Tenets — 2015-10-13

Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets — 2015-10-13
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

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File: 2015-10-13 – KR.mp3

UUID: a2d69e19-a248-4527-ae14-eccabdb105a7

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)

Date: 2015-10-13

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Duration: 1h 28m

Words: 3,712

So when we speak of tenets, Dhrutta in Tibetan Siddhanta in Sanskrit, what is the purpose of tenets? Broadly speaking, there are two types of happiness, physical and mental happiness. Mental happiness does not just arise by itself, it arises independence on study. That happiness, mental happiness which has arisen independence on study is related to one’s view, one’s viewpoint. This is akin to tenets.

So this inner experience of mental happiness arises in dependence on study. Such studies are rare at present in the world. We can say that for the majority of people the foundation is attempting to gain physical happiness and our studies are exclusively dedicated to the attainment of physical material happiness. So this is evident. To give an example, let us take medical studies.

One studies medical, medicine for what purpose? One studies medicine to dispel the physical sufferings of another and place them in a state of physical happiness. Most studies nowadays are of this nature. So in the case of which we are studying, our goal is to gain experience. To gain in other words, a profound happiness from the depths of our mind.

Then since you yourselves have studied tenets, in other words have studied the view, I would like to ask you, have you gained experience from this and has this been a source of inner happiness or not? So in other words, one studies tenets to gain direct experience of the tenets to generate thereby this profound feeling of innermost happiness. Then as one’s understanding of tenets deepens and becomes ever more subtle, one is eventually able to counter the root of the afflictions, which is the ignorance grasping at itself. So, clearly studying the realization of the view enables one eventually to gain experience in this view and this can give rise to this profound feeling, profound sensation of mental happiness. Now in our own case, we don’t have these experiences at present, but all of us know that from time to time our minds are deeply troubled.

They are deeply troubled because they are beset by the afflictions and it is at this point that the distinction between Buddhists and non Buddhists, outsiders and insiders, arises. From a Buddhist standpoint, the root of these afflictions is none other than the ignorance grasping at a self, and it is through this that we are able to place our mind in a relaxed state. So the non Buddhist yogis of ancient India probably recognized that the afflictions troubled the mind. I would suspect they did not understand the origin of the afflictions. Had they understood the origin of the afflictions, they would have understood dependent origination and would have understood that anger, pride, desire and so forth arise ultimately from the ignorance grasping at a self.

So if this is the case, how did the non Buddhist yogis of ancient India counter the afflictions? The method they used was meditation. In other words, they focused the mind in a relaxed fashion, single pointedly on one object of observation for a long period of time. When this is engaged in, the afflictions are no longer manifest. They cease, they are stopped.

This is a means which was used. So as the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India understood and accepted the existence of ordinary dependent origination. In other words, the fact that from a seed a sprout arises or that we arise from our parents. What they did not accept was the general arrival of phenomena from other bases. Had they done so, then seeking for the source of the origin, they would probably have encountered the view.

So if the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India, the Tirthikas, had understood the origin of the afflictions, in other words, the causes and the conditions of the afflictions, then they would have had to understand the ignorance apprehending a self or self cherishing. Investigation of this shows clearly that they would have had to have the view which they did not have. So what was their assertion? Their assertion was that of the existence of a self which was permanent, one and independent and the foundation of this is the person. So, the Tirthikas, the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India therefore asserted the existence of a self of persons, of an Atman in other words, and said that this self of persons was permanent, one and independent.

What was meant by this is something which we have explained many times already. They considered that in addition to the aggregates, there was an owner of the aggregates, a person or an entity which had power over the aggregates, whereas the aggregates were that which were under the power enthralled by the owner of the aggregates. The Buddhist scriptures speak of this in terms of the metaphor of a king and his serfs. The serfs depend on the king. The king does not depend on his serfs.

So, we have various outlooks, various way of thinking and the ancient Buddhist philosophers of India had their own which they felt was rooted in a valid cognizer, which according to them identified an Experiencer which experienced the fruition of karma and a Karma which was that whose fruition was experienced. Relied heavily on reasoning. They accepted the existence of past and future lives as an evidence and they asserted that it was evident, was one of the lines of reasoning that the person did not depend on the aggregates, on its constituents since at death the aggregates or the body would be incinerated but the continuum of the person would continue. So it is extremely important for you to focus here on the foundations, on the distinction between Buddhist and non Buddhist systems of philosophy or systems of tenets. And this can only be done through listening to teachings repeatedly, thinking about them carefully, reading book after book, and finally reaching one’s own system of tenets, a system of tenets which is compatible with oneself.

