Tenets — 2014-07-22

1 h 13 min · 3,004 words · 22 July 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Tenets — 2014-07-22
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 74-minute session, Kyabje Rinpoche examines the Vaibhāṣika system’s understanding of the person and selflessness. He works through cosmology—how subtle particles and the five aggregates constitute sentient beings—then focuses on the distinction between coarse selflessness (the person is neither permanent, singular, nor independent) and subtle selflessness (not a substantially autonomous entity). Using the Prime Minister analogy, he clarifies why the subtle understanding requires first apprehending the aggregates themselves. An extended Q&A follows, with practitioners raising sharp paradoxes: if Vaibhāṣikas accept true establishment, why pursue enlightenment that extinguishes the mental continuum? If Buddhas lack reflexive consciousness, how are they omniscient? Aimed at practitioners with foundational study of Buddhist philosophy and tenet systems.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 2014-07-22.mp3

UUID: 8070fab4-5c04-4813-b96e-b4052a4a8e8b

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Tenets

Date: 2014-07-22

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~3,004

So as usual, we shall generate the motivation before receiving these teachings. There is a scripture, I don’t remember the precise reference, which says this earth mandala has arisen out of sin. This earth mandala refers to this world of ours. And as you know, in Abhidharma, there is a description of the various stages of generation abiding disintegration and emptiness of the cosmos. Then during the phase of disintegration of the universe, saṃsāra is progressively emptied from the hells upwards up to the fourth Dhyāna realm.

And therefore, I mistranslated this answer. The Earth Mandala arises from concatenation, which is homophonous with sin in Tibetan. Then concatenation here in the Vaibhāṣika system refers to the concatenation of the subtle most particles. Then the basis of imputation, in other words, the foundation of the person are the five aggregates. And if we take the aggregate of form, the origin of our present aggregate of form is the union of spermatozoa coming from the father and an ovum coming from the mother.

Then if we go backwards in time from generation to generation, we eventually will reach the origin of matter. And the origin of matter is said by some to be constituted of particles of space by others to be constituted of the subtle most particles. This is the Vaibhāṣika position. Then regarding the actual constituents of these components in the case of living beings, living beings are generally said to be constituted of the four elements, earth, water, fire and air. Whether a subtle most particle, in other words, an indivisible particle can be said to be constituted of the four elements or not is open to analysis.

If we take the subtle most particle of the water element, I would suspect it is only constituted of the water element. Both the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika are similar in asserting the existence of indivisible particles. There is somewhat of a difference in the presentation of their association. Both assert the existence of indivisible particles with six directions and assert that coarse matter is constituted by the concatenation of these indivisible particles. However, the Vaibashika assert that when these indivisible particles concatenate or conglomerate, there is an empty space between them.

Because if they were not an empty space, they would be confused and conflated. The Sautrāntika, on the other hand, assert that there is no empty space, but that nonetheless there is neither conflation nor confusion. Then the mode of generation of our universe is the process of

Concatenation of these indivisible particles which form ever larger units. Then the actual relationship of the container or the environment, in other words, the universe, and the contained or the sentient beings is complex and difficult to understand. It is asserted in Abhidharma that the universe or the non-sentient environment is both beginningless and endless. Likewise, it is also asserted in Abhidharma that sentient beings are both beginningless and endless. Then generally speaking, as you know, sentient beings are imputed on the basis of the five aggregates.

But if we focus on the four latter aggregates, the process of imputation regarding sentient beings and their beginning and endless qualities should become more evident. The same thing is true for the process of establishment of the environment, in other words, the non-sentient environment. Then if we take the case of sentient beings, which are contained within the environment, it is asserted in Buddhist scriptures that the origin of a given sentient being is the first of the 12 links of dependent origination, the limb of ignorance. Now what the actual origin of the limb of ignorance eventually is is another question altogether. Let us set aside the issue of whether one accepts a presentation of previous existences or not and consider a person.

A person in this context would be a conventional self. Some religious systems postulate that such a person, such a terminological self is created by a creator. Clearly, in that case, there would probably not be past and future lives. Then according to Buddhist scriptures, such a person would be a person which is bereft of a self which is permanent, one and independent. non-Buddhist scriptures would accept the existence of a person which is endowed with a self which is permanent, one and independent.

The issue which arises is that of the beginning and the end of such a person. Generally speaking, the person is considered endless in most Buddhist tenet systems except the Cittamātra system, which considers that one particular category of experiences what is known as the end of existence. Then generally speaking, the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept the existence of a self which is permanent one and independent. However, they do accept the existence of a self which is a substantial , which is a substantial entity which can exist a substantial entity which can be autonomous. Generally speaking, from my standpoint, if one accepts the existence of a self which is permanent one and independent, one necessarily accepts the existence of a self which is a substantial entity which can be autonomous.

