the first are the conception apprehending the person as an independent substantial existence and the three poisons—in other words, desire, hatred, and ignorance—which arise through the power of this, their imprints, and so forth.

An important distinction has to be made at this point between two terms which are both used in this context. One are imprints, bag chag in Tibetan or vasana in Sanskrit, and the other are seeds, sa bon in Tibetan or bija in Sanskrit. Now what is meant by imprints is actually the trace of non-virtuous deeds on the mind in a similar way to, for instance, when our hand has been dirty. Even if we wipe the dirt off, there will be a remainder of dirt on the hand. So this is how one should understand karmic imprints. Seeds, on the other hand, have a much more active connotation. When one speaks of karmic seeds, it actually refers to the propensity of previously committed virtues or non-virtues in the mind to give rise again to virtues or non-virtues in the future. And moving onwards, instances of the second are the karmic imprints of the conception apprehending the person as an independent substantial existent, and so forth. These are traces in the mind which actually are karmic imprints which arise through the power of this.

So the assertion of the existence of obstructions or obscurations which are not afflictions, as Geshe-la said, is an uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas. And some such obscurations which are not afflictions are, for instance, the trace-faults which subsist in the mind of an arhat who is unable to perceive the collection of the totality of ethics and merit accrued to ethics in the mind of a fully enlightened being, because this is very difficult to understand. Or, for instance, the trace-faults which subsisted in the mind of Maudgalyayāna, who was unable to perceive his mother’s rebirth in a hell realm despite his paranormal powers because of the great distance at which this occurred. Or, for that matter, trace-faults which prevent an arhat from realizing events because of great distance in time. Or, for that matter, trace-faults which prevent an understanding of events because of the great difficulty of these events. So these are the four categories of non-afflicted obscurations of which trace-faults are an instance. And then generally speaking, the obscurations which are afflictions are the objects of abandonment of beings striving for liberation, whereas the obscurations which are not afflictions according to the Vaibhāṣikas are the objects of abandonment for beings who are striving for full enlightenment, such as bodhisattvas.

This will be explained in greater detail in the second part of the seventh outline in the middle of page six of your text. As to the second, the actual presentation of grounds and paths, there is a difference in the mode of progression on the path for the beings of the three vehicles. Because those who have the type of a Śrāvaka—there are three categories of types or three goals which beings set themselves: the Shravakas who are hearers, the Pratyekabuddha who are solitary realizers, and the Bodhisattvas who aspire for full enlightenment for the benefit of all beings. Those who have the type of a Śrāvaka associate the view which realizes a person’s emptiness of substantial independent existence—in other words, the subtle selflessness of persons—to a small collection of merit. This collection of merit is said to be small because the goal which the hearers or the Shravakas have set themselves, which is arhathood, is a small goal. Whereas the collection of merit of the Pratyekabuddha is said to be middling, and the collection of merit of the Bodhisattvas is said to be great because both Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattvas are striving for full enlightenment.

A difference between these two is that because Pratyekabuddha are striving for full enlightenment for their own benefit, whereas bodhisattvas are striving for full enlightenment for the benefit of others, therefore, the greatness of the collection of merit which has to be accumulated by the Bodhisattvas is posited in terms of the cause. And those who have the type of a—excuse me—to a small collection of merit and through meditating during three lifetimes, attain lesser enlightenment. Those who have the type of a Pratyekabuddha—and generally speaking, Geshe-la says, for the two lower categories of beings, Shravakas and Pratyekabuddha, both Shravakas and Pratyekabuddha are themselves said to have the type of Shravakas and the type of Pratyekabuddha even though they have obtained the result, which is the state of Shravakas or the state of Pratyekabuddha.

This is not the case for bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas themselves have the type of a bodhisattva, but when they attain the result of the path of a bodhisattva, which is full enlightenment, then they no longer have the type of a bodhisattva because they are fully enlightened beings. So returning to point B on page six, those who have the type of a Pratyekabuddha associate such a view—in other words, a view of the subtle selflessness of persons—to a middling collection of merit. The collection of merit referred to here is practices such as prostrations, donations, offering mandalas, and so forth, and through meditating during one hundred eons, attain a middling enlightenment.

