1 h 3 min · 2,980 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 64-minute classroom session, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen teaches Tibetan Buddhist epistemology from a foundational logic text, working through direct perception and inference with meticulous analysis. He defines valid yogic direct cognizers as non-reflexive wisdom arising from the union of calm abiding and analytic meditation, then contrasts non-mistaken minds with mistaken minds, subdividing the latter into conceptual and non-conceptual varieties. The lecture pivots to spurious direct perceivers—consciousnesses that appear to apprehend phenomena clearly but misrepresent them—and gives vivid examples: an eye diseased with cataract seeing one moon as two, a person on a moving ship perceiving the shore as moving, a whirling firebrand appearing as a circle of fire. He finishes by introducing inferential valid cognizers and their three types: cognizers based on fact, on renown, and on conviction from scripture, with examples drawn from Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland. This is a detailed philosophical commentary aimed at students already familiar with Buddhist logic and terminology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Line in 0226 – KR.mp3
UUID: 9a3451e0-a919-4388-ae6d-6b91c58f194a
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tibetan Language
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,968
And the only state in which we will be able to do so will be the state of full enlightenment. Therefore, this should be our goal. I will translate directly from the Tibetan. So a valid Yogic direct cognizer is defined as a non reflexive wisdom within the continuum of an Ārya being, which realizes newly and directly, either subtle impermanence or the coarse selflessness of persons, or the subtle selflessness of persons in dependence on a Samādhi, which is the indissociable union of śamatha and vipassana, which become its controlling condition. So here, such a mind, in other words, a valid Yogic direct cognizer can only arise in dependence on the union of śamatha and vipassana, which are not merely its cause, but actually its immediately preceding cause.
And such a śamatha which is conjoined with vipassana is called a Samādhi. So it is in dependence on this from the standpoint of the mind, and independence from the standpoint of the object being meditated upon. The object being subtle impermanence, coarse or subtle selflessness of a person, that such a mind can be called a yogic direct valid cognizer. And at present, there is a two fold subdivision of minds in non mistaken and mistaken minds. A non mistaken mind is a mind in which phenomena actually exist in the way they appear.
Whereas a mistaken mind is a mind which phenomena do not exist in the way they appear. There are two such categories of mistaken minds, conceptual and non conceptual mistaken minds. Generally speaking, all conceptual minds are mistaken with respect to their object of appearance, since their object of appearance is a meaning generality which is a permanent phenomenon. But conceptual minds are not necessarily mistaken with respect to their object of engagement. Regarding non conceptual minds, which are mistaken minds, such minds do exist through afflictions of the sense organs for instance, but most of the other non conceptual minds are unmistaken.
And then moving onwards, we reach a definition of what in your text is called pseudo perception. Generally speaking, we have covered authentic direct perceivers and at present we have spurious direct perceivers. I will translate directly from the Tibetan regarding the explanation of spurious direct perceivers. Their definition and divisions are twofold. The first of these and as well as the definition is the definition of a spurious direct perceiver is a knower which is mistaken with respect to its object of appearance.
This is synonymous with a mistaken consciousness. So generally speaking, these are non conceptual minds, which however, are mistaken with respect to their actual object of engagement. Their mode of reflecting on their object of engagement is not in accordance with the mode of appearance of the object of engagement. And when a sense consciousness for instance is mistaken, then the sense consciousness automatically becomes a wrong consciousness. So in this case, we can say that these are wrong consciousnesses.
For instance, the case of an eye consciousness, which through for instance disease or affliction sees one person as two persons or two persons as one person, such an eye consciousness is an afflicted consciousness. Likewise, with an auditory consciousness which perceives two sounds as one or one as two. These are all mistaken consciousnesses. And then, with respect to the divisions thereof, there are seven subdivisions which include the six spurious conceptual direct perceivers, as well as the single spurious non conceptual direct perceiver. And the first six fold division, in other words, conceptual spurious direct perceivers include mistaken conceptual minds, conventional conceptual minds, inferential conceptual minds, conceptual minds which arise out of an inferential cognition and as well as conceptual minds which recollect either the past or anticipate the future.
So your English translation is a little bit misleading. This covers point six, the past as well as the future. Geshe-la says, perhaps the last point includes these two subdivisions since if we count them, we have five instead of six. So, the examples of the two first six fold subdivisions are as follows. Example of a mistaken conception would be for instance, the conception apprehending sound as permanent, since sound is an impermanent phenomenon.
Now such a conception is an extremely coarse level of mind, and actually would probably not be able to qualify as any mind above a conviction. All of the afflictions for instance fall in the category of mistaken conceptions. Secondly, the category of conventional conceptual minds, an instance thereof is the inferential cognizer, which cognizes sound as impermanent. So in dependence on many reasonings, such an inferential cognizer would eventually arise which recognizes newly sound as impermanent and this mind would be a classic example of a conventional cognizer. And the example of the third here, which is a conceptual, which is an inferential valid cognizer, is for instance, a conceptual mind which arises from the mind apprehending the reasons.
