1 h 42 min · 5,596 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 102-minute session, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen begins a detailed exposition of the Vaibhāṣika school, the first of four classical Buddhist tenet systems. After establishing bodhicitta as the proper motivation for study, he introduces the Vaibhāṣika through seven analytical frameworks: definition, divisions, etymology, and modes of asserting objects, subjects, and selflessness. The core definition identifies Vaibhāṣikas as lower-vehicle practitioners who accept external objects as truly established and reject reflexive consciousness—positions he contrasts with rival schools. Geshe-la walks through their unique assertions: acceptance of partless atoms as reality’s constituents, the idea that past and future objects exist as substances, a threefold structure to each moment (generation, abiding, dissolution), and uncompounded phenomena like space as ultimately real. He fields questions on reflexive consciousness, the meaning of “able to perform a function,” and how karmic imprints are carried from life to life, showing how each school locates these answers differently. Pitched at serious practitioners studying classical Buddhist epistemology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Line in 0106.mp3
UUID: 67572147-b313-4a00-8222-b46f362cbe61
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~5,608
So Geshe-la says we will practice the preliminaries as is the tradition in school, which is that first one generates a powerful motivation, which enables one to connect the activities of listening to the teachings on our side and explaining the teachings on his side with actual Dharma. It becomes actual Dharma through the motivation. And of all motivations, the best motivation is that motivation to benefit others. Benefit others in which way. Geshe la says you have all received elaborate teachings from Khensur Rinpoche regarding the generation of bodhicitta, and this is a motivation which has to be generated within our mind stream, specifically the wish to help all other sentient beings of which there is not a single one which has not been our father or mother.
So Geshe la said last time he explained in detail the general presentation of tenets, the definition of a Buddhist, and the division of the schools into Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Madhyamaka. And today, we will enter in detail into the actual presentation of one of the schools, the Vaibhāṣika School. So as a preliminary, we must understand that the two first schools, the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools, are known as the schools which assert true existence. The true existence they assert is a true existence of outer phenomena. Of the four Buddhist schools, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Madhyamaka, the Cittamātra school asserts the non true existence of outer phenomena because it asserts the nonexistence of outer phenomena.
And within the Madhyamaka school, a subschool, the Svatāntrika Yogachara Madhyamaka, asserts also the nonexistence of outer phenomena. Apart from these two schools, all the other schools assert the existence of outer phenomena, and in the case of the two lower schools, their true existence as well. So what specifically is meant when we speak of the schools which accept the existence of outer objects? They accept the existence of the five sensory objects, which are the objects of sight, forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and feelings. And they accept them because they accept that they are constituted ultimately of partless atoms, partless constituents, on the basis of which through the power of karma, the exterior objects ultimately appear.
So these are the assertions of the schools which accept the existence of outer objects, specifically the so called two lower schools at the Sautrāntika. So last time, we finished page two of your text with the presentation of the four schools. Certainly, they explained the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Madhyamaka schools. Now Geshe-la is going to explain each of these four schools of tenets, and each of them is divided into seven outlines. So he will explain the Vaibhāṣika and so forth in seven outlines.
And then on page three of your translation, the Vaibhāṣika school is explained in terms of the presentation of definitions, divisions, etymologies, and mode of asserting objects, and mode of asserting subjects, and mode of asserting selflessness and grounds and paths. The definitions are actually what the objects considered are. Divisions are their subdivisions. Etymologies explain why a given school is known by a particular name, in this case, why the Vaibhāṣika school is known as Vaibhāṣika. The mode of asserting objects is a mode of asserting existent phenomena, whereas a mode of asserting subjects is the mode of describing minds and mental factors as well, since in the Buddhist tradition, mental factors are considered as subjects.
