Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-06-23 – KR.mp3
UUID: a51280d6-4bac-4c95-90b9-0979c39e1dd5
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Date: 2015-06-23
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 1h 20m
Words: 3,547
So we start generating motivation as usual. So we have probably completed the presentation of Svatantrika Madhyamica and shall now start studying Prasangika Madhyamica. The Prasanika Madhyamika system is considered to be the supreme system within the Buddhist schools of tenets. And therefore, it would be good if we could applicate ourselves to its study as much as is possible. It will be a bit difficult to enter immediately into a presentation of the Prasangika Madhyamaka view.
And therefore, I think it would be of benefit to all of us if we covered the material which we have already seen, if I give a commentary on this in a concise fashion. It is our usage in the great monasteries. After the month or so preceding losar during which there is no debate when classes are resumed to enter gradually into the material again. Otherwise, if we were to do so suddenly as debate had not occurred for almost a month, it might be somewhat difficult. Likewise here, it has been one month or so since tenets, classes have been given and therefore we should reenter the material gradually.
Otherwise, you may enter the into a state of advanced shock. The period immediately following the Tibetan New Year, Losar, is a very difficult one for the teachers of Buddhist philosophy in the great Tibetan monasteries. Classes have not been held during one or two months. They themselves have not studied that much. And the new class is so called Shung Sa, the new treaty students come in and often they drift off and fall asleep during class.
I don’t know whether that will happen to you or not. You will, I assume, have had a smattering of the prasanika view since whenever the view is presented in general teachings, it is presented from the standpoint of prasanika. For instance, when the view is presented in the context of Lamrim, it is presented from the standpoint of Prasanika. Likewise, when an introduction to the view is given preceding empowerments, the various empowerments, it is also given from the standpoint of Prasanika. Whereas, for instance, the Vaibhashika, the Sotradhika, the Chittamadhyamika views are not covered when Lamrim is taught nor when an introduction to the view in the context of the initiations of the four classes of Tantras is given.
So from the standpoint of the four schools of tenets, if we look at the base, the assertion that the person is permanent, one, and independent, which is the shared view countered by the Buddhist schools of tenets is countered within the context of Vaibhashika and Sattratrika by the assertion or the teaching of the subtle selflessness of persons. When the base which is asserted by the non Buddhist, Tirthikas, non Buddhist forwarders, in other words, a self which is permanent one and independent is countered and refuted by Vaibhashika and by Sattratika, they do so through teaching the subtle surfaceness of persons. And in the process, they abut on teachings regarding the existence of indivisible particles. This shared assertion of Vaibhashika and Sotradhika is thereafter countered or refuted by Chitamatra and when Chitamatra counters this view, it teaches a subtle form of emptiness. So in my opinion, it’s extremely helpful to understand the various modes of proceeding of the schools of act of tenets and to present them both from the bottom to the top and from the top to the bottom, as well as to understand their uncommon assertions.
Therefore, when Chitamatra counters the uncommon assertions of Vaibhashika and Sautrantika, it does it through teachings on its subtle most emptiness. So when the Vaibhashika and the Chitamatra school counter the view of the non Buddhist forwarders or tirthikas, what they counter is the assertion of a permanent one and independent self which arises within the context of analysis of death and impermanence. And in so doing, they are led to the conclusion that indivisible particles necessarily exist. This is their subtle most assertion. However, when Chitamatra counters the assertion of the existence of these indivisible particles by Vaibhashika and by Sautrantika, it does this through teaching its own uncommon assertion that of the subtle most selflessness of phenomena.
In turn, the uncommon assertion of Chitamata is none other than the assertion that other powered phenomena, in other words, all composite phenomena, do not exist as exterior entities and therefore are not mere conceptual imputations, but dwell within their own mode of abiding. And in turn, the uncommon assertion of Chitamatra, the uncommon view of Chitamatra that other power phenomena, in other words, all composite phenomena are not mere conceptual imputations, but abide within their uncommon mode of abiding is refuted and countered by Svatthakamadhyamika, and the foremost means by which Svatthakamadhyamika counters this view is through teaching the subtle most emptiness in keeping with that school of tenants. When the Swatavika Madhyamikas counter the Chitamata understanding of other powered phenomena, their main object of refutation is that other powered phenomena are not mere conceptual imputations and abide within their own uncommon mode of abiding. This is the subtle most object of refutation of Svatantrika Madhyamica. Instead, Svatantrika Madhyamica asserts that other powered phenomena are on the one hand mere conceptual imputations and on the other hand abide within their mode of abiding and occur at the intersection of these two.
