Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-05-05 – KR.mp3
UUID: 81bbc28a-14e3-488c-b841-72a698893729
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Date: 2015-05-05
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 1h 3m
Words: 2,585
So regarding Svatantika Madhyamika, as you know, it is subdivided into two sub schools. Svatantika Madhyamika and Yogachara Svatantika Madhyamika, both are Svatthakamadhyamika, but it is important to understand their respective differences. There are not great differences between Sotantika, Svatantika, Madhyamika and Yogacarasvatantika, Madhyamika, but there are differences nonetheless. Chris, can you give the differences? So, Svatantika Madhyamika who in addition propound a presentation of conventional phenomena broadly speaking in accordance with Svatantika.
Whereas Yogacara Svatantika Madhyamika are Svatantika’s who in addition, prepared a presentation of conventional phenomena. Broadly speaking, the text says mainly in accordance with Yogachara. So in as much as Bhagavad Vedekha is given as an instance of Sautrantika Sautrantika Madhyamika, it is said that Bhavaviveka accepts a presentation of conventional phenomena broadly speaking in accordance with Sautratika. This means that Bhavaviveka accepts the existence of exterior objects. Whether these exterior objects are actually constituted of indivisible particles or not is a topic of debate.
In Jejun Chugi Gilsain’s presentation of tenets, it is said that Sautratnica, Sautratnica Madhyamica accept that form and the consciousness perceiving form are different substantial entities. Then if indeed, Bhavaviveka and others accept the existence of exterior entities which are composed or constituted of indivisible particles, then the following debate arises. In that case, what precisely does one posit as a difference between propounders of Mahayana tenets and propounders of Hinayana tenets? Then, in as much as propounders of Buddhist tenets are exhaustively subdivided into persons who are profounders of Mahayana tenets and persons who are profounders of Hinayana tenets. The question arises, what is the difference between these two?
It is adequate to posit as difference the following. Propounders of Mahayana tenets accept the existence of the surfaces of phenomena, whereas propounders of Hinayana tenets do not. Then if this is the case, one has to be able to posit a selflessness of phenomena for propounders of great vehicle tenants. In this case, what exactly is the surfaces of phenomena propounded by Bava Viveka and Sotrannica Sotrannica Madiamicus? It is difficult here to propose non duality since their view is at odds with Chitamatra.
The same problem arises if one asserts that the distinction between propounders of Mahayana tenets and propounders of Hinayana tenets hinges on whether or not they accept the existence of form constituted of indivisible particles. If Mahayana propounders of tenets accept that form constituted of indivisible particles does not exist, whereas Hinayana propounders of tenets accept that all form is constituted of indivisible particles, then Sartravikas Satavikamadhyamikas like Bhava Viveka would no longer be propounders of Maharana tenets. You do understand that there is no debate about Bhavaviveka being a pro pounder of Mahayana tenants. He is a pro pounder of Mahayana tenants. He is a Madhyamika.
Then it is appropriate to posit the selflessness of phenomena as a distinguishing feature between propounders of Mahayana tenants who accept it and propounders of Hinayana tenants who do not accept it. This does create, however, difficulties for the figure of Bhavaviveka and all Sautrantika, Svatrantika, Madhyamika. This is therefore something we must talk about. So this is an extremely important and difficult point. Therefore, in your opinion, what exactly is the difference between propounders of Mahayana tenants and propounders of Hinayana tenants?
Please give the difference. Quickly, quickly, quick, quick, please. Okay, in that case, then what is the mode of establishment of the separatists of phenomena for those who accept it? And what is this self assistive phenomena which is not accepted by those who don’t accept it? That’s the question.
There’s no debate about the fact that proponents of Mahayana tenets accept the surfaces of phenomena, and proponents of Hinayana tenets do not accept the surfaces of phenomena. The question is, what is the surfaces of phenomena which proponents of Mahayana tenets accept, And what is this self of phenomena which propounders of Hinayana tenants accept? They accept the services of persons, give the services of persons. We’ve said proponents of Mahayana tenants accept the surfaces of persons. They all do.
What is the surfaces of persons for all of them? Give it. Then the South Antikas would be Mahayana proponents of tenets because they accept that phenomena empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities. I guess they are saying what, what? In brief, since we accept the existence of surfaces of persons, what is the surfaces of persons?
So if you say emptiness, then you can say that the Sautratikas accept an emptiness since the emptiness of persons being substantially existent autonomous entities is an emptiness. Then we all agree that the difference between propounders of Mahayana and propounders of Hinayana is the first accept the surfaces of persons and the second do not. However, we are unable to identify the surfaces of persons, surfaces of phenomena, excuse me, which we are talking about. Now if we say the surfaces of phenomena is non duality, in other words, form not being established as composed of indivisible particles, then Sattrathika Sattrathika Madhyamika would have to not accept this since it is a Mahayana school. Then when we assert that according to the definition, Sauthentika Sauthentika Madhyamikas whose presentation of conventional phenomena is mainly in keeping with Sauthentika, If this entails that they accept the existence of indivisible particles as do the Sartantica, then how precisely can we present them as Mahayama schools of tenets?
