Sun Radiance – Thought Transformation

59 min · 7,602 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Sun Radiance - Thought Transformation (Khensur Rinpoche)
Sun Radiance - Thought Transformation (Khensur Rinpoche)
Sun Radiance - Thought Transformation
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 59-minute Q&A session, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen explores the Buddhist analysis of the six root afflictions and four types of afflicted views, moving from abstract definition into searching debate about substantial cause and momentary change. He begins by examining desire and anger as mental factors that can be either conceptual or non-conceptual depending on the mind they accompany, then discusses ignorance as the absence of knowledge rather than a positive position. The discussion of pride and afflicted doubt follows, with particular attention to how afflicted doubt differs from virtuous debate. The final and most complex topic is afflicted views, broken into four categories: the view of a permanent self within the aggregates, extreme views of eternalism or materialism, unethical conduct based on such views, and outright wrong views denying karma and causality. He then pivots to a prolonged exploration of what “similar in type” means when defining substantial cause—a concept central to Buddhist logic and the proof of past and future lives. The session moves through concrete examples: lumps of clay and vases, the first moment of flame when striking a match, the substantial continuum of the human body from conception onward, and challenges from quantum mechanics and particle physics. Pitched at serious students already familiar with Buddhist tenet systems and ready to engage in rigorous philosophical debate.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 8 Verses (D2Q&A – KR.mp3

UUID: 03ac683d-f14c-433a-b694-e7d36b6bdb44

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Sun Radiance – Thought Transformation

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~7,603

Very good. Okay. Better, Can anyone list the six root afflictions, Molly, please? Desire, anger, pride, ignorance, afflicted doubt, afflicted view. Very good.

Very good. Then you all know them. Oh! They are part actually of a larger presentation known as the 10 afflictions, which are presented in Asaṇga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya, which is the Mahāyāna Abhidharma, if you wish. It’s translated by the way in English from a marvelous French translation by Walpola Rahula, Leo Pruden did it.

I think we may have it in the library. And this 10 presentation of the afflictions can also be found in Asaṇga’s Yogacarabhumi. Then we’ll cover them one by one. The last one, afflicted view, is the most difficult, obviously. That is subdivided by Asaṇga into four.

So the first is desire. A desire seems self evident. It’s an attraction of the mind towards an object which is attractive. Desire, as all of the root afflictions with the exception of ignorance in some cases and the afflicted view is a mental factor. Then, in your opinion, is desire conceptual, non conceptual, or can it be both?

Why? It’s good. Can you give me a more abstract, more theoretical answer? Less sort of experiential. All of us have experiences but So I gave you the hint when I said desire was a mental factor.

You should be able to conclude from that. The clock is ticking. What are the features mental factors shares with the main mind of the companies? It’s similar to its aspect. Yes.

The five features. Right? So same substance, same time, same aspect, same object, etcetera. So the key here is same substance. What does that mean?

That if the main mind is conceptual, the mental factor accompanying it is conceptual. If the main mind is non conceptual, the mental factor accompanying it is non conceptual. So you have a main mind, a conception, let’s say. Let’s say in my case right now the memory of my mother. So the mother of my mother image of my mother appears, that’s a conceptual mind.

Right? Then that is surrounded by mental factors. All those mental factors will be conceptual because the main mind is conceptual. If on the other hand, let us imagine Andy had marvelous not a Toyota, but a marvelous car. And I was looking looking because Toyota’s don’t elicit these emotions.

It has to be German or Italian to elicit this type of reaction. I was looking at Andy’s car and a continuous stream of visual consciousness was focused on that car. That visual consciousness can be accompanied by desire. Right? And that desire, it’s a mental factor.

It’s actually when we say mental factor, it’s part of the visual consciousness. Right? That mental factor of desire is non conceptual because the visual consciousness is non conceptual. And the moment you pause and you start thinking, then conceptuality enters the picture. You may have conceptual, you know, desire and so forth.

So if you you have to function in terms of fundamental analysis here. The same thing would be true for anger. Right? Obviously, if this were not the case, then animals which have very limited conceptual activity would not experience anger or desire. Right?

