TBI Recordings

1 h 3 min · 2,492 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Other recordings (Khensur Rinpoche)
Other recordings (Khensur Rinpoche)
TBI Recordings
Loading
/

Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 64-minute teaching, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen explores the philosophical foundations of the Cittamātra school through detailed analysis of why it asserts eight collections of consciousness rather than six. He begins by establishing the unique Cittamātra position—that a mind basis of all (ālaya vijnana) must exist—then walks through the eighth logical proof from the root text: if the ālaya vijnana did not exist, death and rebirth would be impossible, since consciousness must pervade the body to withdraw coherently through the heart or crown at death, determining the realm of rebirth. He contrasts this with Sautrāntika, which asserts only six consciousnesses, yet Geshe-la probes a troubling gap: Sautrāntika must logically accept some subtle consciousness between death and rebirth to maintain continuity, yet denies the ālaya vijnana. The teaching becomes a Socratic dialogue where he engages students directly, drawing parallels to geopolitical positions (Tibet’s independence as seen from Chinese versus Tibetan perspectives) to illustrate how competing philosophical schools disagree on fundamentals while sharing a common foundation. He closes by explaining how training in calm abiding makes these subtle minds accessible, essential for practitioners not yet experiencing death directly. Pitched at those with some background in Buddhist philosophy.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 14112017 Cittamātra.mp3

UUID: 0b104c7c-d422-48dc-8158-c36847492ad5

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Cittamātra

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~2,493

There are numerous assertions regarding the number of collections of consciousness. Some assert six collections of consciousness. Some eight, some nine, some one. So the most famous, in other words, the majority position is that of the propounders of tenets who assert six collections of consciousness. But the Cittamātrins assert eight collections of consciousness.

Now within the twofold division of Cittamātrins into true and false aspectarians, the false aspectarian Cittamātrins assert three final vehicles and eight collections of consciousness. So when we refer to the false aspectarian Cittamātrins asserting eight collections of consciousness, the foundation of their assertion is that of the existence of an ālaya vijnana, a mind basis of all, which is a main mind. Now it is the only school of tenets which asserts this. The other schools of tenets assert the existence of six collections of consciousness. And here, one must understand the ground, the foundation, or the reason for which Cittamatrin false aspectarian Cittamātrins assert an ālaya vijnana.

So within stanza 36 of your root text, Cittamātra asserts numerous logical proofs of the existence of the ālaya vijnana. The eighth proof, which is that passing away, chi po, in Tibetan, would be inappropriate, refers to the fact that death and rebirth would be inappropriate. So when one refers to passing away being inappropriate, if the ālaya vijnana did not exist, what this means is that at the time of death, warmth withdraws from the extremities of the body, from the feet upwards. And with the sensation of warmth, it is also sensation, which is the mind, which withdraws.

Do you understand? So as the warmth withdraws, in turn sensation, in other words, consciousness withdraws as well. Now here, it is only the ālaya vijnana, the mind basis of all, which could pervade all the parts of the body, and therefore function in this way. The mental consciousness cannot pervade all the parts of the body. Then if the ālaya vijnana did not exist, those parts of the body which were not pervaded by it, and where the mental consciousness obviously is absent as well, would become like a corpse.

It would become dead. You understand? Sure? As is taught in Abhidharma, whatever part of the body consciousness departs from, and by extension, wherever the warmth dissolves determines the rebirth. So for instance, if the warmth dissolves downwards into the feet, and consciousness departs through the feet, one is reborn as an animal.

If it departs from the navel, one is reborn as a human being. If it departs from the heart, one is reborn as a god. So Cittamātra’s own presentation is slightly different. If one is going to be reborn in the lower realms, then the mind dissolves from the crown to the heart. Whereas if one is going to be reborn in the higher realms, the mind starts from the feet to the heart.

And you can see with corpses that the feet are extremely cold. Do you understand? Alright. Sure. That it dissolves in the heart is evident when we see the experiences of thukdam, of the meditation, the death process, literally the mental seal, where the limbs become cold, but the area around the heart retains the temperature of flesh.

So therefore, returning to the eighth reason of stanza 36, if the ālaya vijnana did not exist, death or passing away and rebirth would be inappropriate. Now, keep in mind that Cittamātra is the only school of tenets asserting the existence of the mind basis of all. None of the other schools of tenets such as Sautrāntika do. Now regarding the explanation of the death process in Sautrāntika, Sautrāntika asserts that death and transmigration occur when the consciousness relinquishes the aggregates, and then enters the intermediate state, the bardo. But Sautrāntika does assert the existence of a consciousness between these two moments.

