Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-07-21 – KR.mp3
UUID: c5c7aebb-f225-4e69-8b91-280b10e3f583
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Date: 2015-07-21
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 59 min
Words: 2,797
So let’s generate the motivation to receive these teachings. Difference between the prasanica and the Svatantrika Madhyamica view is that for the prasanica madhyamica, all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there without being in the slightest established from their own side. Whereas for Svatantrika madiamika, phenomena occur at the intersection of, on the one hand, being imputed by mind and on the other hand, being established from their own side. In brief, the Prasangika assert that if we, look at the objects of the consciousnesses of the five doors, in other words, the five sensory consciousnesses, apart from an imputation out there, there is nothing from the outside which returns. Whereas the Svatantrika Madhyamika consider that there is both something which returns from the outside and that this is at the same time imputed by mind.
In brief, the Prasanika understanding of all phenomena without exception being mere conceptual imputations out there can best be explained in the light of the previously given example of a coiled multi colored piece of rope in the grass being mistakenly understood by a mind as a fully characterized snake. To the mind, to which this multicolored coil of rope appears at as a snake. That snake actually can be asserted to be merely imputed on the coil of rope. Yet, from the standpoint of the coil of rope, whether it is within its object as such, its color or its continuum, there is no snake whatsoever. So a critical point of the Prasangika view is the understanding that when all phenomena are said to be mere imputations out there, this means that they are merely imputed by mind and are not established in the slightest from their own side.
In other words, they arise exclusively in dependence on conceptuality and have no establishment from their own side. This is a critical point. So the doubt which can arise occurs because Prasangi Kamadhyamika asserts, it seems that all phenomena are basically manufactured by mind, which is quite strange since phenomena do not exist independently of mind and are not established from their own side or by their own characteristics. The example given of a multi colored coil of rope, being apprehended by a mind as a snake, is clear in this respect. However, if we take the table which, is in front of Geshela, then, we would have to say that this table is a mere conceptual imputation, which has no existence from its own side.
And yet, it is obvious that this table does exist. So the question which arises is, how precisely does this table exist? If we take once again the case of the mind which thinks that the multicolored coil of rope in the grass is a snake, such a mind sees this multicolored coil of rope as a fully characterized snake. Yet this is a mere imputation from the side of the mind onto the coil of rope. There is nothing from the side of the rope.
Now clearly, if we return to the example of the multicolored coil of rope mistakenly apprehended as a snake, this is a mere imputation from the side of the mind. However, exactly the same thing is asserted in to be the existential status of a table or of a chair. Now this is quite difficult to understand because clearly a table and a chair exists. Whereas on the other hand, there is no snake whatsoever in the grass. So the question which arises is that of the mode of existence of phenomena in prosanica madiarmica.
Are we to say that phenomena are akin to flowers in the space, or to the reflection of the moon in the water, or is it something else? Do you understand? Really? That’s good. So the problem which arises is that from the standpoint of Prasangika Madhyamika, if we look at the objects of the five doors, in other words, the five sense consciousnesses, there is nothing from the side of the object whatsoever.
In other words, there is no object which is characterized by its own characteristics. There is no object which is established from its own side. These are actually objects of negation in prasanica madiamica. If we take the case of the coil of multicolored rope in the grass mistaken for a snake, while it is clear that as far as phenomena is are concerned, this is a good simile for phenomena being mere conceptual imputations and for phenomena occurring only independence on conceptuality. The snake does not exist in the grass and phenomena do exist.
So clearly, this raises a lot of questions. If we assert that the objects of the five senses actually do not exist, then this is very strange indeed. But if we analyze to see how the objects of the five senses appear to us, we will see that whenever we perceive an object of the five senses, it actually appears as if it existed from its own side, as if it were established from its own side, established by its own characteristics. Under analysis, we can see that this is not the case in the slightest. The table in front of Geshela, for instance, appears to us as if it existed from its own side.
For that matter, all phenomena appear as if they existed from their own side. This is for prosanica madiamica, the object of negation. For this reason, all phenomena are said to be akin to an illusion. In other words, they are said to be untrue, to be false. All phenomena without exception.
Returning at present to the distinction between Svatantrika and Prasangika Madhyamica, clearly, it hinges on whether phenomena are established from their own side, established by their own characteristics or not. For Sotelica Mediamica, they are. For Prasangika Mediamica, they are not. Now within Sotelica Mediamica, the object of refutation is a phenomenon abiding within their own uncommon mode of abiding without mental imputation. This is not accepted within prasanica madiamica.
