Tenets — 2015-03-10

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)

Tenets — 2015-03-10

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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 62-minute session, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen continues an advanced commentary on Buddhist philosophical tenets, focusing on the crucial distinctions between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka schools, and subdivisions within Madhyamaka itself. He unpacks the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka presentation of three objects of meditation—the selflessness of persons, nonduality, and the selflessness of phenomena—contrasting it with the Cittamātra approach where Bodhisattvas meditate on nonduality rather than universal emptiness of true establishment. The bulk of the session tackles the concept of mere conceptual imputation as understood across three systems: Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Madhyamaka. Geshe-la repeatedly emphasizes that while all three schools employ this term, the meaning differs profoundly. In Madhyamaka, crucially, all phenomena without exception are mere conceptual imputations; in the lower schools, only non-causally-arisen phenomena qualify. He addresses a series of student questions that probe these distinctions and their implications. The teaching is directed at serious philosophical study practitioners already familiar with foundational tenets.

So we will generate the motivation for receiving these teachings. So regarding the distinction between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, I mentioned last time the definition of a Madhyamaka. You find this on page 25 of your English translation. A being who is a propounder of great vehicle tenets and who does not assert even conventionally actual true existence. Moreover, Madhyamikas are subdivided into Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamikas.

To present an easy to understand definition of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, I would say that a Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is a Mādhyamika who does not assert even semiotically actual true existence, while asserting that all existent phenomena are established by their own characteristics. Moreover, the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka are subdivided into two schools, the Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka on Page 26 of your transcript. The definition of a Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka is a Madhyamaka who prepounds a presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in accordance with the Cittamātra school. Then this is the main school which is studied in the three seats when one studies pāramitā or Prajñāpāramitā. One studies then from the standpoint of Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka.

Yogacāra Svatāntrika Madhyamaka has three main examples, three main propounders of this view, Bhāvaviveka, Haribhādra, and Shāntarakshita and Kamalaśīla. When it is said on page 26 of the translation that Yogacharasvatantrika Madhyamikas are Madhyamikas who propound. Madhyamikas who propound a presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in keeping with the Cittamātra school. What is meant by mainly in keeping with the Cittamātra school? What is meant is that the Yogacharasvatantrika Mādhyamika accept nonduality.

In other words, they refute the existence of exterior phenomena in keeping with the Cittamātra school And in addition, they accept the existence of reflexive consciousnesses. This is what is meant by a presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in keeping with the Cittamātra school. Then in the context of the presentation of the Yogacarasvatantrika Madhyamaka School, there are three different presentations of the view. The first is a view of the selflessness of persons. The second is nonduality.

And the third is the selflessness of phenomena. What are these three views? The selflessness of persons is simply the subtle selflessness of persons as understood in the lower schools of tenets. In other words, persons being empty of being autonomous substantially existent entities. The nonduality is in accordance with that understood in the Cittamātra school.

In other words, in the case of form, form and the consciousness perceiving form being empty of being different natures. In other words, the non existence of exterior phenomena. And as far as the selflessness of phenomena is concerned, this refers to the fact that all phenomena are empty of being truly established. Then in the Yogachara Svatāntrika Madhyamaka School, just as there are three different presentations of the view, there are three types of beings who train or for whom these are objects of meditation. The selflessness of persons is the object of meditation of the hearer or the Shravakas.

The non duality is the object of meditation of the solitary realizers or Pratyekabuddha. And the emptiness of true true establishment is the object of meditation of Bodhisattvas. This is important. This is very different from the presentation in the Cittamātra school. As you remember, in the Cittamātra school, the object of meditation for hearers and solitary realizers is the same.

It is the subtle selflessness of persons and the object of meditation for Bodhisattvayāna practitioners is emptiness of non duality. There is no meditation on the fact that all phenomena are empty of true establishment since Cittamātra does not accept this. Then in the case of the two lowest schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika, there is no acceptance of the selflessness of phenomena and no particular emphasis is put on the great vehicle trainees. The practitioners of the two first vehicles, the hearers and the solitary realizers, meditate merely on the selflessness of persons.