This does not happen after one or two trials. So, the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India therefore asserted the existence of a person, an Atman or a soul, which was the experiencer of happiness and suffering themselves, the fruition of past karma and which was, or which existed within the basis of imputation, which was the aggregates. In such an analysis, this Atman or this soul was seen as permanent. In other words, it did not depend on other phenomena, it did not depend on parts. I personally feel it is extremely important to gain an understanding of this ancient Indian outlook.

And therefore, what from the Buddhist standpoint is the object of refutation, a person or a soul, which is autonomous and does not exist in dependence upon the basis of imputation, which are the aggregates, is from the standpoint of the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India, an existent. It exists because it is that which experiences suffering and happiness. Now, when wishes to establish the view, then one should act in accordance with the quote from Arya Dev Chattushata, Count of 400 in which it is said initially reflect on causality, then on the self and finally on the emptiness thereof. The meaning of this stanza is that initially one should reflect on karma, then one should reflect on the object of refutation which is a self, which is permanent, one and independent and finally one should reflect on the prasanika viewpoint, the emptiness thereof. So, the lower schools of tenets assert that the object of refutation is none other than precisely such a self which is permanent, one and independent.

Now at this point, there is an issue which arises from the standpoint of prasanika madhyamika. Do we say that in prasanika madhyamika there is a refutation of this self which is permanent, one and independent and if so, what precisely is it? The refutation of such a self from the standpoint of prasanika madhyamika in no way refutes other components of the basis of imputation. So for the lower schools of tenets, this apprehension of the person as permanent one and independent is an imputed apprehension, whereas for the higher schools of tenets, it is an innate apprehension. The question which arises is when such a conception of the person is refuted from the standpoint of the higher schools of tenets, what precisely is the independence which is refuted?

So this is not easy to understand but I think over time through studying tenets, one’s understanding will deepen. So from the standpoint of the lower schools of tenets, such a presentation of an Atman, of a self which is an experiencer of happiness and of suffering, which is an experiencer of the maturation leading to happiness and suffering, and which is therefore in accordance with the view of the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India, the Tirthikas, such a view is totally unacceptable since this would entail the existence of a person which is independent of the aggregates which exists within the aggregates. So when we ask what exactly appears innately to the mind, we just have to look at our own experience. When we say I with a strong feeling of I, every one of us experiences something, for some it might be in the brain, for some it might be in the chest, but there is a sense of something there within the aggregates. Now this is what is referred to here.

So in Tibetan, we say it’s me. We say it’s me, it’s not my hand, it’s not my hand, it’s not my legs, it’s me, right? Then in English when you say it’s me, what are you saying? So here, therefore when we’re speaking of an innate mind, we’re speaking of a mind whose perceptions are not constructed manufactured by tenets. And the lowest schools of tenets assert that the person can be found within the aggregates.

Then their viewpoint may be erroneous but it is not that easy to disprove. It is very easy to say that the Prasangika view is supreme, it’s a very different matter to establish it as such. Therefore, the position of the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India which is that there is an Atman or a self, which is the experiencer of pleasant and unpleasant sensations and of all maturation. This viewpoint is unsuitable. Then, through analyses, the lower schools of tenets refine their understanding of the person as something which exists within the aggregates until we reach the view of Bhava Viveka, who asserts that the person is none other than the mental consciousness.

So, this view that the self or the I is the mental consciousness is a view of Svatantrika Madhyamika. It is a view in accordance to which the person which exists within the aggregates is none other than the mental consciousness and it is this which is the experiencer of pleasant and unpleasant sensations as well as the experience of maturation. Therefore, it is this which we experience when we have a strong experience of self. So, this mental consciousness which is asserted to be the experiencer of pleasant and unpleasant sensations is however experienced or perceived as existing beginninglessly from beginningless time in its own mode of abiding. Now there are obviously numerous different gradations of mental consciousness, coarser and more subtle ones, but this experience of the mental consciousness as existing beginninglessly in its own mode of abiding or existing autonomously is the one we are referring to here.