The mode of asserting selflessness is one of the most important. It is the presentation of emptiness in this school or the various emptinesses. And the last seventh outline is grounds and paths, and this is the essence of these outlines because it is the way of taking the teachings of the six previous outlines inside one’s mind. So the first outline is the presentation of definitions. And in your text, regarding the first presentation, the definition of a Vaibhāṣika is a person who asserts lower vehicle tenets accepting outer objects as truly established and not accepting reflexive consciousness.
Geshe la says this is divided into three parts. First, a Vaibhāṣika is a person who does who accepts lower vehicle tenets. Secondly, this is a person who accepts outer objects as truly established. And thirdly, this is a person who does not accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses. And then the Buddhist schools of tenets are divided into two broad categories.
Those who accept the existence of reflexive consciousness and those who do not. Those who accept the existence of reflexive consciousness are specifically the Cittamātra school, the third school, and the Sautrāntika school, the second school. Both necessarily accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses. On the other hand, the Vaibhāṣika school and the Madhyamaka school in general do not accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses. However, within the Madhyamaka school, there are subschools which do accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses.
For the Prāsaṇgika school does not accept the existence of reflexive consciousness, among the lower Madhyamaka school, the Svatāntrika school, the Sautrāntika Svatāntrika, who are the followers of Bhāvaviveka, do not accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses, but the Yogacāra Svatāntrika, who are the followers of Śāntaraksita, do accept the existence of reflexive consciousness. So when we speak of a reflexive consciousness, we are referring to a mind. Generally speaking, mind consciousness and knower are all synonymous. Now it is crucial for us to understand how mind functions since the very source of all happiness and suffering, virtue and nonvirtue, is to be found in the mind.
So Geshe will present in turn the reasons for which some schools accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses and the reasons for which other schools do not accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses. The Cittamātra school specifically accepts the existence of reflexive consciousnesses in keeping with the Sautrāntika school because it provides an explanation for memory. He says if we take the example of an eye consciousness perceiving blue, the eye consciousness which perceives blue arises. Then after the cessation of this eye consciousness, we have the memory of having seen blue. If we have the memory of having seen blue, then it means that the eye consciousness which was perceiving blue must have some type of self awareness of its self perceiving blue.
That is what is referred to as reflexive consciousness. It provides a justification for memory, and this is accepted also by the Sautrāntika school. On the other hand, the Vaibhāṣikas and the other schools which do not accept the existence of reflexive consciousness say as an example that they do not accept its existence because in the same way as however strong one is, one cannot cut one’s own head, or in the same way as however sharp a blade is, it cannot cut itself. In the same way, however acute the consciousness is, it cannot perceive itself. And further on, we will see later on in the text, they give a specific reason for which they do not accept the existence of reflexive consciousness, which is that, and this is an uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣika school, They assert that the subtle form of the visual sense organ is a valid cognizer, is a pramāṇa.
This is unique to the Vaibhāṣika school. So Geshe-la says, generally speaking, these schools are a little bit like the classes of a high school. As we graduate upwards, things get more difficult. So, obviously, for us, the tenet system we have to accept is a Prāsaṇgika system, but we’re starting from the bottom up. And then we are explaining in detail the definition of a Vaibhāṣika.
And because the sequence of the Tibetan is different from that of the English, we have started with the last characteristic, not accepting reflexive consciousness. English should explain what reflexive consciousness is. Now the second characteristic in Tibetan is accepting outer objects as truly established. This is a clear distinction with the Cittamātra school, That’s why this is included in this definition because it makes it very clear the Vaibhāṣikas cannot be Cittamātrins. The Cittamātrins accept that outer objects are nonexistent, that all phenomena are of one nature with the mind.
The mind perceiving a phenomenon, the phenomenon perceived arise from one karmic imprint. On the other hand, the Vaibhāṣika school and the other realistic schools assert that all phenomena, as Geshe la explained, are constituted from partless particles or partless atoms. And as these build up, they create the objects which are perceived by the senses, such as form, sound, smells, taste, and so forth. And because these are perceived by the senses, they are said to be external existence, and not merely external existence, but truly established external existence. So the third characteristic of the definition of a vaibhashika is a person who asserts lower vehicle tenets.
