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About this talk. Answers questions on emptiness and selflessness. The speaker explains that the object of negation is the inherently existing self, distinct from the conventional self, and that valid conventional imputations, such as a name or a lawyer’s role, remain valid while invalid ones do not. The session also covers the view that the fundamental mind of clear light is empty of inherent existence, and discusses self-sacrifice as a bodhisattva path.
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And I’m glad so many of you have lasted until the last day. It’s nice to see. And I assume that since Geshela talked about emptiness and it’s a big favorite with Westerners, there’ll be a lot of questions about emptiness. So before we start, I’d like to suggest some reading. We are fortunate in the last thirty years since I started that there are excellent translations.
There’s a lot of nonsense and emptiness, but there are some very good texts, mainly by Geoffrey Hopkins in his school. The best general introduction I can recommend is Meditation on Emptiness by Geoffrey Hopkins. So when I went in 1981 to study Nāgārjuna’s thought at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala, there was really nothing of value available on Prāsaṇgika. And I was quite despondent, because I felt I had wasted my time going to the library, you know, and, I had a Tibetan teacher who spoke no English and I spoke no Tibetan, so it made communication extremely difficult. And I ran into a marvelous Australian nun, I’ve never met her since, with a PhD in Anthropology, and, she said, You have to read this.
It was Geoffrey’s unpublished manuscript of his theses. It’s through reading that that I really was able to find what I was interested in, which was an authentic interpretation of Madhyamaka. So meditation emptiness has one big advantage. It presents the view of the selflessness of persons and of phenomena according to all four schools of tenets. So it is it is a bit long, but once you’ve worked through this, you will have a good understanding of the view of the selflessness of persons and emptiness according to Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Chitamatra, and Mādhyamika.
It remains the fundamental reference. Then for those who are specifically interested in Prāsaṇgika, I cannot recommend this book too highly. It’s been my destiny to read these things in manuscript form. Elizabeth Napper was the wife of Jeffrey Hopkins and the instructor of Tibetan language at the University of Virginia, and she wrote her PhD thesis on the insight section of the Tsongkhapa’s Lam Rim Chenmo. It’s the best translation ever made of this, and her introduction is superb because she addresses all the misunderstandings of the Madhyamaka view.
Then I had the honor to proofread her text, so I’ve always felt quite close to it, suppose. We both have both these books in them. Dependent-Arising and Emptiness by Elizabeth Napper. If you have to choose between these two, this is preferable, and emptiness. Elizabeth Napper, n e p p e r, n a p p e r, my apologies, And then there’s a third book we don’t have in the library, you may still be able to find it.
It is Echoes of Voidness by my late teacher Geshe Rabten. As you know Geshe Raptan was recognized as having attained the path of seeing. In other words, having direct realization of emptiness, which means he had already attained calm abiding. He had generated bodhichitta since he attained the path of seeing, of the Mahāyāna, and on this basis he’s generated direct realization of emptiness. How far he progressed beyond that is unknown, but upon his passing, a stupa was erected in his honor, which is generally done for fully enlightened beings.
He was asked by his Holiness the Dalai Lama to teach calm abiding to the geshes who wish to enter into retreat. Then Geshe Rabten gave teachings this little booklet on his own experience of emptiness. He combined them with formal teachings of emptiness and a presentation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, some sections thereof. Then a topic like emptiness should really be addressed by people who have tasted emptiness. So I would highly recommend this book to you.
And then obviously for those of you who have worked through this, there is perhaps a work, I won’t recommend it to everybody, because the works of the great yogis are prone to misunderstanding. It’s Geshe Rabten’s Song of Realization, which he presented to His Holiness the Dalai Lama after gaining realization of emptiness. That we have in the library. Yes, madam, please. That’s a good book.
I doubt it’s by Geshe Rabten, however. I can check at once if you want. I don’t think it’s by Geshe Rabten. If it is, then it is one I don’t know about. So as I was saying, and the loudspeaker agrees, it’s not by Geshe Rabten, it’s by Venerable Lobsang Gatso, the director of the School of Dialectics.
