1 h 8 min · 3,154 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 68-minute teaching, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen provides a detailed commentary on Cittamātra, the Buddhist “mind-only” school of tenets, tracing its origins to the Samdhinirmochana and Lankavatara sutras. He begins by establishing the core definition: Cittamātrins assert that phenomena such as form have no independent external existence but arise as the nature of consciousness itself. The bulk of the session works through a central logical puzzle—if one table appears pleasant to one observer and unpleasant to another, and each pleasant or unpleasant appearance belongs to that person’s mind alone, how can both be perceiving “one table”? Geshe Jampa uses concrete examples: a beloved car, one’s own house, a beloved pet unit, and a spider’s web—all experienced as beautiful or attractive only to the individual whose karma and mental conditioning generates that perception. He clarifies that under philosophical analysis, uncommon appearances (emotional and sensory overlays) belong to individual consciousness, while common appearances are accepted within the unanalyzed, conventional context of everyday experience. The teaching includes extensive Q&A in which students probe whether distinct perceptions entail multiple objects, and whether physical properties remain identical across observers. Throughout, Geshe Jampa emphasizes careful reasoning and warns against either dismissing the view as absurd or accepting it naively without rigorous investigation.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 09052017cittamatra.mp3
UUID: e889c226-ff5b-4294-ae2a-2a4be43f06e5
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Cittamātra
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,156
Hello? Baby, chill. Yeah. Yeah. Sure.
So regarding the Chitamatra school of tenets, its origin can be traced back to the Samdhinirmochana sūtra, the sūtra Unraveling the Thought and there are also passages in the Lankavatara sūtra, the sūtra of the Descent into Lanka which refer to mind only. You probably know the definition of a Chittamatrin. A Chittamatrin is a propounder of Mahāyāna tenets who does not assert the existence of exterior entities and asserts that other powered phenomena are truly established. Now there are three components to this definition one must be aware of. The term Cittamātra, Chitta in Sanskrit is mind, Matra only.
These are persons who assert the existence of mind only and this is indicated in the definition by the statement who do not assert the existence of exterior entities. In other words, entities such as form, I. E. Who do not assert entities being truly established as exterior. Please listen carefully, I shall try to explain concisely without elaboration.
In brief, Chittamatrans are propounders of tenets who assert that phenomena such as form are established as of the nature of mind. Don’t worry, we’ll go slowly about this one. When it is said that Chitamatras do not accept the existence of exterior entities being established, what is meant by this is that they do not accept the existence of exterior entities established on the base of indivisible particles. And this entails, however, that entities such as form exist, but that they are of the nature of mind. And therefore, according to Chitamatra, exterior phenomena are of the nature of consciousness.
They are the substantial result of which consciousness is a substantial cause. Now this is made clear in the root text of Je Tsongkhapa on page three. Since apart from appearing as form to consciousness outside, nothing exists. This is extremely clear. So these topics reward careful thought and analysis.
We will not be able to understand this rapidly When it is said that entities such as form are not established from the outside or as exterior entities, this is something we have to analyze because within our mind stream there are numerous types of consciousnesses, both mistaken and unmistaken. So this doubt appears in Je Tsongkhapa’s auto commentary as well as Kirti Tsenshab Rinpoche’s commentary. The doubt is the following, Should two persons perceive one table at the same time simultaneously, then if that table were of the nature of the mind of each of the two persons, wouldn’t it follow that those two minds were of one substance or one nature? So this becomes clearer and clearer in the commentaries. So this start is on page 13 of your translation of the auto commentary.
Where then should one inquire if one accepts that one apprehended object becomes a factor apprehended by two consciousnesses in as much as whatever appears to a consciousness is of the nature of that consciousness, two consciousnesses would become of one substance and therefore common apprehended factors would not exist. And Je Tsongkhapa answers this doubt by stating, there is no thought because the statement whatever appears to consciousness is either of its nature or is neither established as one or as different from it is for when analysis occurs and at that time, all common apprehended factors are not accepted from the standpoint of the uninvestigated and unanalyzed common apprehended factors are accepted.
