Tenets — 2015-04-14

Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets — 2015-04-14
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

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File: 2015-04-14 – KR.mp3

UUID: feaf25dc-a151-4c98-af48-609a9370d6db

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)

Date: 2015-04-14

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Duration: 1h 1m

Words: 2,988

So when we speak of Buddhist tenets and of the propounders of Buddhist tenets, tenets, Dhrukhta in Tibetan, Siddhanta in Sanskrit, can be understood in terms of the presentation of basis, path, and result. The first syllable, drup, refers from the standpoint of the mind of the propounder of tenets to the establishment of these tenets. Second syllable ta, which means boundary or frontier in Tibetan, refers to the fact that there is nothing superior to these for that person. The follow following syllable, mawa, to propound in Tibetan, refers to uttering and thinking. In other words, it indicates a person, the person who propounds Buddhist tenets.

And the presentation of tenets from the standpoint of basis of path and of results is a difficult and profound one. The basis here is the two truths and the path, the means for realizing these two truths. Then regarding the presentation of the path, in other words of the two truths, this is best understood in terms of basis of characterization and of characteristics. So the characteristics are the two truths. To be characteristics they require a basis of characterization.

And in addition, from the standpoint of Madiamica at least, these characteristics, the two truths are of one nature. It is difficult to say that this is the case in other schools of tenants. If we take, for instance, the Vaibhashika school, the lowest school of tenets for the Vaibhashikas, even though the two truths are indeed presented, these two truths are not of the same nature. If they were of the same nature, it would be possible to posit them on one basis. This is not the case for Vaibhashika since for Vaibhashika, the two truths are contradictory.

They refer respectively to what can be subsumed within a mind which is able to understand the destruction of an object and what cannot be subsumed within a mind which is able to understand the destruction of an object. Therefore, they cannot be posited on one basis and cannot be said to be of one nature and of different isolates, as is asserted in Madhya Mika. So even though we have covered already this presentation of the two truths from the standpoint of the various schools of tenets, it is extremely important. Likewise, if we take the following school of tenets, the Sauthenticas school of tenets, it is not possible for the Sauthenticas to posit both truths on one base even though they accept the existence of both truths. For Sauthenticas, conventional truths are permanent phenomena, whereas for Sautrantika, ultimate truths are composite phenomena.

There is no common locus between these two. Then for both Fibashica and Sartrondika, the two truths are contradictory and incompatible. It seems therefore difficult to posit them on one base. For instance, for Sautrantika, conventional truths are permanent phenomena which are ultimately unable to perform a function such as uncompounded space, whereas ultimate truths are impermanent phenomena which are able to perform a function such as this table. There is no common denominator.

Likewise, it seems difficult to posit the two truths on one basis in the Chitamatra school. Since when one refers to nonduality, in other words, the ultimate truth in the Chitamatra school, it is referred to on the basis of form. It is form’s non establishment as an exterior entity. It does not seem easy to posit nonduality on other bases. For instance, let us take the Chitamatra analysis of my little table.

This little table is indeed, from the standpoint of Chitamatra, considered to be a conventional phenomenon in as much as it arises independence on causes and conditions. And so far as it is not established as an exterior entity or an exterior object, one can also posit ultimate truths on this basis. However, the reason for which it is said to be a conventional phenomenon is because it arises in dependence on causes and conditions and this reason cannot be given for its being an ultimate phenomenon. Therefore, it seems difficult in Chitamatra to posit the two truths on one basis. Moreover, it seems difficult to provide reasons for positing both truths for all or on the basis of all phenomena in Chitamatra.

Now from the standpoint of Madhyamika, in other words, Svatantrika and Madame Mica, it is straightforward to posit the two truths as being of one nature. So if we take the case of the little stand in front of me from the standpoint of Svatantrika Madhyamika, it can both conventional and ultimate natures can be posited on its basis. Conventional natures can be posited since itself is a conventional nature because it arises independence on causes and conditions. Therefore, it is produced. It’s being produced means that it arises independence on causes and conditions.

However, that very reason for the fact that the stand in front of me, the table in front of me is a conventional phenomenon, in other words, the reason that it is produced from causes and conditions can be invoked for positing ultimate truth on its basis, the fact that the table is not truly established or that it is not established as its uncommon mode of abiding. The two truths of the table in front of me of the stand, in other words, its conventional truth and its ultimate truth, can both be established according to the scholars of Madhyamika from one and the same reason. Its conventional truth can be established from the fact that it arises from causes and conditions, and this is its being produced and its ultimate truth. In other words, it’s not being truly established and it’s not being established as dwelling within its uncommon mode of abiding also occurs because of the reason of its being established by causes and conditions. Probably no other system of tenets can posit the two truths on one base.