It’s a good book, very good book. There are many many good books. These are, I would say, three are foundational. Then I would really recommend that you be you ask a TBI, if you’re serious about trying to understand emptiness, as opposed to just being dilettantes. If you really are interested, ask a TBI which books to read.
I’d say the presentation of the view in easily 90% of the works on the topic is false. Then you can waste a lot of time with that approach. We are very lucky to be in Tsongkhapa’s tradition, which has been able to harmonize the presentation of conventional and ultimate truths. The big problem in Tibet was the deprecation of conventional truths at the expense of ultimate truths. Then I’m available for your questions.
Mark please. Thank you. My question relates to causality, selflessness and free will. I referred to something Einstein said in ’32. He said, I do not believe in the freedom of the will.
Schopenhauer’s words, Man can do what he wants but he cannot will what he wills. This thought has accompanied me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of freedom of will preserves me from taking too seriously myself and my fellow men as acting and deciding individuals and from losing my temper. And I just wondered what your comment is in relation to free will and how it applies. It’s a western debate.
Basically, it doesn’t concern us. It’s a debate which arises when you postulate the existence of a soul, which somehow functions within the envelope of the body as an autonomous entity. And then you try to address the issue of how much autonomy the soul has in its will, in its wishings. Then, when you are in a tradition like ours, for which there is no such thing, there is just basically a causal continuum, to think that there is this one part of the causal continuum which has complete autonomy in its willing, is exactly the view of an inherent or an autonomous substantial existent which is refuted when one refutes the existence of a subtle self of persons. So for us it’s a non issue.
It’s a paradox which arises once one accepts the existence of a self with a capital S. Then the issue of whether this self with a capital S is conditioned or not becomes a very problematical issue. So for all the monotheistic traditions which basically accept the existence of such a self, it is very problematic. But if we had to take position, we would say there is no free will. Because this idea of something which is isolated from everything else within the person, and which in the absence of any other conditions or influence decides, is something we don’t recognize the existence of.
Do you have other questions? Yes, Natalie, please. In relation to the inherently existing self where the example is given of the king and the slaves. I found that a little bit difficult to take on with thinking of the inherently existing self because for me slaves are incredible kings are incredibly dependent on slaves to exist. The Pharaohs hadn’t have had those massive numbers of slaves we’d never have got those pyramids and Kings that have slaves that go out and fight their battles they wouldn’t be able to do it without them.
So they’re very dependent on slaves. So I don’t find it a very helpful analogy. If the example doesn’t work for you, don’t cling to it. It’s an example which was given for people who lived one thousand years ago, where it was obvious to everybody that the person who had the freedom to beat the other person was not dependent on the party he beat. Then in Australia, you don’t have slaves, you don’t have servants.
Then it’s an example which doesn’t go down well, you know. I mean, my family had basically, they amounted to indentured servants who worked for my grandfather. He didn’t have power of life and death over them, but pretty much he had every other power in the book, you know. Then, it was a completely asymmetrical relationship. They were at his mercy.
He happened to be basically a good man. He was not at their mercy. But the examples don’t go down well anymore, you know. Yes, Richard. I sort of tend to think of the command and control in that sense.
There’s some external commander and controller that seeks to reflect on and impose a will on body and mind. That’s how I see the king and the slave. Yeah. If the examples don’t work for you, don’t cling to them. I mean, you have to you have to be mentally flexible.
I mean, when you enter in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, you’re taking on board the fact that you’re dealing with teachers who come from a feudal environment, and you’ve accepted to do that, right? Then you can’t expect their sensitivity and yours to be the same, right? That really is a form of cultural imperialism, you know? And it’s astonishing how far the Tibetans have developed, But some of the examples, like in Australia, you have no servitude. Well, I spent a large part of my life in India, servitude is a reality, you know.
When you do have a form of servitude, it is your people here on student visas, right? Who have to work for a token salary. But anyway, do you have other questions about emptiness? Yes. I’m trying to get to the more precise distinction between this permanent, independent, or permanent one and independently established self, this Ātman, which non Buddhists or Hindus, etcetera consider to migrate from life to life as an independent entity, not dependent upon the aggregates from that point of view.