So let us take an example to make this clear. Let us take this case of the table in front of Geshela, which is simultaneously being perceived by both Geshela and Chris. Now Geshela perceives this table, but in addition, Geshela himself perceives the color and the shape of this table as particularly pleasant. Now that particularly pleasant perception of the table is private to Geshela. Chris, however, does not perceive perceive that particularly pleasant appearance of the table.
He might perceive the table as unpleasant to look at. Now, that unpleasant perception is private to Chris. The pleasant perception which is private to Geshela is of the nature of the consciousness of Geshela perceiving the table. So there are numerous such examples, don’t worry, I’ll give them one by one. I’ll take another example, Chris’s greatly beloved car.
So Chris has probably a big car, and when he looks at his car, this car appears to him as a beautiful car, a profoundly pleasing car. However, when Hiro looks at the same car, that beautiful, profoundly pleasing car does not appear to Hiro. It appears to Chris. And therefore, that beautiful, profoundly pleasing car is of one nature with Chris’s mind perceiving it. So let us take another example, one’s own house.
One’s own house appears as very beautiful and attractive to oneself, but that sort of same house neither appears as beautiful nor as attractive to another party. Why is this the case? Because one has an uncommon relationship with one’s own house and as a result, that house is of one nature with the consciousness perceiving it or it arises from a karmic imprint within the Alāyavijñāna of that person that is not perceived by the other person. So I think we take Tenzin Drolkar as an example. Tenzin Drolkar has a unit.
Then she praises her unit a lot. Her unit is beautiful, it is just right for her, it was inexpensive. Then to others looking at this unit, none of this appears. So this is something which appears to Tenzin Drolkar because of the uncommon relation between that unit and herself. Her perception of that unit is of one nature with her own mind.
That does exist. So in brief, the Chitamatra view is one which asserts mere appearance. And as a result, this view is extraordinarily beneficial for an understanding of It can act as a gateway to It is also a view which is extraordinarily beneficial for an understanding of karma, And this is the reason for which Cittamātrins are called Vijñaptimātrins. Let us take also the example of spiders. Then a spider’s web is the home of a spider.
It looks extremely attractive and beautiful to the spider. To us, it looks fearsome. So if we take a spider web, that spider web appears beautiful and very pleasing to the spider as a result of the labor invested in basically constructing the web. This spider web appears pleasing to the spider because it is of one nature with the spider’s consciousness perceiving it. However, to us, the spider web probably gives rise to fear or revulsion.
The same thing is true with the burrow of a snake. So this is the meaning of the term unanalyzed on page 13 of Je Tsongkhapa’s auto commentary. In the context of nonanalysis, what appears to us is of one nature with our consciousness, just as what appears to another is of one nature with their consciousness. So if we take this table, if the table was established as an exterior entity, then that table could not be a mere aspect of consciousness. That table would actually have no particular relationship to consciousness.
It could not be of the nature of the consciousness observing it. Now this assertion that observed phenomena of the nature of the consciousness observing them is shared by both Chitamatran schools, the true and the false aspectarians, and has no particular relationship with the existence or the assertion or non assertion of a mind basis of all. Since the false Aspectarians assert the existence of a mind basis of all, whereas the true Aspectarians do not. So this is the mode of establishment of a tenet system which asserts that phenomena are of the mere nature of consciousness. So now a couple of debates on this topic.
If we take Drolkar’s unit again, then clearly Tenzin Drolkar’s unit appears as pleasing to Tenzin Drolkar, but for instance might not appear as pleasing to Geshela. Now these two appearances, are they one or different? Well, they are different, obviously. Then does this mean in this context that there are two houses? Obviously, there’s not two houses.
Would be very strange. Right? Correct. Yes. So what’s going on?
So I won’t explain too much today. I would like to focus purely on these topics, otherwise we get very confused. But the doubt here is, there two houses or multiple houses if multiple people perceive the same object or not? So let us at present meditate during a couple of minutes on the mode of existence of phenomena for the Chitamatra school, that phenomena are of the nature of mind alone and that the term nature in this context only occurs in the context of reflection. Please open the page one.