So, when the Sattvatantrika Madhyamika refute the Chitamatra view, what they refute is that other powered phenomena are truly established. They do assert, however, that other powered phenomena are established from their own side. In turn, the Prasangika Madhyamika system refutes the uncommon tenets of the Sotanvika Madhyamika system. It refutes, in other words, the Sotanvika Madhyamika view that all phenomena are established by their own characteristics and are established from their own side. The refutation of this is the subtle most object of refutation of.
So we would like present enter into details of the uncommon prasanika assertions, but this was the system of the other schools of tenants. Do you still remember them? That’s good. Very good. Thank you.
Thank you. I am very happy to tell you that when his holiness gave the Yamantaka initiation, a sizable number of TBI students approached me and said that they understood his presentation of the view much better because they had been attending the tenets at TBI. This made me very happy. Very It’s extremely helpful to understand the incremental progression from system of tennis to system of tennis. Starting with the presentation of indivisible particles within Vaibhashika and Sautrandika, which is designed to counter the understanding of a permanent one in indivisible self as taught by the non Buddhist Indian philosophers.
This view of indivisible particles in turn is refuted by the next higher school of tenants, the Chitamatra school of tenants whose uncommon assertion is in nonexistence of exterior objects. And therefore, which asserts that other powered phenomena, in other words, all composite phenomena are not mere conceptual imputations, but dwell within their own uncommon mode of abiding. In other words, are truly established and are established by their own characteristics. This assertion of Chitamatra in turn is the main object of refutation of Visvatantrika Madhyamika school whose subtlest emptiness counters this. And in turn, the Svatanika Madhyamika School counters the uncommon assertions of the Chitamatra School.
The Svatantrika Madhyamika School asserts that all phenomena are established from their own side and are established by their own characteristics. In keeping with the monastic philosophical textbooks, these are called lectures, the Krasanika Madiamikas themselves refute this uncommon assertion of these Svatantrika Madhyamikas and do not accept that phenomena are either established by their own characteristics or established from their own side. This study of the system of tenets is extraordinarily beneficial when we study texts in turn. If we have not studied tenets, we will become distracted and wander when we study text. On the other hand, we have a solid grounding in tenets, then we can benefit greatly from the study of Buddhist texts.
In addition, the various schools of tenets have their own subdivisions. There are subdivisions of the Vaibashikas. The Sattrannikas are subdivided into Sattrannikas following reasoning and Sattrannikas following scripture. The Chitamatras are subdivided into true and false aspectarians. Sattankhamadhyamika is subdivided into Sattankhamadhyamika and Yogacara Sattankhamadhyamika, but these distinctions are minor compared with the overall flow of the school of tenets.
Within the Prasangika madiameka system of tenets, the presentation of the two selflessnesses of persons is as follows. The coarse selflessness of persons is persons being empty of being a substantially existent autonomous entity. The subtle surfaces of persons is persons not being inherently established or not being established from its own side. The reason for which these two different surfaces of persons are presented is because they are the respective antidotes of two different levels of afflictive obscurations. Coarse afflictive obscurations and subtle afflictive obscurations.
The coarse surfaces of persons is the antidote of coarse afflictive obscurations and the subtle surfaces of persons is the antidote of subtle afflictive obscurations. This is an uncommon feature of prasanika madhyamika, Since in the other schools of tenets, Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chitamatra and Svatantrika madhyamika, there is only a subtle selflessness of persons, which is the persons being empty of being a substantially existent autonomous entity, is taught. No emptiness of the person being inherently established is taught. As his holy minister Dalai Lama said during the recent teachings, for, it is the case that, or it is not the case, that the object of refutation, which is persons being substantially existent autonomous entities, cannot appear to conceptual, to excuse me, to sensory consciousnesses, but can appear to mental consciousnesses. It is the case that the persons appearing to be inherently established can appear to sensory consciousnesses.
What is the rationale for the existence of four different schools of tenets? The rationale is the existence of two different categories of trainees. Trainees of course or limited acumen and trainees of subtle acumen. For trainees of course acumen, even though they might have an interest in the prasanika madhyamika view, there is a very great risk when they study this view that they will fall into wrong views. And it is therefore of great benefit to them to progress through a study of the Vaibhashika and Sautrandika view leading up to the Prasangika Madhyamika view.