And the very subtle mind that migrates according to Buddhist view and which was unclear as to whether this was perceived as the accumulator and maturator of karma. Yours is an excellent question. Then if we posit ourselves from the standpoint of tantra, which is what you’re doing, right? From the standpoint of tantra, the other schools don’t accept the existence of a subtle mind. They posit consciousness as the instance of the person.
But from the standpoint of tantra, it’s a fundamental mind which transmigrates from life to life. But this fundamental mind is not an ātman. It is not an ātman because it is not permanent, it is not one, it has parts, and it’s not independent. It actually depends on the aggregates when it manifests through them, and therefore it is empty of inherent existence. It is empty of inherent existence.
So it’s one of the very, very basic misunderstandings which led me yesterday to mention that I think a lot of Western Buddhists, and not just Western Buddhists, many Tibetans are Crypto Hindus. Because Crypto Hindus, secret closet Hindus. Because, basically, we deny with one hand the existence of the self and the soul, but then very comfortably we basically speak of the fundamental mind of clear light and mentally this equates to a soul transmigrating from life to life. It’s not that at all. The fundamental mind of clear light changes instant by instant, unlike the Hindu Ātman.
It arises independence on causes and conditions, and it is not permanent. So there is really no relation. It happens to be a very subtle type of mind. That’s all. It is not a, it is not an aggregate.
Yes it is. It the is part aggregate whilst it forms part of It is definitely an aggregate. Which aggregate is it? Consciousness. And then it ceases to be part of the five aggregates.
Why does it cease to be part of the five aggregates? Upon death. Well it’s part of the aggregate of consciousness upon death as well. So isn’t that aggregate continues. It depends How about that aggregate?
It depends of the school. Right? For instance, for Bhāvaviveka, yes, that whole aggregate continues. From the standpoint of tantra, part of that aggregate continues, the mind of clear light. To which the nominal I is to be imputed?
If you’re going from the standpoint of tantra to designate an I on something, you would designate it on the fundamental mind. It’s a mere designation. I think one of the big problems I noticed this morning was the difficulty in identifying the object of negation. This is the most difficult point. If you don’t understand what you are refuting, you cannot understand what emptiness is.
So, in your opinion, what is the object of refutation? Try not to use the words we use. You see the problem in daily life, you have two selves, right? One self, the nominal self, the name, let’s say, Anne, for instance, which exists. I mean, if Anne doesn’t exist, then she would feel, I think, quite quite annoyed.
I I think we can all take for granted, and I’m sure Anne will support me in this matter, that she exists. Right? Then the Buddhists are not saying Anne does not exist. So what are they saying? What does not exist?
The problem in daily life is that the self which does exist, the normal self, and the self which is, if you wish, a fantasy, are completely mixed like oil and water. Then you have to separate them, you have to centrifugate them. Those of you who have laboratory experience, you have to centrifugate them. Right? So what do you do?
What’s a centrifuge? Yes. How what would be the centrifuge to separate them in a person? In the laboratory of the person? Inside.
Inside. Yes. Like, if you have somebody a very naughty person has basically carefully mixed water and oil and given them to you, well, especially if the density of the water and the oil are quite close, you’re in trouble, right? It forms an emulsion. Then how do you separate the two?
Put them in a centrifuge, after five minutes you have oil on the bottom oil on bottom and water on the top or the opposite. Right? So, in the person, if you’re trying to meditate on selflessness, how do you separate these two selves? Does anyone know? Yes, please.
I just saw a comment in Hopkins saying you used your name of your Western self and you had a separate name for your refuge self and you used that slightly artificial division. No. This is really very much part of the old tradition and this is what Geshe Rabten taught, all my teachers taught. Then to do it correctly with you, I’d have to put you under a lot of pressure, and I think maybe I shouldn’t. When you’re the disciple of a teacher, then the teacher does this to you, and it becomes really, really clear.