Then you see this powerful predilection, this powerful conception which thinks I, this is that which is at the root of all of the experiences of the afflictions of anger and so forth. Is it possible or not to refute this powerful predilectional conception by means of the view of the lower schools of tenets? I don’t know what more to say to you. And therefore, this is why it is said by Chandakirti in his commentary on which is brought up by Je Tsongkhapa in his lecture when identifying the object of negation that which whose nature does not depend upon an other and which is independently true, that is the object of negation. This is what is referred to when we refer to abide or dwelling within one’s own mode of abiding.

So, regarding this object of refutation, the lower schools assert that the person exists within the aggregates, that the person can actually be found within the aggregates and is identified generally speaking with the mental consciousness. Then, if such a mental consciousness is the person, such a mental consciousness has a nature separate from others, such a mental consciousness would be autonomous, Such a mental consciousness would therefore be the object of refutation in accordance with Aryadeva’s Chattushattaka. Then how independence on meditation on such a person is it possible to eliminate the afflictions? And there is a passage in the Lama Chupa, which actually refers to this type of entity in which it is said abiding from beginningless time. Now this refers to the fundamental mind, certain understandings of the fundamental mind are in keeping with Hinduism.

And therefore when we experience such a mental consciousness as the experiencer of pleasant and unpleasant sensations, as the experiencer of the fruition of past accumulated karma, we see this mental consciousness as dwelling within its own mode of abiding, as autonomous, as independent. This conception of the mental consciousness is actually the object of refutation within prasanika madhyamika. So let us at present reflect on the mode of assertion of the experience of pleasant and unpleasant sensations for the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India. The mode of assertion of the experience of pleasant and unpleasant sensations for the lowest schools of Buddhist tenets and the mode of assertion of the experience of pleasant and unpleasant sensations for Prasangika Madhyamika. So let us reflect on this for a couple of seconds and then we will recite the prayers.

So at present, I’d like your questions on what we talked about. In other words, the mode of assertion of the I. With the non Buddhists, did they assert that the Atman was beginningless? It was permanent, but was it beginningless? Definitely.

Not only did they assert that it was beginningless, they asserted that it was permanent. When you speak of beginninglessness, you have the problem of beginnings, don’t you? So now that you start asking your questions, I’ll explain a bit more. If I explained everything at once, you’d all get dizzy. So as you ask questions, I will explain.

Okay. Yeah. My question is about the experience of happiness. So what is the difference between the non Buddhists saying that the Atman is independent because it is the experience of happiness and the prasin geekers who say that the self exists in some way or another because we experience it. Because last teaching, Geshela said it has already been decided that the self exists.

We just need to know the the mode of existence. The non Buddhists assert the existence of a self which experiences happiness and suffering, but in addition, they assert that this self is not part of the aggregates. This is something which the Buddhist texts refute. My question is about the Sotantrika Madhyamaka view. How do they explain how does how does Sotantrika Madhyamaka explain if the self is, that whose nature which does not depend on another and is autonomous, then how do they explain phenomena such as the story of when Chenrezig went to the lower the hell realms and gave, his right arm to Brahma with his left hand.

And at that point, he lost he despaired and his head broke into ten different heads. How would they explain that story? So if you accept the Sratantika Madhyamika system, how does this account of Arya Avalokiteshvara Descent to the Hell contradict their tenets? Well, I’m presuming I don’t really understand Sultantreka Majumika position, but I’ll give it a go. If we weren’t dependent, if we were completely autonomous and weren’t dependent on others, then, you know, Chenrezig would have just gone to the lower realms, given the hand the arm over and then just sort of departed, that would have been it.

But because we are dependent on others, others, our behavior is constantly, or our minds are constantly changing independence on others and other circumstances. And so that seems to me to be an instance of where he, you know, with Brahma being offended by the offering with the left hand that would say and then Chenrezig despaired at that moment seems to be a direct it seems to him, to me that how can one assert that we are autonomous beings? That’s a very good example of not being able to assert that we are autonomous beings. Another question. Just looking at the assertion by the non Buddhists of the Atman and that the lower schools assert the, mental consciousness as the instance of the self.

It seems that, there’s not much difference between the two except that one’s saying the, self is outside the aggregates and the other is saying that it is inside the aggregates as the mental consciousness. Are there any further distinctions than those two? There’s not a lot of difference between your bank account and my bank account except that my money is in my bank account and not in your bank account, right? Right. No, no, maybe I’ve got that wrong then.