It therefore does assert the existence of a subtle consciousness. Do you understand? Have you all understood? So the Sautrantikas must assert the existence of a subtle consciousness, which exists in between the moment at which consciousness has relinquished the aggregates, and the moment at which it enters a body in between.

Mhmm. There is something, and it has to be a subtle consciousness. Mhmm. Do you understand? Someone tell someone.

So between the moment of death and the moment of ingress into the bardo, there is something which has to ingress. So at this point, I would like to ask you, well, we have established that Sautrāntika necessarily accepts the existence of a subtle consciousness, which exists between the moment of the consciousness relinquishing its aggregates and the entry into the bardo being. Why then does Sautrāntika not accept the existence of an ālaya vijnana? Okay. Now that’s the question.

So, what do you think? It seems that Sautrāntika asserts that the mental consciousness is subtle enough and so they don’t need to assert an ālaya vijnana. And my understanding is that philosophically the Sautrantikas believe in particles whereas the Cittamātrins don’t. In fact, the mind and objects upheld by the mind are the same nature which means basically they must all be deposited somewhere which is the ālaya vijnana — that’s not required under the Sautrantikas.

So you should start by looking at it from the standpoint of subtle minds. Cittamātra says, the ālaya vijnana exists and in addition, it is a subtle mind. Then doesn’t Sautrāntika assert the existence of subtle minds? So let us take the example of the table in front of Geshe-la, which is the base if you wish. Then everyone agrees that there is a table.

Some assert that the characteristic or the quality of the table is to be impermanent. Others assert that the quality of the table is to be permanent. So you can see this in politics as well. If you take the case of Tibet, Chinese works on Tibet assert that on the base Tibet, in the case of Tibet, there is no independence. Then Tibetan works assert exactly the opposite, that Tibet is independent.

So the Chinese say Tibet is not independent, Tibetans say Tibet is independent, then this creates a lot of problems. So the systems of tenets are broadly speaking similar. They differ in terms of terminology. So the Sautrantikas definitely assert the existence of a subtle mind. Cittamātra asserts it and calls it the ālaya vijnana.

Then Madhyamaka asserts the existence of a subtle mind. Then the differences may be mainly terminological. So the Sautrantikas assert one type of selflessness of persons. Cittamātra asserts another type of selflessness of persons. Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka asserts another type of selflessness of persons again.

These are differences within the systems of tenets. But for these differences to exist, you need a preexisting foundation or base. So before we enter into these distinctions, [student’s name], I would like to ask you, are you confused about the distinction between the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra systems or not?

So if Geshe-la asks you to explain what Sautrāntika is and what Cittamātra is, can you? So it’s in keeping with the example Geshe-la gave previously.

From the standpoint of Chinese works and books, Tibet is not independent. Then from the standpoint of Tibetan works and books, there are numerous proofs that Tibet is independent. This is how one has to understand these issues between the schools of tenets. So what is the difference between Sautrāntika and Cittamātra?

So the issue is the following. Even though one is a Sautrāntika, let us presuppose there is just one instant, a second instant, between the instant at which consciousness relinquishes the aggregates, in other words, death, and the instant at which consciousness enters into the bardo body. Then what is this instant in between? So this consciousness in between has to be a subtle consciousness. In the Sautrāntika system. Yes, yes, right?

One thing I don’t quite understand is then, they posit that the last moment of the waking consciousness is the substantial cause of the first moment of the waking consciousness upon waking. Why is it that they do not posit a subtle consciousness in the time in between and yet they do at death? Yes. Yours is a good doubt, but there is a difference between these two cases. When one falls asleep, indeed, probably Sautrāntika does assert that there is no consciousness, but the physical aggregates are there.

Whereas, at that instant between the moment where consciousness relinquishes the aggregates and the entry in the bardo body, there has to be consciousness for there to be a continuum. So such a consciousness in Cittamātra would be a consciousness. But is it one of the six collections of consciousness or not? This is how one has to think about it. It is a subtle consciousness.

So then in Sautrāntika, at the time of death, or before death, first, it is self evident that the coarse consciousnesses, six collections of consciousness exist. Then at death, these six coarse consciousnesses dissolve. And when the mind of death itself has disappeared, at that point, one enters actual death. Then what exactly exists there? That is the question.

So in Svatāntrika Madhyamaka and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, it is certain that there is a subtle consciousness at this point. Then in Sautrāntika, Geshe-la has not examined in detail what our friend says is true, that Sautrāntika does assert that in deep sleep between the dreams, there is no consciousness according to Sautrāntika, but nonetheless, it would seem that there is a subtle mind at death. So how do we address this problem? The mind basis of all is a subtle consciousness. That’s not the question.

