Tenets — 2015-03-03

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)

Tenets — 2015-03-03

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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 60-minute session, Kyabje Rinpoche systematically compares Buddhist tenet schools on how they understand true establishment of phenomena. He builds from lower schools, then develops the Cittamātra (Mind Only) three-natures framework: other-powered phenomena are truly established through arising from causes and conditions, while imputed phenomena like uncompounded space are purely conceptual. He contrasts this with Mādhyamika, where all phenomena are non-truly-established, using magical illusions to exemplify Svatāntrika Mādhyamika’s view. Concrete examples recur—the table, the vase appearing as nectar, water, and blood-pus to gods, humans, and hungry ghosts—testing whether listeners grasp the stakes. Student questions probe subtle distinctions: why coarse selflessness is imputed in Cittamātra yet subtle selflessness is truly established, and why other-powered phenomena are not mere mental imputations yet arise through valid cognizers. For established practitioners comfortable with technical philosophical debate.

So we will generate the motivation for receiving these teachings. Vaibhāṣikas are propounders of tenets, and Vaibhāṣikas assert both the existence of exterior objects while rejecting the existence of reflexive consciousness. Sautrantikas, are also propounders of lower vehicle tenets, however, not only accept the existence of exterior objects but also accept the existence of reflexive consciousness. Therefore, the difference between Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrantikas hinges on the acceptance or non acceptance of the existence of reflexive consciousness. Otherwise, they are identical.

Then the Cittamātrins, as is said in the definition on page 17 of your translation, are persons propounding tenets of the great vehicle who do not accept the existence of exterior objects while asserting reflexive consciousness as truly established. When Cittamātrins assert reflexive consciousness as truly established, it is not reflexive consciousness in general but it is the reflexive consciousness of something which is asserted as truly established. Moreover, within the three natures, Cittamātrins assert both other powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena to be truly established. In other words, they assert emptiness to be truly established. Then in addition to this, I suspect that the understanding of composite phenomena is quite similar between the Cittamātra and the Sautrāntika School.

The Cittamātra School obviously asserts other powered phenomena, in other words composite phenomena to be truly established. But the Sautrāntika School asserts composite phenomena to be ultimate truths. I wonder whether there is that much of a difference with the Cittamātra School. Then a better way of putting it is that in the Cittamātra school, all phenomena are subsumed within the three characteristics or the three natures which are thoroughly established phenomena, ultimately established, thoroughly, other dependent phenomena, thoroughly established phenomena and imputed phenomena. Within these three, other powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are truly established whereas imputed phenomena are trueless.

In addition, when the Cittamātra or Mind Only school asserts that other powered phenomena are truly established, this is to be understood as followed. Other powered phenomena, in Tibetan, depend on others, depend on others. What are the others they depend upon? They depend on causes and conditions. It is for this reason that they are said to be truly established.

In the Cittamātra school, other powered phenomena are therefore said to arise in dependence on causes and conditions. Since this is the case, they are said to abide actually within their own mode of abiding without being merely imputed by conceptuality. In other words, for the Cittamātra school of thought, the mode of existence of other powered phenomena is one in which to put it simply, they are not mere mental products, but they actually arise in dependence on causes and conditions. And therefore, the mode of existence of other powered phenomena is on arising and dependence on causes and conditions. They exist thereby.

Then regarding the second nature, thoroughly established phenomena, phenomena, this refers to emptiness which is also understood as truly established. And emptiness in this context must be understood in terms of the basis of emptiness. Here in the context of the Cittamātra school, emptiness refers to non duality. And if we were to posit non duality on the basis of form, non duality would be form’s not being established as an exterior object. This is the mode of existence of form.

This mode of existence of form does not however entail forms being mentally imputed. Otherwise, should this be the case, form would become a an imputed phenomenon. There is a quote in Maitreya’s Abhisamayālamkāra in the fifth chapter referring to this which intimates that should the wisdom realizing emptiness not exist, one could not refer to the establishment of emptiness. This is the meaning in which emptiness is understood to be a thoroughly established phenomenon. Then there is food for thought literally for analysis.