Then as far as the Madhyamaka schools are concerned, all phenomena are asserted to lack true establishment. From the standpoint of the Cittamātra school when one views phenomena from the standpoint of the three natures, in other words the other powered nature, the imputed nature and the thoroughly established nature, The two first natures, the other powered nature and the thoroughly established nature, are both truly established, whereas the last nature, phenomena subsumed within the imputed nature, are not truly established. And as you remember last time, had a doubt. As was said in the Cittamātra school, both other powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are truly established. And obviously the subtle selflessness of persons as well as the selflessness of phenomena are thoroughly established phenomena and are therefore truly established.

But what about the coarse selflessness of persons? Persons being empty of being permanent, one and independent? Cittamātra does not consider this to be a thoroughly established phenomena but asserts it is a phenomena subsumed within imputed phenomena. Now as was mentioned last time, for which reason are other powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena considered in the Cittamātra school to be truly established? Other powered phenomena are considered to be truly established because they arise from causes and conditions.

In as much as they arise from causes and conditions, they are not posited merely by the mind. And this is sufficient to assert that they are established by their own characteristics and are truly established. Now why in the Cittamātra system are thoroughly established phenomena truly established? The instances of thoroughly established phenomena are, for instance, these subtle selflessness of persons, in other words, persons being empty, of being substantially existent autonomous entities, as well as the selflessness of phenomena. In other words phenomena not being established as exterior entities or phenomena being empty of being exterior phenomena.

In every single case, these thoroughly established phenomena are not merely posited by the mind and for that reason they are said to be truly established. Now for which reason in Cittamātra is it asserted that the coarse selflessness of phenomena, in other words, phenomena as being empty of being permanent one and independent is not a truly established phenomenon, is not truly established but instead is an imputed phenomenon. Nothing is clearly said about this but in my personal opinion it is because the object of refutation of persons being empty, of being permanent one and independent is precisely a self of persons which is one permanent and independent. And this assertion of a self of persons which is one permanent independent is not made within our systems but is made within wrong systems of tenets. Its opposite that which is discordant with it is in keeping with reality.

For this reason, I believe that the emptiness of persons being permanent one and independent is said to be an imputed phenomenon in Cittamātra. Then there is considerable debate about whether the person’s emptiness of being permanent one and independent is truly established or not within Cittamātra. It is not clearly asserted either way. A doubt might arise: within the Sautrāntika system, this selflessness of persons would have to be asserted to be truly established, and this would be at odds with the Cittamātra position. This doubt need not arise since in the Sautrāntika system, the selflessness of persons is considered to be a permanent phenomenon.

And for Sautrāntika, these phenomena are never truly established. Then at present, a difficult topic of mere mental imputation arises. If we analyze it, its understanding within the various schools of tenets, probably the terminology is not used within Vaibhāṣika. However, Sautrāntika does accept the concept of mere conceptual imputation, so does Cittamātra, and so does Madhyamaka. Then within these three systems of tenets, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, which is subdivided into Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka which accept a mere conceptual imputation.

While the term is accepted, the understanding thereof is very different. So generally speaking, the understanding of mere conceptual imputation in Sautrāntika and Cittamātra is probably identical. When we speak of mere conceptual imputation, the critical word is mere since mere refers to the object of refutation. The object of refutation both for Sautrāntika and for Cittamātra is true establishment. Therefore, are merely conceptually established those phenomena which are not truly established.

In other words, for both Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, this refers to imputed phenomena. Then should one inquire whether in the Sautrāntika and Cittamātra system, anything which is an object of knowledge, in other words, a phenomenon, is necessarily a mere conceptual imputation? The answer is obviously not. Since for Sautrāntika, all composite phenomena are necessarily not mere conceptual imputations. And for Cittamātra, all truly established phenomena are necessarily not mere conceptual imputations.

However, in the Svatāntrika Madhyamaka system as well as in general in the Madhyamaka system, all objects of knowledge, in other words, all phenomena, irrespective of whether they are other power phenomena, imputed phenomena, and so forth, are necessarily mere conceptual imputations. Then in this Svatāntrika Mādhyamika system, it is precisely because all phenomena are not truly established that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations. Now in the Sautrāntika system, when it is asserted that a phenomenon such as uncompounded space is a mere conception imputation, what is being said is that this phenomenon is not truly established. When it is said in Cittamātra that the set of same uncompounded space is a mere conception imputation. What is being said is that it only arises through being posited by the mind and does not exist or is not established by its own characteristics.

