2 h 15 min · 5,409 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 135-minute session, Kyabje Rinpoche transitions from the Vaibhāṣika School to present the Sautrāntika School, working through a systematic seven-fold structure that defines it by two core positions: acceptance of reflexive consciousness and partless material particles. He covers the two main Sautrāntika divisions—those prioritizing scriptural commentary versus those emphasizing logical reasoning—and explains why exterior objects exist independently of mind. Through a detailed Q&A session, Rinpoche clarifies how the four Buddhist philosophical schools differ on perception, the nature of consciousness, and emptiness, particularly contrasting Sautrāntika with the Cittamātra mind-only view. Directed at serious practitioners of Buddhist philosophy.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Line in 0127.mp3
UUID: fe1792d9-7672-48c3-bab9-bb1655b6a653
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Tenets
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~5,400
So we will meditate for one minute on generating a good motivation in keeping with Rinpoche’s tradition, and a good motivation in this context means generating a mind of great compassion and bodhicitta because with such a mind, whatever activities we engage in become causes for full enlightenment. And the way to think about this is to think that our benefit should be put after that of others, and we should strive to benefit others. And if we have the capacity to do so, we should meditate on generating bodhicitta in keeping with the instructions which Rinpoche gave, the detailed generation, following the seven cause and effect procedure, the interchange of self and others, and otherwise try to generate a mind which is striving to benefit others as much as possible to put them in a state where they are endowed with all qualities and freed of all defects. And with this in mind, then we ourselves take the resolution to attain a state of full enlightenment for the benefit of others. Let us meditate on this for one or two minutes.
So we have completed the presentation of the Vaibhāṣika School last time. And now Geshe la will start presenting the Sautrāntika School. When we have completed the presentation of all four schools, it will be very helpful for us to be able to delineate clearly their positions. And therefore, in keeping with the presentation in the Vaibhāṣika School, there is also a seven fold presentation of the Sautrāntika School on page eight of your transcript, the bottom part. The Sautrāntika School is explained in terms of the sevenfold presentation of definitions.
Definitions are the characteristics of the school divisions. In other words, the various types of Sautrantikas. Etymologies, which means why the school is called the Sautrāntika school or the followers of Sūtra, the mode of asserting objects, objects are phenomena in general, The mode of asserting subjects, subjects are that particular subcategory of phenomena such as minds, but also such as expressive sounds, which can express other objects. The mode of asserting selflessness, selflessness is the core of the practice. It’s the explanation of the emptiness of persons or phenomena for the great vehicle.
And then in dependence on meditation meditating on selflessness, the final subdivision, the grounds and paths one attains. So there is a difference in the mode of composition of treatises in ancient India and in Tibet. Generally, the Indian pundits, when they composed a treatise, defined the topic or the subject of composition and then composed the treatise on that basis without further ado. An uncommon and specific development of Tibetan callers scholars was that in addition to defining a topic before starting to compose treatise, the great Tibetan star scholars would compose a detailed outline or a detailed table of contents of the treatises. It is only after composing the table of content that they would compose treatise and fill in as it were the table of content or the outline.
The advantage of this procedure is that it fosters tremendous clarity in the mind of the composer of the text as well as in the mind of the readers. This is why these presentations or outlines are very important. And then generally speaking, the first presentations of definitions and of divisions are of great advantage because they flesh out the meaning of the school. The school is Sautrāntika School specifically is not understood merely in terms of its name, Sautrāntika. It’s also understood in terms of its fundamental characteristics, which is given by the definition, and the sub schools within it.
In other words, the variances of opinion within the school. Now regarding the first outline, the definition, the definition of a is in your text. A person propounding lower vehicle tenets who accepts both reflective reflexive consciousness and exterior objects. Therefore, Geshe-la says, moving from the end of the definition backwards in keeping with Tibetan grammar, a Sautrāntika is a Buddhist practitioner who has three characteristics. The first is that he accepts the existence of exterior objects.
This is a case of all of the schools of the so called lower vehicle, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrantikas. Both accept exterior objects, specifically both accept the fact that phenomena are truly established and do not accept the existence of a excuse me, accept the existence of a self of phenomena. Therefore, not accept the selflessness of phenomena. The second characteristic of Sautrantikas in this definition is that they accept the existence of reflexive consciousness, what is called in Tibetan rang rig. This reflexive consciousness is not accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas as the definition of Vaibhāṣikas made clear, but it is accepted by the Sautrantikas.
