Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 58-minute teaching on Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka tenets, the Dalai Lama examines how all phenomena are merely conceptual imputations with no independent existence from their own side. He opens with a classical Buddhist analysis of the object of negation—the mistaken appearance of things as truly established—and illustrates this through vivid examples: a coiled rope mistaken for a snake in dim light, and a person (using his translator Ilya Dorje as the example) existing only as a conceptual imputation on the basis of the five aggregates. The teaching then explores a subtle distinction critical to Prāsaṇgika philosophy: while all ordinary consciousnesses are mistaken and perceive phenomena as inherently real, there remains a valid cognizer operating within this delusion. The final section addresses questions from students about how sensory consciousness, which merely apprehends sensations like blue, differs from the mental consciousness that conceptually identifies and names them—a distinction that marks Prāsaṇgika’s unique stance compared to other Buddhist philosophical schools. Intended for serious students already engaged with Buddhist epistemology and tenet study.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-07-14.mp3
UUID: b56c0791-7d4d-4969-9946-5d02a4a3ccbb
Teacher: HH Dalai Lama
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2015-07-14
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,544
As is said in clarifying the intent regarding the object of negation. Once all interior and exterior conceptions are pacified, At that point, one will have refuted grasping at a self. Here interior and exterior conceptions refer to interior and exterior conceptions which apprehend all phenomena as established from their own side. And when these are pacified, one will have eliminated self grasping. So in Jangya Rolpai’s great presentation of tenets, the Prāsaṇgika view is presented from the standpoint of basis, path and result in the context of the ascertainment of the view at the level of the basis, it is said one must initially understand the mode of positing by conceptuality.
So according to Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, all phenomena without exception are posited under the power of conception. This positing under the power, under the sway or in dependence on conceptuality means that for instance, when phenomena appear to the sense consciousnesses, they appear to the sensory consciousnesses as being established from their own side as being inherently established. Therefore, the sensory consciousnesses are mistaken consciousnesses. This is what is meant in prasangika by phenomena being posited in dependence on or under the power of conceptuality. Therefore, in Prāsaṇgika, phenomena without exception are said to be merely posited by conceptuality.
This mere positing of phenomena by conceptuality is evident in all of the minds within the continuum of ordinary beings such as ourselves. Whether these are sensory or mental consciousnesses in every single case, Phenomena appear to be established from their own side even though they do not exist in the slightest in this way. This establishment from its own side is the object of negation for In brief, phenomena exist merely in dependence on conceptual imputation. They exist merely as conceptual imputations. The example which is given regarding this and which I explained last time is the following.
Some people in the twilight upon seeing a piece of striped coiled rope, on the ground may mistakenly think this is a snake. At this point, from the standpoint of their own mind, the thought this is a true fully characterized snake arises. This thought is none other but the conceptual imputation on the basis of the rope of snakeness. It is of great import to think carefully about this. So this example is extremely important.
What exactly is occurring? When one mistakenly considers that a coiled length of multicolored rope on the ground is a snake. It is the conceptual imputation on the basis of the appearance of a coiled multi colored rope, which leads to the thought this is a snake. However, there is no snake, no fully characterized snake whatsoever from the side of the coiled multi colored rope. Whether it be within the parts of this rope, the concatenation of these parts, its shape, or its form.
Therefore, from the standpoint of this being, apart from the positing by this mistaken mind of a snake upon a multicolored coil of rope, there is no snake whatsoever in the multicolored coil of rope. So let us take the example of your translator Ilya Dorje, also known as Tenzin Tempa. When you look on the basis of imputation, which is the five aggregates of ilea. Then in dependence on this basis of imputation, the mind which thinks this is Ilya or this is Tenzin Tempa arises. However, Ilya or Tenzin Tempa does not exist in the slightest within these aggregates and does not exist apart from an imputation on that basis.
So let us analyze this further. Mind to which Ilya appears, in other words, to put it technically, the mind to which the accumulator of karma and the experience of the fruition of karma known as Ilya, who eats meals, who drinks tea, who walks. To this mind, Ilya appears. Ilya exists. Ilya is actually established by valid cognition.