And this is rooted in a passage of Tsongkhapa’s Legs Bshad Snying Po, The Essence of Eloquence, in which Tsongkhapa says, in addition to a self which is a substantially existent entity which is autonomous, the non-Buddhist outsiders, in other words, the Hindus, accept the existence of a self with a capital s. So generally speaking, the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept the existence of a self which is permanent one and independent, but do accept the existence of a self which is a substantial existent which can be autonomous. One must investigate whether this self which is accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas is or is not an imputed existent. Generally speaking, it is an imputed existent, and it is because it is an imputed existent that these issues arise. In particular, the Vaibhāṣikas assert the substantial existence of all three times.

In other words, the substantial existence of past, present and future. Now when we analyze what is meant by this, generally speaking, if we take the example for instance of a vase, what is meant is that the substantial continuum of the vase, which existed yesterday, still exists today and will exist tomorrow. It is the characteristics of the vase, which change from day to day. Then as you remember, the example which is given for this is that of the process of transformation of milk into yogurt. Even though the taste and the consistency of the milk changes as it transforms into yogurt, nonetheless, its color, its white color does not change.

This is a traditional example which is given for change in the Vaibhāṣika system. If this is the Vaibhāṣika understanding of change, then it would seem that the Vaibhāṣika seem to subscribe to some type of a person which is permanent one and independent or not.. Check this for yourselves. The Vaibhāṣika system is therefore a system which is quite close to the common sense understanding of phenomena. And the Vaibhāṣika, for instance, would probably not accept that persons such as ourselves are impermanent.

They would accept that our continuum is impermanent, and they would, for instance, accept definitely that phenomena such as fire or air, which change to the common eye rapidly are phenomena which change instant by instant and are impermanent. And therefore, a precise understanding of the mode of positing impermanence is not easy. It is certainly quite different from the one we are accustomed to. Clearly, the Vaubashikas, when they assert that all three times, past, present and future, are substantially existent, close the door to the notion of instant by instant impermanence. Their viewpoint is one which is shared by a large number of religious schools, whether one accepts past or future lives.

Christians, for instance, seem to accept a self or a soul, which is permanent one and independent. And the Vaibhāṣika understanding at times is quite close to this.

And therefore, the understanding of persons being permanent one and selfless within the Vaibhāṣika tradition entails the acceptance of the three features of such a view of the self. The first is that such a self would not depend on causes and conditions. The second is that such a self would neither arise nor disintegrate and therefore by extension would be permanent. And the third is that such a self would not depend on components. And, therefore, a self which were permanent one and independent would probably not be a self which could exist contingently.

Regarding the subtle self of persons, in other words, the assertion that there is a self which is a substantial existent, which can exist autonomously, such a mistaken assertion views itself and its relation to the aggregates as akin to that of a king and his court. A king does not depend on his court, but the court does depend on the monarch. In such a mistaken view of the relationship between the person and the aggregates, the person does not depend on the aggregates, but the aggregates on the other hand, depend on the person or the self. This innate vision of the self is what is meant by a self, which is a substantial existent which can exist autonomously. Then my private opinion for the reason of the distinction between the coarse and the subtle selflessnesses of persons is as follows.

It is not possible to subscribe to an understanding of a self of persons as permanent one and independent without having been exposed to tenets. This is in other words an acquired viewpoint. On the other hand, the understanding of the person as a substantial existent which can be autonomous is innate. It is not acquired through tenets. It is an understanding of the person as a king in its relationship to the aggregates as a king to his court.

The king does not depend on his court, but his court depends on the King. In addition, I feel that it is not possible to give rise to such a mistaken view without initially having apprehended the basis of apprehension of the person, which are the aggregates. For this reason, I think that this view is more subtle than the view of the person as permanent one and independent. And therefore, the distinction between the emptiness of the person being permanent, one, and independent and the emptiness of the person being an autonomous entity, a substantial entity which can exist autonomously can best be understood through the example of the election of a political leader such as a Prime Minister, Tony Abbott. Before Tony Abbott was elected Prime Minister five years ago, the designation Prime Minister would not be applied to Tony Abbott.

On the morning of the election after Tony Abbott was elected, the designation Prime Minister could be applied to Tony Abbott. The fact that it could not be applied to him previously indicates that it does not inhere in him. That noninherence of the designation prime minister in Tony Abbott is the intended meaning of the emptiness of a person’s being substantial existence which can be autonomous. Generally speaking, in the Vaibashika system, two instances are given of the person. The first instance is the collection of the five aggregates, whether the collection of the five aggregates means the five aggregates as a whole or not is unclear.

The second example is the mental consciousness. With the exception of the Prāsaṇgika, most of the lower schools of tenets give the mental consciousness as an instance of the person. Within the context of the presentation of selflessness in the Vaibhāṣika, there are two selflessnesses which are taught in Vaibhāṣika, the coarse selflessness of persons, which is a person being empty of being permanent one and independent, and the subtle selflessness of persons, which is the person being empty of being a substantial existent which can be autonomous. There are numerous various modes of presenting the selflessnesses of persons within Vaibhāṣika, and there is one school, the Vatsiputriya school, which accepts the existence of the coarse self of persons. In other words, it is the only Buddhist school which accepts the existence of a person which is permanent, one, and independent.

At present, I will take two questions. Can you just repeat what you just said? How much of it? You know, the only school So the is the only Buddhist school which accepts the existence of a coarse self of persons. In other words, a person which is permanent one and independent.

