1 h 2 min · 2,595 words · 12 May 2015 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 62-minute seminar, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen works through Buddhist philosophical distinctions essential to understanding the four main schools of tenet. He opens by clarifying the critical difference between a Hīnayāna being (someone personally motivated to escape cyclic existence) and a Hīnayāna tenet propounder (someone accepting certain philosophical positions), showing these are independent categories — a Mahāyāna bodhisattva can hold Hīnayāna philosophical views, and vice versa. He then explores the Buddhist understanding of personal identity and emptiness: what it means to say the person lacks a substantially existent, autonomous self, and why affirming such a self would make liberation impossible. The core teaching focuses on conceptual imputation — how Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika asserts all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations lacking inherent existence, while lower schools limit this to uncompounded phenomena and accept conventional establishment by characteristics. Throughout, Geshe-la clarifies how each higher school of tenet refutes the uncommon assertions of the lower schools, using precise examples like uncompounded space and the status of indivisible particles. The Q&A session reveals the teaching is pitched at serious students already familiar with foundational Buddhist philosophy.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-05-12.mp3
UUID: 45685214-917b-4afd-a35f-d71ebe6ae3e2
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets
Date: 2015-05-12
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,594
So as usual, please generate the motivation to receive these teachings. It is important to be able to distinguish between a being of the great and the small vehicle on the one hand and a propounder of Mahāyāna tenets and Hīnayāna tenets on the other hand. What is the difference between a Hīnayāna being and a propounder of Hīnayāna tenets? A Hīnayāna being or Hīnayāna person is a person who for his or her own sake alone wishing to be free from cyclic existence has generated an uncontrived wish or spontaneous wish to be free from cyclic existence. An example of a Hīnayāna being would be a Śrāvaka or a Pratyekabuddha.
So a propounder of Hīnayāna tenets is a being who accepts the existence of self, of phenomena. For instance, Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrantikas. Is it necessary for a propounder of Hīnayāna tenets to be a Hīnayāna being? Not in the slightest. Actually, there are four logical possibilities between being a pro pounder of Hīnayāna tenets and being a Hīnayāna being.
For instance, one can be a pro pounder of Hīnayāna tenets without being a Hīnayāna being. Atisha’s teacher, Dharmarakshita, who was a Vaibhāṣika bodhisattva, was one such example. Then there are numerous Cittamātrins and Madhyamikas who are Hīnayāna beings without being propounders of Hīnayāna tenets. Then there are numerous instances of beings which are both Hīnayāna propounders or propounders of Hīnayāna tenets and Hīnayāna beings, for instance, arhats and śrāvakas Then instances of a being which is neither a Hīnayāna being nor a propounder of Hīnayāna tenets is easy. There’s no point in giving examples here.
Now regarding the distinction between Mahāyāna beings and propounders of Mahāyāna tenets. A Mahāyāna being is a being who has generated uncontrived bodhicitta. A propounder of Mahāyāna tenets is a being who accepts the selflessness of phenomena. An instance of a Mahāyāna being who is not a propounder of Mahāyāna tenets is the aforementioned Dharmarakshita, the master of Atisha, who was a Vaibhāṣika by tenet and a Mahāyāna by path. Then beings which are propounders of Mahāyāna tenets are not necessarily Mahāyāna beings.
There are numerous Cittamātrins and Madhyamikas who fall in this category. We ourselves, for instance, in this temple may have a proclivity for the Cittamātra or the Mahāyāna view. We may be propounders of Cittamātra or Mahāyāna, but for us to be Mahāyāna being, we would have to generate uncontrived bodhicitta. We should check our mind stream to see whether anyone here is in that situation. Then an instance of a being which is both a propounder of Mahāyāna tenets and a Mahāyāna being would be, for instance, Ārya Nāgārjuna or Ārya Asaṇga.
Then regarding a being which is neither a propounder of Mahāyāna tenets nor a Mahāyāna being, there’s nothing special to say. It’s easy, right? Then regarding the assertion of the selflessness of persons, Buddhists assert a selflessness of persons. Should the self of persons be posited? Well, clearly, it is not to be found, to begin with, as an object of knowledge, but should it be, then probably all phenomena would become permanent.
Now regarding the persons being empty, of being a substantially existent self-sufficient entity, the object of negation here is substantial self-sufficiency. And this substantial self-sufficiency refers to the person, which is an imputed existence, being perceived as not needing to be found within the aggregates. Now should the person be a substantially existent autonomous entity, is not the case, then the attainment of the state of full enlightenment, of liberation, of the complete presentation of grounds and paths, the path of seeing and the path of meditation would become untenable. This becomes easier with an example if we take the case of your translator. Now clearly, your translator appears to you as a substantially existent autonomous entity.