But let’s imagine, I’ll take Natalie as an example. Natalie is, I hope I’m not misreading you, quite annoyed at the thought that one is introducing this concept of slavery as an example. Then allow your annoyance to increase. Don’t just be annoyed, be basically furious. Absolutely furious.
You know, ready to burst. At this point, you stop and you examine in yourself who is saying, I am absolutely furious. That I is the object of negation. So what you are doing, and you can only do this in practice, you have in daily life a mixture of the nominal self and the inherently existing self, you cannot distinguish. If you try to negate in daily life, you will refute the nominal self and you’ll fall in the extreme of nihilism.
What you have to do is to examine your mind during periods of powerful emotion, and since we get caught up in desire too much, anger is much, much preferable. And the way the great teachers do is that they accuse somebody. Right? You are not doing your job correctly. You are slack.
You have actually taken money from the center. We are quite sure of it. And look how Aaron is bringing look at you. Look. Look.
It’s happening right now. Now check your mind. At that point, and I only do this Aaron because I’m good friends with Aaron, I know he’s gonna let it pass, I hope. I hope. Do you see the change?
You think. Okay. That it is at this point, you check inside yourself. Now, the more unfair the accusation, to be frank with you, the greater the sense of I which arises. So it the only way to identify the object of negation is you have to know the reasonings first, right?
Otherwise, this doesn’t work. And when you are the subject of an unfounded attack, something profoundly unfair, at this point you have a huge sense of I which rises, I am not like that, I have not done this, this is unfair, who is he or she to say that to me? Okay, this is the object of negation, but you see the problem, until you have separated the two, if you go through these reasonings, you negate everything, Right? So the biggest difficulty in an understanding of the Prāsaṇgika view is an identification of the object of negation. Now, generally, it is taught here in a philosophical context, the reasonings are very subtle, but it is difficult to differentiate what Rinpoche called so nicely the self which exists and the self which does not exist.
They’re both. And you must differentiate them because there is something, let us say there is a Sam which goes downtown, walks, has accumulated virtuous karma in past lives, and would experience the result of virtuous karma in future lives. If we deny that, we’re denying the existence of Sam or the existence of Anne. Obviously, that would be absurd. Right?
At the same time, it is quite clear that independence on this fantasized self, which does not exist in the way in which it appears, we accumulate all our non virtuous karma. Why does it not exist in the way it appears? And this, you really have to do the experience yourself, I cannot, I can present the lines of reasoning, but you have to live this one. When you are unfairly accused, and this is the greater the accusation, the more helpful it will be for you, and this huge sense of I arises, check. Does it appear to depend on conditions?
No. Does it appear to have parts? No. What is it its relationship with your aggregates? It is the king.
I, the king, the boss, number one, as they say in America. It is the injured party. Now this conception which apprehends of the existence of this I exists, but the I it apprehends does not exist. It’s something we are profoundly familiar with since beginning this time, it doesn’t exist at all however. The way you counter it is once it has arisen powerfully, you keep it there, and then you analyze it.
As Gesheera explained this morning, you can use that type of analysis. Does it exist in any of the five aggregates? If so, where? Or you can see is it one or multiple? It’s a more standard analysis, you know.
And when you do this you find it’s not one because if there would be this contradiction and if it were multiple there would be that contradiction it cannot be both one and multiple because nothing is nor can it be neither then you are left with the realization that that I that inherently existing I which clings to consciousness, that innate sense of an I, is a profoundly mistaken consciousness. Yes, sir. Sorry. So you you’ve given this this again before. This is what it takes you guys and asks you, so where do you feel angry?
You know, where are the parts of your body do you feel angry? And you can’t ascertain At the end, you’re left with a place where it, ultimately it’s consciousness. How do you the profound sense of anger in the consciousness and the I and the consciousness is hard to get beyond. How do you then get to the point of negation around that? So how do you negate it?