In the fact that the Cittamātra School posits the subtle selflessness of persons. In other words, persons being empty of being substantially existent autonomous phenomena and the subtle selflessness of phenomena as truly established and as thoroughly established phenomena. While at the same time considering that the coarse selflessness of persons, in other words persons being empty of being permanent one and independent is not a thoroughly established phenomena and is actually considered in the Cittamātra school to be an imputed phenomenon. Then this is something we should reflect upon since after all these are quite similar. We have covered the two first natures, the other powered and the thoroughly established nature.

Regarding the third nature, the imputed nature, the Cittamātrins consider for instance uncompounded space to be an imputed phenomenon. As an imputed phenomenon and as all imputed natures, uncompounded space is not truly established. What is its mode of existence? Its mode of existence is one as a mere mental imputation. In other words, it does not arise in dependence on causes and conditions, for instance, as other powered phenomena.

Then for which reason is uncompounded space said to be an imputed phenomenon? It is said to be an imputed phenomenon because the basis of imputation here is the intermediate space in which or on which conception or the mind imputes uncompounded space. For this reason, uncompounded space is said to be an imputed phenomenon. So another way to look at this is to understand that uncompounded space does not exist from its own side. It exists as a mere conceptual or mental imputation.

For this reason, it is said to be an imputed phenomenon. Then what is at present the distinction between Cittamātra and Mādhyamika. As was mentioned, within these three natures, Cittamātra considers other powered and thoroughly established natures to be truly established. Madhyamaka considers all phenomena to be non-truly established. Then in addition to the fact that Mādhyamika does not accept that other power phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena are truly established as Cittamātra, Mādhyamika considers all phenomena without exception to be non truly established.

Mādhyamika is subdivided into two schools, Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. Therefore, the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika do not consider other powered phenomena, to take their example, as truly established. If they were however to consider them to be truly established, then they would become similar to the Cittamātrins who as you remember assert that other powered phenomena abide within their actual mode of establishment without being mere conceptual imputations. In the context of Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, this is slightly modified and they are said from the standpoint of the Svatāntrika view to be abiding within their uncommon mode of establishment and not mere conceptual imputations. Uncommon is a term which is added here to specify.

Then the Svatāntrika are the opposite of the Cittamātra. They assert that not only are other powered phenomena not truly established, but all phenomena without exception are mere conceptual imputations. The distinction between the Cittamātra and the Prāsaṇgika School can best be understood regarding the mode of existence of other powered phenomena. For the Cittamātra School, other powered phenomena abide as established within their uncommon mode of abiding without being mere conceptual imputations. This is not accepted by the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika School which considers that other powered phenomena are conceptual imputations and arise at the intersection of the mind imputing them in their own characteristics.

Then if you do not listen carefully at present to these explanations, confusion risks to arise. There are numerous explanations one has heard over and again. So difficult. And therefore this is not an easy topic and one must listen carefully. Otherwise, expressions such as phenomena are mere conceptual imputations or they flow off easily off our tongue mean little and can be rather awkward.

Specifically as you remember the Cittamātra school asserts that other powered phenomena exist as mere mind. Yet at the same time they assert that other power phenomena are not mere mental imputations to the difference of the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika school. The Svatāntrika Mādhyamika School on the other hand asserts that other powered phenomena are mere mind. What really matters more than a mere study of these tenet systems is to actually interiorize them and gain some type of inner understanding of them. Therefore, to understand the distinction between the Cittamātra and the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika School.

So the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika consider that all phenomena whichever it might be in terms of its mode of existence is a mere conceptual imputation and gives as example for the mode of existence of all phenomena there being akin to a mirage. So my apologies. It’s not a mirage, but an illusion. And the mode of existence of such an illusion and the reason for which it is an example for the Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view is best understood as follows. When we see illusory horses or elephants, for instance, in the work of a magician, These are projected on a material basis such as pebbles and sticks.