But even though this is the case, it cannot be ascertained as such. And if we analyze, we can see why. For instance, we can say of your translator he is cold. And when he experiences cold, he says, I am cold. When he experiences heat, he says, I am hot.
Clearly, there is an intimate relationship between the I here, which is the object of imputation, and the basis of imputation, which are the aggregates. Now the third topic I would like to cover is that of conceptual imputation. The conceptual imputation is accepted by all these schools of tenets up to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, and numerous references are found regarding it in Buddhist scriptures. In the Consequentialist system, for instance, all phenomena are said to be mere conceptual imputations out there. Now what is meant by this is that even though phenomena appear to us to exist from their own side, nonetheless, they do not exist in the manner in which they appear.
And this mode of appearance is the actual object of refutation. It is none none other than phenomena’s existing from their own side. We gotta go downwards now. Are mere conceptual imputations out there without existing from their own side. In other words, for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, phenomena necessarily exist from their own side, whereas for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, phenomena cannot exist from their own side.
This leads the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika to debate with Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika and say, but if phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there without existing from their own side, then flowers could grow in the sky. Now regarding Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, Sautrāntika and Cittamātra do not assert that all phenomena are conceptual imputations. Sautrāntika and Cittamātra do accept the existence of conceptual imputation, but assert that only uncompounded phenomena are conceptual imputations. Another important distinction is that probably for the Sautrāntika and Cittamātra schools, the basis of imputation for phenomena which are mere conceptual imputation such as uncompounded phenomena necessarily has to be an has to be a compounded phenomenon. This would not be the case for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.
Now if we take the Cittamātra and the Sautrāntika systems, in these systems, uncompounded space, for instance, which is an imputed phenomenon and is a conceptual imputation has a basis of imputation. What would be the basis of imputation of uncompounded space? It would be the interval between dawn at daybreak, and the evening before the night. Why is this the basis of imputation of uncompounded space? Because the interval between the moment at daybreak when one moves into the day and the moment in the evening when one enters into the night is an interval which is characterized by the absence of contact and obstruction.
It therefore can be said to be an absence of obstructive contact. So both for Cittamātra and Sautrāntika, all phenomena are said to be established from their own side. Cittamātra, however, does not consider all phenomena are established by their own characteristics. Now whether here, uncompounded space in addition, the basis of imputation of uncompounded space in addition is established from its own side, from its own side is something which should be analyzed. And the reason for this is that should the basis of imputation of uncompounded space be established from its own side, then that interval between dawn and sunset would have to be established from its own side as it is the basis of imputation of uncompounded space.
Should this be the case, it would have to be said to abide within its uncommon mode of abiding. Uncompounded space does have to be said to be established from its own side. Then the issue which arises is whether this applies to its basis of imputation or not. Now within Cittamātra and Sautrāntika, should, however, the basis of imputation of uncompounded space be established from its own side, then it would probably exist within its uncommon mode of abiding and it should be possible to contact it. If this were the case, then uncompounded space itself would have to become a compounded phenomenon, which is obviously not the case.
Now uncompounded space is therefore asserted in Sautrāntika and Cittamātra to dwell within its common mode of abiding, but not to dwell within its uncommon mode of abiding. Therefore, it is said to be a mere conceptual imputation. Therefore, in my opinion in brief, the basis of imputation of uncompounded space is probably unfindable, and therefore, it cannot be said to be established from its own side. So let us set here Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika aside. Right?
We’re talking of the lower systems of tenets from Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika on downwards. For these systems of tenets, the person is findable within the aggregates. Right? It is actually the aggregate of consciousness. As is said in Vinaya, we can posit phenomena in keeping with the person.
Now within Svatantika Mādhyamika, when we refer to the common mode of establishment of phenomena or to phenomena existing within the common mode of establishment, we refer to the fact that phenomena exist at the intersection or due to the combination of being posited by mind and of existing by their own characteristics. Should phenomena either exist by being posited by mind alone or by being established by their own characteristics alone, then they would dwell within their uncommon mode of abiding which is rejected by Svatāntrika Mādhyamika. So it is probably the case that the positions of the lower schools of tenets cannot be found within the higher schools of tenets. For instance, the main object of refutation of the two lower schools of tenets, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, is that Ātman, that self which is asserted by the non-Buddhist Tīrthikas, the Hindu philosophers. On the other hand, the main object of assertion is the existence of indivisible particles, and this is the subtle most object of refutation of the Cittamātra school which asserts precisely the non existence of these indivisible particles as the subtle selflessness of phenomena.
Do you understand? Really? Then the uncommon assertion of Cittamātra is that other powered phenomena, Paratantra, are truly established. This assertion is the main object of refutation of the higher school of tenets, Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, for which no phenomenon is truly established. Then likewise, from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the uncommon assertion of all of the lower schools of tenets without exception is that all phenomena are established from their own side.