If this is not the case, then what precisely is meant when we say that their viewpoint is mainly in accordance with Sautrantika? Yeah. So the problem is the following. Bhavaviveka is a Svatantrika Madiamica. He is a Svatantrika Madiamica.
Not only this, he is a trailblazer of the Svatantrika Madiamica. In other words, he is a Sattatika Madiamica whose presentation of conventional phenomena is mainly in keeping with Sattatika. The question which arises then is when one says that it is mainly in keeping with Sattatika, does he understand the existence of partless particles in accordance with Vaibhashika and Sautrantika, or is it something else? There is no problem here with the Sattatika view. There is a problem with the subdivision of Svatthakamadhyamika into Svatthakamadhyamika and Yogacarasvatthakamadhyamika and the difference between these two.
So, Jeshun Chukigitsi, the author author of the tenet texts we are studying at present, is unambiguous in asserting that Sattrathika Sattrathika Madhyamicus consider that consciousness, the five sense consciousnesses, and the forms they perceive are different substantial entities, and therefore accept the existence of exterior phenomenon. Regarding the issue of indivisible particles, one possible way of looking at it is to say that for Sattratica Sattratica Madiamica, the various sense objects, the objects of the eye organ, ear organ, nose organ, so forth, are object conditions of the corresponding sense consciousness. The visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, olfactory consciousness, and so forth. Since they are object conditions, they are in a relation of anteriority and posteriority. The object precedes the sense consciousness to which it gives rise to.
And in this sense, one can say that these objects are exterior objects. So, wall, it seems appropriate to posit acceptance of the surfaces of phenomena or non acceptance of the surfaces of phenomena as a distinguishing feature between being a propounder of Mahayana tenets or a propounder of Hinayana tenets, it does not seem possible to identify one unique surfaces of phenomena which is shared by all of the Mahayana schools of tenets. They have different presentations. For Chitamatra, the surfaces of phenomena refers to non duality, in other words the absence of a form constituted of indivisible particles. Whereas for Svatthakamadhyamika, it refers to the non true existence of phenomena, and for Prasangika madhyamika, it refers to phenomena not being established from their own side.
Now, regarding the difference between Sartantikas on the one hand and Sartantikas Vatantrika Madiamikas on the other hand, there are very great differences. If we take the instance of other powered phenomena, Sautranticas consider other powered phenomena to be truly established, and they consider them to not be mere conceptual imputations, but to abide within their uncommon mode of abiding. On the other hand, Sattratika Sattratika Madhyamika consider that other powered phenomena are not truly established, and that they are mere conceptual imputations. Now regarding Sauthantika and the Chitamatra schools, both Sauthantika and Chitamatra share the opinion that other powered phenomena are not mere conceptual imputations, but are truly established, and exist within their, or dwell within their own uncommon mode of abiding. They do not consider that this is the case for all phenomena, since uncompounded space is considered to be a mere conceptual imputation in as much as it does not arise independence on causes and conditions, but is imputed by the mind.
Now, if we take the case of uncompounded space, both Sautratika and Sithamatra assert that uncompounded space is not an other part phenomena. It is truly established. It is imputed by conception. It is a mere conceptual imputation. However, Svatantrika Madhyamica asserts exactly the same thing regarding uncompounded space.
Srtanika Madhyamika says that uncompounded space is a mere conceptual imputation. What difference is there, if any, between the understanding of uncompounded space in Sattvakka and Chitamakha on the one hand and Sattvakka Madhyamaka on the other hand. So if we take therefore the example of uncompounded space, which is a non affirming negative characterized by the mere absence of obstructive contact, according to Sautratika and Chitamatra, uncompounded space is a mere conceptual imputation. However, according to Sattrantika Madhyamika, uncompounded space is a mere conceptual imputation, and as it is a phenomenon, we can posit its subtle selflessness of phenomena. What is the subtle selflessness of phenomena of uncompounded space for Svatadika Madhyamika?
If we were to say it is just the fact that uncompounded space is not truly established, this is hard to understand. It would be more correct to say that it is a fact that uncompounded space is not exclusively imputed by mind, but dwells within its common mode of abiding. If this is the case, are we able to assert that Sattrathika and Chitamatra understand also the subtle surfaces of phenomena of uncompounded space, or not? So this is a delicate debate in the context of the monastic studies. Since if we take subtle surface posited on the basis of uncompounded space within the Svatantrika Madhyamika school.
