Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2014-07-01 – KR.mp3
UUID: dfb53245-845e-47c5-8fcc-4fe578740727
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Tenets (Khensur Rinpoche)
Date: 2014-07-01
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 1h 15m
Words: 3,011
The definition of a person asserting Buddhist tenets on page two of Jitsu Jugi Gelsen’s presentation of tenet. A person asserting Buddhist tenets is a person who accepts completely the triple gem as a place of refuge and asserts tenets which disagree with places of refuge other than these. The first part of the definition, a person who accepts completely the triple gem as a place of refuge is critical in establishing the differentiation between Buddhist and non Buddhist propounders of tenets. And within this, between those who propound Hinayana and those who propound Mahayana tenets. And within the latter, between those who propound Sutrayana and those who propound Tantrayana tenets.
The specific goal of the latter tenets is to accumulate at present the requisite causes for the attainment at the time of full enlightenment of the abode, body and enjoyment of a fully enlightened being. So when one attempts to differentiate between Buddhist and non Buddhist, it’s important to be very precise. In Tibetan, the term Buddhist is which means insider, and non Buddhist is which means outsider. So what That’s right. What is meant by insider and outsider here?
If within one’s mental continuum, refuge is present, then one is a Buddhist. One might not necessarily be a propounder of Buddhist tenants, but one is a Buddhist. If within one’s mental continuum, refuge is absent, one is not a Buddhist. And therefore, the differentiation between Buddhist and non Buddhist, between insider and outsider is made in terms of the presence of the absence of refuge within the mental continuum. This does not entail necessarily adopting Buddhist tenets, although it is difficult to fully understand refuge without an understanding of tenets.
Refuge from within the threefold subdivision of impermanent phenomena into matter, consciousness, and non associated compositional phenomena is consciousness. And within the sevenfold subdivision of consciousness in accordance with Roerich is a form of conviction, although it has a component shared with wishing, literally a wishing or a wishful conception. If one attempts to identify precisely what refuge is, taking the case of the Buddha refuge, in other words, the teacher, it is not sufficient for the Buddha himself to have the capacity to protect one, literally the Tibetan term khapa means to protect, the same door which gives refuge, to protect one from the lower grounds and the sufferings of cyclic existence in general. But in addition, oneself, one must one must be totally convinced that Buddha has this capacity. This conviction has an element of wishful conception to it.
Refuge is therefore this mindset which is profoundly convinced, which wishes that one will obtain protection from the suffering of the lower realms, specifically, and the sufferings of cyclic existence in general. There are components of main minds within refuge. There are components of mental factors. In other words, there are components of both. And therefore, a convinced faith in this, a profound wish for this qualifies one as a Buddhist.
And, therefore, refuge entails the presence of this focused mind, this faith of conviction in the object of refuge. For instance, if someone who had never ever been to India had to travel to India, such a person would have to rely on an experienced guide. And he would want a guide who has actually been to India, who is experienced, but not only this, someone who is honest, truthful, and trustworthy. Having found such a person, he would rely on him saying this is an honest, truthful, trustworthy person. It is this sort of guide we find in Buddha Shakyamuni.
And this is therefore a difficult and a delicate point. You may attend Buddhist teachings on the Lamrim, but whether you are a Buddhist or not depends on whether precisely this state of mind is present in your mental continuum. You have to check for yourselves. If it is there, you are Buddhist. If you are not, it is you are not a Buddhist.
For it is said, refuge is a boundary between being an insider and an outsider, a Buddhist and a non Buddhist, just as bodhicitta is a boundary between being a practitioner of the Hinayana and the Mahayana. Atisha and some of his disciples debated on the boundary between Buddhism and non Buddhism, which had become very close. And it was difficult to differentiate. And this basically covers the first part of the definition of a person Buddhist asserting Buddhist tenets. This is a person who accepts completely the triple gem as a place of refuge.
In other words, a person who has refuge. Regarding the second part, and asserts tenets which disagree with places of refuge other than these, it would seem that such a person would have to have the view and would have to have realized the view. Whether this is the case or not is something one has to debate. So the first doubt is if one is dealing with a person who is a Buddhist and who in addition is committed to a system of tenets, actually has engaged or is trying to realize a system of tenets. In other words, a system of assertions.