Therefore, the object or the uncommon object of refutation of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is precisely the establishment from their own side of all phenomena. Then, generally speaking, the uncommon assertions of the lower schools of tenets are rejected by the higher schools of tenets. This, however, cannot perhaps be said to be a systematic rule. For instance, it is clear that Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika accept the existence of indivisible particles. Whether indivisible particles are actually rejected by Sautrāntika Mādhyamika is an open issue.
If we were to say that they are rejected, then how can one say that the conventional presentation of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is mainly in keeping with the Sautrāntika view? This is something I shall not enter into any further. Difficult point as scholars who have studied carefully assert. If we take Bhāvaviveka, his view is mainly in keeping with, But if his view is mainly in keeping with Sautrāntika, how is it possible for him to reject the existence of indivisible particles? So in brief, to return to the presentation at the beginning, the distinction between a Hīnayāna being and a propounder of Hīnayāna tenets is that a propounder of Hīnayāna tenets propounds a view.
A Hīnayāna being is a Hīnayāna being from the standpoint of behavior. Likewise, the same thing is true for a Mahāyāna being and a Mahāyāna propounder of tenets. So we shall stop here. And if you have questions, feel free to ask one or two questions, brief, concise, and clear questions, please. What is it about the Yogacāra view that Bhāvaviveka could not accept and thus asserted indivisible particles?
What is the Yogacāra view, Bhāvaviveka, about the Yogacāra view that Bhāvaviveka could not accept and thus asserted indivisible particles? So accept nonduality and reject the existence of exterior objects. Accepts the existence of exterior objects and rejects the existence of nonduality. In addition, it is possible he was a Sautrāntika Mādhyamika because his teacher was. To make it simpler, we could say that Bhāvaviveka accepts that sense objects are the object condition of sense consciousnesses.
In other words, sense objects precede sense consciousnesses. Whereas Yogachara-Svatāntrika Mādhyamika considers that sense objects and sense consciousnesses are simultaneous. They are subject and object. If the Prasangikas refute the establishment from their own side of phenomena, how do they address the statement of flowers growing in the sky? So the reason for which Prāsaṇgika does not accept the existence of space flowers is because such things cannot perform the function of space flowers.
Another. Here. Sorry. I wanted to just check the three subjects that I thought Geshe la was bringing up. I thought the first one was the distinguishing between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna tenets and motivation.
The second one was the, in my phrase, the absurd consequences of a self of a person being findable, and the third one was conceptual imputations. What was the first? Excuse me. The distinction between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. What was the second?
The absurd consequences of a self of a person being findable. The third? Conceptual imputation. Mhmm. So the presentation of conceptual imputations in the four systems of tenets.
Okay. Another. Dev, is it? What is her name? I think Dev.
Bev. Bev. Bev. Bev Segiri. Have you question?
No. Don’t. I’m gathering sorry. I’m gathering my thoughts. It’s tempting to.
Oh, yeah. Chris. So Geshe-la, what is the mind that the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika say exists for the existence of pebbles and stones etc in a place remote from sentient beings. The mind that establishes the existence of such phenomena? What is the how do they defend that?
Yes. So what you’re saying is correct indeed for Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, pebbles and twigs in such a place are established from their own side. They are established by their own characteristics, but the problem which arises is the mode of their being posited by mind in a place where there is no mind. So how do they what do they say as a defense of the establishment of such phenomenon? So the answer in Buddhist treatises is telepathy, which can perceive objects and minds from a distance.
Natalie. Debate is how we answer. If you want to know reality, that’s a different question, right? So you answer debate, right? Natalie?
Thank you, Geshe la. I feel very humbled thinking about trying to develop as a Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika mind when I think about past teachers like Kamalaśīla and Padmasambhava and many of the others whose names I can’t even remember. And I’m just wondering about the historical context of the tenets in terms of because Padmasambhava and Kamala Shilla are from another time. Has there been some sort of development so that there is more encouragement now for all Buddhists to attain Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika tenets as opposed to the past where they were working through them at a different pace or something? Yes, I mean the Yes, I mean the Prāsaṇgika view describes reality as it is.
It connects with reality. However, obviously beings have numerous different types of dispositions. And it’s for this reason these other views are still taught. So we shall stop the course here for tonight, and you know these three topics I covered today. They were repeated.
So if you can discuss all three, excellent. If you can discuss two, and if you can discuss only one. Thank you.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Hinayana theg mäen (Tib)
- Literally, Small, or Lesser, Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. The Hinayana practitioner's motivation for following the Dharma path is principally the intense wish for personal liberation from conditioned existence, or samsara. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Mahayana teg chen (Tib)
- Literally, Great Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
- The Yogic Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Cittamatra (Mind Only school). LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.