The final characteristic of the school is that it is a school which propounds lower vehicle tenets.
Tenets. Now generally speaking, although it is a school which is said to propound lower vehicle tenets because it refuses to accept the existence of the selflessness of phenomena. Nonetheless, because both Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrantikas accept the existence of bodhicitta and therefore of bodhisattva practitioners, it is possible and beneficial for great vehicle practitioners to study these schools from the standpoint of method. And it is also possible and beneficial for a great vehicle practitioners to study them from the standpoint of wisdom since through understanding these schools with a coarser level of wisdom, the subtle level levels of wisdom can be understood better later on. And then developing somewhat more the analysis of the three characteristics of the Sattrantika.
The first characteristic in our Tibetan text is the Sautrantika has reflexive consciousness. What is meant by reflexive consciousness? Generally speaking of the four schools of tenets, only the two middle schools, Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, accept the existence of reflexive consciousness. The other schools with normal exceptions in the Madhyamaka do not accept the existence of reflexive consciousness. The reason for which Sautrāntika and Cittamātra accept the existence of reflexive consciousness is that if we were to take for instance the example of the eye consciousness perceiving the color blue, the eye consciousness perceives the color blue, and we have after this perception of the color blue, an eye consciousness which is aware of the fact of having perceived the color blue and a memory of having perceived the color blue which arises in dependence on this.
Therefore, there is not merely the perception of the color blue. There is also this sense, I have perceived the color blue. Now this memory which perceives or this memory which is aware of the perception of the color blue and which says to itself, I have perceived the color blue, which is aware therefore of the subject having perceived the color blue is a subsequent consciousness. In as much as it is a subsequent consciousness, both Sautrantikas and Cittamātra say, it is indispensable that it have as a preliminary cause a valid cognizer. And the only possible valid cognizer which can be aware of the eye consciousness perceiving the color blue is one aspect of that eye consciousness which is aware of itself and which is of one nature with itself.
Now this one aspect of the eye consciousness which is aware of itself is what is called the reflexive consciousness. The second characteristic of Sautrantikas in keeping with the definition of a Sautrāntika is that they accept the existence of exterior objects. Now generally speaking, the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka accept also the existence of exterior objects, but the meaning is different here. What is meant when we say that the two lower schools, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, accept the existence of exterior objects is that they accept the existence of partless particles. And these partless particles are the core constituents of matter.
In other words, they are the core constituents of the experiences of the eye consciousness, the ear consciousness, the nose consciousness, the taste consciousness, and the bodily consciousness. All these consciousnesses arise independence of on objects which are constituted from their own side by partless particles. And it’s through understanding clearly the meaning of exterior objects in the context of the two lower schools of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrantika that we can then progress to the affirmations of the mind only school, the Cittamātra school, which asserts that there are no exterior objects in this sense. And then moving onwards with our text, Sautrantikas and exemplifiers are synonymous at the bottom of page eight. These are this is another name for the same school.
Regarding the second, in other words, divisions of the Sautrāntika school, if one divides them, there are two types of Sautrantikas. Sautrantikas following scripture. In other words, those following Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, and Sautrantikas following reasoning. In other words, the seven treatises of Dharmakīrti given in your footnotes. And our text continues.
The first type of Sautrantikas following scripture are, for instance, Sautrantikas following Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu. The second in the seven valid treatises on cognition. And the meaning of these these two fold division of Sautrantikas, Sautrantikas following scripture and Sautrantikas following reasoning, is that the Sautrantikas following scripture privilege in their practice for the attainments of the various paths, the description of the objects of meditation and the attainments given in scripture and specifically in the great treatises on Abhidharma. Whereas the Sautrantikas following reasoning, as their name indicates, privilege mainly the great Dharmakīrti’s great treatises on reasoning. And because these treatises are mainly treatises on Buddhist logic, privilege over scripture training in logic and reasoning as a guideline for practice.
So the author of Abhidharmakośa was the peerless scholar Vasubandhu, who was the author of the Bhasya as well. And the author of the seven treatises on reasoning was a peerless scholar, Dharmakīrti. So the Sautrantikas rely alternatively on or Dharmakīrti. And strictly speaking, all the Sautrāntika’s following scripture rely therefore mainly on Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu whose presentation is a clear Sautrantika or Vaibhāṣika depending on the viewpoint presentation of the teachings. It becomes a little bit more complex regarding the Sattrantika’s following reasoning.