Now the Vaibhāṣikas, generally speaking, assert lower vehicle tenets because they do not accept the existence of the obstructions to omniscience. They merely accept the existence of the obstructions to liberation, the afflictive obstructions, kleshavarṇa. And therefore, they are fully categorized in the category of lower vehicle practitioners. Moreover, if they were greater vehicle practitioners, they would have to accept either an emptiness, which is an emptiness of subject and object, the mind perceiving the substance being different entities. In other words, as the cittamatra’s an emptiness of exterior objects, or in keeping with the Madhyamaka tradition, they would have to accept an emptiness of true existence.
They accept neither of these. Therefore, they qualify clearly from the standpoint of the view as well as lower vehicle practitioners. However, they do accept the existence of three vehicles for practitioners, the vehicle of the hearers, the Śrāvaka, the solitary realizers, the Pratyekabuddha, and the Bodhisattvas, but they have uncommon assertions regarding the way one progresses on these vehicles. And finally, they are said to be lower vehicle practitioners because they do not consider that the greater vehicle teachings of the Buddhas, the sutras of the greater vehicle, are actually teachings of the Buddha. They consider these to be spurious.
So for all these reasons, they are said, in keeping with our definition, to be lower vehicle practitioners. Now this teaching was nonetheless imparted by the Buddha because it was of benefit in as much as practitioners of the Vaibhāṣika school do engage in practices such as the practices of renunciation, reflecting on the view, and a type of generation of bodhicitta. So the reason for which the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept that the great vehicle sutras are utterances of of the Buddha are because they privilege the first turning of the wheel of the law from among the three turnings of the wheel of the law. And they consider that when the Buddha turned the first wheel of the law and taught the four noble truths, he imparted all his teachings. And for this reason, and especially because at the period when they thrived, the teachings of Nāgārjuna and Asaṇga were not present, for these reasons, they do not consider the great vehicle texts as teachings of the Buddha.
On the other hand, practitioners of the great vehicle, the two latter schools of tenets, Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, consider that since both Ārya Nāgārjuna and Ārya Asaṇga are clearly prophesied in sutras which were composed by the Buddha, one can consider that they were clear proponents of the Buddhist teachings, and they, the practitioners of the great vehicle, accept as the teachings of the great vehicle, those sutras which were taught by the Buddha on Vulture Peak, such as, for instance, the perfection of wisdom sutras, the 8,000 perfection, verse perfection of wisdom sūtra, and so forth. So Geshe-la has finished explaining clearly the definition of a Vaibhāṣika, which as he explained has three characteristics, a person who accepts lower vehicle tenets, a person who accepts outer objects as truly established, and a person who does not accept reflexive consciousness. Such a person qualifies as a Vaibhāṣika. Now regarding the second presentation, the division of Vaibhāṣikas, there are three broad categories of Vaibhāṣika from the standpoint of the location of the school. The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika, which was a dominant school, the Aparāntaka Vaibhāṣika, and the Magadha Vaibhāṣika.
Magadha is actually the location in India of Bodhgaya. So the Vaibhāṣikas of that school basically mainly thrived around Bodhgaya, while the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas, the dominant schools, were mainly from Kashmir. Now in addition to this threefold division of the Vaibhāṣikas, there is, from the standpoint of tenets, there is a fourfold division from the standpoint of teachings regarding Vinaya because our lineage of Vinaya comes from the Vaibhāṣikas, and the lineage which is dominant in the Tibetan tradition is a slightly compressed or compact tradition, that of the Mūlasarvāstivāda, but there are as well three other Vinaya lineages.
Mhmm. So regarding the third presentation, in other words, etymologies, if one were to inquire why are they called Vaibhāṣika, they are called thus since they have certain tenets which follow the detailed explanation of the great Abhidharma. Now Geshe la says specifically Vaibhāṣika, Jirawa in Tibetan means a detailed propounder or someone who explains in detail. What do they explain in detail? They explain in detail the great Abhidharma, the Mahavibhasha.