It’s just, well they just I want to do business. But they’re basically, they’re saying that there’s a self. There is no major difference apart from this, both assert the existence of a person which experiences pleasant and unpleasant sensations but the lowest schools of tenets assert that this person is within the aggregate, to put it bluntly, this person is the mental consciousness. Fundamental mind asserted in all the tenet schools and does it have the same meaning in each of the schools? The schools of tenets present the view, they do not make a differentiation from the standpoint of Paramithayana or Mantrayana.

That differentiation is not made in the schools of tenets. Then there is a relationship, but I won’t enter into it, between the view of Chitamatra and the generation stage. No discussion today, only questions. Another, another, I need another. If not another, then you will have time.

Yeah. I look in the Internet regarding I think his holiness has have a meeting with Buddhist monk in Taiwan. He is his name is Seng Seng Yuan, and they both discuss about different school of, you know, like, of thought. And the Taiwanese monk say about the the zen. Is is it similar to the tantric I mean, the the the Tibetan, the the tantric one, tantric yarn?

His Holiness in that interview distinguished between authentic and inauthentic Zen. He said authentic Zen might have a relation with Dzogchen, the Nyingma tradition. Today we have more time. Yeah, I like it. Thank you.

So my understanding is that with the present view, given the fact that phenomena do not have characteristics from their own sides, they come to a conclusion that the mode of existence of the self therefore is mere amelior conceptual phenomena, terminologically existent. Sorry. However, there could be alternative views because it’s based on the number of implicit assumptions. For example, it assumes that whether something is existent or nonexistent is a collectively exhaustive set of events when in fact that may not be the case. It’s just that conceptually as humans, we can only see things as being dichotomous and so I could basically come up with a view that in fact something is neither existent nor nonexistent and that would be different from stating that something is terminologically existent.

What would you give as an instance of something which is neither existent nor non existent? Well, I would say basically for example or phenomena, given the fact that you can establish that it does not have characteristics from their own sides, does not necessarily only implies that phenomena are terminologically existent if you accept that basically things can either just be existent or non existent. But that’s just that’s a conceptual framework. The conceptual framework itself may be wrong. So in research for example, when you don’t get a result that you’re expecting, it may be because the framework that you’re actually looking at is actually itself false.

That’s what I’m trying to hint at. Why can you just simply make a statement of things are neither existent nor nonexistent? That to itself would also be a correct statement. Every phenomenon. I would say every phenomenon.

So in Buddhist treatises, existence and non existence are contradictory and directly incompatible. Existing phenomena are observed by valid cognition, non existent phenomena are non observed by valid cognition. That is based on an implicit assumption of the conceptual framework that things are they are or are not. That’s my point. The fact is there are implicit assumptions that it’s riding on.

Are you driving at prevalent logics? Is that what you’re thinking of? I’m not driving any particular philosophical point other than saying that there are implicit assumptions underwriting everything. I can add something. The fact is, from a prasangita perspective, that everything is a conceptual framework that would include therefore whether something is existent or nonexistent, which by default therefore is also false.

Right? You’re speaking of phenomena being both existent and nonexistent, right? Or being neither existent nor nonexistent? Which one of the two? Which one?

Why? I guess my point of that I was trying to make is that that is seems to me to another alternative in my view to then just simply say, well, things are that one modes of existence is through a terminological existence. It it to me seems like to be slightly different there. Alright. Thank you.

So what I asked you was to ask questions regarding the assertions of the self as experiencer of happiness and unhappiness in the various schools of tenets. However, even though your questions are not on these topics, I find them very nice questions. They’re proof that you’re thinking about things.

Key terms in this teaching

atman dag (Tib)
Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
dzogchen
Literally "Great Perfection", the practice to attain the mind's natural, primordial state. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
Nyingma
The old translation school of Tibetan Buddhism, which traces its teachings back to the time of Padmasambhava... LYWA
object of negation gag cha (Tib)
An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
Vajrayana dor je theg pa (Tib)
The adamantine vehicle; the second of the two Mahayana paths. It is also called Tantrayana or Mantrayana. This is the quickest vehicle of Buddhism as it allows certain practitioners to attain enlightenment within a single lifetime. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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