For that matter, the very concept of phenomena being established by their own characteristics is rejected in Prosanica Madiameka. And the problem which occurs is that it would seem that the object of refutation in Svatantrika Madiameka is one which is constructed within a tenet system. If that is the case, then such an object of refutation cannot be the innate object of refutation which appears to the mind. Clearly, the object of refutation of Satotica Madhyamica, in other words, phenomena not being imputed by mind but abiding within their own uncommon mode of abiding, is one which is easy to put down in writing or to verbalize. But it is not obvious how this would appear innately to the mind in contradistinction to the object of refutation, which is phenomena is being established from their own side, which we can see could appear innately to the mind.
It is quite similar to the coarse self of persons which is taught by the non Buddhist Hindu schools. Persons being established as permanent one and independent. This is a characterization of persons which could only occur to someone whose mind has been affected by tenets. It will never occur to someone whose mind has not been affected by tenets. Likewise, the Swatanika Madiamica object of refutation does not seem to be one which would occur to someone who has not been affected by tenets.
This is why Je Tsongkhapa says in Lecce Nyinpo, placing himself from the standpoint of the school, under analysis, the object of refutation here appears to be the contrived grasping at a self. Therefore, this distinction between the object of refutation or the object of negation of Svatantrika Madhyamika and the object of negation of Prasanica Madhyamica is fundamental. It is not one which can be approached easily. It calls for repeated reflection and investigation. As Yana Garber said in his auto commentary, on the two truths, in Prasangika Madhyamika, the object of refutation appears to these sense consciousnesses.
Clearly, the object of refutation does not exist. Nonetheless, in prosanica mediamica, it does appear to these sense consciousnesses. So this calls for very careful analysis since our goal here is ultimately to counter self grasping. At the beginning, it may not be easy to counter self grasping, but at the very least, we can loosen it. So let us analyze carefully the two examples.
The first of a coiled a coiled piece of rope in the grass, which is perceived as a snake and the second of the table in front of Gesheva. Both from the standpoint of Prasangika Madiamica asserted not to be established from their own side and to be mere conceptual imputations. Yet, one is existent and the other is nonexistent. In that case, what is the criterion which differentiates existence from nonexistence? What in other words is the mode of existence of the concerned phenomenon?
If we say that the table in front of Geshela exists from the standpoint of the mind perceiving that table, this is quite odd. So, at present, Gesheel, I will take your questions. Only one question per person. Short questions, please. The base of imputation for a person is the aggregates.
Yep. But the aggregates aggregates are also an imputation. And so it goes back and back to an atom that’s also an imputation. So what is the primordial first thing that was an imp basis for every all these imputations? So from the standpoint of prosanika, there is no such thing as an unimputed phenomenon nor is there a phenomenon which exists from its own side.
So for instance, the five aggregates are the base of imputation of the person. With respect to the person, they are a basis of imputation. However, they are an imputed phenomenon with respect to another basis of imputation and so forth. Jen. Concerning the two analogies, the rope snake and the table, would it be appropriate to say that the nonexistence of snake on rope is similar to the nonexistence of the self that has grasped that and that the existence of the table, despite its being not established from its own side in mere imputation, is like the mere eye that eats and walks.
You have to make a distinction between someone who has great habituation with emptiness and ourselves who do not. For someone who has great habituation with emptiness, all phenomena without exception are false and lying. And therefore, the table for such a person would be illusion like and a simile of the person. However, for ourselves, the table does not appear to be false. And therefore, for ordinary beings like ourselves, beginners like ourselves, it would not be a good metaphor.
Thank you, Geshela. My question is about, the cognition of inherent existence. It seems to myself that, I find it impossible to accept that cognition of inherent existence occurs by a direct cognition I think that the cognition of inherent existence must necessarily be an inferential cognition but I don’t have a great many reasons to refute that. Could Geshela, elaborate? Cognition or appearance?
So, the issue is rather delicate because direct perception in Prasangika, is not necessarily non conceptual. It has a common locus with conceptuality to the difference of direct perception in, for instance, Sauthantika, one of the lowest schools of tenets. Then regarding your question about whether established inherent establishment can only be apprehended by an inferential valid cognizer, probably not an inferential valid cognizer, but a conceptual mind. Yes. So there maybe is a bit of confusion.