The Mahavibhashamma was composed after or on the basis of the teachings of the 500 Arhats who were disciples of the Buddhas. But, unfortunately, this text, extant in Sanskrit, was not translated in Tibetan directly from Sanskrit. It was, however, it would seem translated in Chinese. And Geshe la says he has heard that there has been a translation from Chinese into Tibetan, but he has not seen it himself. So this is the first explanation for the meaning of the term Vaibhāṣika.
Then the alternative explanation is the one regarding a detailed explanation of the three times, and this is what Geshe la would explain now. And then the second etymology is alternatively accorded to Vaibhāṣikas, both because they expound in detail the substances of all three times. So Geshe la says, perhaps the uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas, to put it nontechnically, is that all existents are substances, perhaps. And this would explain why they assert that to give the example of a sprout and a seed, the seed itself is the cause of the of the the sprout. So at the time of the seed, the sprout does not exist.
Yet because the seed has potency, and in the future, the sprout itself, which is the result of the seed, has potency too, both are asserted as existent, as well as the past of the seed. So this is a very uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣika school. And regarding the fourth definition, so we’re still on page three of your text. The definition of a thing is that which is able to perform a function. Now this is a definition which is actually accepted by all four Buddhist schools of tenets, but the meaning is different.
The meaning we will understand clearly in the following line, thing, existent, and known object or object of knowledge are synonymous. So this is an uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas since, for instance, for the Sautrantikas, things are not synonymous with object of knowledge. And generally speaking, if things are divided, if they are divided from within the twofold division, permanent objects and impermanent objects, so Geshe la says permanent phenomena are objects or things which do not change, and impermanent phenomena are objects or things which change instant by instant. And the examples which are given for these are, the first would be such phenomena such as uncompounded space, analytical cessation, or non analytical cessation. Says, actually, the acceptance of the existence of non-analytical cessation is an uncommon tenet of the Vaibhāṣikas.
It is not shared by the other schools, and he will explain in detail what that is. And returning to the first of the three examples, uncompounded space refers to space in the sense of being an absence of any obstructive contact. So this is a permanent phenomenon. Analytical cessation, on the other hand, are generally said to be of two categories. They can either be the analytical cessation which arise in dependence on meditating on the four noble truths, and specifically on the noble truth of cessation, Or another example which is given for analytical cessation is that cessation of the afflictions in one who is engaging in meditation on Samatha and Vipassana conjoined.
Whereas the second in other words, the second example of impermanent phenomena here would be such phenomena as arising. Arising refers to being created from causes and conditions or being generated by causes and conditions being made, in other words, being a manufactured phenomenon, which is self evident, or an impermanent phenomenon. Now, generally speaking, in all the Buddhist traditions, impermanence refers to momentary transience, so the phenomena is changing instant by instant. However, the Vaibhāṣikas have an uncommon assertion with regards to impermanence, because they assert that each phenomenon, as it is changing instant by instant, is characterized by three instants. One instant of creation, one instant of abiding, and one instant of dissolution.
This is different from the assertions of the other schools for whom every single instant of an impermanent phenomena is at the same time an instant of generation abiding and dissolution. This will be explained later. And then the second division of phenomena, we had the first one into permanent and impermanent phenomena. The second division on the beginning of page four of your text is into the two categories of conventional and ultimate truths. Now all Buddhist schools accept the existence conventional ultimate truths.
The Vaibhāṣikas are uncommon in that they accept a division of things into conventional ultimate truths. And specifically, conventional truths are defined as regarding the first definition of a conventional truth is that which is observed as a phenomenon which is not observed by the mind apprehending it when it is destroyed or when its individual parts are eliminated by the mind. Now, two examples are generally speaking given, vases or woollen cloths. In both cases, they are said to be conventional phenomena because they can be destroyed. For instance, a vase can be destroyed by a hammer.