Then if you yourselves are practitioners of sharp acumen, it is appropriate to present the prasanika madhyamika view to you. If you are not, the risk of your succumbing to extreme wrong views is quite high and therefore one should proceed to a gradual presentation of all four schools of tenets. It is in no way definite that one must to study Prasangika Madhyamika initially pass through a study of Vaibhashika or through a study of Sautrantika or through a study of Chitamatra. Whereas for instance, in the presentation of the paths of the beings of the three scopes, the higher realizations depend on the lower realizations. And without the lower realizations, the higher realizations cannot arise.
For instance, to obtain the realizations of the being of the great scope, one must have generated within one’s continuum those of the being of the middling scope. And to obtain those of the middling scope, one must have generated the realizations of the being of the small scope. Otherwise, they will not arise. There is therefore an uncommon relationship between these three paths. As I said in Arya Deva’s Chattushattaka, the 400 initially accumulate vast merit.
In the middle, understand the lack of a person, and finally, strive for complete liberation. The meaning of this stanza is initially that one should rely on causality. Then following this, this second verse refers to understanding or gaining a realization of the emptiness of the persons being a substantially existent autonomous entity. And the final verse refers to gaining the realization of the prasanika madhyamika view. For a trainee of supreme capacity, I would suspect that an introduction to the coarse, selflessness of persons, in other words, the person being empty of being a substantially autonomous a substantially existent autonomous entity would naturally lead to an understanding of the subtle surfaces of persons.
In other words, the persons being empty, of being inherently established and would prevent succumbing to any of the wrong views. The rationale for presenting the prasanika madhyamika view at the culmination of a presentation of the four schools of tenets for trainees of, let us say, dull capacities is because if the pathetic review were presented immediately to trainees of dull capacities and when they are told that things are not established from their own side, they are afflicted with the anxiety where shall I sleep, Where shall I stand? What shall I eat? Nothing exists. And therefore, one must present all four schools of tenants incrementally as well as their purpose, the reasons, and their benefits leading up to Prasangika for these trainees.
Regarding the outlook of the various schools of tenets, if we start with Vaibhashika and Sauthantika. Sauthantika for instance subdivides phenomena into composite and non composite phenomena. In other words, impermanent and permanent phenomena. For Sautrantika, permanent phenomena and permanent phenomena alone are conceptual imputations. Moving upwards to Chitamatra, Chitamatra considers that other powered phenomena from within the three natures are not conceptual imputations, but considers that permanent phenomena such as for instance emptiness are conceptual imputations and do not abide within their uncommon mode of abiding.
At present, if we move upwards to the Svatantrika Madhyamica view, Svatantrika Madhyamica considers that both composite phenomena, in other words, impermanent phenomena, and non composite phenomena, in other words permanent phenomena, do not abide within their uncommon mode of abiding. They are for Svatathika Madhyamica, conceptual imputations and they abide within their common mode of abiding. They exist at the intersection of these two and are necessarily established from their own side. In turn, once one has understood the swatantika madame curve view, let us say on the basis of a person, other in words, this person arises at the intersection or at the confluence, if you wish, of a conceptual imputation on the one hand and establishment from its own side or by its own characteristics on the other hand. This as a preliminary is very beneficial for the understanding of the prosangika madiamica view that the person does not exist at all, from its own side and is a mere conceptual imputation, since it prevents one from succumbing into wrong views.
At present, we will introduce briefly the Prasanika Madhyamika School on page 30 of Justin Triggy Geltsin’s presentation of tenets in English. This presentation is subdivided as usual into seven definitions, divisions, etymologies, the mode of asserting objects, the mode of asserting subjects, the mode of asserting selflessness, and the presentation of grounds and paths. And a concise definition of a Prasangika madhyamika is simply a madhyamika who does not accept any phenomenon as inherently established. The Prasangika Madhyamika view is rooted in the following sutras. It is rooted in the extensive, middling, and shorter perfection of wisdom sutras, the prajnaparamita sutras, and especially rooted in the heart sutra, which is considered literal within the prasankika madhyamika school since the heart sutra teaches literally the non establishment of all phenomena by their own characteristics.
In addition, prasanika madhyamika is rooted in shastras such as Nagarajuna’s six collections of reasoning. So this is the presentation of Prasangika in Sutra and Shastra. And instances of Prasangika scholars and yogis would be Buddhapalita, Chandakirti, and Shantideva. Then you will have a good sense at present of the lower schools of tenants, which we have covered again. And we can at present broach the Prasanica School of Tenet.