Obviously, they do, you know. So both desire and anger are mental factors. Both can be conceptual or non conceptual. Both are rooted in an exaggeration of the status of the perceived object. It’s not that the experience is pleasant or unpleasant, it is that it is transformed by the mind into something dramatically pleasant or dramatically unpleasant.

Right? So those are the two first of these six mental factors. The third is ignorance and ignorance here is not the ignorance of selflessness alone. So it is understood in a broader context. It is for instance the ignorance of causality.

I would say that if you look at it in this sense probably most westerners nowadays are beset by this ignorance. Very few people accept the existence of any type of ethical causality. Events and the results are seen as a random concatenation, if you wish. That is the third mental factor, ignorance. The fourth is pride.

Then pride is quite straightforward. Pride is an exaggeration of one’s importance based on preexisting physical or mental qualities. In other words, pride has an element, if you’ll forgive me, of truth to it. Otherwise, it would be a wrong view. You are, let us say, let us say in my case, I look at myself in the mirror, I see this dashing young man with a fair number of hairs remaining, a nose which isn’t that big, you know, and I think my goodness, you know, don’t want.

Right? And that’s not pride, that’s a wrong wrong view, you know, because there’s nothing there. But let us say if someone who is quite attractive or someone who is quite intelligent on the basis of that were to say, I am, you know, as attractive as whoever a famous actor is, or I am as intelligent as a great scientist, then that is pride. Because on the basis of pre existing qualities, there’s a huge exaggeration which occurs. So this is all fairly straightforward.

Right? And the fifth root affliction is afflicted doubt. Now here, you have to distinguish between afflicted or afflictive and non afflictive doubt. Not all doubt is afflictive. Right?

Most doubt, let’s say, have I left the keys of the car in the temple or in the room in the back, is not afflictive doubt. It is ethically neutral. Most doubt is neutral. Right? Afflictive doubt is doubt specifically of issues which are related to the spiritual path.

It is doubt regarding karma and causality. It is doubt regarding the existence or non existence of the triple gem. And here we speak very much from a Buddhist standpoint, you know. Such doubt is obviously very harmful to any type of spiritual practice. This is in no way the doubt which is fostered in debate.

It’s a very important distinction. In debate, there is a suspension of conviction, I suppose that’s the way I would put it, for the duration of the debate between two parties who actually subscribe to these views but wish to deepen their understandings through seeing what would happen if we said this is not the case. This is very powerful for the mind. That doubt, I would say, is virtuous doubt because it typically leads to a great deepening of one’s understanding. Then I used to know a Geshe who made a very thoughtful comment, I thought.

I was talking of the works of a very controversial Tibetan scholar, And I asked him if he had read them, and he said no because I’m not sure I would have the capacity to refute them. And I thought this was very wise of him. You know? I don’t mention his name because as Westerners I know, you’ll go to look it up and you won’t be able to refute. You know?

But it was interesting. He had a very clear sense of what was in his remit and what was not. And he did not want to put in question fundamental aspects of his practice. You see? That’s really a form of wisdom, you know.

I I was very impressed when he said that. Then that is for afflictive doubt, and the final wrong view is afflicted views. Then there are four afflicted views. I list them first, we’ll cover them together after. The first is the view of the disintegrating composite.

The second is extreme views. The third is ethics or conduct based on this. And the fourth is wrong views. Wrong So you can already see that there is a distinction between afflicted views and wrong views. Wrong views are a subset of afflicted views.

In other words, everything which is a wrong view is an afflicted view, but everything which is an afflicted view is not a wrong view. So within afflicted views, the first subdivision is that of the view of the disintegrating composite, which is something very important for us to understand. The view of the disintegrating composite is a view according to which, within our five aggregates, in other words, the form, sensation, discrimination, composition factor, and consciousness aggregates, there is an I which is the owner of the aggregates. In other words, when you look inside the aggregates, you find an I whose relation to the aggregates is that, if you wish, of a king to his subject, of an owner to what it owns. Now this view is called the view of the disintegrating composite to teach by that statement that this composite, and composite here refers to the five aggregates, is composed.

