Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen examines the philosophical foundations of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka by distinguishing it from lower schools of Buddhist logic. Using the classic rope-mistaken-for-snake metaphor, he unpacks what Prāsaṇgika means when it asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations. He contrasts the Sautrāntika view—where a table is established from its own side while a rope’s snake-appearance is not—with Prāsaṇgika’s radical stance that neither is inherently established. The talk culminates in explaining conventional existence through mere nominal imputation: how phenomena perform their functions through conceptual designation alone, illustrated by currency, bowls on tables, and requests for water. He addresses how an enlightened being perceives the table without mentally consenting to its apparent inherent existence, and closes with a question about whether the differences between these schools are ultimately sustainable.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-07-28.mp3
UUID: 26ad78d1-f0bb-4571-b57c-a18b36505e2f
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2015-07-28
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,140
So let us generate the motivation to receive these teachings. So this presentation of the tenet systems is from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka. So when in the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka system, it is asserted that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, are mere nominal imputations. What precisely does the term mere rebut or eliminate? Mere eliminates the notion that phenomena are established by their own characteristics or are inherently established.
So one should reflect on the fact that in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, not only does mere in the statement that phenomena are mere conceptual or nominal imputations eliminate phenomena being established by their own characteristics or inherently established. But in addition, the basis of imputation of phenomena is neither inherently established nor is it established by its own characteristics. In other words, for Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, phenomena are only conceptual imputations. Now when we refer to phenomena being mere conceptual imputations in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, this differs radically from the understanding of the mode of existence of phenomena in the lower schools of tenets. If we were to take specifically the instance of Sautrāntika and of Cittamātra.
In Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, taking for instance a mode of existence of the small table in front of Geshe la. Whether this table exists or not, its mode of existence has nothing to do whatsoever with the mode of existence of the imputation of a multi colored snake on a multi colored piece of rope in the grass. Should we ask Cittamātrins or Sautrantikas what precisely the mode of existence of this little table is? They would answer that this little table arises in dependence on causes and conditions and therefore can be said to dwell within its own uncommon mode of abiding. Therefore, its existence or its mode of existence has nothing whatsoever to do with the mode of existence of a coiled piece of rope in the grass being perceived as a snake.
This perception of a coiled piece of rope in the grass, understood as a snake is a metaphor for the Prasanika Mādhyamika understanding. Now should we at present address the view of Sautrāntika Madhyamaka? In Sautrāntika Madhyamaka, what are the similarities or dissimilarities regarding the mode of existence or none of this existence of the table in comparison with a snake imputed on a multicolored coil of rope. For, Sautrāntika Madhyamaka, there are on the one hand similarities between the mode of existence of the table and that of a multi colored coil of rope misapprehended for a snake in as much as both are conceptual imputations. There are however differences in as much as the table is established from its own side.
It is established by its own characteristics, whereas the coil of rope is neither. So from the standpoint of Sautrāntika Madhyamaka, the table is said to be established from its own side. In other words, when we search for the constituents of the table, these are findable. On the other hand, for Sautrāntika Madhyamaka, if we take the, multicolored coil of rope, in the grass and we seek on that basis for the instance of a snake, that is impossible to find. A snake cannot be found in the shape or in the color of a multicolored coil of grass, of rope.
For this reason, the multicolored coil of rope is said not to be established from its own side as a snake. Therefore, for Sautrāntika Madhyamaka, the table and the multicolored coil of rope being a snake are similar in that both are conceptual imputations. They are, however, dissimilar in as much as the table is established from its own side and established by its own characteristics, whereas the multi colored coil of rope being a snake is neither established by its own characteristics nor established from its own side. It is non existent. It is critical here not to say the multi colored coil of rope, but the multicolored coil of rope being a snake.
The multicolored coil of rope exists in this form. The multicolored coil of rope being a snake does not exist. It’s a nonexistent. Now at present, let us address the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika system. When we compare, the mode of existence of a table and of a coiled piece of rope being a snake, from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, were they to exist, would they be equal in their existence?
And were they not to exist, would they be equal in their non existence? This is the question we have to ask and we have to go over this over and again to deepen our understanding. So in, Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, if we were to ask this question, the answer would be quite straightforward. They are dissimilar in as much as for Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, this table is an existent phenomenon. It is established from its own type side.
Whereas the, multicolored coil of rope in the grass being a snake is a non existent phenomenon. It is not established from its own side. However, from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika, things become more delicate. Both are identical in not being established from their own side. Both are identical in being mere conceptual imputations.
So if we analyze this problem in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, things become quite delicate. Clearly, in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the table is not established from its own side, even though the table appears to the sense consciousnesses which apprehended as established from its own side. Therefore, this establishment from its own side of the table is the object of negation or the object of refutation. However, the coiled multi colored rope in the grass being a snake also is not established from its own side. It also appears as if it were established from its own side.