The bodhisattvas associate such a view, always the subtle selflessness of persons, to a great collection of merit and through meditating during three countless great eons and so forth, attain a great enlightenment. The term “countless” here in “countless great eons” must not be understood literally. Otherwise, it would be a misnomer. These are not countless eons. This refers, however, to the highest possible number in the traditional Indian numerology, which when you moved up from hundreds of thousands to millions to tens of millions to hundreds of millions to billions to tens of billions and so forth—in other words, this refers to an extraordinarily vast, but nonetheless finite, amount of time. And at present, we have explained the actual presentation of the paths for the three categories of beings: Shravakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas. Now at the bottom of page six, there is a presentation of the actual mode of collection of merit for these practitioners. Point A: Bodhisattvas, after accumulating the collections during three countless eons and so forth on the levels beneath the great path of accumulation, actualize grounds and paths and bar paths from the level of warmth of the path of preparation up to the path of no more learning in one meditative session. It is important to understand what follows to have a brief presentation of what is meant by the path in the various schools of tenets.

There are five different paths which bear the same name for the three categories of practitioners: Shravakas—in other words, hearers—Pratyekabuddha, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas. These five paths are the path of accumulation, the path of preparation, the path of seeing, the path of meditation, and the path of no more learning. So there are five paths for the Shravakas: the Shravakas’ path of accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, and no more learning. There are five paths for the Pratyekabuddha, and there are also five paths for the bodhisattvas.

Unlike, however, the Mahāyāna schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept that the three upper paths of a bodhisattva are divided into ten grounds, nor do they, for that matter, accept the concept of ten grounds. And they consider that bodhisattvas engage in the accumulation of merit for three countless eons at the level of the path of preparation and accumulate merit up to the very last instant of the path of preparation. And then in one meditative session, pass from the path of preparation through the remaining three paths—in other words, the path of seeing, meditation, and no more learning—and attain the enlightenment which they accept.

And then moving on to page seven, those of the Pratyekabuddha type, after accumulating the collections during one hundred great eons. So they accumulate the collections for a lesser period of time than the bodhisattva practitioners because they do not have to abandon the obscurations which are not afflictions from within the twofold division of obscurations. They only have to abandon the obscurations which are afflictions, and so forth, on the levels beneath the great path of accumulation. So just as the bodhisattvas, they have to practice, for a much shorter period of time, for one hundred great eons at the level of the path of accumulation. And at the last instant of the path of accumulation, they enter into meditative equipoise, and then a yogic direct perception arises, which is placed upon their principal object of abandonment, the subtle selflessness of persons. And in dependence on this, they progress through all four remaining paths.

Actualize grounds and paths, though not grounds—again, since the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept the existence of the ten grounds—from the level of warmth of the path of preparation up to the path of no more learning in one meditative session. I meant actually, not grounds. They do accept the five paths, but they do not accept the ten grounds. And those of the Śrāvaka type have a different mode of accumulation of merit from those of the Pratyekabuddha types and those of the Bodhisattva types. Those of the Śrāvaka type accumulate the collections on the occasion of all four paths of learning, which means the first four paths.

However, upon obtaining the path of an ārya, which means a path of seeing, they must still train in the path of learning for sixteen lives. So this is quite different from the mode of training of both the Pratyekabuddha and the Bodhisattvas, and this is the case because Shravakas from within the three categories of beings are those of dullest faculties. Therefore, these Vaibhāṣikas do not accept that the form aggregate of a Buddha is a Buddha since it is an object of abandonment. This is an uncommon Vaibhāṣika tenet. The Vaibhāṣikas consider that since, for instance, a practitioner of the Bodhisattva lineage attains within one meditative session all of the paths from the level of warmth of the path of preparation all the way up to enlightenment, he will attain full enlightenment with the contaminated body he had at the time of entering practice at the level of warmth of the path of preparation.

So his mind can be said to be the mind of a fully enlightened being and a Buddha, but his body cannot be said to be a Buddha. It is actually an object of abandonment. Moving onwards, the fifth paragraph of page seven: since it is an object of abandonment inasmuch as it is subsumed by the one life on the bodily basis of the previous bodhisattva on the path of preparation, which we explained previously. Why is this necessarily the case? Because the bodily base of a bodhisattva on the path of preparation is an aggregate which is impaired by formerly cumulative common afflictions.