So Geshe-la’s question is, in Sautrāntika, how do we address this issue? Are they saying that this subtle consciousness is one of the six collections of consciousness? So at death, the six collections of consciousness have ceased. I agree, but I’m saying that obviously their system’s inconsistent. If they’re saying there are only six collections, and yet there’s a consciousness which doesn’t meet the definition of a mental consciousness, then they’re internally inconsistent.

So in other words, if it is none of these six collections of consciousness, they assert seven collections of consciousness. So it increases, right? Seven, eight, nine. So if the Sautrantikas accept a subtle mental consciousness, then this mental consciousness is one of the six collections of consciousness. So Geshe-la was asking me what I would suggest, and I said, well, if it turns out that there was no interval between the mind of death and the appearance of the bardo being, then there would be no problem.

But that would be very strange, Geshe-la says. Then if we assert that there is an interval of consciousness, I don’t see what else it can be but a subtle mental consciousness. It’s not something they say. So this is the doubt we must entertain. The Cittamātrins assert eight collections of consciousness with ālaya vijnana acting as a bridge, whereas the Sautrantikas assert six collections of consciousness.

And then what precisely bridges the gap between the death consciousness and the bardo body? So at present in stanza 36, we are talking about the logical proofs of the existence of the ālaya vijnana. So this is not a section where one relies on scriptural proofs, but instead one relies on one’s own experience, on one’s own analysis of the situation. So here in Cittamātra, it is explicitly asserted that there is a subtle mind within our mind stream at present, the ālaya vijnana. Now if this were not asserted by Sautrāntika and Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, if such a subtle mind was not asserted, their system would become very strange.

So they must assert it. However, in Sautrāntika, only six collections of consciousness are asserted. So in Cittamātra, it exists at present in our mind stream. So these are the differences. Both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools of tenets assert that the means to purify the mind and to progressively give rise to these subtle minds is training in calm abiding.

Both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools of tenets assert that it is through calm abiding, through habituation with calm abiding that one causes these subtle minds to become manifest, and both Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools of tenets assert the existence of the four dhyanas, their corresponding realms, and the most subtle mind in cyclic existence, which is the peak of cyclic existence. Then the Buddhists assert that through an inseparable union of calm abiding and insight, in other words, the view realizing emptiness, one is able to abandon cyclic existence. So for beings who are entering the path, it is possible to train in these subtle minds and cause them to become manifest through calm abiding. But for ordinary beings such as ourselves, the main experience we will have of these subtle minds will be at the time of our own death. Apart from this, we do have access to subtle minds during the dream state in this life.

Then we must therefore train in calm abiding, since apart from calm abiding, the only possibility we have to access and use these subtle minds is to generate the recognition of dreams as dreams, which is extremely difficult. So without calm abiding, it is difficult. Okay. Let us generate the requisite motivation and then recite the prayers.

So at present, the topic for discussion tonight is the following. As Geshe-la explained, if we take the Sautrāntika system, but if you’re uncomfortable with Sautrāntika, this can also be applied to Svatāntrika Madhyamaka or Prāsaṇgika. Between the moment of death, in other words, the moment the mind relinquishes the aggregates, and the entry into the bardo body, there has to be an interval of time. And in Sautrāntika, this interval of time must be occupied by a consciousness, otherwise it would be very strange. Now is this consciousness, or what is this consciousness?

It’s a subtle consciousness. If we say it is one of the six collections of consciousness, the six collections of consciousness are said to have ceased at that point. If it is not, what is it? So in Cittamātra, what proceeds at that point is the ālaya vijnana. Then Geshe-la says he’s going to have to check because maybe the Sautrantikas assert at that moment that there is no consciousness.

Then there has to be some sort of thought or intent. Do you understand? So in Abhidharma, there is this notion of the immediately preceding condition. So in English, you have a translation of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa from Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s French translation, Leo Pruden made an English translation. And Geshe-la said at the end of the second chapter, there is an explanation of the immediately preceding conditions.

Very extensive. Check. We have it in the library.

Key terms in this teaching

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
mind basis of all alayavijana (Skt); kun zhi nam shä (Tib)
A main consciousness posited by the Cittamatra school, the consciousness they say is needed to carry karmic imprints. LYWA
Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
principal consciousness vijnana (Skt); nam shë (Tib)
The main cognition posited by means of apprehending the entity of its object. Synonymous with main mind, it is one of the two divisions of mind, the other being mental factors. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
shamatha zhi nä (Tib)
Calm abiding; a state of concentration in which the mind is able to abide steadily, without effort and for as long as desired, on an object of meditation. There are nine stages in its development. LYWA
Svatantrika Madhyamaka u ma rang gyü pa (Tib)
The Middle Way Autonomy school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Autonomy school accepts autonomous reasons and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Scroll to Top