What then is the difference? Now in Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, the answer to this question is easier. Since for Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, phenomena’s appearance as being established from their own side to sense consciousnesses is the actual way phenomena exist. Therefore, there is no particular difficulty. Now let us return to the Prāsaṇgika viewpoint.
So as we said for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the little table in front of Geshe-la and a multicolored coil of rope in the grass being a snake are similar in being mere conceptual imputations. They are also similar in not being established in the slightest from their own side. Yet, the table in front of Geshe-la exists from the standpoint of what is commonly known to the world, Whereas the coil, the coil of rope in the grass being a snake does not exist from the standpoint of what is commonly known to the world. In this case, for what exactly is the mode of existence of the table in front of Geshe-la? So what exactly is the mode of existence of this table in Prasanika Mādhyamika?
This table according to Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka appears to the sense consciousnesses perceiving it as inherently established and is established from its own side. This is not its mode of existence. Then what is its mode of existence? So the table in front of Geshe-la exists, and on the other hand, the multicolored coil of rope being a snake does not exist. Both are conceptual imputations, neither is established from its own side.
What precisely then is the mode of existence of the table? It can be posited as a mere nominal imputation. The common answer of Jangkya’s great treatise on tenets, of Jamyang Shepba’s Gomang Rabsal, and of Ngawang Palden’s Tenets, Rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, is that it is sufficient for establishing the conventional existence of table deposited as a mere normal imputation. So what exactly is meant when one says that it is possible to posit phenomena in dependence on a mere name in accordance with one’s wishes in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika? What is meant by this is that if for instance I were to wish to place a bowl on the table, it is sufficient to have understood the term table and posited table nominally to be able to put a bowl on it.
Now an elegant way of presenting this is with the example of putting a bone on a table. If I say to somebody, put the bowl on the table, it is through the mere understanding of the name table that person is able to perform the deed of putting the bowl on the table and he will not put it on the floor but on the table. And therefore, everything, fire and water, for instance, merely in dependence on positing a name are able to perform their activities for us, for instance, their beneficial activities. Now regarding the coiled piece of rope being a snake, the coiled piece of rope being a snake does not exist. In as much as a coiled piece of rope being a snake does not exist, it is unable to perform the activities or to perform the function of a snake.
Then table and a coiled piece of rope being a snake from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika are both similar in being mere conceptual imputations and are both similar in not being established from their own side or by their own characteristics. On what basis do we then say that table exists and that a coiled piece of rope being a snake does not exist, it is adequate to answer because a coiled piece of rope being a snake cannot perform the function of a snake, whereas a table can perform the function of a table. Then one example which helps a lot to understand this is imagine if you were very thirsty. Then if you address someone and say someone who has water, bring me a glass of water. Just on the basis of understanding water that person is able to bring you a glass of water.
However, if you were to say to that person, bring me that water which appears to my sensory consciousnesses, would he or she be able to do this or not? If you analyze carefully, that water which appears to the sensory consciousnesses is actually unable to perform the function of water. And therefore, when we say imputed through mere name, imputed through mere enumeration, what we refer to is precisely this mere name water. It is unnecessary to actually say, bring me water. Then an example I would like to give you is that of currency.
Let us take the US dollar. If you have seen US dollar bills, you know that they are all exactly of the same size basically. And they look very similar in terms of appearance. Then in dependence on what do you have a different potency if you own one of these bills? Independence exclusively on nominal imputation.
Right? For instance, a 20 US dollar bill and a $100 US bill have exactly the same size, yet they do not have at all the same purchasing capacity, the same potency. Then you might think, well, it is because the $100 bill is heavier than the $20 bill. Then if you check, you will find this is not the case. So why does a $100 bill have more buying power than the $20 bill?
So why is it that the $100 bill has five times the purchasing power of the $20 bill? It is exclusively due to the fact that the number 100 is printed the $100 bill, whereas the number 20 is printed on the $20 bill. Apart from this, there is no difference. It is therefore exclusively due to what is known to the world or what is commonly accepted. This is what is meant by being merely imputed by name or by sign.
So for instance, if you go to a store and you want to purchase something which costs $100 if you give a bill with 100 written on it, the shopkeeper will accept it and sell you the good. If you give a bill with 20 written on it, the shopkeeper will not accept it and not sell you the good. The only difference is the number written on the bill. In other words, this is a case of effectiveness through mere nominal imputation or mere imputation of a sign. So it is therefore extremely important to reflect on what is meant by mere nominal imputation, mere imputation of a number, mere imputation of a sign.
Then you might wonder, is this the case also in Sautrāntika Madhyamaka? Fundamentally, yes, apart from the fact that they do not accept that phenomena are merely imputed by name, by number, or by sign. They believe that there is something from the side of the object. Maybe we shall stop here for tonight. And if you have questions, please ask your questions.
Someone who realizes emptiness, they realize emptiness and they’re looking at the table, what do they actually see? When they realize emptiness or after? They’ve already realized emptiness as they look at the table. So what do they actually see? That’s good, good question.