There’s a mistake in the Tibetan text. Tibetan text has apprehending permanent, this is wrong. It’s apprehending the reason. Now an example for this would be for instance in the syllogism, the subject sound is impermanent because of being composite. The inferential cognizer which realizes that the subject sound is impermanent arises directly as a result of, or in dependence upon, the twin realizations that the subject sound is a composite phenomenon and upon the realization that every composite phenomenon is necessarily impermanent.
So these two act actually like the cause or as the cause of the realization that the subject sound is impermanent. And it is in this sense that one can say that conceptions which arise out of a mind apprehending the reason, here compositeness, are actually conceptions which are valid cognizers. So as you remember Geshe-la says, one can assert likewise that all inferentially valid cognizers fall within the second category of conventional valid We are now on page 18 of your text and the fourth, an example of the fourth category. The fourth category is a conception which arises from an inferential valid cognizer would be for instance, a conception which is generated from an inferential valid cognizer, which is none other than the second instant of consciousness following that first instant which is an inferential valid cognizer. And the examples of the fifth and sixth categories, as you remember, they were subsumed in one as conceptions which recollect.
This is one way to translate it from the Tibetan. And the fifth category refers to conceptions which recollect the past. And the example given here is a conception which recollects at the present moment, a past object. Or the sixth example, which is a conception which anticipates the future is a conceptual mind which wishes for a future object implicitly which does not yet exist at the present time. And then moving onwards with our text on page 18.
There are many instances of spurious non-conceptual direct perceivers, which are broadly divided into two categories. Spurious non conceptual valid direct perceivers, which are mental consciousnesses and spurious non conceptual direct perceivers which are sense consciousnesses. Now, an example of the first Geshe la says will be for instance, the dream consciousness. The dream consciousness is actually a non conceptual mind. But it is a mistaken non conceptual mind, since it is a non conceptual mind which apprehends phenomena in a way which they do not exist.
What appears to a dream consciousness is not in any way the actual mode of existence of phenomena. So such an instance would be an instance of a spurious direct non conceptual perceiver, which is a mental consciousness. Otherwise it is rather difficult to give instances of these as they are fairly rare. As for the second category, spurious direct non conceptual minds, which are sense consciousnesses, there’s quite a few which will be given in the text. So this second category has four subdivisions.
Those minds which are relying on a mistaken cause, which is their base, which arise from a mistaken cause, which is their place or their abode in your English translation, which arise from a mistaken cause, which is their object, which arise from a mistaken cause, which is their immediately preceding condition. The examples will make clear the meaning of these. However, with the last one, Geshe-la would say that the immediately preceding cause would be for such a sense consciousness, a mental consciousness and it might be for instance, a mental consciousness in someone who is strongly afflicted by wind disease, by lung, which then would affect very much the eye sense organ and the way things are perceived. So, the example of the first, in other words, spurious non conceptual direct perceiver, which is a sense consciousness and which is mistaken because of its basis, would be an eye consciousness, which is in an eye, which is afflicted by cataract. So in an eye consciousness, basis, whose eye sense organ is afflicted by cataract, through cataract one gets a perception of what is traditionally described in Tibetan as falling hair.
Now, as a result of this, eye sense perception is distorted. And as our text reads onwards, onwards, in dependence on this, the sense consciousness to which one moon appears as two moons arise. So this would be a clear case of a sense consciousness which is mistaken because of its basis, but which is not mistaken because of the place or because of the object of this consciousness. An example of the second which is a spurious direct perceiver, which is non conceptual, which is a sense consciousness, is mistaken with respect to its place. Would be for instance, for someone who is travelling in a ship, seeing the trees on the shore as moving as a result of this.
So this is a clear case where a mistaken perception arises because of the place one is in. One is oneself in a moving object. And an example of the third, in other words, such a consciousness which is mistaken with respect to its object, or in dependence upon its object, would be for instance, that consciousness which perceives a swiftly whirling firebrand as a circle of fire. in dependence on a swiftly whirling firebrand, a circle of fire is perceived whereas in actuality, there is no such thing as a circle of fire, but merely a firebrand. The fourth example would be in dependence on the mind being disturbed by great anger, seeing for instance, the earth as red.
So in dependence on great anger arising in the mind, the eye consciousness, because of the flow of blood to the eye might see the earth as red even though this is in no way the actual color of the earth. So, we’re in the middle of page 18 of your English translation. And therefore, a non conceptual wrong consciousness, a spurious direct perceiver which is non conceptual and a consciousness which is endowed with a clear appearance of a non existent phenomenon, of a non existent literally, are all synonymous. So the reason for which such consciousnesses are said to be consciousnesses, which endowed with a clear appearance of a non existent, is because something which is non existent such as two moons appears clearly to such an eye sense consciousness which is afflicted or whose basis, whose eye sense organ is afflicted by cataract. So the sequence of explanation here has been first an explanation of direct perceivers in general over the last couple of lessons, then an explanation of valid direct perceivers and then an explanation of spurious direct perceivers which we have covered today.