Is such a person a propounder of Buddhist tenets or not? If we assert that if someone is a Buddhist and in a in addition asserts tenets, that person is a Buddhist asserting tenets. Then we have to address the issue of the subschool of the Aparantaka Vaibhashika, which is one of the three subschools of Vaibhashika, which is a Buddhist subschool, but whose practitioners affirm the existence of a self of persons which is one, autonomous and substantially existent. They are Buddhists, they assert tenets, does this make them Buddhist propounders of tenets? I made a slight mistake actually, Aparantaka Vaibhashikas accept the existence of a self.
They accept the existence of the self of persons being empty, of being permanent, one, and independent, but they do not accept that the self of persons is empty of being a substantially existent autonomous entity. So we must make a distinction between the boundary between being a Buddhist and a non Buddhist on the one hand, and the boundary or the distinction between between being a propounder of Buddhist tenets and someone who is not a propounder of Buddhist tenets on the other hand. Where the boundary between being a Buddhist and a non Buddhist is contingent on refuge, what is the boundary between being a proponent of Buddhist tenets and not being a proponent of Buddhist tenets? It is the view. And therefore, the distinction between a being a proponent of Buddhist tenets and not being a proponent of Buddhist tenets is not contingent on refuge, but on the view.
So, this boundary, the boundary between between being a proponent of Buddhist tenets and not being a proponent of Buddhist tenets is contingent on the view and specifically, it is contingent on whether or not one accepts the subtle selflessness of persons. In other words, whether or not one accepts that persons are empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities. A Buddhist who accepts that persons are empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities is a proponent of Buddhist tenets. One who does not accept that persons are empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities. In other words, one who accepts that persons are substantially existent autonomous entities is not a proponent of Buddhist tenets.
Otherwise, if this were not the criterion or the boundary distinguishing propounders of Buddhist tenets and those who are not propounders or proponents of Buddhist tenets, then we would have to posit a fifth system of tenet in addition to the four existing systems of tenets. Therefore, it is the acceptance of the persons being empty, of being a substantially existent autonomous entity, which differentiates proponents of Buddhist tenets from those who are not proponents of Buddhist tenets. On Page three of this presentation of tenets, the Vaibhashika school is explained in terms of seven subdivisions, the third of which is etymologies. The etymology of Vaibashikas is twofold. Some assert that Vaibashikas are those who follow the Mahavibhasha, a treatise only extant at present in Chinese.
Others assert that Vaibhashikas are those who assert the substantial existence of all three times, past, present and future. What is meant by the second etymology, the assertion that for the Vaibhashikas or three times are substances or substantially existent is that for the Vaibhashikas, if we take the present moment, the present exists at present, but for instance, this morning exists right now as well, and so does tomorrow morning. And since this is a system which propounds particulars, it is called Vaibhashika from Visesha, particular in Sanskrit. And these are some of the reasons for which Vaibhashikas are subdivided into the three schools, the Kashmiri, Aparantaka and Magadha Vaibhashikas. Regarding the presentation of objects, the fourth point, the Vaibhashikas assert that objects of knowledge, existence and things, Bhava are synonymous.
The definition they give of things, Bhava, is the tradition definition that is able to perform a function. If for the Vaibhashikas things, in other words, effective things and existence are synonymous, what about permanent phenomena such as space? The Vaibhashika considers space to be a thing or an effective thing because it is able to perform a function. It supports the motion of entities within space. According to the Vaibhashikas, things are subdivided into two, permanent things and impermanent things.
An example of permanent things would be space as was mentioned. In permanent things would be phenomena such as houses, roads and persons met on the road, which change instant by instant. Likewise, you may have heard of analytical and non analytical cessation. An analytical cessation is identical to the third noble truth, the noble truth of cessation. It is a cessation of the afflictions.