The Sautrantikas following reasoning rely on the seven treatises of Dharmakīrti. Now the seven treatises of Dharmakīrti are actually from the standpoint of tenets shared by both the Sautrantikas and the Cittamātra school. And the foremost of these treatises, Pramanavarttikam, which is divided into four chapters, is broadly speaking a common treatise to both the Sautrantika and the Cittamātra school. So if one were to try to posit one treatise from among the seven treatises of reasoning, which is specific to the Sautrāntika following reasoning and them alone, this might be somewhat difficult, Geshe la says. And this was a prelude to the third presentation or etymology since it is important to be able to posit one instance of the Sautrantika at least.
So the instance posited is perhaps the ancient Indian scholar Kumaralata. Unfortunately, not a lot has survived of him, but it is said that he was a pure Sautrāntika. So he was not a Sautrāntika whose tenets were mixed with Cittamātra. And reading on page nine of your text, if one were to inquire why they are called Sautrantikas, they are called Sautrantikas because of being proponents of tenets who follow the sutras of the Lord. So the Sanskrit term Sautrāntika derives from sūtra.
It’s followers of sūtra. Because they are followers of sūtra, are called Sautrantikas, and they are called exemplifiers in Tibetan because they assert the teaching of all phenomena by means of examples. In other words, when the Sautrantikas try to justify an analysis through reasoning, they invoke examples, similes, metaphors. For this reason, they are called exemplifiers.
And then regarding this third presentation, one might wonder what sutras specifically the Sautrantikas are following to be called followers of the Sutras of the Lord. Now the Sutras they are following refers in general to Sutras of the first turning of the wheel of the Lord. But specifically in this context, it refers to the seven great treatises on Abhidharma, which are accepted by the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrantika as having been authored by the Buddha himself. All the two schools of the great vehicle, Cittamātra and Prāsaṇgika, consider that they were authored by the 500 arhats. And the names of the sutras and their purported transcribers are the wisdom Abhidharma Sūtra, the Sūtra of Thorough Wisdom, which would have been composed by supreme wisdom, the Sūtra of the collection of phenomena, which would have been composed by Śāriputra, the Sūtra of the collection of purities, which was put in writing by the Sūtra of the harvest of beings, which was composed by an called the fresh one, and the Sūtra, the collection of presentations composed by Arhat Gompa or Arhat, the meditator.
So these would be the seven Abhidharma Sutras, which are considered by the two lowest schools to be Sutras, which are considered by the two higher schools to belong to the collection of Abhidharma and to be Śāstras. And then regarding the fourth presentation, there’s a mode of asserting objects. The definition of an existent is that which is observed by a valid cognizer. Now generally speaking, the main focus of our practice is existent phenomena, and phenomena can be defined through the mind which perceives them. So that which is observed by a valid cognizer, that which is known by a valid cognizer, that which is realized by a valid cognizer are all synonymous.
And valid cognizers were clearly explained by Geshe la in the context of the Vaibhāṣika school. Here, the definition is the same, a valid cognizer is a new and unshakable knower. The newness refers to the first instant of consciousness. The unshakability refers to the fact that it does not turn away from its object of ascertainment, and the term knower refers here to the fact that it is a mind. Now referring to a question which was asked from Geshe la a couple of times ago regarding the tree which falls in a forest and is unobserved.
Geshe la pointed out at the period that there is no such thing as an unobserved or unperceived phenomena, and this definition is a lead into that. What is meant by the definition that an existent is that which is observed by a valid cognizer is that it is sufficient for something to be observed by one single valid cognizer for it to be an existent. It does not have to be observed by all valid cognizers. So all we have to do is to be able to put posit one single valid cognizer which observes a phenomenon to be able to say that that is an existent And then in the middle of page nine of your transcript, if one divides them, in other words, if one divides phenomena, they divide into two categories of conventional truths and ultimate truths. A phenomenon which is ultimately able to perform a function is a definition of an ultimate truth.
Geshe la says that actually one ought to add as an addendum to this text that this presentation of conventional and ultimate truths is not specific to Sautrāntika in general. It’s only specific to the Sautrāntika’s following reasoning. Since the Sautrāntika’s following scripture, the other main subdivision of Sautrāntika’s accept a division of conventional and ultimate truths in keeping with the presentation in the Vaibhāṣika school since they rely on the main the same sources, the and the seven sutras on. And then in the definition of an ultimate truth, a phenomenon which is ultimately able to perform a function, An important distinction, grammatical distinction is to be made by the use of the adverb ultimately here, which is conveyed by the Tibetan case which is the meaning of a dative. A phenomenon which is ultimately able to perform a function, in that definition, the term ultimately, the adverb ultimately, actually refers to an ultimate mind which perceives it.