The question which arises is that of the mode of abiding or the mode of existence. Now this we understand through analysis. When we analyze whether Ilya is present within the five aggregates which are his basis of imputation, we find he is not present at all. He is a mere conceptual imputation on the basis of these five aggregates. So if we analyze whether ilea is within his five aggregates or not, starting with the form aggregate, if you take the form aggregate and this is the body of Ilya and you check whether Ilya is present in his head and check the whole body from the head to the feet, Ilya is obviously not there.
Then if one checks the other aggregates, the aggregate of sensation, of discrimination, of compositional factors and of consciousness, Ilya is not present in any of these aggregates. Yet Ilya exists. But Ilya exists out of the aggregates or within the aggregates. This is something for you to examine. What is the mode of existence of Ilya?
Clearly, all of us who study tenets understand that phenomena are established by valid cognizers. Ilya is established by a valid cognizer. But how does he exist? As a mere conceptual imputation. Now, all of us have the innate sense that things out there are, they truly exist.
This is the object of refutation of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. All of the schools of tenets from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika downwards to Vaibhāṣika consider on the other hand that things out there exist truly. This is what is meant by things being established from their own side. If we were to assert that this is a case for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika as well, there would be no difference whatsoever this is a way to understand clearly the difference between prasangika and So the question which arises now within our continuum from the Prāsaṇgika standpoint, is there no such thing as a valid cognizer? You all know what a valid cognizer is.
A valid cognizer is a mind which ascertains the mode of abiding of phenomena such as the five exterior sense objects, forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations. Then this is a very major subject of investigation whether according to Prāsaṇgika, there are valid cognizers within our continuum or not. And this is intimately connected with the identification of the object of negation. Now numerous scholars and teachers have identified the object of negation in various ways. One should rely on the instructions of one’s own teacher.
But His Holiness the Dalai Lama has said that the object of negation in prasangika is none other than the way phenomena appear to our ordinary sense consciousnesses. Then, all phenomena appear as really out there to our sensory consciousnesses. In other words, form, sound, smells, tastes and tactile sensations appear as really out there to our sensory consciousnesses. This is the object of negation of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.
If this were not the object of negation of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, then Prasanika Mādhyamika could not be different from Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. As a matter of fact, this is a position of all of these schools of tenets from Svatāntrika downwards that phenomena really are out there. So as always, pointed out that in Jnanagarbha’s commentary, auto-commentary on the two truths, Jnanagarbha, translated in English by the way, Jnanagarbha says that the object of negation, the true establishment appears to the sensory consciousnesses. This is a specifically Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika position since for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the object of negation does not appear to the sensory consciousnesses. In other words, for prasangika, the object of negation appears to the sensory consciousnesses which are mistaken, whereas for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, the object of negation cannot appear to the sensory consciousnesses which are not mistaken, it appears to the mental consciousness.
So regarding this mode of existence, this real mode of existence out there for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika considers that phenomena appear to the sensory consciousnesses as existing really out there. This is the object of negation, the object of refutation. What then precisely is a function of the mental consciousness? The function of the mental consciousness is this identification.
This is this, this is that. Therefore, in dependence on the appearance of all phenomena out there to the sense to the sensory consciousnesses, the mental consciousness cooperates with this and identifies them. Then, furthering our analysis of Prāsaṇgika, since according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the five sense objects appear to the sensory consciousness as really existing out there. In other words, being established from their own side, being established by their own characteristics, being inherently established, and that these sensory consciousnesses in turn induce a mental consciousness which cooperates with this understanding. Is it the case for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika that there are no valid cognizers whatsoever within our mind stream?
So just as Candrakīrti says that there are three views of a sprout, that the sprout is established from its own side, that it does not exist as such, and that it arises or is generated from anything. So let us take this table or this little stand in front of myself. There are three ways of understanding it. As established from its own side, as not established from its own side, and as something of which it cannot be said that it is either established nor not established from its own side. So this is what Jetsün Gompo asserts in Nirvāṇa Nyingpo to be the three possible modes of apprehension of table within the mind stream of someone who has investigated the view.
So Jetsün Gompo says that in the mind stream of someone who does not investigate the view, I cannot say for yourselves, but let us say for myself, then what exactly does exist as far as the table is concerned? In the mind of someone who has not ascertained the view by a valid cognition, the mind which understands this table to be established by its own nature or the mind which understands that there is no difference between it’s being established by its own nature and not being established by its own nature do exist. But what does not exist is the consciousness for which the table is not established from its own side. Now let us examine for ourselves. When we enter in this temple, we see the table.