Because it can be destroyed by a hammer, the term destroyed in the definition of a conventional truth refers specifically to this category of phenomena. Whereas, for instance, woolen fabric or woolen cloth can be destroyed by eliminating its threads, and that is what is referred to by the second part of the definition when its individual parts are eliminated by the mind. Now in both cases, since these are phenomena, which if they can be destroyed by the mind, can no longer be apprehended by the mind, they are said to be conventional truths.
And then regarding the second definition of an ultimate truth in the middle of your text on page four. An ultimate truth is that which is observed as a phenomenon which is not abandoned by the mind, apprehending it when it is destroyed or when its individual parts eliminated by the mind. Instances of such phenomena such as the individual indivisible direction of an atom, an indivisible instant of consciousness, and uncompounded phenomena. So the meaning of this definition, Geshe la says, is in a nutshell, it’s exactly the opposite of the definition of conventional truths. Those phenomena which resist this process of mental destruction are phenomena which are said to be ultimate existence, ultimately existent phenomena.
And instances of these are, for instance, the indivisible directions of an atom. The Vaibhāṣikas accept the existence of indivisible particles. These particles have directions, the north, south, east, west. Now these directions actually cannot be broken down any further. Therefore, these would be a classic instance of an ultimately or ultimate truth.
Secondly, the second example given is an indivisible instant of consciousness, which is also an ultimate truth for the same reasons, because it cannot be broken down any further. And the third is an uncompounded phenomenon such as space. And Geshe la says, again, it is pretty self evident that this is a phenomenon which cannot be destroyed through this process of breaking down into parts. And then a quote from Abhidharma, the root text of Abhidharma is given to provide the justification for these two definitions. If that can be eliminated into another by the mind and destroyed, this refers to conventional truths, that the mind does not engage.
All phenomena like vase or water exist conventionally, so this gives the example. Vase and water are conventional phenomena because as the first two stanzas say, they can be eliminated in another by the mind or destroyed. Ultimate existence is other. This provides a basis for the definition of ultimate truth, which is that they are other existence than conventional truth. And then our text continues, therefore, they accept the existence of substances in all three times.
And this is the uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣika school, which is that they accept that not only does a phenomenon such as a vase exist, but also the past and the future vase are also existing phenomena. And therefore, they, in other words of Vaibhāṣikas, accept the existence of substance in all three times. Hence, not only do they accept that vase exists at the time of the past of vase, they also accept that vase exists at the time of the future vase. So as Geshe-la was explaining, this is an uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣika school, which must be explained in detail to be understood. Unlike the other schools, which assert that every single instant of an impermanent phenomena is at the same time an instant of generation abiding and destruction, the Vaibhāṣikas assert that every instant actually has three parts, a part of generation, a part of abiding, and a part of destruction.
So if we if we pass at the example of a vase, whether it be made of clay, of iron, or whichever other substance, it is an impermanent phenomena. It changes instant by instant. But according to the Vaibhāṣika school, each of these instants has these three parts of generation, abiding, and destruction. Therefore, at the time of the instant of the iron vase or the clay vases abiding, Because these three parts are part of one instant, the previous part, the part of generation, and the future part, the part of destruction exist. And it is this uncommon understanding of instance which enable the Vaibhāṣikas to assert that the that vase exists at the time of the past of vase and at the future of vase.
It remains to be defined clearly what is meant by an instant. An instant is defined as one sixty fifth of the time it takes for a healthy and sound man to snap strongly his fingers. So if you snap strongly your fingers, the instant of time it takes to do that divided in 65 parts is the measure of impermanent change. This is obviously something we cannot realize at our level, but through training, one gets to a point where one can perceive this. And then we have finished presenting four of the first categories of the presentation of Vaibhāṣikas.