It has parts, in other words, and it disintegrates. It is impermanent. It disintegrates instant by instant, and it is composed of elements. So it is the understanding of the view of the disintegrating composite and its antidote which is what differentiates the various Buddhist schools of tenets. Right?

Then on the basis of this view of the disintegrating composite, which is innate, it is something which arises naturally within us. You know? When I address, for instance, let us say, I would ask her, how is your body today? How is your leg? I imply that there is an owner of the body or the leg.

How is your mind today? Once again, the statement implies there is an owner of the mind apart from the body and the mind. This is the problem with this view, which is which underlies speech in general. Right? Then this is the first of the four afflicted views.

The second is the view of the extremes. The view of the extremes is on the basis of the view of the disintegrating composite to succumb either in the extreme of eternalism or nihilism. The view view of eternalism would be to say, which is, let’s say, the position of most of the world religions, that there is a soul. The Christians call it a soul, the Hindus call it an Ātman within the disintegrating composite. So it disintegrates, but there is an owner, and this owner is the soul.

You know? The view of nihilism, the extreme of nihilism is, I would say, the view perhaps of the majority of thinking Westerners nowadays, as opposed to people who just go with the flow. If you’re a thinking Westerner, basically, nowadays, you are a materialist. You know? Most people don’t analyze too much, but if you speak, let’s say, the departments of philosophy, for instance, to people or if you go, let’s say, where I used to be in the science then everyone is a materialist, a hard materialist.

My father was a hard materialist, he was a leading scientist. Then the mind was the brain. It was another name for the activities of the brain, you know, and apart from that there was nothing. Before the brain was functional, there was no mind. After the brain decayed in the grave during incineration, there was no mind.

People who believed this were primitive. This is a dominant view in the West, this extreme of nihilism based on the view of the disintegrating composite. Right? So that’s the second category of wrong views. The third is wrong behavior on the basis wrong behavior or wrong ethics on the basis of such a view.

Then you would have two extremes. One extreme, which is prevalent nowadays, would be fundamentalist Islam. On the basis of the assertion of a creator who has given his law in the Quran, then, and this is only for extremist Muslims. Right? The killing of unbelievers not only allowed but encouraged.

This is Jihad, misunderstood Jihad. Right? So this is wrong ethics. It’s very difficult to counter because it is a profoundly held belief of the person. Right?

Another case of wrong ethics, which may cut perhaps some of you close to the bone, is on the basis of the view that the mind is a product of the brain. The idea that late abortion is permissible. Late abortion is permissible. There is no mind there. Right?

It is not a sentient being. It is just matter. Right? A thing. Both cases, killing, that’s what we’re talking about, is justified on the base of what amounts to a wrong ideology.

So those would be the two types of wrong behaviors which arise from extreme views. And then we have wrong views themselves. So wrong views themselves are the mistaken belief in the non existence of karma and causality or, and once again here, one is speaking from a strongly Buddhist standpoint, the mistaken belief in the existence of a creator. So Buddhists consider there are there is no creator nor can there be. He would be self sufficient and inherently existent if he existed.

You know? So these are the four afflicted views. Then you can see that there is a big difference between wrong views and afflicted views, can’t you? Afflicted views is a larger category and wrong views is a smaller category. Right?

It’s very interesting for us to analyze the unfolding of the history of ideas in terms of the unfolding of these four categories of afflicted views. How on the basis of the view of the disintegrating composite, extreme views arise. These extreme views give rise to wrong views and these wrong views give rise to wrong behavior or ethics. And it is not trite because frankly the consequences are around us to see, you know. Then that’s what I wanted to cover on the six root afflictions which as we said actually can be subdivided into 10.

These are desire, anger, ignorance, pride, afflicted doubt and afflicted views, which are subdivided into four. Right? Does all of this make sense? Very good. Then do you have questions?