So within the three modes of apprehension of the table, which one is present within our mind stream? Then after asking the question of the three modes of apprehension of the table within our mind stream, is there a valid cognizer, cognizing the table or not? Clearly there exists within our mind stream, a mind which apprehends a table for the first time. To this mind to which table appears for the first time, table appears according to the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view as established from its own side, as inherently established, as established by its own characteristics. The question which arises is whether or not this visual consciousness induces in turn a mental consciousness which conceptually understands the table as being established from its own side or not.
This is something for you to examine. According to the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view, all of the consciousnesses within the minds of ordinary beings are mistaken without exception. Only the yogic direct valid cognizer realizing emptiness is unmistaken. Now if you assert that there are no valid cognizers within the mind of sentient beings, this has far reaching consequences. Then you have to decide whether you have valid cognizers in your minds or not.
So check carefully because Prāsaṇgika says that the object of negation appears to the consciousnesses of all ordinary beings. The object of negation here is nonexistent. So how can a nonexistent phenomenon appear to be a valid cognizer? So since we have little time, Geshe-la will take only two questions. Short questions, only one question per person.
In short, short, short, please. Geshe la, I have a I have a doubt. How can a sense consciousness conceptualize anything? The sense my eye consciousness apprehends a patch of blue. But is it not my mental consciousness that says that is the base of the mandala or that is a piece of sky or that is a part of a pot?
The visual consciousness perceiving blue, does not think this is blue. The visual consciousness perceiving blue, induces a conception which thinks this is blue. The two are different, separate. Just hold the microphone to your chin. Last week, Ilya and I were talking about worldly conventions.
So does that mean, all sense consciousnesses are necessarily, established as worldly conventions? Yes. So within the presentation of base, path and result in which we have subdivided Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, most of the base would be established as being posited by the world. This would not apply to the path and the result. Last week, Geshe-la mentioned the base of imputation for a person and other phenomenon were different.
What is the base of imputation for other phenomena? So if we were to take the case of a table as a phenomenon, which is not a person, then the basis of imputation of the table would be the square top of the table. Again, I think you’re left. I’m afraid I’m in a like a tornado of of doubt. Going back to the other answer about the difference between an eye consciousness apprehending blue and the the conceptuality of this is blue, doesn’t that just affirm the Sattrantika Svatāntrika Mādhyamika position, which is that it’s the mental consciousness that does the the apprehending of appearance?
The apprehending of what? Of the Okay. If I heard if I heard correctly, his holiness, the Dalai Lama said that the object of negation in prasangika madhyamaka is the way phenomena appear to our ordinary sense consciousnesses. That’s the prasangika madhyamaka view. The svatantrika Madhyamaka view is that it’s not the sense consciousnesses that apprehend.
It’s the mental consciousness that apprehend. But if there’s a difference between an eye consciousness apprehend you know, just apprehending, blue without calling it blue. And then there’s another aspect of of consciousness, which I assume is mental consciousness that says this is blue. Then if there’s a difference there, doesn’t that mean doesn’t that undercut the Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka position? Isn’t it the mental consciousness that actually does the apprehension based on sense data?
So there is no difference between Prāsaṇgika and Svatāntrika as far as the refutation of true establishment is concerned. However, Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika in addition considers that the subtle object of refutation which is the inherent existence or the true, excuse me, the establishment from its own side of phenomena appears to sensory consciousnesses. This is not the case for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika which considers that the object of refutation does not and actually cannot appear to sensory consciousnesses. It can only appear to mental consciousnesses. Should this not be the case, there would no longer be any difference between prasangika and svatantrika Mādhyamika.
So we shall stop here for the questions for tonight and the topics for debate are first, the object of refutation or the object of negation in Prasanika Mādhyamika. This object appears to the sensory consciousnesses. How does it do so? What is it? The second topic of debate is the difference between the objects of negation of prasangika and svatantrika Mādhyamika and the differences in their modes of appearance.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- mandala khyil khor (Tib)
- A circular diagram symbolic of the entire universe. The purified environment of a tantric deity; the diagram or painting representing this. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- self-grasping dag dzin (Tib)
- The mind that apprehends the self as inherently existent. This refers to both the self of persons and the self of phenomena. LYWA
- Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
- The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.