And at present, we will have as a direct counterpart to the explanation of spurious direct perceivers, the explanation of inferential valid cognizers. And we’re in the middle of page 18. So there’s a mistake in the English translation. It’s not an other cognizing awareness. The translator mistakenly misread this is actually conceptual awareness.
So the definition of an inferential valid cognizer is a conceptual awareness which is incontrovertible and new and which arises directly in dependence on its basis, which is a correct reason. This definition has several parts. The critical ones here are that such a mind is new. In other words, it is the first instance of consciousness. It is a conceptual mind.
In other words, the inferential valid cognizer which realizes that sound is impermanent, realizes the impermanence of sound through a meaning generality of the impermanence of sound. And it arises directly from such a realization. And if one divides inferential valid cognizers, there are three subdivisions. Inferential cognizers by the power of the fact, inferential valid cognizers by repute and inferential valid cognizers based on conviction. From within these three, an instance of the first is that inferential valid cognizer which cognizes the impermanence of sound based on a reason.
Now generally here the term reason in Tibetan refers to reason in general. But that specifically refers to a correct reason. Now a correct reason is that which has the three characteristics of a correct reason. The three characteristics of a correct reason are the presence of the subject in the reason, and what are called the forward and reverse pervasions, which are the fact that the reason necessarily entails a predicate, and the fact that the opposite of the predicate necessarily entails the opposite of the reason, what we call the counter positive. Now the second category, inference through renown, is generally subsumed within the first category, inference through the power of fact.
And an example given for inference through renown, would be for instance, that inferential valid cognizer which realizes based on the perceptions in a given location, in a given area. The suitability of calling that which is adorned with a hare, a rabbit in other words, by the name moon. Now, this refers to the fact that in many parts of the world it is thought that the image of a moon is visible on the surface, the image of a rabbit is visible on the surface of the moon and thereby the moon is called the one with a rabbit. Here Geshe-la says precisely because if you look carefully at the moon, there seems to be something like a hair within the moon, there is a reason for this attribution of the epithet, moon, to what seems to have a hare within it. And in the reason which is given here, it is not stated that it is necessary to call the moon the one with the rabbit, but that it is suitable to do so.
In other words, one can understand that such is done. And an example of the third category of inferential valid cognizer. The inferential valid cognizers which arise in dependence on conviction would be for instance, the inferential valid cognizer which realizes the incontrovertible meaning taught by the quote from the Buddhist scriptures. From the practice of generosity arises prosperity and from the practice of ethics arises happiness. in dependence upon the scriptural reasons which are purified by the threefold analysis.
So generally speaking here, such a quote from scripture, the practice of generosity arises prosperity and from protecting ethics arises happiness, which is actually a quote from Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvali, the Precious Garland, is to be purified or is to be analyzed in the light of these three modes of analysis. The three modes of analysis are that such a passage first is not in contradiction with direct perception. Secondly, that such a passage is not in contradiction with an inferential valid cognizer through the power of fact. In other words, it’s not in contradiction with reason, we would say. And certainly that such a passage is not internally contradictory.
In other words, that there is no contradiction between this passage and other former or latter passages in the same text, referring to the same topic. Should this be the case, this passage is said, or this quote from scripture can be said to be a reason from scripture, which is purified by these three analyses. Now generally here, this quote from Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvali, does not apply to the general practice of generosity leading to prosperity, and to the general practice of protection of ethics leading to happiness, since such is understandable through the power of reasoning alone and from within the three categories of phenomena manifest phenomena, hidden phenomena and extremely hidden phenomena would fall in the category of hidden phenomena. However, here this quote applies to how one deed of generosity in a past life and a very specific past life in a specific location gave rise to one result in future lives of prosperity, or how one deed of protection of the ethics of an ordained or a non ordained person in one specific past life gave rise to one specific instance of happiness in a future life. Such a detailed analysis of causality is only accessible to reasoning which is based on scripture, since it is an extremely hidden phenomenon.
And then there are some consequences which are drawn here, which since they are straightforward, Geshe-la will cover. An inference through renown is necessarily an inference by the power of fact, and direct perceivers are not necessarily direct valid cognizers, since the second instance of a perceiver, a sense direct perceiver apprehending form is not a valid cognizer. This is the case because it is similar to the second instant of an inferential cognizer realizing that sound is impermanent in being a subsequent cognizer. This is such because it is said in Pramanavinishcaya Tika, which is a great text on logic composed by Dharmottara, first instance of a direct perceiver and of an inferential cognizer, are indeed valid cognizers. That which arises within their continuum, in as much as it is different from them, cannot be acknowledged to be a valid cognizer.
Key terms in this teaching
- insight meditation vipassana (Pali); vipashyana (Skt); lhag tong (Tib)
- The principal meditation taught in the Theravada tradition. It is based on the Buddha’s teachings on the four foundations of mindfulness. It is sometimes called mindfulness meditation. LYWA
- shamatha zhi nä (Tib)
- Calm abiding; a state of concentration in which the mind is able to abide steadily, without effort and for as long as desired, on an object of meditation. There are nine stages in its development. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.