I will present non analytical cessation in the Vaibhashika School later. All of us in this room claim to be Buddhists. Some of us may be propounders of tenets. It is up to us to examine whether we are propounders of tenets or not. And if we are propounders of tenets, are we propounders of Buddhist tenets?
If we are propounders of Buddhist tenets, we necessarily are propounders of one of these four schools of tenets, and the question is, which of the four schools of tenets are we a member of? So we are Buddhists. Then, do we actually propound tenets or not? If we propound tenets, are these Buddhist tenets? For these tenets to be Buddhist tenets, we must propound the emptiness of the person, persons being a substantially autonomous entity.
To propound this, we must understand it. It is not a question of realizing it, but understanding it. Do we understand it or not? So are you propounders of tenets or not? Are you propounders of tenants?
Are you propounders of tenants? Really? Good. Then you are a propounder of tenets. You are a Buddhist.
Are you a propounder of Buddhist tenets? Then from within the four schools of tenets, which school of tenet do you follow? Then if you are Madameka, obviously, you can only belong to the highest, the supreme school, the Prasangika school. And if you are a Prasadhika Madhyamica, obviously, you cannot accept the subtle surfaces of persons. You must accept the subtle selflessness of persons.
In other words, you must accept that persons are empty of being substantially existent autonomous entities. Can you explain this? Then if you have any questions on tenets, please ask them now. We had a question from our group last week as to what’s the difference between true existence and inherent existence? In which tenet system?
The terms inherently established and established by its own characteristics are probably not encountered at all in Vaibhashikha texts. It’s a terminology which is alien to them. When the Vaibhashikas refer to true existence, it is within the context of the definition of the Vaibhashika school. Vaibhashikas are persons who assert assert lower vehicle tenets accepting outer objects as truly established and not accepting reflexive consciousness. And here, truly established refers to objects, to exterior objects.
Thank you. Yes. Can Geshela explain why the Vaibhashikas conclude, on what basis do they conclude that reflexive consciousness does not exist? The Vaibhashika School is a literalist school which accepts all the sutras the Buddha taught as literal and rejects interpretation. As a result, it relies on numerous passages in the Buddha Sutras in which Buddha Shakyamuni says, however flexible a finger is, it cannot touch itself.
However flexible a person is, he cannot see himself to conclude that consciousness cannot perceive itself. This is the reason for which Vaibhashika rejects reflexive consciousness. The schools which accept the existence of reflection, reflexive consciousness, svasamvedana in Sanskrit. Our schools such as the Sattrathika and the Chitamatra school, who consider that this reflexive consciousness is of one nature or one substance with the consciousness it perceives. It is a particular component of consciousness which perceives itself.
Independence of numerous examples, the Vaibhashika assert that consciousness does not perceive itself. Examples such as, a sword cannot cut itself. Question I wonder if you could just explain about the three times being present, the past and the future in the present because I don’t understand how they fit causality in there but maybe I’m not understanding it at all. I don’t recollect the details, but it hinges on the Vaibhashika understanding of fabricated phenomena, which have three instants. An instant of creation or generation, during which abiding does not occur.
An instant of abiding, during which neither creation nor destruction occur. And an instant of destruction during which neither abiding nor generation occur. I’ve noticed some tenant schools say that such and such was the word of the Buddha and others disagree. How do people ascribing to a particular tenet system avoid the sin of abandoning the dharma when they say that this or that was or was not the words of the Buddha? Clearly, the Vaibhashikas do not accept the Mahayana sutras.
If you ask whether the Vaibhashikas commit the sin of abandoning dharma, from the standpoint of the loan system, you know they don’t. Obviously, if you are the propounder of a tenet system, that is what there is, right? For instance, if you are a proponent of Vaibhashika tenets, then Buddhist sutras taught Vaibhashika tenets. Could you repeat a little bit higher? Could barely hear.
Why are the Four Noble Truths in the continuum of Nagajuna? I gave the example of Nagarjuna because I had to give the example of somebody. I couldn’t give the example of everybody. But clearly, Bodhicitta was in the mental continuum of Buddha Shakyamuni is an example the truth of the path. Okay.