What precisely is the object of negation here? The object of negation is this uncompounded space not being posited by mind, but dwelling within its uncommon mode of abiding. Now, this actually is something which both the Sattrathikas and the Chitamatras understand, since both Sattrathika and Chitamatras assert that uncompounded space is a mere conceptual imputation, it is merely posited by mind. And it is so because it does not arise independent on causes and conditions. Can we therefore conclude that Sattrathika and Chitamatra have realized the subtle selflessness of phenomena of uncompounded space?
It is not possible for the lower schools of tenets to realize the, subtle most emptiness of Sotadeka Madhyamika, whose object of refutation is phenomena’s not appearing as being posited merely by mind, but dwelling within their own uncommon mode of abiding. If you have questions, ask one, two or three questions concisely please. If Geshela could clarify exactly what is this uncommon mode of abiding for uncompounded space? It’s unclear to me. Will think about it a little bit.
Another question, Chris. Referring to the beautiful doubt that Geshela spoke of last week with respect to Svetantrika, would the following syllogism hold? The subject, trees, rocks, etcetera, in a remote place, bereft of sentient beings, are not truly established according to Svatantrika Madhyamika because they rise independence upon causes and conditions and their apprehension by omniscient mind. So why did you have to throw omniscience in the mixture? The first part of the syllogism makes a lot of sense indeed.
One might say that twigs and pebbles in a place bereft of sentient beings are truly existent because they arise independent on causes and conditions, and because they are not posited by mind. This is the case because there is no mind to posit them and they dwell within their own uncommon mode of abiding. Which would negate the, you know, the definition of Svatantrika Madhyamika, and I wondered if they’re retaught was that omniscient mind pervades or apprehends all objects and therefore causes and conditions and mind is therefore satisfied. No. There’s not a lot of debates in Buddhist scriptures about omniscience.
Clearly, omniscience realizes everything. But your doubt is a good one. Another. If I may just follow-up on Christa’s question. The issue is if there is a place that is barren of sentient beings, what ontological status can you attribute it following the Saptantrika Majumika perspective?
So from last week, Geshela stated that it may not be there. But from my perspective, it’s in stasis. It’s an uncertainty as to whether it’s present or not until there’s a mind Presenting apprehending what? Well, you can’t say that a land exists unless there is a mind apprehending it. So Chris’s point, I think, is that, well, if you basically say the Buddha or at least one entity is omnipresent, then you forego the whole necessity of having to worry about the ontological status of any barren land because obviously being, you only need one omnomus and present entity to ensure everything is there.
So I understand your position. However, within Satanika Madhyamica, when one refers to being posited by mind, the term mind does not refer to omniscience. And this doubt is specifically addressed within Jetson Kopas Gompa Rapssel, elucidating the intent in which Jetson Kopas says, should one say that Sattrantika, the lower school of tenets, understands positing through mind since for Sattrantika all phenomena are established by valid cognition, and valid cognition is a mind, I answer no provision, no entailment. So we will now have a discussion, and there are two topics for discussion. The first, as was made clear, the surface phenomena is the distinguishing feature between the propounders of Mahayana tenets and the propounders of Hinayana tenets.
Identify what the surfaceness of phenomena is, and clarify its meaning in the various schools of tenets. The second topic of discussion is the following. If we take the case of uncompounded space, uncompounded space is asserted to be posited by mind, but in both Svatantrika and the Chitamatra school. On the other hand, if we posit the subtle surfaceness of phenomena on the basis of uncompounded space in Svatantrika Madhyamica, it is uncompounded space not dwelling in its uncommon mode of abiding, but being posited as appearing to mind. If this is the case, can one say that Sattrathika has realized the subtle selflessness of uncompounded space or not?
The last one, or both? Both. So the first is the difference between propounders of Mahayana tenets and propounders of Hinayana tenets is the selflessness of phenomena. Please identify what the surface system phenomena is, and what it is in the various schools of tenets. The second is, I will summarize it.
Sattrantika asserts that uncompounded space is positive to appearing to mind, and is a mere conceptual imputation. When, in Svatantrika Madhyamika, one posits the subtle selflessness of phenomena on the basis of uncompounded space, This refers to uncompounded space being empty, of dwelling in its own uncommon mode of abiding, or being posited as appearing to mind. In this case, does Sattrantika realize the subtle surfaces of space in accordance with Sattrantika Madhyamika?
Key terms in this teaching
- Hinayana theg mäen (Tib)
- Literally, Small, or Lesser, Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. The Hinayana practitioner's motivation for following the Dharma path is principally the intense wish for personal liberation from conditioned existence, or samsara. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Mahayana teg chen (Tib)
- Literally, Great Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- selflessness of phenomena chö kyi dag me (Tib)
- The absence of a self in phenomena - all things other than the person. In the Prasangika Madhyamaka view, the most subtle form is their lack of inherent existence: they do not exist from their own side. LYWA
- Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
- The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
- Yogachara näljor chöpa (Tib)
- Often used as a synonym for the Cittamatra school, it can also refer to a subdivision of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka school. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.