What is the name of this? Thank you. Oh, what if I must do today? I come to some various conclusions that, to me, sound very odd. So I just wanted to go through one stream of thought that I’ve had.

From my understanding, the cosmos is built on the basis of sin. That from the first That that was my mistranslation. My apologies. Translation. Okay.

It’s Dik pa and Dupa. So cosmos is best built from concatenations of what of subtle particles. Okay. So we’ve not built No. No.

No. No. That changes my argument slightly. Okay. So then moving on from there, my understanding clearly is that even if you deny the self that is one permanent and independent plus also is substantially existent and autonomous, that the Vaibhāṣikas still accept that it is truly established.

And that true establishment must come through the mental continuum. And the reason I posit that is because of the five aggregates, only the mental continuum seems to my understanding is that which carries or transmigrates from life to life. So following that, that mental continuum which is truly established must lead to Buddhahood. Now if it does lead to Buddhahood and just to reassert the mind is truly established, yet at the same time the Vaibhāṣikas do not accept reflexive consciousness, then how can the Buddha, claim to be omniscient if he can’t even self cognize his or her own mind? Furthermore, this leads on to another interesting aspect, which is that the mind itself must be considered to be polluted, and therefore, Buddhahood entails the end of the mental continuum, in in which case, I get the conclusion that the Vaibhāṣikas are nihilist because they advocate self suicide, the suicide of the self.

So that’s basically it. What was your third doubt?

There’s a very good doubts regarding the first, in other words, acceptance of true establishment by the Indeed, Vaibhāṣikas do accept true establishment. It is part of the core tenets of the Vaibhāṣikas. Regarding the second doubt you have concerning reflexive consciousness and the fact that reflexive consciousness is non acceptance would entail that omniscience would be internally contradictory. That is not the case because reflexive consciousness is only a term which applies to ordinary sentient beings. It does not apply to fully enlightened beings.

Regarding your third doubt that according to the Vaibhāṣikas, there would be a cessation of the mental continuum at the time of full enlightenment. That is indeed, the case. The Vaibhāṣikas are one of the schools which accept the existence of a remainderless Nirvāṇa. There are some Buddhist schools which assert that the mental continuum is interrupted as a flame is extinguished. Is truly established, and now, basically, I’m killing my true establishment effectively.

So do I prefer nonexistence or to live in a delusion of hopefully in the higher realms as a god? I don’t understand your question. Okay. So if Vaibhāṣikas accept that there is true establishment of the self, so why would you want to therefore extinguish your own self? It doesn’t compute.

Particularly if you can live a lifetime’s eons as a god and enjoy all Mhmm. On a carnal activities to your desire. So you’re not asking the question. But basically, it is true that within the four schools of tenets, the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrantikas and a portion of the Cittamātra school assert that there are Arhats who attain a remainderless nirvana. In other words, when they attain nirvana, everything is extinguished, nothing is left.

Regarding reflexive awareness, reflexive consciousness Mhmm. I understand from looking at a few sources including Alexander Berzin’s archives that it performs the function of staining the consciousness. Of what? Of staining or imprinting the consciousness. Staining, imprinting.

Perfuming, whatever that word is for for karma. We’re speaking of Imprinting. Reflexive consciousness. Yeah. Berzin asserts that reflexive consciousness plays the function of staining the consciousness.

He’s mistaken. Thought he’s using another term that which I do not know. Mhmm. It is mistaken. Yes.

I mean, those who are certainly defenders of reflexive consciousness use it to justify memory. Yes. Just quickly, truly established, inherently established, and established from their own side, are they synonyms? In which system? Because last week, Geshe la said that the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika accept that.

The Vaibhāṣikas do refer to true establishment, but they never use to my knowledge the terms inherent establishment or establishment from its own side. But they probably mean the same thing. Debate Then by peers, different personas. Two two discussion, please. So the topics are the three times in Vaibhāṣika, the substantial existence of the three times, and the difference between coarse and subtle selflessness in Vaibhāṣika.

Just a couple of announcements. Of course, next Thursday, the thirty first, at seven. And, if you haven’t done so, the symposium on the August. And the Tuesday and Wednesday of that week, there won’t be a teaching so that of the of August, the week of the symposium leading up to symposium so that Ilya can prepare. But I’ll be here if oh, there’s a pooja at on the Wednesday at five.

But if anybody wants on that Wednesday. But if anybody wants to come for, you know, informal conversation, I’ll be here on Tuesday. And, and same thing with with Wednesday if people wanna come and just, talk about any of the the teachings. Otherwise, private study at home and come to the symposium. Thank you.

Key terms in this teaching

basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
dhyana samten (Tib)
An advanced form of concentration meditation after realizing shamatha (calm abiding). LYWA
higher realms
The higher realms comprise the more fortunate rebirths as a human, god or demi-god. LYWA
mandala khyil khor (Tib)
A circular diagram symbolic of the entire universe. The purified environment of a tantric deity; the diagram or painting representing this. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
sentient being sem chen (Tib)
Any being who has not abandoned the two obscurations. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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