If I were to play the devil’s advocate and point it out that it’s not refuge but rather the view that distinguishes someone being a proponent of Buddhist tenets or not. What happens if you have an individual who is not a Buddhist, has never come across Buddhist teachings but definitely does accept the view that people are empty of substantial existence. Does that basically make them still a proponent? Not necessarily of Buddhist tenets, would assume, because they haven’t accepted refuge. Generally speaking, it is impossible to be a propounder of Buddhist tenets and not to be a Buddhist.
Then I mentioned to Geshela that His Holiness has, and I think that’s what you’re thinking about, mentioned he has encountered scientists who seem to have come close to an understanding of emptiness by their own analysis without seemingly being Buddhist at all. And Geshela said that in the definition of a propound of Buddhist tenets, he only explained taking refuge from the standpoint of the causal refuge, which is refuge in an exterior Buddha, Buddha, exterior teachings, and an exterior Sangha. He did not explain it in terms of the effect refuge, and he would like you to reflect about this, because this entails taking refuge in one’s own self, in the dharma one develops oneself, and oneself as a member of Sangha. Such a person who takes refuge in the effect refuge is a Buddhist. From my opinion, whether he uses a term or not.
If the actual refuge is the cessation in the mind of an arya and the meaning of the Sangha refuge is an Arya being then it seems to follow that at no time would a non Arya bodhisattva be an object of refuge even though bodhichitta is the refuge in the mind of a Buddha or possibly an arya. So this seems a bit strange from the Mahayana’s point of view which privileges bodhichitta over just a realization of emptiness. Could Geshela touch on the subject? Indeed, Bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation and preparation are not authentic objects of refuge. This is the case because an authentic object of refuge necessarily is on the aria path.
So it’s it is only on the arya path that one no longer falls under the sway of the ignorance which apprehends the selfless, the existence of a self, of persons. Bodhisattvas on the path of accumulation and of preparation, although they have bodhicitta, still fall under the sway of the ignorance which apprehends a self of persons, and are therefore not authentic objects of refuge. From the standpoint of the Vaibhashika system, it is guaranteed that a Vaibhashika can attain full enlightenment. From the standpoint of higher systems of tenets, it is considered that the Vaibhashikas cannot attain full enlightenment. Then two by two for debate.
So please don’t pair with the person you pair with. So please don’t pair with the person you paired with the last two times. So please debate on the difference between being a Buddhist and a Buddhist by tenets, and on the subtle selflessness of persons. If anybody hasn’t registered for the dinner on Sunday, the lunch lunchtime for his Holiness birthday celebration. Then there’s a piece of paper here that you’re welcome to write your name on.
Thank you.
Key terms in this teaching
- causal refuge
- The objects of refuge - the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha - existing in the mental continua of others, as opposed to resultant refuge. Only by relying upon these external refuge objects can we achieve our own internal resultant refuge. LYWA
- Hinayana theg mäen (Tib)
- Literally, Small, or Lesser, Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. The Hinayana practitioner's motivation for following the Dharma path is principally the intense wish for personal liberation from conditioned existence, or samsara. LYWA
- path of merit sambhara-marga (Skt); tsog lam (Tib)
- The first of the five paths leading to buddhahood. Usually translated as path of accumulation. Lama Zopa Rinpoche’s preferred term is path of merit because the activity of this path is the accumulation of merit. LYWA
- Sutrayana döi thegpa (Tib)
- The Sutra Vehicle, another name for Bodhisattvayana or Paramitayana; the non-tantric path that encompasses both Hinayana practices such as the thirty-seven wings of enlightenment and Mahayana practices such as the six perfections... LYWA
- tenet system drubtha(Tib)
- A general term for a religious and/or philosophical system, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist. It is often used as shorthand to refer to the four major Buddhist tenet systems that emerged from India. LYWA
- Three Jewels triratna (Skt); kon chog sum (Tib)
- Also called the Triple Gem or the Three Rare Sublime Ones. The objects of Buddhist refuge: Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. Lama Zopa Rinpoche prefers “Three Rare Sublime Ones” as a more direct translation of kon chog sum. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
- Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
- The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.