Because once you get to consciousness, it’s strong, it’s tenable, you can place anger at consciousness. That is exactly why Geshela was so surprised by your answer this morning. Because Geshela was not asking you for a dogmatic answer which you all gave. Right? You’re a good Buddhist, you come to the temple, you say what is expected from you.
Geshela was asking you check inside yourselves to see where you feel the I is. Then it’s true, I mean, he checked in high side himself, he thought it was in consciousness. If I check inside myself, I have this natural sense that there is an somehow filling the body, right? It’s innate within us. Now this I filling the body is a mixture.
It’s a mixture of the designated self and the inherent self. The more powerful my emotions, the more the mixture shifts and the inherently existing self becomes big, right? Then ideally, you turn it into something huge, because there’s basically no designated self left. And then you analyze. Yes.
It’s a projection. It’s a projection of from one’s consciousness. It’s a matter of differentiating in that case, is it not? Between what constitutes a projection or a fabrication or a fantasy of one’s mind and the mind itself. No, that’s not the issue.
For instance, if I project lawyer upon Richard, that’s a correct projection. You are a lawyer. But if I project mathematician, it’s probably an incorrect projection. You’re not a mathematician. So imputation in and of itself is not wrong.
It is perfectly correct to project or impute person on the aggregates. That’s correct. And that person which is imputed or projected on the aggregates, that’s a conventional person. It’s not being denied. Like, when I put project the name Richard on your aggregates, in this case the form aggregate, which I see, that’s correct.
Your name is Richard. You function in society as Richard. Now, if I project Richard, let’s say prime minister, hopefully, you will become one day, then that’s incorrect. Right? That’s that’s that’s incorrect.
Right? So you have correct and incorrect projections, correct and incorrect imputations. Right? There’s two things I’d like to bring up. If I’m projecting that everybody here is horrible, they’re really nasty, but they’re here to destroy me, etcetera.
If I have that projection And I’m angry about it. Mhmm. Mhmm. So what is it that I can How is it that I can separate that particular mental projection on the basis that it is a false mental projection and the projection that I am a lawyer? Well, basically what you’re asking is how conventional phenomena are established as valid in Prāsaṇgika and the answer is quite simple whether they can perform the function which is attributed to them through the imputation so in your case you can perform the function which is expected from a lawyer.
Then I am quite sure nobody in this room room could perform the function expected from being horrible to you. Right? So you have it’s really important to distinguish here that you have when we criticize in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the notion of an inherently existing self, we are in no way criticizing projection as projection. Projection, you have valid and invalid projections. Then that projection does not exhaust what it is projected upon.
All the Buddhist schools agree. It’s almost trite. This is one of the main misunderstandings of Madhya Mika in the West. Right? The Sautrantika School and his Dharmakirti’s contribution considers that the conceptual image of an object is a poor representation of that object.
For instance, if I look at Lily now, Lily appears to me with all her features, Lily’s body, her shape and form do. Right? If I close my eyes and I think Lily, something appears, it’s like an outline of Lily with perhaps a black tunic, the hair and sort of a white face in between, but all the uncommon features are gone. Right? So for this reason, in the Sautrāntika school, conception is said to be partially erroneous.
It is functional, and we use it. It can lead to scientific discoveries, to realization of emptiness, and so forth. But conception has one big weakness. It eliminates the uncommon features of its object. If I look at Lily, the uncommon features appear instant by instant, movement of the eyes, etcetera.
If I was an Achat, probably I could see very, very subtle changes instant by instant. But the moment I close my eyes, all this is gone. The mental image itself is a permanent phenomenon. This explains, for instance, much of the process of falling in love. Right?
We fall in Right? We fall in love with mental images, don’t we? You have a mental image of the person. You might have known them thirty years ago. They were young and gorgeous.
And then whenever you think about them, the mental image which appears is a thirty year old mental image, even though they are gray and doddering. I just finished this one. This is a Sautrāntika understanding of the difference between direct perception and conception, which we’ll study in Lorig. A lot of Western scholars think that Mādhyamika is basically criticizing the process of projection or imputation, which is a conceptual process. That’s not the case at all.