The fifth category, Geshe la says, is a more difficult one. It’s at the bottom of page four of your text. Regarding the fifth presentation, the mode of asserting subjects, they assert, as the Vaibhāṣikas assert, that the mere collection of the five aggregates is an instance of a person, and they assert mental consciousness as an instance of a person and so forth. So as a matter of fact, the various assertions regarding what a person is are very much the core of difference in the schools of tenets because the question here is actually what reincarnates, what passes from the countless past lives into the present, into future lives. And the Vaibhāṣikas have several different assertions.
Some assert that it’s a collection of the five aggregates or specifically the four mental aggregates, which would pass from life to life. Others assert that it is merely the mental consciousness. Specifically, the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas, which is a dominant school, assert that it is only the mental consciousness which passes from life to life and is posited, therefore, as an example of a person. On the other hand, the two other schools, the and the assert generally that it is a collection of aggregates which passes from life to life, but by no means exclusively so. In other words, this means that there are who actually have different positions than those asserting that it’s just the collection of aggregates which passes from life to life.
So Geshe la says, generally speaking, all of the Buddhist schools assert that the mental aggregates or a form thereof transits or passes from life to life. There’s no difference in that respect. The problem is what is posited in terms of the basis of imputation of the person, and the assertions vary in function of the schools. So for the Vaibhāṣikas, as he explained, it’s a collection of the five aggregates or the mental consciousness for the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas, whereas for the Prasangikas, it would be a different basis of imputation. However, all agree that the consciousnesses of ordinary beings are afflicted consciousnesses.
In other words, consciousnesses which have objects of abandonment, and that they pass from life to life until through this process of complete purification, they either reach extinction, in the case of the Vaibhāṣikas, or attain full enlightenment. This is something which all the schools agree upon. And says, since we have finished, if you have any questions, now is the point to ask your questions. Before questions, there is a list of doubts which I prepared. For those of you who want to cover the material from last time, it’s available from Tenzinlar.
Yes. It’s already distributed. And it is just it’s a basis of discussion. You know? If you have your own doubts, all the better.
So Geshe-la says that generally speaking, the presentation of, reflexive consciousness from the standpoint of Cittamātra is for the benefit of those who don’t have direct perception. However, for that matter, even from the standpoint of those who are endowed with direct perception, there are different levels of direct perception which may or may not permit perception of reflexive consciousness. For instance, one who has realized calm abiding, we have a very limited level of direct perception, or one who has more advanced realizations, such as advanced bodhisattvas, we have a very different level of direct perceptions. So it is not just a matter of asking whether something can or cannot be perceived by direct perception. The basis has to be posited.
And he would like in this respect to give an example. It is said that both Ārya Asaṇga, the founder of the Cittamātra tradition, should I say its main exponent, and his brother Vasubandhu, who eventually became an authentic Cittamātra, both had direct perception, but they had direct perception of different, of a different level. And Ārya Asaṇga was once looking at a pregnant cow, a cow with calf, and he was able through direct perception to see that the calf in the womb of the cow had a white spot on his forehead or on its forehead. Vasubandhu also had direct perception, but a direct perception of a lower level. And because the calf’s back leg was in front of its forehead, he thought the white spot was on the back leg leg of the calf.
So they decided to wait till the calf was born to check. And when it was born, they did find that Asaṇga was right. So, Geshe la said, it’s a very good question, really. But, basically, it is important to understand that there are these various levels of direct perception. And that, for instance, a very coarse type of direct perception such as perceiving what is happening at a distance in no way grants one direct perception which enables one to perceive the subtleties of past and future lives of being.
Likewise, a very simple form of direct perception, which is to perceive the thoughts or emotions in the mind of another, is a very basic level of direct perception, which arises merely through the dawning of the aspect of the thoughts of another in one’s own mind. This in no way enables one to gain subtle levels of direct perception understanding, for instance, the existence or nonexistence of reflexive consciousness. However, the schools of tenets are posited from the standpoint of ordinary beings and for the benefit of ordinary beings. So Gesheva says, now generally regarding the second question, which is the meaning of able within the definition of things able to perform a function, we have to posit that definition from the standpoint of two sets of schools, the Vaibhāṣika on the one side and the higher schools on the other side. So he will first explain from the standpoint of the higher schools.