However, when in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka one asserts that all phenomena without exception are mere conception imputations, it is critical to understand for Svatāntrika Madhyamaka the mode of conceptual imputation. Therefore, the term conceptual imputation is shared in all three schools of tenets but the meaning is profoundly different. It is through understanding this that one begins to understand the differences in tenets. So if we contrast Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, we can see that in Sauthantika, when one refers to a phenomenon such as uncompounded space or for that matter, the empty component, the empty factor of a house or of a vase, while these exist, they are nonetheless conceptual imputations. They do not exist from their own side.

In the case of Cittamātra, likewise, although uncompounded space does exist, it is

Merely posited by the mind and does not exist from its own side or by its own characteristics. Uh-huh. Alright. Are you do curt this subject? Yes.

Really? Why? So this issue of mere conceptual imputation is extremely important. It is something we must realize. And if you have questions, please ask your questions.

In my opinion, the meaning of mere conception imputation in Sautrāntika and Cittamātra is the same. Then in the system, the In which system are you asking the question? The thing is in the Sautrāntika and in the Cittamātra system, it is not the case that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations. Both for Sautrāntika, phenomena which arise dependently from causes and conditions cannot be mere conceptual imputations. They really exist like things, houses, and so forth.

And for Cittamātra, if phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions, they cannot be mere conceptual imputations. It is only in the Madhyamaka schools that it is said that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations. Then adapting your question to the Madhyamaka system. In the Madhyamaka system, when one asserts that specifically in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, when one asserts that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations, what one means is that if one takes a phenomenon such as my table, that phenomenon arises at the intersection or as a collection of the mind positing tableness on that table on the one side and something coming from the side from the characteristics of table on the other side. This is the mode of existence of table.

So indeed, the characteristics of table are themselves mere nominal, mere conceptual imputations. This mode of positing of the existence of phenomena in is a difficult topic. Phenomena are mere conceptual imputations. They arise merely through the power of mind. And what is meant by this is is that phenomena are a collection of, on the one hand, the mental imputation from the side of the subject and on the other hand, the characteristics from the side of the object.

Then if we don’t examine quite carefully this mode of positing of objects both by the mind perceiving them and by their own characteristics in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka, we will not be able to understand. As far as the Yogacharasvatantrika Madhyamaka school alone is concerned, yes, the understanding of nonduality in Yogacharasvatantrika Madhyamaka is probably identical to that in Cittamātra. One could say that Yogacharasvatantrika Madhyamaka is a successor of Cittamātra. And then oh, yeah. Naturally.

So Geshe la asked me to answer your question. The answer is no. The term indeed exists in the Mañjuśrī-nama-samgiti. It does not refer to the external objects in Cittamātra. It refers probably to the Sankhya view of existence.

There was this idea of the universe arising from a big egg called Hiranyagarbha. You know? This is what is alluded to, I think. And an another? Yes.

Definitely. The lower schools of tenets lead to the upper schools of tenets. An understanding of Svatāntrika Madhyamaka is of great benefit for an understanding of Prāsaṇgika. Another question? Mhmm.

Really? So this is not how the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas proceed. If the Svatāntrika Madhyamikas were to proceed through constant analysis into the characteristics of the object whereby the object is established, then, obviously, they would find that these are unfindable and would succumb to the extreme of nihilism. Yeah. But there’s a passage from which Geshe-la was trying to find.

And yet you say? Thanks. They do accept exterior phenomena and establishment by exterior phenomena, but they do not do so in the sense of the way the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika do, which therefore does not lead them to that sort of partless particle. If it did lead them to that sort of partless particle, it would be difficult for them to affirm that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations. They would probably be unable to do so.

And another question.

So the accept subtle particles, partless particles which are exterior objects. Scientists which accepted this would be, you know, or would have a view in keeping with those schools. So today, the topic for discussion is the mode of conceptual imputation in the three schools which accept conceptual imputation, in other words Sautrāntika, Cittamātra and in our case Svatāntrika Madhyamaka. Specifically, the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra mode of assertion of conceptual imputation is almost identical up to you to examine. For the Cittamātra all other powered phenomena in as much as they arise from causes and conditions cannot be conceptual imputations whereas for instance for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika all phenomena without exception are mere conception imputations.

By groups of two.