The ultimate mind which perceives it is a direct perceiver. Otherwise, able to perform a function would be sufficient as a definition for an ultimate truth, and the remainder of the definition would be redundant. So the remainder of the definition is not redundant precisely because the adverb ultimately indicates the mind which perceives its capacity to perform a function which is a direct perceiver. And then moving onward with your text on page nine, the second paragraph from the bottom. Ultimate truth, truly established thing, product, impermanent, compounded substance, self characterized phenomena or synonymous.
These terms being synonymous means that they have the same meaning, but they are referring to the same reality from different angles. If you were to take for instance a vase as an example, a vase is an ultimate truth for the Sautrantikas because within the two divisions of conventional ultimate truth, it is ultimate. A vase is a truly established phenomenon because from the Sautrantikas’ standpoint, it is established truly on the basis of its causes and conditions. This is different from the Madhyamaka viewpoint, naturally. A vase is a thing, a bava, because it is able to perform the function of a thing.
It is able to perform a function, which is a definition of a thing. A vase is said to be product because it is produced in dependence on its causes and conditions. A vase is said to be an impermanent phenomenon because it disintegrates instant by instant. A vase is said to be a compound compounded phenomenon because it is compounded or it is composed of many parts, not merely its constituents, but also all the previous causes which constitute it. And a vase is said to be a substance because it is differentiated from other material phenomena which differ from it in nature.
Finally, a vase is said to be a self characterized phenomenon because it is characterized by its own features, and it arises in dependence on its own features. So all of these are said to be synonymous. In other words, that the meaning is the same, but the standpoint or the viewpoint of the same reality is different. So moving onwards to the definition of a con
Conventional truth. A phenomenon which is ultimately unable to perform a function is a definition of a conventional truth. And the core distinction here between ultimate and conventional truths for the Sautrantika school is a distinction between phenomena which are truths for ultimate minds and phenomena which are truths for conventional minds. Ultimate minds for the Sautrantika school refers to non mistaken, non conceptual minds. In other words, direct perceivers.
What is a truth for a direct perceiver is an ultimate truth. And the meaning of this is that as far as the Sattrathikas are concerned, impermanent phenomena and all ultimate truths are impermanent phenomena for the Sattrathikas school exist from their out their own side. They exist independently of the mind perceiving them, in dependence on their own causes and conditions. And they appear to the non conceptual mind perceiving them through their own power. Therefore, they are said to be ultimate truths, truths for this ultimate non conceptual mind.
On the other hand, conventional truths are truths for conventional minds. Now the term conventional we use in translation here is quite misleading. The Tibetan term is in Tibetan derives from the root which means to lie, what is force. So these are truths for a forced mind. What forced minds are the minds being referred to or what flawed minds are being referred to, conceptual minds.
So all phenomena which are true for conceptual minds, such as uncompounded space and all permanent phenomena in general, are said to be conventional truths. Conventional truths because they are can only be perceived by a conceptual mind through the medium of a meaning generality, don spyi, or a sound generality. They can never be perceived by a conceptual mind, nakedly. And then at the bottom of page nine, the synonyms of conventional truths. Conventional truths, in other words, which we explained, falsely established.
It is said to be falsely established because it seems to be truly established by its own characteristics, but in actuality, it is established by a process of conceptual imputation. So for that reason, conventional truth, permanent phenomena said to be falsely established in the Sautrāntika school. Permanent, permanent here refers to the fact that the phenomena which are considered do not change instant by instant. It do not mean it does not mean that at some point they may not cease to exist, and generally characterized phenomena. Generally characterized phenomena is the opposite of specifically characterized phenomena and refer to phenomena which are only imputed by consciousness.
So for the Sautrāntika school, all permanent phenomena are said to be only imputed by consciousness. And then at the beginning of page 10 of your transcript, an alternative alternative division of phenomena or existence. Alternatively, if existence are divided, are two other categories, negative and specified phenomena. This division is presented here because the category of negative phenomena is such a fundamental category from the standpoint of practice since all selflessnesses, both coarse and subtle, as well as all emptinesses for the schools such as Cittamātra and Madhyamaka which accept emptiness, all are negative phenomena. For that matter, all are not merely negative phenomena.