This is an uncommon characteristic of Madhyamika. And therefore the relationship between the two truths and the base on which it is posited must be understood as a relationship between characteristics and base of characterization or characterizend. The characteristics here are the two truths and that on which they are posited is the base of characterization of the characterizand. This capacity to posit the two truths as of one nature but different isolates seems very difficult to engage in for the Chitamatra School of Tenets. And therefore, the Madhyamika School of Tenets can be said to be the only school of tenets which is able to engage the two truths as of one nature but different isolates.

And therefore, from the standpoint of the Madhyamika School of Tenets, this table is said not to be truly established because it arises independent on causes and conditions. In other words, a rise of independence of cause on causes and conditions is given to establish the predicate not being truly established. From the standpoint of Chitamatra, the very self same reason arising independence on causes and conditions is given to establish a totally different predicate that the table is truly established. Therefore Chitamatra and Madhyamika differ fundamentally in this respect the self same reason being a rising independence on causes and conditions is invoked to demonstrate two totally different predicates. Why?

Why? Yeah, yeah. This approach to tenets is an extremely helpful one. All Buddhist schools of tenets without exception accept the existence of the two truths. And whereas in Vaibhashika and Sautrantika, the two truths are incompatible and in Chitamatra it is awkward to posit them with respect to all phenomena.

It is in Madhya Mika that the tutus can be posited on the basis of every phenomenon. So as is mentioned in General Pedogie’s treatise on tenets, while it is possible to present the systems of tenets in terms of the two truths, it is also possible to present them in terms of the extreme of permanence and the extreme of nihilism. The presentation in terms of the true truths is one which is very helpful, although more awkward in this case of the lower schools of tenets. And this is why in Jean Pierre Robert Doge’s presentation of tenants, this presentation in terms of the two truths begins with Some scholars have said that the fact that based on the reason of dependent origination, in other words, based on the fact that phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions, Chittamatra on the one hand demonstrates the true establishment of certain categories of phenomena and Madhyamika, on the other hand, demonstrates based on the same reason the non true establishment of phenomena. This reason can be said to be the royal syllogism.

There are numerous reasons for which the reason of dependent origination is said to be the royal reason. One of them is that it can simultaneously extreme eliminate both the extreme of permanence and the extreme of nihilism. And therefore, in the Svatantrika Madhyamika system, on one basis, it is possible to posit both natures which are themselves both truths which are themselves of one nature. The reason which is invoked in both cases is the reason of dependent origination. Now there are three different categories of dependent origination: coarse, middling and subtle.

Now in the Svatantrika Madiamica system, positing non true establishment on the basis of the table or positing not being established in terms of its uncommon mode of abiding on the basis of table is none other than positing the ultimate truth on the basis of the table. Now the issue of the non true or the non establishment of table as abiding in its uncommon mode of abiding in Svatantica Madiamica is a difficult one for us to understand. This is tantamount to its non true establishment. So in this context, Table’s establishment as dwelling within its uncommon mode of abiding is the object of negation. Then I would like to explain during a couple of seconds the mode of existence, the mode of designation of phenomena within Svatandrika Madiameka.

This is a bit difficult to understand, but if you listen carefully, I think you will be able to do so. So what precisely is this mode of existence of phenomena in Swatantika Madhyamica? If we analyze the object of negation, which is phenomenas being established as dwelling within their uncommon mode of abiding. What precisely is meant by the uncommon mode of abiding here? The uncommon mode of abiding, according to Sotantica Madhyamica, refers to the fact that phenomena are seen as not only being established from their own side, but as merely being established from their own side without any imputation from the side of the mind.

Therefore, Sotelica Madiomica considers that the mode of existence of the table is that the table is posited independence on the mind. In other words, that it is posited through the power of the mind. It’s not being posited independence of the mind. It’s not being posited through the power of the mind. It’s being established by its own uncommon mode of abiding.

This is specifically to counter the view of the Chitamatra school of tenets. For Chitamatra, it is indeed true that phenomena such as other powered phenomena are established as arising through causes and conditions. But this is seen as excluding their being posited through mind. Whereas for Svatanteca Madhyamica, their arising independence on causes and conditions is complementary to their being posited by mind. Therefore, for Svatantrika Madhyamika, the mode of abiding of table and of all phenomena is, first, that they are posited by mind, and secondly, that in addition to this, they arise from their own side.