From the standpoint of the higher schools, which means Sautratika up to Prāsaṇgika, what is to be understood by able to perform a function is an impermanent phenomenon’s capacity to function as a substantial cause or a cooperative condition of the phenomenon which is its effect. He says this is perhaps the best presentation of what is to be understood as able in able to perform a function for the higher schools. Now with regards to the Vaibhāṣika school, because the Vaibhāṣika schools have rather uncommon assertions and assert for instance that space is a thing, in other words, that space is able to perform a function, their understanding of able to perform a function is different because they consider that space is able to help somewhat to impact somewhat the mind which apprehends space. And therefore, that sense, space from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣika school alone, uncompounded space, is said to be a thing and a phenomenon which is able to perform a function. So, Geshe-la said this is a very important doubt.
And the best way to understand it is to say that the process of implanting of karmic imprints, which are different from memories, is a process of implanting of capacities or potencies either for virtue or for non virtue in the mind. Now what precisely is that within which the karmic imprints are imprints are implanted, this actually differs in the function of the schools. For instance, from the standpoint of the highest school, the Prāsaṇgika school, generally speaking, the basis on which karmic imprints are implanted and which carries the karmic imprints is a mere nominal designation, a mere imputed phenomenon, nothing more than this. And this is best understood if we reflect on the process of imputation of the term human being on the conglomerate of the body and mind. The term human being is a mere name designated on the conglomerate of body and mind.
And if we analyze from the standpoint of the Prāsaṇgika school, we cannot find anything other than this mere designation human being or I to carry the karmic imprints. So we understand this clearly when the mind which apprehends this I arises powerfully. This is actually what carries the karmic imprints from life to life. Apart from this, from the standpoint of the Prāsaṇgika school, there is nothing which can carry these karmic imprints. Now from the standpoint of the Cittamātra school and lower, since some phenomena are asserted as truly established, then these phenomena are generally the phenomena which carry the karmic imprints from life to life.
In the case of the Cittamātra school, it would be the mind basis of all, the ālaya vijñāna. But there can be other such phenomena. And one understands this best through progressing and understanding from the lower schools to the higher schools. Anyway yeah. Geshe la’s teaching on Sunday is not next Sunday and the not following Sunday.
And next Sunday would be Easter weekend. But if you haven’t moved, you know, you better burst. And there will be four days on each weekend. Easter Sunday? No.
It what was it called? Easter weekend. Alright? And after that, we one Sunday, he’s not able to do that teaching. And so is teaching.
But, however, is there would be a question and answer in the June long weekend. Oh. Alright. I mean yeah. Alright.
Geshe la is very keen to learn English. If you are professional English teacher, that will be most welcome. But if if you are not professional English teacher, but if you like to teach conversation, we’re also welcome as well. And so this you know, that would be a great chance for you to experience and to share his stories, etcetera. And it would be a fantastic and he speaks English and also Chinese.
And Chinese, he learning you know, there is a teacher and who you know, to to refreshing his Chinese again. And, also, you know, he’s really keen to learn English. And if if you are not able to if you know somebody who are English teacher, maybe, you know, suggest, and that’d be fantastic.
Thank you. And the Easter weekend is coming. You know, please, you know, we’re looking forward to this teaching. You know? Fantastic.
So that you have to book. Okay? Thank you very much. Sorry. I have a registration form.
Please don’t go away before you know, please put in registration here your name and plea for Sunday teaching.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
- As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
- grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
- Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- tenet system drubtha(Tib)
- A general term for a religious and/or philosophical system, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist. It is often used as shorthand to refer to the four major Buddhist tenet systems that emerged from India. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.