The appearance of the illusory horses and elephants to the mind perceiving them is dependent not only on that appearance, but on the pebbles and sticks which are their base. They arise at the intersection of the two. So to further this explanation, let us take the basis of the illusion which is pebbles and sticks. On the basis of the illusion, a magician using mantra causes horses and elephants to appear. To a mind which is not contaminated by the mantra of the magician, only pebbles and sticks appear.

To a mind which is affected by the mantra, however horses and elephants appear. They appear in dependence both of the pebbles and sticks and of the influence of the mantra on the mind. This is seen in Svatāntrika as a metaphor for the mode of existence of conventional phenomena, which appear simultaneously through mental imputation and through being established by their mode of abiding. And therefore, the essential difference between Cittamātra and Svatāntrika is that in Cittamātra the two first natures, in other words other powered and thoroughly established phenomena are truly established. Whereas in Svatāntrika all phenomena without exception are non truly established.

True establishment is therefore the distinguishing factor. So in Cittamātra, the little table in front of myself is said to be truly established because it arises in dependence on causes and conditions. At the same time in Cittamātra, it is said not to be a conceptual or mental imputation. The doubt which might arise is whether it arises through the power of a valid cognizer, a pramāna, or not. Then in Svatāntrika, the problem does not arise.

The table is a mere conceptual and mental imputation. It does not arise with the power of a valid cognizer. Then I have tried to clarify all the doubts on this topic, the difficulties, and at present if you have questions, please ask your questions. Causes and conditions, isn’t that the same for a Sautrāntika to say that the table is truly established based on its own characteristics? Because by default, that would have to come from and conditions.

It’s that you’re positing a Kitamatra critic of Sotantrika. Right? It’s exactly the opposite. So if you say this to a Svatāntrika, the Svatāntrika will say the table is actually not truly established because of arising in dependence on causes and conditions. Arising in dependence on causes and conditions is the opposite pervasion from that within Cittamātra.

So in Cittamātra, the table is said to be truly existent because it arises in dependence on causes and conditions. So this issue arises with the royal syllogism. In the royal syllogism, it is asserted the subject persons is not truly established because of being a dependent arising. Then the reason dependent arising can be understood in numerous ways since there are numerous levels of coarseness and subtleness of dependent arising. This syllogism in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika is seen as establishing the non true existence of persons.

The reason dependent arising and specifically dependent arising in dependence on causes and conditions in Cittamātra establishes the true existence of phenomena. And another question. So the question is concerning the traditional debate in Cittamātra on the vase which is filled with liquid and which appears to the gods as nectars, to the humans as water and to the prettas as a mixture of blood and pus. And Jampa Gyaltsen’s question is in that case if we could put ourselves in the Cittamātra system, from the Cittamātra standpoint, what is the actual mode of abiding of the liquid in the vessel since it must have an actual mode of abiding for Cittamātra? Then Geshe la said that these three appearances to gods, human beings, and pretas are contingent on the uncommon karma of each category of being and this in turn leads each category of being to perceive particles of respectively nectar, water and blood and pus which are present in the mixture of the liquid.

This is the uncommon mode of abiding of the substance. This is standard answer. And another? The common mode of abiding. You can’t say that there is a common mode of existence of this liquid.

There’s an uncommon mode of existence and it is truly established. Have your question and other? So this is something which I would like you to examine for yourselves in the light of the object of refutation. Why in Cittamātra the coarse selflessness of persons is an imputed phenomenon and why in Cittamātra the subtle selflessness of persons is not an imputed phenomenon but a thoroughly established phenomenon and is truly established. And therefore, I would like you at present to discuss the following topics in the Cittamātra system since no such difficulties arise in Svatāntrika Mādhyamika.

In Cittamātra, why is the coarse selflessness of persons. In other words, the emptiness of persons being permanent one and independent. An imputed phenomenon which is non truly existent whereas the subtle selflessness of persons is a thoroughly established phenomenon which is truly established? And secondly, why is it the case that in Cittamātra one asserts on the one hand that other powered phenomena are not mere mental and conceptual imputations while simultaneously asserting that they arise under the power of valid cognizers and are established by valid cognizers. Then by groups of two.