I’m just not quite clear on ignorance and afflicted views seem to have some overlap. There seems to be a little bit of overlap there. Does everyone agree with Andy or not? The question is, is there some overlap between afflicted views and ignorance? No, I’d like to want I’d like you to say whether you agree with Andy or not.

Andy says there’s overlap. Yes. Who says yes? Okay. Who says no?

Who has no position? Okay. So gentlemen and ladies, you do have to commit. Then let us reflect a bit. What is ignorance?

Ignorance is not a position. It’s the absence of a position. Do you see how the absence of the position and the commitment to a wrong position might be very different? Right? So you have never heard of karma and causality.

You are ignorant about karma and causality. Right? It will affect your life very heavily, but it’s not a choice, at least not in this life. You reject violently karma and causality in our stark materialist. That’s a choice, it’s a position.

It’ll have basically the same consequences as ignorance of karma and causality, except that maybe ignorance is easier to counter. Right? There’s no choice. So I it’s a matter for you to analyze personally. I think there’s no overlap.

Because one is a passive state and the other, the afflicted views, is an active state. You know? So there’s very big difference. And you have other questions? Alright so well the hot topic before lunch was substantial causes and cooperative conditions and then it was also a hot topic over lunch.

So your digestions have not been good enough? No, they are not. They feel like a lump of clay. So could we have a little bit of a talk around the substantial cause because I had a strong position at lunchtime and then I started thinking while I was washing and while I was drying dishes and sweeping the floor in the kitchen that maybe I had misled people with my strong views which were wrong views perhaps. It’s a frightening confession not to mention.

You have strong adamant views, you preach to others and then you change your mind. My. Pretty much in itself. So what were the doubts about? Oh okay, so we were talking about the lump of clay and the moment that comes into a vase so I was talking that I was saying that the key factor here is momentariness in understanding substantial cause and that substantial cause of a vase, the immediate moment of the lump of clay before it just becomes a vase is the substantial cause.

It’s not a cooperative condition. The cooperative conditions for that vase would be the person, wheel, the kiln and so forth. That’s exactly it. Except for one thing I don’t know has anyone of you ever made a vase? I did as a child then there is not this one moment before the occurrence of the vase.

I mean you would be very hard put to put one moment before which that coil which you are coiling up is not a vase and one moment after which it suddenly is a vase, right? So every single moment there is part of the substantial continuum of vase. Right? The questions I think about the substantial cause are actually questions about what a substantial continuum is. Know?

And that, if you do you remember the definition of a substantial cause? Anybody? Words to that effect. Yes. Yes.

A producer which produces a a later phenomenon of similar type to it. So the key what are the keywords here? You’ve got a couple. Let’s let’s not rush into things. Producer.

Producer. So producer is number one. Then produces a phenomenon similar in type are the next two words, and later is the final word. A producer is easy. It is a producer because it is a cause, and likewise, all causes are producers.

That’s not a problem. Later, the last one word is also easy. Effects come after the cause which has produced them. That is not difficult. The two difficult terms are in the middle, similar in type.

What do we mean when we say that the substantial result is similar in type to its substantial cause? Did you say substantial end? Yeah. But you just replaced one statement by another. I mean, the question is there’s two questions here.

What is meant by similarity and what is meant by type? Same nature is actually a stronger statement than saying type in Buddhist logic. Alright? So let us take an example. If we are saying that the lump of clay before the creation of vase and vase after the creation its creation from that lump of clay are of one substantial continuum and that that lump of clay is a substantial cause of vase, then that means that that lump of clay is of similar type to vase.

So vase ness is an issue of the shape. Right? It’s not an issue and function perhaps, but it’s not an issue of substance. Do you start to understand how we are functioning here? Vase is a shape given to a substance, but the continuum of the substance is uninterrupted.

Right? Now, I don’t know how you would destroy clay, maybe with plasma, I don’t know. But let’s say you put it in a plasma oven and there was no clay left, the substantial continuum would be destroyed. Alright? Now, let us take these lines of reasoning with substantial cause one step further and ask a little bit more difficult of a question than that about vases.