In other words, it is a collection of contaminated aggregates and therefore cannot be called a Buddha. They do not accept—”they” refers here to the Vaibhāṣikas—the existence of the Sambhogakāya, and assert that the Supreme Nirmāṇakāya at the time of parinirvāṇa, as well as the mind’s continuum, is interrupted. In other words, after a being attains full enlightenment, at the time of the death of that being, what is called parinirvāṇa, then the mental continuum as well as the bodily continuum are interrupted and actually cease to exist. Although the Buddhas and Aryas have abandoned all suffering without exception, since a being has attained full enlightenment, he has abandoned suffering. It is not contradictory to assert that the truth of suffering exists in their continuum because the truth of suffering is posited as abandoned when all the afflictions whose object is the truth of suffering are abandoned.

The meaning of this line, Geshe-la says, is that while the Buddha’s mind has indeed abandoned the first two noble truths—the truth of suffering and the truth of the origination of suffering—until he enters parinirvāṇa, he is endowed with a body which was impelled by past contaminated karma. This body, which was impelled by past contaminated karma, is of the nature of the truth of suffering. So this body is actually said to be included in the continuum of the Buddha, and therefore, one can say that the truth of suffering is included within the continuum of the Buddha, the continuum of the five aggregates, even though obviously it is not included within the mental continuum of the Buddha. This is the case because when Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha-type arhats attain the state of arhats, they are posited as having attained a nirvana with remainder. In other words, they have attained nirvana at that point.

The remainder is the continuum of their aggregates for as long as they are alive and are posited as having attained a remainderless nirvana after departing this life. This is the case because the Vaibhāṣikas consider that such beings have put an end to the cycle of lives, and they finish the life they are in after attaining nirvana. But at the time of their death, at the time of parinirvāṇa, their continuum of both mental and physical is interrupted. In other words, both their minds and bodies cease completely to exist. However, the truth of cessation, which they have generated at the time of attaining nirvana, would, Geshe-la says, probably continue to exist.

And moving on, this is the case because when Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha-type arhats attain the state of an arhat, they are posited as having attained a nirvana with remainder for as long as they are alive and are posited as having attained a remainderless nirvana after departing this life. This is so because although all obscurations which are afflicted—in other words, the afflicted obscurations from within the two categories of afflicted and non-afflicted obstructions—are abandoned at the time of a nirvana with remainder—in other words, a nirvana which they attain within their life—they still have—and here Geshe-la says, which is not clear in our text, this applies to Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha—they still have non-afflicted obscurations within their minds. And these non-afflicted obscurations within their minds remain present until they attain what is called in the Tibetan tradition a remainderless nirvana, which is called in the Indian tradition a parinirvāṇa, when actually their continuum is cut. Now because their continuum is cut—in other words, at the time of the death of such beings, the continuum is interrupted—then, obviously, the non-afflicted obstructions in their mind are interrupted also.

And Geshe-la from his side has somewhat of a doubt regarding whether one could say that some type of a non-afflicted continuum survives at the level of a remainderless nirvana from the Vaibhāṣika standpoint. The texts are not clear on this topic. This is a position which is adopted by the Cittamātra school, for instance. And then passing on to page eight and the hermeneutics of the Vaibhāṣika school, and the criteria for distinguishing interpretable and definitive sutras. When the proponents of true existence—which applies to the two lower Hīnayāna schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas—differentiate interpretable and definitive sutras.

An interpretable sūtra is a sūtra which was uttered by the Buddha for the sake of specific trainees, but which cannot necessarily be accepted as authentic for all trainees, whereas a definitive sūtra represents a definitive thought of the Buddha. They, in other words, the Vaibhāṣikas, differentiate them by using the criteria of those which can be accepted literally and those which cannot be accepted literally. In other words, there is no leeway for interpretation of the meaning of passages in sūtra for the Vaibhāṣika school. If it cannot be interpreted or accepted literally, the sūtra then is necessarily interpretable. If it can be accepted literally, the sūtra is necessarily definitive.

However, both schools of proponents of true existence—in other words, both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas—do not acknowledge the baskets of the great vehicle as a speech of the Buddha. And what this means is that both Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrantikas consider that from within the three turnings of the wheel of the Dharma—the first turning of the wheel of the Dharma, the four noble truths; the second turning of the wheel of the Dharma, the perfection of wisdom sutras at Rajgir; and the third turning of the wheel of the Dharma—the latter two turnings of the wheel of the Dharma are false. And they are actually not sutras which were taught by the Buddha and are not accepted either as interpretable or as definitive by the Vaibhāṣikas.