All are what are called non affirming negatives. And then with respect to the definition of a negative phenomenon, which is given in Chim Jampaiyang’s Gongdü, it is that which is realized by means of the mind which apprehends it, eliminating its object of negation. Now generally, this is an adequate definition of a negation. It would actually be preferable if this definition was qualified and read that which is realized by means of the mind which apprehends it directly eliminating its object of negation instead of eliminating its object of negation. The meaning of the definition is as follows.
Negative phenomena, a phenomena which understood when the which are understood when the mind which realizes them excludes that which is being negated in the process. And if one were to give an example of this, for instance, an example would be the nonexistence of vase in the place where there is no vase. So the nonexistence of vase in that context is a negative phenomenon. The nonexistence of vase in the place where there is no vase negates what? It negates the existence of vase.
So the existence of vase is the object of negation in that place. Now the reason for which it is preferable to say directly eliminates or directly negates instead of just eliminates or negates is because this prevents problems later on with respect to what are called affirming negatives. But that directly is not included in our root text mainly because the context of the question, which is one which is quite clear in its presentation of negations and affirmations precludes these problems. So we will stop here for today. And Geshe la says, if you have any questions, now is the time to ask them.
So the question is when the Vaibhāṣikas say that the five aggregates are objects of abandonment, in what way do they abandonment abandon them? What does abandon mean in this context? Says this is an uncommon assertion of the Vaibhāṣikas, which must be understood in the light of their assertion that practitioners progress from the path of preparation directly to the path of no more learning and to a Nirvāṇa with remainder in one meditative session. Therefore, if that is the case, in one meditative session, they attain a Nirvāṇa without remainder, other words attain Nirvāṇa, with a body which was impelled by afflictions. In other words, a body which in actuality at the time when they engaged in practice was a contaminated body.
Therefore, from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣikas, such a body cannot be called the body of an enlightened being and does not qualify for the term Buddha. And this is the reason for which they say that the body of such a being is not an object of refuge. What actually is not accepted or this is not accepted by the higher schools starting with Sautrāntika since for all of these higher schools, it is not considered that one progresses with one contaminated body directly from the level of the path of preparation all the way to the level of the path of no more learning. So this is the uncommon understanding of the Vaibhāṣikas. Geshe-la says his personal slant on this is that the body of one who has reached from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣika a Nirvāṇa with remainder, more it cannot be said to be a contaminated body, can nonetheless be said to be a body which shares similarities with contaminated bodies and therefore from the Vaibhāṣika standpoint would not qualify as being a Buddha refuge.
So the question, unfortunately, is not very clear, but I will read the question rapidly. The final view of Buddhist tenets assert that there is nothing from the side of an object being observed. However, relating to color, there must be something from the side of the labeled basis that determines whether the object appears to us as red or as blue. There is not something from the side of the object. How can our mind distinguish between the two colors?
So the problem with the question is that the school which is within which a question is being asked is not specified. So based on the tenor of the question, Geshe-la thinks probably the author of the question has some sympathies for the mind only view. Therefore, he will answer the question in the light of Cittamātra and try to expand from there. In the light of Cittamātra or the mind only school, the appearance of the mind perceiving red and the color red which is perceived by the mind perceiving red are both the substantial results of one single substantial cause, which is the implanting in the mind of the being who perceives red of karmic imprints leading him to perceive red. For this reason, the Cittamātra assert that there is no color red independent of the perception of red and are said to be a mind only school.
Now regarding the collective perception of a color, be it red or blue, the cittamatra assert that a group of persons perceiving the color red or agree that they are perceiving the color red because of shared karmic imprints between these persons, which lead them to perceive that basis of the color red as red in the light of the shared karmic imprints. This is the uncommon position of Cittamātra, and this is why from the standpoint of the Cittamātra school, and this is the uncommon characteristic of Cittamātra, there are no exterior objects. Now generally speaking, the other Buddhist schools accept the existence of exterior objects. Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika do. And regarding Madhyamaka, the only subschool of Madhyamaka which does not accept the existence of outer objects conventionally is the Yogacarasvatantrika Madhyamaka because they partially accept a cittamatra presentation of phenomena.
Other word otherwise, regarding the final tenets school, the Prāsaṇgika school, the Prāsaṇgika school most definitely accepts the existence of outer objects also. Yes. So Geshe-la thinks perhaps your question about some of the differences between Sautrantika and Cittamatra. So he would develop a bit these points. From the standpoint So this just as he understands your question, of course, better now.