Let’s take our own body. What is the substantial cause, let us say, of my body in the past? Can you give one instance? Substantial cause, Of my body. Okay, the previous moment of your body.

Okay, very good. Everyone agrees? Is the substantial continuum of my body eternal or not? Eternal in the past or not? In the future, we know it terminates.

I will die. But in the past, is there a beginning or not? No. There’s not. Of your body?

Of my body there is or there isn’t? Yes. So how come everyone said no and everyone is saying yes now? Raise your hands. Who says there isn’t a beginning?

Only two, three? Okay. Who says there is? My body. This this here.

Right? So is there a beginning to the substantial continuum of my body or not? Yes. Okay. Raise your hands those who say no.

It started and then went back down. It started? No. Okay. Then please raise your hands those who say yes.

Okay. Then those who say yes, what do you give? So, I give the moment that the sperm and the egg joined in your mother’s body? Yes, very good, very good. If you’re going to give an answer, that’s the one to give.

Those who say no, why? Because the material that makes up the sperm and egg is a cause or is a result of previous bodies and that goes back ad infinitum. We take the first instance of my body. Is the first instance of my body merely the conjunction of the material of the sperm and the egg or not? Why not?

What does mind have to do with it? Well, in that case, mind would be a cooperative condition. But let’s set aside Buddhism for the time being. You all have a bit of genetics in your education. So from the standpoint of genetics, is the spermatozoa part of the substantial continuum of my body or not?

Yes. So the genetic material of the spermatozoa is the same as my genetic material? I don’t know. First you said yes, now you’re saying no. Is it part of the continuum?

Yes. Then that means it’s similar in type. Yes. Yes. Right?

So I would ask you the same question for the egg. Right? From the mother’s side. Is my body or is the egg part of the substantial continuum of my body or not? You run into problems if you say yes.

Because my genetic code, which is if you’re gonna give a type for my body, it’s probably my genetic code you have to look at. Right? My genetic code is neither the genetic code of or included in the nucleus of the spermatozoa nor the genetic code included in the nucleus of the egg. Right? Well, it derives from the two, but it is certainly different from either.

Importantly different. Right? So if you’re going to make a case for the body, the form aggregate, in other words having a beginning, it has to be the egg at the first instant of conception because if you could define the type for the body, it’s probably going to be the genetic code. Right? I don’t know what would be the best way to do it nowadays.

Then if you’re going to say that there is no beginning, you have to say that the type of my body is the same as the type of the two, the spermatozoa and the egg. Right? And that in my opinion is awkward. Is it the case, sir Geshe-la said, that all composite phenomena necessarily have substantial causes in cooperative conditions. Right?

Do you agree or not? Yes. Everyone agrees? Yes. Anyone disagree?

No. Does that mean that every composite phenomenon is a has a substantial cause? Apparently, it is. No. It is debate.

There’s no no waffling, no apparently, no I think. No. Let me reconsider. It’s yes or no? Yes.

Yes. Then what is the substantial cause of the first instance of the flame when you strike a match? First instance of the flame when you strike a match is a composite phenomenon, right? The flame, got a first instant. You all said this has a substantial cause, then you have to give me the substantial cause.

And then if you excuse me, I’m going for a little walk, I’ll be back. So what’s the substantial cause? I can’t say I think. Is the friction between the match and the box? So, friction between match and box is similar in type to flame.

Sachi? Is the heat. Is the heat. Okay. You’ve already changed your answer.

Now we’re talking about the heat. Is the heat caused by the friction between the match and the So heat is similar in type to flame. Yes. It is. Heat has the same results as flame.

Yes. A result? Heavens, thank God you don’t work for an insurance company. There’s a big difference between heating the room and burning the room down. I said no.

Do you see So you all said, you see, you’ve all taken things in authority. Right? So part of the training which is imparted our tradition, the Guru tradition, Buddhism in general, is that you have to learn to use logic. The teachers’ teachings are there as a guideline. Then you have to think by yourself, you know, and especially in the context here of what is known as Thari, which is basically instructions on texts, not only are you entitled, you are encouraged to disagree.