We we cite one b, two, three, four, and also page five. Number six, another offering, plus one and three. So here we are explaining the Chitamatra system and obviously in the context of the Chitamatra system of tenets, Chitamatra has no faults. Otherwise, it would not be one’s own system of tenets. Then when we take the case of the table in front of Geshela, and assert that this table is established as merely of the nature of mind, one might feel a bit awkward about such an assertion because after all, the table can be carried, things can be put on the table and whatnot.
Then one has to try to dispel this narrow mindedness. Things become clearer if we take an example of such as Tenzin Drolkar’s unit. Now Tenzin Drolkar’s unit appears pleasing and beautiful to Tenzin Drolkar. Sorry. That pleasing and beautiful unit of Tenzin Drolkar does not appear to other people.
It appears as such to Tenzin Drolkar. Therefore, it is not illegitimate to say that it is of the nature of Tenzin Drolkar’s mind, and specifically either the nature of her visual consciousness or arises from an imprint which dawns from within her Alaya Vijñāna. Then her pleasing unit is simultaneous with her visual consciousness. It is not the case that it existed before her visual consciousness perceived it, otherwise, we would immediately fall in the Svatāntrika view. Then something like the pleasing unit of Tenzin Drolkar.
What is it? It’s a thing, in other words an impermanent phenomenon. But is it within things or impermanent phenomena form, in other words matter, consciousness, or a non associated compositional phenomenon? So I’ve explained it all to you and you have no doubts left. So what are your doubts?
Have you got any questions, please? I might give Tenzin Drolkar’s unit a rest and go back to Chris’s car. So Chris loves his car and Hiro doesn’t like it that much but they both agreed that it’s a car and then there is the other aspect about the car that people who don’t know what the car’s function is or the label of it don’t know that it’s a car. So it’s got more to there’s like the whole idea of the object has got a number of different facets apart from being pleasing or unpleasing. Yes?
Yes. So that’s my statement. Another question, right? Yes. I’m not really quite sure what my question It’s not a question, right?
Can I reword it? Yes. Go for it. So all Yes. Yes.
Thank you. And all Geshela’s examples involve a psychological, emotional overlay of the actual phenomena. But the phenomena itself hasn’t been touched. So basically the actual appearance of the unit or the table remains the same to both consciousness. So how can both consciousness view the same item to be identical?
The only thing that’s different in fact is the psychological imprint that comes from as you pointed out, karma, etcetera. So the actual appearance itself remains the same to both to both conscious based on exam. Both then both consciousness are of the same nature of mind because they’re perceiving exactly the same thing. The only thing that’s different is the psychological overlay, which is not the appearance itself. The appearance remains the same.
You were saying that when those two people see the same house at the same time, their two consciousnesses are of one substance. The argument that Geshe posed as a question was that, how is it not that they are the same consciousness? My retort is that in fact he hasn’t proven that they are seeing something completely different. It’s just that their emotional attachment or aversion to the object is different, which is separate from the actually perceiving the object and the visual consciousness perceiving exactly the same thing. So there’s no uncommon mode of appearance.
They both share the same common mode of appearance, just that psychologically one’s averse and one’s attracted to it. Doesn’t change the color, doesn’t change the features, the tone, or the smell, or the touch of it. The appearance of the house which appears to Geshela is private to Geshela and does not appear to anyone else. That is sufficient to assert that that appearance of the house is of the nature of consciousness. Following on from that, it makes me wonder are there two apprehended objects, sort of a universal apprehended object that both people see the house and what is an uncommon apprehended object which is the emotional attachment or dislike or neutrality towards that object, the house, the car, etcetera.
Indeed, that pleasant car, house or whatever which appears to oneself does not appear to anyone else in that fashion. As a result, it is asserted as being of the nature with one’s own mind. Does it mean that when you say the nature of its own mind is that we get it from karmic imprint that we’re born that way or you know we perceive it that way or we were brought up to perceive that way? These uncommon appearances arise as a direct result of karmic imprints deposited within one’s own Alaya Vijñāna, one’s own mind basis of all. There seems to be a common sorry.