It will be very odd to enter directly in a presentation of Prasanika Madhyamika. So today, we will have no discussion. We will resume discussion next time. I will take your questions at present if you have questions. Please, concise questions.
I’d like your questions to be mainly on the lower schools of tenets since that is what will be helpful, in our understanding of Prasangika in the next couple of classes. Please hold the microphone to your chin. My question is, how did all the schools actually get their names? These names were given to these schools of tenants from the glorious monastery of Nalanda after they had spread to Tibet. So what do they all mean?
Names. What do all the names actually mean? Take some time. Are there other questions before that? Marco.
I’ve been away for a little while, so I’ll ask a question that you’ve answered in the past. I can see a progression from atomism to nominalism in each of the schools. I’m just trying to get my head around the Chitamatra position. Is it is it an idealism? Is it a a monist idealism where all phenomena are purely mental?
So it is not incorrect to say that for Chitamatra, all phenomena are of the nature of mind, but that is not the main import or the main purpose of Chitamatra. Chitamatra’s purpose is to counter the assertion of the Vaibhashikas and the Sattrathikas that there exist indivisible particles. And therefore, with this in mind, Chitamatra asserts that form, in other words, matter, does not exist as an exterior object and is of the nature of mind. No particular focus is brought to bear on space or consciousness and so forth, apart from the assertion that all phenomena find their roots in the subtle most mind. Yeah.
I just wanted to clarify what I think Geshela said before which was that for the Prasangikas the mental consciousness cannot see a person as a substantially existent autonomous entity, but the mental consciousness can see a person as inherently existing. Was that what Geshela said? No. Exactly the opposite. The opposite.
So you can see, for instance, with the example of the little table in front of Geshe-la. This little table is said to be established from its own side because it seems to exist independently of us of our perception of this. Now this is something which appears naturally to our eye consciousness. It is not a reflective position. On the other hand, when we say that the person, is not established as a substantially existent autonomous entity, what we mean is that the person’s relationship, to its basis of imputation, is not that of a lord to its subjects or to its court.
Now how could something like this be understood unless it was understood through the mental consciousness? Geshela spoke about how, for the Prasangikas, they used, subtle selflessness of persons as a means of, I don’t know exact word, refuting or, subtle afflictions. And I’m just wondering how do the other schools, I I I haven’t quite got my question clear, but, basically, how do the other schools work with the subtle afflictions? From the standpoint of the Prasangika system of tenets, it is not possible to counter the subtle afflictions by means of the antidotes proposed in the lower schools of tenets. Otherwise, if this were possible, why would one bother to study prasanica?
So for the lowest schools it seems to me that they must posit some sense of you wouldn’t call it inherent existence but they must posit some kind of self that is directly seen by the or perceived or appears to the sense consciousnesses. I’m thinking of how the lower schools would say that an animal has a sense of its own self. They don’t accept an inherently existent self, but they accept an inherently existent person. Sorry. The lowest schools.
The lowest schools. They do accept the existence of a semantic self which is, established, inherently. And is that the conception of self that they would assert that animals and and, quite, you know, non conceptual sentient beings, I suppose, would identify as a self? So regarding Natalie’s question about the etymologies of the names of the schools of tenets. For Vaibhashika, Vaibhashika is called Vaibhashika because they rely on a treatise called the Maha Vibhasha or the great subdivision.
Vishesha in Sanskrit is division. The Sartraddikas are called Sartraddikas because they understand all phenomena through instantiation or exemplification, giving examples of. The Chitta mantras are called Chitta mantras because Chitta in Sanskrit is mind, matra is alone in Sanskrit, and they assert that all phenomena are mere mind. The are called because means own, and tantra refers here to continuum or syllogism. And therefore, they accept a syllogism with the three modes which are considered to be established from their own side.
So we will enter in detail in the Prasangika view next time. And since this view is so important and you have some smattering of familiarity with it, it would be good if you focused and interest in entered in detail in it. We have time, so we will spend the rest of this year studying the Prasanica Madiameka view, relying first on Jean Pierre Ole Pedorgy’s great presentation of tenets and in addition on Jason Chuyghe Gilsson’s concise presentation of tenets. You have a very good translator. It is an opportunity to seize, and I myself will present things as best I can.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- grounds and paths sa lam (Tib)
- Various advanced mental states that are achieved through meditation and practice. LYWA
- lamrim
- The graduated path. A presentation of Shakyamuni Buddha’s teachings in a form suitable for the step-by-step training of a disciple. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
- The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.