That’s a very good question. Someone who, is in subsequent attainment after having had the direct perception of the emptiness of a table, obviously, is an Ārya being. And when that Ārya being looks at the table, the table does appear to that Ārya being as being inherently established as existing from its own side. But the Ārya being does not mentally consent to that mode of appearance. Just following on from that answer.
So if the Ārya being is not consenting to the appearance of the table or of any phenomena, are they is it just naturally that they’re not consenting to that? They’re not having some sort of mental discussion occurring about, no, it doesn’t exist as it appears to exist, or does it just it just is in the way that we see the table as totally existing from its own side, do they also totally see that it doesn’t exist from its own side in that instinctive way? So, an Ārya being, who, observes a table during subsequent attainment does indeed experience the appearance of the table as being established from its own side, as being inherently established, but does not conceptualize the table as being inherently established or established from its own side. There is therefore no sensation which has arisen from conceptuality related to the tables being inherently established. It would follow then that an Ārya being would see a snake, as a noninherently existing snake in the right conditions of twilight where there is rope.
Sorry. Could you repeat? So an Ārya being would still impute snake onto rope in the conditions that Geshe-la has described until that person examined closer. But that would see the snake initially as noninherently existing. I know I’m mixing two metaphors, but I’m just clarifying that to a mistaken appearance, the object that is mistaken would still be seen as inherently existent even when it wasn’t the when it was still a rope.
No, there’s no difference. There’s no difference between our eye consciousness and that for instance of a first ground Ārya being, both would mistakenly see the snake imputed on the multicolored coil of rope in the grass as an inherently existent snake. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify few weeks back Geshe la said the object of negation appears to the sense consciousness. Now I’ve got a bit of a problem with understanding conceptuality so I just wanted to clarify that the object of negation in the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is not the conception of inherent existence but rather is the apprehension of inherent existence.
Is that am I on the right track? You have to distinguish between two types of objects of refutation. Objects of refutation which are subjects and objects of refutation which are objects. So it is true that you can call the apprehension of true existence or the apprehension of the inherent existence of all phenomena, objects of refutation. But this is not the object of refutation which is referred to when one speaks of identifying the object of refutation when one tries to realize emptiness.
That is always the object of refutation, which is an object. Monica, I think. Are your questions? I’m not sure if I want to ask it anymore, but I will. So just going back to the previous question before Lily’s.
When emptiness is realised, does it mean that conception, no longer arises conception of objects or phenomena? When or for you are having the direct realization of emptiness, probably there are no conceptions which appear to the mind, although there are numerous different explanations of this. However, after you arise out of the direct realization of emptiness, in other words, during what is known as subsequent attainment, there are and there is conceptual activity. Another question? How does one determine if the Sautrāntika Mādhyamika or the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamakas are correct?
The reason I asked this question is because if the difference is whether there are objects characterized from their own side, can that just simply be construed as what Geshe la indicated as when the rope is imputed on the sorry, the snake is snake is imputed on the rope as being that it cannot perform a function because simply being functions can also be attributes and characteristics. So they’re very similar. Prāsaṇgika and Sautrāntika are identical in the mode of conceptualizing or the mode of understanding, a coiled, multicolored piece of rope being a snake. And they are identical in their understanding that it cannot perform the function of a snake. There is no difference at all in this matter.
They are different in as much as Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika uses a coil of rope being a snake as a metaphor for all phenomena being mere conceptual imputations, whereas Sautrāntika Madhyamaka does not accept this as a metaphor for the mode of existence of phenomena. So what I’d like you to think about in the context of mere nominal imputation, mere imputation by sign or semiotic imputation, and mere imputation by number or numeral imputation is what happens when you ask somebody for instance, give me 10. What do they give you? They give you $10. Or if you ask somebody, give me some water, then they will give you what they understand as water.
Then if you ask them, give me what appears to my sense consciousnesses as water, probably they’ll give you nothing. And if they say, give if you say give me and you don’t say what, then you may be on the receiving end of some very dirty words. So it is in dependence on the name that the function is performed. So the important topic today is this capacity to perform action or function based on mere nominal imputation or mere imputation of a number. I wish I’ll stop here.
Then by twos as usual. Yeah. By two. By pairs.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.
Questions answered in this teaching
When someone who has realized emptiness looks at a table afterwards, what do they actually see?
A person in subsequent attainment, after having had direct perception of the emptiness of a table, is an Ārya being. When that Ārya being looks at the table, the table still appears as being inherently established, existing from its own side. The difference is that the Ārya being does not mentally consent to that mode of appearance.
When emptiness is directly realised, does conception of objects or phenomena no longer arise?
While a person is having the direct realization of emptiness, there are probably no conceptions appearing to the mind, although there are numerous different explanations of this point. After arising out of the direct realization of emptiness, in what is known as subsequent attainment, conceptual activity does occur.