Madhyamika distinguishes between valid and invalid imputations. If I impute Aaron on the body in front of me, this is a correct imputation. It is in keeping with his driver’s license. If he goes to, let’s say, the passport office to get a passport, he can get a passport as Aaron. If I impute Mark on his bases, then it is an invalid imputation, not merely because he doesn’t have a beard, but because if he goes to the passport office he will not get Mark’s passport.
Yes Sam. To make that example real though, so instead of imputing Mark or an Aaron and say we take for example a car or something that makes it real and how it relates to karma. A car is a car with four wheels and takes you from A to B. But then the incorrect imputation is to say that car will make me good looking, handsome, etc. And therefore I commit a karmic misdeed to acquire that car.
Is that the linkage between the two and therefore There you are just imputing qualities to the car which may or may not be correct. I don’t know what a car does for you. Say those things in I don’t know. You know? According to the ads.
Yeah. They have never done that for me, but, you know. Let me give you one example which Geshe Rabten always used, which is a very powerful example. I think you’ll understand better. Now, I wish I had a thousand a Swiss CHF1,000 note.
It’s like a thousand dollars, it works better. But this works quite well. Basically, we designate 50 Australian dollars on the basis of this piece of plastified paper. Right? Now every single person in this room agrees that this is designated as $50.
Because of our consensual agreement this can function as legal tender, right? So if I give I’m sorry I don’t remember your name any if I give Brad $50 sorry? Grant. Grant, sorry. If I give Grant $50 to purchase, let’s say, his jacket, assuming he wanted to sell it for that price, he would consider that that is a legal deal.
Right? Now, that imputation is a valid imputation. Assume that actually this is a false note. Right? You don’t know it is a false note.
But you impute 50 dollarness onto it. Until somebody checks and realizes it’s a false note. At that point, the object is exactly the same. Right? But its capacity to function as a $50 note has ceased.
Right? It is no longer able to perform the function of a $50 note. So this is how conventional phenomena are established by mere designation. This is perfectly valid, nobody denies this in Prāsaṇgika. Nobody.
Then I was going to say, I wish I had a thousand dollar note and I wish I had matches. But this was what Geshe Rabten did. Now it depends how greedy you are. Right? If you’re really greedy, this works well.
If you want, it doesn’t work very well. If I take a lighter and I light this in front of you, there will be, especially in the American audience, I don’t know mister Edward, a reaction of absolute horror. It is like you are basically flying in the face of the values of the republic, especially if it’s a big note. How dare he? How can he?
At that point, you are apprehending this not as a nominal designation, but as an inherently existing phenomenon. And the emotions which arise, as you can see immediately if you think about the scenario, are the emotions attributed to an inherent existing phenomena which are completely unwarranted. Right? So you could take any other example, but these are very nice because one of the big problems you have with Prāsaṇgika, or at least I used to have, is how is it possible for something which is a mere name to function, right? Then actually in our Western societies, there are many examples of this and it works really well.
The one which worked really well for me was a company. I had to create my own company many years ago. When you create a company, it’s actually a name. You basically choose a name among the list of available names, you propose a name to see whether it’s free or not. There are a series of legal acts which are actually basically words, and there is a consensual agreement, and that is sufficient to enable that entity to perform a lot of activities, issuing shares, buying other companies, research and development, borrowing, it becomes an effective phenomenon.
And it’s just a name. Then you can see for a person the same thing, right? We see ourselves as solid entities. If you examine yourself or you were to examine yourself in an electron microscope, you would see aggregates of cells, and if you went in deeper and looked at the atoms, would see basically huge areas of empty space with one proton here, and one electron a couple kilometers away, and another proton here. And this heap of material elements is designated as your body.
But it functions. So does this example help to understand the example of the bill? Yes. Given the cigarette lighter example, is this the right place to ask for another explanation of why the monks burnt themselves in Tibet? If they were further down the track than we are in terms of understanding where I was and that the body is just a collection of aggregates being propelled along by karma and their bodies were going to die anyway.