So the Vaibhāṣika school, which is referred to here in the context of tenets, is that Vaibhāṣika school which thrived during the period between the Buddha’s entering parinirvāṇa and the appearance of Ārya Nāgārjuna and Ārya Asaṇga. And it is relying on these texts that the Vaibhāṣika school is explained. Now it would seem based on these texts that the Vaibhāṣikas did acknowledge the existence of a greater vehicle, but did not practice it. So the question is: what is the relationship between the aggregates and the elements? There are four elements: earth, water, fire, and air.

These are the basis of matter, and actually our body is mainly constituted from the Tibetan standpoint of the earth element, so it’s a substance of solidity and immovability. On the other hand, the five aggregates are form, feeling, recognition, volition, and consciousness. The four elements are subsumed within the first of the five aggregates. In other words, the four elements are part of the form aggregate. So we have finished the Vaibhāṣika school.

Do you have any doubts about the Vaibhāṣika school? It would be surprising if you didn’t. So this is a very good question. It’s an uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas. Vaibhāṣikas consider that the reason the continuum of a Buddha ceases at the time of parinirvāṇa is because the Buddha has, at the time of a nirvana with remainder—in other words, a nirvana during that life—eliminated all afflictions.

And since the afflictions is a motor of cyclic existence, he has eliminated the motor of cyclic existence. So when he reaches death, there is no longer a rebirth, neither for the mind nor the body. And then the uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas is that the truth of cessation within the mind of the Buddha, which was attained at the time of a remainderless nirvana, since it is a permanent phenomenon and since there is no reason for it to cease, subsists even though the basis on which it has been attained, which is the mental and bodily continuum of the Buddha, have been interrupted. This is a very uncommon position. Now there are some assertions regarding remainderless nirvana in the Cittamātra school specifically, where it is said that at the level of a remainderless nirvana, the non-contaminated continuum of some aspects subsists, and Geshe-la wonders whether this might not be read into the Vaibhāṣika assertions, but there is nothing in the texts to support this.

If I understood correctly, then one hundred ordinary eons constitute one great eon. And then a quasi-infinite number of great eons, which would be about as high a number as one could count in the Indian tradition of counting, would constitute one countless eon. So it is during three such countless eons that bodhisattvas would practice at the level of the path of accumulation. And these are the cycles of time during which the human lifespan passes from ten years to one hundred years and back and so forth. So Geshe-la says, actually, from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣika, the position he explained is a rather uncommon standpoint.

But from the Prāsaṇgika standpoint, from the definitive standpoint, then the Vaibhāṣikas cannot progress beyond the path of accumulation because the basis to progress beyond the path of accumulation is not present. So the issue doesn’t arise basically. So from a Prāsaṇgika standpoint, all the schools below Prāsaṇgika, which means downwards, have fallen into an extreme of eternalism. From the Prāsaṇgika standpoint, the Vaibhāṣikas have fallen both into an extreme of eternalism and an extreme of nihilism, because they both refuse to accept the selflessness of phenomena, so they have fallen into an extreme of eternalism, and they assert the total disintegration of the self, of the person. They have fallen into an extreme of nihilism as well.

That’s a big good debate. That’s a—

Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika have no secret mantra. Tantric practice does not exist in those schools. Hello? Oh, I just wanted to remind everybody. Excuse me?

Hello? Hello? Hello? I just wanted to remind everybody, as Tenzin announced, if there is anybody who wishes to stay for discussions, we can start that this week. However, if you can’t commit to this week, if you could put your name down and would like to have discussions in following weeks, we can organize that too.

We were gonna have a fifteen-minute break. And then even if the discussion only lasts for half an hour, that could be possible. Yeah. To start at 1:00. Yeah.

Oh, I see. Yeah. Well, yeah. You can bring a sandwich if you want to.

Key terms in this teaching

basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
five paths lam nga (Tib, Wyl)
The five stages of spiritual progress - the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation and no more learning - set out for each of the three vehicles; the Mahayana five paths culminate in buddhahood. LYWA
grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
parinirvana
The final nirvana the Buddha attained when he passed away in Kushinagar, India. LYWA
path of no more learning ashaiksa-marga (Skt); mi lob pä lam (Tib)
The fifth of the five paths, the culmination of practice: for the Mahayana, buddhahood; for hearers and solitary realizers, the liberation of an arhat. LYWA
pratyekabuddha rang sang gye (Tib)
A solitary realizer or self-realizer; a Hinayana practitioner who attains liberation from cyclic existence autonomously, without relying on an external teacher or teachings. Cf. shravaka. LYWA
selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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