That’s why Geshe-la was very happy with Mari’s strong opinionated stance this morning. You know? Then you all drew from the statement that all composite phenomena necessarily have a substantial cause and a cooperative condition, the conclusion that all composition phenomena necessarily have a substantial cause. Can you see that that is unwanted? If I were to ask you do all composite phenomena have a cooperative condition?

What would you say? Yes or no? Anyone disagrees? Phenomena have a cooperative condition. Silence is deafening.

So what do you think? Be be forthright. I also believe that all composite phenomena have cooperative conditions because I cannot find a counter example. But I do not accept that all composite phenomena have substantial causes because the evident one of the first instance of the flame of the match or in the Buddhist treatises, the first instance of the flame of a lamp. You know, the reason I took the flame of a match is because you have to light the lamp.

So you run into trouble with that one. You say, someone says, yes, but the first instance of the flame of the lamp has a substantial cause because it is a flame with which you lit the lamp. So when you take the match, you know, just my private example is copyrighted by the way. Just for myself. Then before that first instant, there is nothing of the type of flame.

Right? So when you say that all cooperative phenomena have e have a substantial cause or a cooperative condition that is true, it is not true, in my opinion, that all composite phenomena have a substantial cause. I think then you have to qualify. But this is my own understanding which I present to you. .

Yes. Then cooperative conditions, yes. Every composite phenomenon I can think of could be the cooperative condition of something else. Right? So what’s the definition of similar type?

Well, that is a good question. Yes. That is the crux of the issue here. What do you think? The light, it’s not the same as the actual fire.

Because they have different results. We can all agree that within a given continuum, flame is of similar type with future flame. Everyone agrees, right? Yep. Then if you were to ask me whether flame was of similar type than coal, the answer would be no.

No. Right? Then if if you were to say, heat is of similar type with flame, I would certainly say no. Because? Because in terms of result, you can have heat without flame and flame without heat.

But then the lump of clay wouldn’t have the same wouldn’t provide the same functionality as a a pot. If you’re talking about results, if you’re talking about they have different because they don’t have the same result, therefore they are not similar in type. I’m not saying this is a definite statement by any way. I’m not saying it is not a general rule that having the same results mean the two phenomena are similar in types. I mean, nobody is saying that.

I’m just saying we have to find the meaning for similarity in type. Right? And then if you’re going to say that heat is of the same type as flame, then by extension, you would have to say things along the lines of perhaps what do you have to say? Well, many things like that. Many things like that.

And also, you know, heat would be a very relative concept. So heat in an Arctic country would be of the same type as flame in that country. Then heat in an Arctic country might be minus 20 when it’s minus 40 outside. That’s of the same type as flame. Again, that’s strange.

Okay. That is a good way to look at it. Before you strike the match, you’ve got chemical energy stored in the substance that coats the tip of the match. Once you strike the match, that triggers a chemical reaction which releases that chemical energy. So, you’ve got chemical energy transferred into heat energy.

That’s a transformation of the transformation, but it’s not necessarily change of type. So what what is flame? Flame is is gas. That’s better. Flame is Flame is hot gas.

Hot gas? Yes. It’s dependent upon hot gas. It’s actually the light released by hot gas as electrons move from a high energy state to a lower energy state. Oh, very good.

You have some physics. I can see that. Very good. Now, that is the way to start thinking about things. Now, we’re going very far field with the example of flame here, but the goal here is to give you an idea of how to think about type and nature.

These are not minor topics. I gave a talk at the University of Adelaide in 02/10. You I think you were there, Department of Philosophy. And there was one of the professors there who who was a physicist by training. And he hit the nail on the head.

He asked me, what precisely do Buddhists say about identity? That’s the crux of the question. Right? Identity. Identity versus difference.

Right? And I told him he said as far as ordinary phenomena are concerned, I said, well, in the continuum of a phenomenon, strictly speaking, you know, you take the Sautrantika system, every instant is different from every previous and future instant. There is no identity. The identity is a mental imputation on the basis of difference. This is the meaning of what we talked about earlier, the view of the disintegrating composite.