How was it that their immolation made such a difference to them? Well, I think it’s almost the opposite of what you mentioned. I mean, you have a very strong awareness that you are going to die of any way, Then, especially if one has trained in altruism, the idea of dying before one’s time and making a difference becomes a very big motivator. Now, we are all the products of a society in which, whether we wish to or not, we are convinced that this is all there is, and we are quite terrified of death. I think there are very few of us who would be able to give their life for anybody.
Maybe, I don’t know, maybe our children, maybe not. I mean, you only know those things when you’re put on the spot, don’t you? Then for us this behavior is aberrant and very disturbing because obviously when monks do this and we are associated with the Buddhist community, we feel it reflects on us, you know. Then everything depends on the motivation of these persons, right? I think if the motivation is pure, it’s a heroic deed.
If the motivation is impure, it concerns a person. Why do you think it’s heroic? The body is neither here nor there, but it is a means of protest against Chinese occupation, the only one left if you don’t want to harm others. I mean, the world has accepted the occupation of Tibet. It’s a given.
It’s been more than fifty years. But now, because of the immolations, all of us are talking about it, aren’t we? It’s all over the news, it’s in the press, it’s a clear sign that basically sixty years later, the Tibetans don’t accept the Chinese occupation. I remember reading about the self immolation of the Buddhist monks in Vietnam during the Vietnam War. I don’t know in Australia, but in America it had a very big impact, Much more powerful than if there were hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating on the streets.
These monks who doused themselves with gasoline, sat in meditation posture and did not move, you know, really showed the man on the street that the religious cream of the country did not accept American presence in South Vietnam. So I don’t know what more to say to you. I can see by your face it disturbs you a lot. Public statement and passed up something of value in order to make the world understand how wrong the situation is. I was looking more about how they separated Well, what for a good monk or just a good Buddhist practitioner, if by reducing this life by a couple of years one were to really benefit others, I think it would be an easy decision.
Would be a reasonable trade off. Pretty easy decision. Well, obviously it depends where you are in terms of your practice. If you’re being of the small scope, would think in terms of your own karma, right? And then, you know, if you basically commit suicide for the sake of others, it’s a strong motivation to help others, it’s a virtuous deed.
You know, then you accumulate a lot of good karma. Then if one is a being of the great scope, one doesn’t think of one’s karma. Yes. Yes, but that’s a Judeo Christian viewpoint, right? It’s the deed as opposed to the intent.
The deed as opposed to the intent. From the Buddhist standpoint, it’s the intent which forges the deed, right? Bodhisattvas, and here we talk about bodhisattvas, have an actual obligation to perform non virtuous deeds as you know, if they benefit others. It It would be an act of might mature as non virtuous karma for you in the future, you might be reborn in the hell realms. Then if you practice as a being of the small scope, you will never do this.
If, on the other hand, your motivation is to help 6,000,000 people, which is a number of Tibetans, and you kill yourself, probably you will be reborn in a hell realm at some point, but most definitely, if the motivation is to help 6,000,000 people, there will also be some very powerful beneficial results for yourself in the future. I see by the body language you are very disturbed by this. I noticed many westerners are very disturbed because it puts it puts it on the point. You see, I’ve asked myself one question because it is an issue which has arisen for me a couple times. I used to be quite close to His Holiness and sometimes I was seated up front.
Then, as you know, His Holiness and Security is a very sensitive affair. And I thought to myself, what happened if someone attacked His Holiness when I was there? Then everyone wants to live, but I thought to myself, you know, my life is not very important. Certainly, I can’t do what His Holiness does. Then for me to take the blows intended for him makes a lot of sense.
I mean, you know, I’m just one person going on 52 this year. His Holiness teaches 7,000 at a time. Then my life is not important compared to that, you know. People feel that way about their children. The thing is actually training to give your body for us, isn’t it?