There seems to be a common appearance. I don’t have a problem with the idea that external phenomena as they appear of the nature of mind. The problem I have is that there is a common appearance of an object and the question of whether that is one or many seems to be very difficult to me. So if two people perceive a house and they have this unique relation to that house, there’s still a house that appears to both of them. Is that one or many?
Seems to be is that either two houses or are they one house? I can’t wrap my head around that. Could you repeat your question in a more concise fashion? So my confusion lies around that there is there does seem to be a common apprehended object and I can’t I I pose the question back to Geshela. If two people perceive a house and they have a different feeling towards it, there is still a house there.
Is that are they one house or are they two? This we have to debate about. So there are three people eating the curry. One is Vaibhāṣika, the other one is Sautrāntika, and the other one is Chitamatra. The Vaibhāṣika says, this is too hot.
Too hot? Too hot. The Sartantrika says, it’s too cold. The Chitamatra says it is just right. It is just your karma that you experience it this way.
You’ve been studying tennis too much. Is that correct? Is that correct? However, when one studies tenets, it is far preferable to root oneself within the system of tenets one is studying. In the instance where a person mistakes, for example, a snake or rope, is that mistaken appearance also the nature of their consciousness?
It’s the snake or the rope which is of nature of the consciousness? It’s the the the fact that it appears to the person as a rope when it’s actually a snake or quite a person. As a snake when it actually is a rope is what you’re say. The appearance of the snake itself is definitely of the nature of consciousness. Definitely.
My doubt concerns the meaning of one nature with a consciousness. The table is obstructive, and consciousness is not obstructive. So they are not of the same substance, clearly. So regarding your question, the table which appears to my visual consciousness is not obstructive. It cannot be said to be obstructive.
However, this table which appears pleasant to me does not appear to as pleasant to others. Nonetheless, it does exist. What is its mode of existence? Its mode of existence is being of one nature with the consciousness perceiving it. On the meaning is to be of one substance with consciousness.
One substance, That does not mean that it is consciousness. But it that’s right. It is it is not itself consciousness. It is not consciousness. No.
Never ever. Okay. Next questions. Does it just mean that it’s relevant to the person’s experience? The name was relevant.
Whatever they’re perceiving is just relevant to their particular experience. Then indeed, if it depends on experience as you say, it’s a one nature with consciousness. So is it correct to say that Chitamatra is not concerned with the common appearance of objects, merely the uncommon appearance of objects. When we say Chitamatra or mind only, and we are referring to phenomena being of one nature with the mind perceiving them, we are referring to the uncommon apprehended factor. Okay.
Just just mind. If, for Cittamātra phenomena are the exhaustion of karmic imprints of an individual’s consciousness, how do they account for a common appearance? So that is not what is said. What is said is that under examination phenomena are of the nature of the consciousness observing them. The unobserved unexamined phenomenon is not of the nature of the consciousness observing it, otherwise, could we work or do anything?
Where do you find, excuse me, such a stupid Chitamatran? The founders of the Chittamatran school were extraordinary scholars and practitioners of the caliber of Ārya Asaṇga, Vasubandhu, his half brother and so forth. And I think we can almost say that there was not an hour or a minute in which they did not study or concentrate. Then I am not saying we have to accept on faith what they said, but we do have to investigate it carefully. So at present the topic for debate is the following, when one house appears as pleasant to one person, and as unpleasant to another person, and that pleasant house is of nature of the nature of the consciousness of the first party, and the unpleasant house is of the nature of the consciousness of the second party.
Are these houses form or not? Are they houses or not? Are we dealing with one or two houses? Okay. Can you use that?
The discussions. Please.
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Mahayana teg chen (Tib)
- Literally, Great Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. LYWA
- mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
- A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- tenet system drubtha(Tib)
- A general term for a religious and/or philosophical system, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist. It is often used as shorthand to refer to the four major Buddhist tenet systems that emerged from India. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.