They are established by their own characteristics. However, if this table which we observe at present were to exist independently of being seen by our visual consciousness, then it would have or it would be established in terms of its uncommon mode of abiding and this would be the object of refutation of So from the standpoint of Svatantrika Madhyamika, the mode of existence of phenomena is both that they are or they exist independence on mind and that they are established from their own side and by their own characteristics. If we were to give an example to try to explain this, let us imagine looking at our face in a mirror. When we look at our face in a mirror, the image of the reflection of our face in a mirror arises independence both on our face and on the mirror. So this is an example which makes the Svatanteca Madhyamica view clearer.

There is a component of the perception of our face in the mirror which depends on the mirror, but it does not depend on the mirror alone since there is also a component of this perception which depends on our eye consciousness. For instance, should the mirror which is the support of the reflection of our face be present, but the eye consciousness which sees this reflection be absent, then we will not see the reflection of our face in the mirror. On the other hand, should the eye consciousness which can see the reflection of our face in a mirror be present but the mirror be absent, we will also be unable to see the reflection of our face in a mirror. Therefore, the sight of the reflection of our face in a mirror is contingent on both the existence of the mirror and the existence of the eye consciousness which perceives this reflection. And therefore, just as in this example, without the eye consciousness which perceives the reflection in the mirror, is no perception of the reflection of the mirror.

And without the mirror, Even though the eye consciousness is existing, there can also be no perception of the reflection in the mirror, but both are necessary for the perception of the reflection of the face in the mirror. Likewise, Svatantrika Madhyamica asserts that for the existence of phenomena, both an imputation from the side of the mind and phenomenas being established by their own characteristics or existing from their own side is necessary. In the same way as it literally is not an object of knowledge, in other words, it does not occur that a reflection is perceived in a mirror without an eye consciousness to perceive it. Likewise, it does not occur that this table is established by its own characteristics without a mind positing it from its own side. This is the refutation of the object of refutation in Svatandika Madhyamika.

In other words, the tables being established in terms of its uncommon mode of abiding. Then we shall stop here for now. And if you have questions, please ask your questions. You’re speaking of imputation. In Svatantrika Madhyamica, there is no existence of phenomenon without being posited by the mind or being imputed by the mind.

Therefore, if the the chair were not imputed by the mind, it would not exist. Obviously, when you don’t impute chairness, you do not see a chair. Even though you do not impute chairness, nonetheless, you must establish difference between the visual and the conceptual consciousness. The conceptual consciousness may still be present, which thinks there is chair. So at this point, the distinction between sensory and mental consciousness, in other words, between the physical and the mental component is extremely important.

Yes. Your line of thinking is rooted in conviction. In mental consciousness. Sorry. In mental consciousness.

In mental consciousness. Anne, another question? In the case of the omniscient mind, if we look at the syllables of the term Buddha in Tibetan, means to dispel and this refers to realizing both truths at the same time. Means to expand and this refers to the fact that there is nothing which is not perceived. In other words, it is not the case that the Buddha’s omniscience when it perceives something does not perceive something else.

Another. Yeah. Yeah. So it is an extremely important point to understand that based on precisely the same reason that they arise from causes and conditions, the Chitamatra School considers other powered phenomena to have the predicate of true establishment and the Svatantrika Madhyamika School considers all phenomena to be non truly established. So perhaps what you do not understand is that it is not possible to assert simultaneously Chitamatra and Svatantrika Madhyamika positions.

So the Chitamatra have their own presentation of basis, path and result. Broadly speaking, it is not compatible with the presentation of Svatthakamadhyamika. And Svatantrika Madhyamika considers its own presentation to be supreme and, if you wish, the best. So Tadekamadhyamika has its own presentation of basis, path and result and it is not compatible with the presentation of Chitamatra. So Tadekamadhyamika considers its own presentation to be supreme.

For instance, the materialists of ancient India, the Lokayatas, had as a core position of their system of tenets that there were no past and future lives at all. Therefore, they could not posit base path and result. Buddhists have exactly the opposite position. They consider that past and future lives exist and posit basis, path, and result on this basis. So this is a difficult topic.

Basically, is being said is that according to Svatantika Madhyamika, every phenomenon necessarily must be posited by some mind. It does not have to be the omniscient mind of the Buddha. It can be some mind whether a conceptual or a non conceptual mind. In this respect, there is a passage from Jetsongapas clarifying the intent, Gompa Rabsal, in which he says even though referring to the Sautrantikas assert that phenomena are established by valid cognizers, this is not the same as being posited by mind. Then at present, we will have the discussion period.

It will be helpful if you discussed the two truths according to the various schools of tenets, Ideally, if you can, according to the Madhyamika School of Tenet. Then by pairs, different pairs from last time, please.

Key terms in this teaching

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
object of negation gag cha (Tib)
An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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