So it is important to recollect this passage of Yana Gaba’s auto commentary on the two truths. It’s translated in English, which his holiness, the Dalai Lama, has quoted repeatedly and in which it is said that in Svatandrika Madiamica, the object of negation does not appear to the five sensory consciousnesses. Whereas in Prasanika Madiamica, the object of negation of Prasanika Madiamica appears to the five sensory consciousnesses. I’m interested in the answer that Geshela posed, which is the fact that with the rope and the snake, clearly, there are no attributes that the rope has that you can attribute to that being a snake. Yet we can attribute qualities to the table.
However, as soon as you do that, you’re effectively providing characteristics of it. So how do you get around that problem? Because anything basic basically, you look at an object, would have to characterize in some form, whether it’s by mutual consent and agreement, its functional form, whatever it is, that provides a characteristic even if it’s basically in agree an agreement with other cognizers, whether they’re valid or not. It is indeed, quite strange, and you’re right to point it out. I am not saying that tables, and for that matter, all phenomena, form, sound, smells, taste, and sensation, Intactile sensations do not exist.
They exist yet when we try to see how they appear to the five sense consciousnesses, we can clearly see that they appear as if they were out there. That is said to be nonexistent by Prasangika Madhyamika. What precisely their mode of existence is at that point is a delicate affair. Now what you say is indeed the common position of all the lower schools of tenets. Phenomena exist out there.
They are established from their own side and they are established by their own characteristics. For that matter, Chitamatra says that not only are they established by their own characteristics, they abide within their own uncommon mode of abiding. This is very good that you ask just this sort of question on what the mode of establishment from its own side is, what the meaning of the example of a coiled, multicolored piece of rope in the grass being mistaken for a snake is. It would be foolish for us to go forwards without this being grounded. So let’s start here by saying that we function within the Prasanika system of tenets.
It’s silly to refer to anything else in this context. So for Prasanika, what is the mode of existence of phenomena if phenomena do not exist out there? So this is a common experience for all who study. When you are studying a system of tenets, you take that system of tenets as your foundation, and sometimes, let’s say, you’re studying Sattrannica and you’re debating about Sattrannica, you find the Sattrannica system quite strange. So here, our basis, our position is So if we position ourselves from the standpoint of Prasangika Madhyamika, and we start reflecting about the mode of existence of phenomena, then clearly from our own side, because of great habituation with the phenomena being perceived as existing out there from their own side, the idea that they do not exist out there from their own side is something which is quite strange.
However, if our position is Prasangika and we say, in keeping with the lowest schools of tenets, that they do exist out there from their own side, it becomes impossible to posit a difference between Prasangika and suetandrika madiamika. And then we are just left there with our mouth hanging open rather foolishly. As, Jeremy Butchie, the Zongopas says, it is through hearing that benightedness is eliminated. This is how the wise eliminate ignorance. It is not the case that through hearing about the view once or studying a text on the view once, we will understand it.
It is through repeated reflection and analysis that our understanding will improve. So the issue we addressed today was the difference of existential status of the table and the coiled piece of rope in the grass. The mind which imputes a snake on a coiled multi colored piece of rope in the grass, imputes a snake on something in which snakeness is totally absent. On the other hand, the table is also from the standpoint of prasanica madiamica, a mere conceptual imputation, yet the table exists. What is the difference between these two?
If we say that it is the conception apprehending table, then in debate, one would immediately say, then it follows that snakes, the snake imputed on the coil of rope in the grass exists because to the mind apprehending that snake, that conception exists as well. So the two topics for discussion today are number one, the table and the snake imputed on the coil of rope in the grass. Are they both equal in existing as conceptual imputations? Are they both equal in being non existent as conceptual imputation? If one exists and the other exists from the standpoint of prasanika, why?
What is the difference? The second topic for today is the difference between the object of negation in and prasanika. By groups of two, please. Yeah. Please everyone’s color.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- self-grasping dag dzin (Tib)
- The mind that apprehends the self as inherently existent. This refers to both the self of persons and the self of phenomena. LYWA
- tenet system drubtha(Tib)
- A general term for a religious and/or philosophical system, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist. It is often used as shorthand to refer to the four major Buddhist tenet systems that emerged from India. LYWA
- two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
- The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
- yana
- Literally, vehicle; a spiritual path that leads to an awakened state. The vehicle and spiritual journey depends on the attitude of the practitioner. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.