So that’s what the self immolation, I mean I know Geshe has spoken before about the self immolations being the bodhisattva path, that are actually giving their for the sake of others and that is part of the bodhisattva path is the expectation that we would do that. The motivation we don’t know, I mean I’m sure that there were some young monks who were basically competing with each other, but there are, I mean for the cases I have read, there are exceptional people, exceptional people, Mothers of families, fathers, people really you read about their lives, what the last things they said, it’s very pure motivation. Then these are great deeds. You yourselves may not be, we ourselves may not be able to engage in these deeds, but we should esteem and respect those who do. I think for most of us Westerners, there really is nothing at present we would give our lives for.
I can’t say this for sure, but I think pretty much so. Pretty much so. Pretty much so. You would. Then you can see that’s partiality.
Right? But that partiality, you can extend to others, you know. Because the rationale we we have when we say I would die for my child is, well, I am old, my child is young. I’ve heard my mother said this, say this, therefore, you know, it makes sense for an old person to sacrifice a couple years for the sake of many years for a child. But you can also use the same rationale in terms of benefit.
If you think, well, in my life I can only do x, but let’s say if I were to give up my life, I would do 1,000 x, then it is tempting to give up your life. This is why Buddha Śākyamūni offered his body to the tigress. Think about it. I mean, I think one thing, you know, you can do for yourselves to train your minds towards the Mahāyāna is to start to foster thoughts of self sacrifice. Very, very beneficial for the mind.
Self sacrifice, it doesn’t have to be sacrificing your body, which at the beginning is too difficult, but for instance, money or your work. And you start small, because obviously there’s a lot of resistance and then you build up your capacity to sacrifice yourself when we speak of the path of the bodhisattva we’re speaking of the path of self sacrifice that’s what the bodhisattvas do you know. I’m sorry? My handbag. You’re not bringing my handbag.
You’re not not having your handbag. Well, whatever. Step by step, step by step, you know. At some point we will be able to initially we give vegetables, as they say, and at some point we’ll be able to give our bodies. This is the path of spiritual growth from the method side.
Then these great beings in Tibet who immolated themselves by fire, not only did they basically give their life, but they gave it in an extraordinarily painful way. The few, in the cases I know of, to make sure that they died as a result, they would, in addition to wrapping their body with wool soaked with gasoline, they would drink kerosene. And then, obviously, it is impossible to save one. Know, one burns from the inside as as well as from the outside. Then it is very shocking for you because it is too extreme an act of giving for us to engage in.
But start small and train your minds and then quietly, quietly. That’s that’s the beginning, but then clearly the parents view the children as their own posterity. Whereas if you were working for your nation, it’s a broader view already. You have no genetic relationship. And then if you’re working for mankind, it’s an even broader view.
And if you’re working for all living beings, it’s even bigger than that. So we start where we are, you know, and try to break this this very sort of narrow egotistical mind, you know, and that’s a path to self growth. Then I’m afraid we have to stop here for today. Thank you for your questions, and I hope the example with the the bill was of help. Oh, my heart bleeds.
Key terms in this teaching
- atman dag (Tib)
- Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
- clear light ö sel (Tib)
- The extremely subtle mind which is directly recognized as the culmination of successful tantric practice, and is also accessible or recognizable to ordinary beings at the time of death. LYWA
- lorig
- Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- right-seeing path darshana-marga (Skt); tong lam (Tib)
- The third of the five paths to buddhahood; attained with the direct perception of emptiness. Also called the path of seeing. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- tantra gyü (Tib)
- Literally, thread, or continuity. The secret teachings of the Buddha; a scriptural text and the teachings and practices it contains. Also called Vajrayana or Mantrayana. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.
Questions answered in this teaching
How does the Buddhist view relate to the question of free will?
Free will is a Western debate that does not really concern Buddhists. It arises when one postulates a soul that functions within the body as an autonomous entity, and then asks how much autonomy that soul has in its willing. In a tradition with no such soul, there is just a causal continuum. To think that one part of that continuum has complete autonomy in its willing is the view of an inherent, autonomous, substantial existent, which is refuted when the subtle self of persons is refuted. So it is a non issue. The paradox arises once one accepts a self with a capital S, and this is very problematic for monotheistic traditions.