And if we were to posit one phenomenon, a vase perceived by two different observers, two different persons, and analyze the process of perception from the standpoint of Sautrāntika, one would say that the visual consciousness of the two observers perceiving the vase perceives the vase actually in the same way from the Sautrantika standpoint. Since the vase is perceived by the visual consciousness in dependence on the vase’s own characteristics which Sautrāntika accept. However, it is an established fact that two separate individuals perceiving the same vase will nonetheless think of the vase differently. One might, for instance, find it more attractive or of better quality, and the other might find it less attractive or of lower quality. This is not something which is contingent on the eye consciousness perceiving vase.
It is contingent on the way of thinking of the person with the conceptual thought processes. And this way of thinking of the person itself is then determined by the karmic imprints of the person. So this would be how the Sartranikas would present things. So there is a major difference between the Sattrathika presentation of the phenomenon of perception here and the Cittamātra presentation since for the Sattrantikas, this phenomenon does not exist independently of karmic imprints in the mind of the perceiving beings. It actually has an independent existence which depends on its own material causes and conditions.
For the Cittamātra, on the other hand, this phenomena itself exists in dependence on the karmic imprints in the mind of the person perceiving it. So Geshe la says, you have made yours the Prāsaṇgika critique of Cittamātra. So from the Prāsaṇgika standpoint, there is no reason to postulate a reflexive consciousness way, rang rig. Since the function of a reflexive consciousness is fully taken on board by the subsequent instance of mental consciousness and by the stream of consciousness. This is a Prāsaṇgika critique of both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra school’s acceptance of reflexive consciousness.
From the standpoint of both Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, on the other hand, it is indispensable to postulate a reflexive consciousness because that recollection of the experience of visually perceiving the color blue, which is
A subsequent cognition can only arise in dependence on a valid cognizer. And the only valid cognizer which can be postulated, which has the experience of the color blue, is that instant of visual consciousness perceiving blue. So a reflexive consciousness, which is of one nature with that instant of visual consciousness perceiving blue from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika and Cittamātra schools must be postulated. The Prāsaṇgika school criticizes his viewpoint saying that the ultimate reason for which both Sattrantikas and Cittamatras postulate the existence of these reflexive consciousnesses is their assertion of the true and inherent existence of phenomena. Geshe-la says that it is very important, he would also encourage you, to clearly distinguish between the schools before starting to think about these topics and to be very clear in your mind from the standpoint of which school you are placing yourself and which school’s perspective you are analyzing.
This will greatly limit the risk of confusion. I would propose let’s stop. Let’s stop. And posit an example, and let’s let’s do it on the basis of an example. Very very very shortly.
I have you got the time table there. Next next Sunday onwards, the teaching will start on 10:30, and then it’s a one hour teaching. Then quick break and then sorry? No. No.
It’s 10:30 finish. And then discussion group, and then Geshe-la will come back at twelve, and then 12:30 question answer. Yeah. And this is the program. Okay?
And that way, you know, we have a just if we can come back on a quick cup of tea and, you know, just get a bottle of water. You know? It’s pretty cheap. 10 $1. Sunday, you know, we like to wrap it up with 12:30, then you have a afternoon free.
You know? So today, we still have a discussion? Today, yeah, you can carry on and which is after half an hour break and then come back. Fifteen minutes. Fifteen minutes.
Yeah. And, you know, this we have now the root text that the Geshe la’s teaching. It’s completed, and this time, you’re not going to get free. It’s a it’s a $15 only. And please come forward, And and then you got probably half of that translator.
And so you can give it back for us, and we can keep save that in a nicely, you know, shirt or something. There you go. $15 for each book. Is it completed? It’s in a if you buy a snow line, it cost you $45.
You know? It’s only 15 done. And it’s the it’s the it’s the ray fantastic. You know? You got the money first?
I like to have money first. Oh, you can you can sorry? You have Alright. Thank you very much. Marvin.
Yeah. Judy, you’re have one?
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
- As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- path of no more learning ashaiksa-marga (Skt); mi lob pä lam (Tib)
- The fifth of the five paths, the culmination of practice: for the Mahayana, buddhahood; for hearers and solitary realizers, the liberation of an arhat. LYWA
- path of preparation prayoga-marga (Skt); jor lam (Tib)
- The second of the five paths leading to buddhahood. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.