Right? So he immediately saw the crux there, and the Buddhist viewpoint is really massively compatible with that of physics as it’s known now. Now there is another problem I’d like to bring up with you just to give you an idea of what we’re dealing with, and then we’ll pass to more Buddhist topics. We speak of a substantial continuum. Right?

Then? Please. No. Substantial continuum is the continuum. Substantial cause is an event in the continuum related to other events.

It’s different. How do we handle the paradoxes in quantum mechanics? Yes, the paradoxes of non locality. Where you have a particle which, let’s say with something which is known as the Josephson junction, basically exists before the junction and then appears the other side of the junction. Then can we speak of a substantial continuum of that particle or not?

If we it’s matter, right? So what happened? Its continuum exists only on a momentary base? And what’s the junction? The Josephson junction is a it’s something used in electronics.

It’s become very important. But, basically, it triggers non local behavior in the particle. The particle passes like an electronic switch, if you want, from one side of the junction to the other, but it actually never passes in between. Right? The junction is a physical barrier.

The junction is a physical barrier, you know, but the particle basically does not physically cross the barrier and yet appears on the other side of the barrier. Then Where you can You can try. So think about it a bit. When we’re speaking, see the key when we bring these Buddhist topics in is to make sure that they match reality. Right?

So that is something you really should think about. Then do you have other questions? Please. Same thing topic and the definition of substantial cause as the similar in type part of it. And we didn’t really kind of give an actual definition of what that means.

Would the function be qualified as being similar in type? Like if we take the clay in the vase, the function of the vase is different to the function of the vase and the second instance of the cause of the vase is a vase, they share the same sample. So would that similarity, could that be defined in terms of function? Difficult, right? I mean, let’s take the example of a flame and sulfuric acid, right?

If you burn a piece of paper with a flame, you burn it to a crisp. If you pour sulfuric acid on a piece of paper, you burn it to a crisp. If you show someone the paper burnt by a flame or by sulfuric acid without telling them what happened, I don’t think they can tell you what caused the burn. But the difference in function say Function is the same. Right?

Not terribly but Think about it. There is no definite answer. You have to think by yourselves what type means, what similarity in type means. It is important to establish the nature of a substantial continuum. It is very important in demonstrating the existence of reincarnation because it is the fact that mind can only be similar in type with mind that prevents mind from being caused by matter or causing matter.

So you see why it’s not exactly a trivial issue in Buddhist logic. It’s actually quite central to Dharmakīrti’s proof of the existence of past and future lives. Then do you have other questions perhaps on other topics? A quick one. Yeah, just want to ask you what’s the substantial cause for momentary change?

Of what? Generally? Particles or Okay, there’s the substantial cause of momentary change, so of impermanence as a whole. Yes. In other words, substantial cause of composite phenomena is the previous instant of composite phenomena.

Does it take table in front of you for example, you’re saying the momentary the past moments of that table is not the same as the current moment of that table. I know it’s different because molecules they change and jumps around the stuff. What’s the cause for that? Well, from the Buddhist standpoint, this is the nature of composite phenomena. Right?

Then a physicist will tell you entropy, the second law of thermodynamics. Right? Which is that the degree of order of a closed system is a decreasing function of time. A closed system is a system in which there’s no energy coming in. So if you imagine we isolate the table, so there’s no electricity, there’s no sunlight, nothing coming in, you leave the table like that isolated in a black box, then the second law of thermodynamics states that eventually when you look at the black box there’s no table basically.

The table will have disintegrated. You know. That only applies as long as there’s no input of energy. Right? So you can’t say, let’s say, the Earth, you can’t apply the second law of thermodynamics to the Earth, right?

Because we have a steady stream of input of energy from the Sun. So on Earth, for instance, have an increase in the level of order. Right? That’s life. Life is an increase in the level of order.

It’s a decrease in entropy. But if you were to seal off the Earth, know, life would disappear. Right? It’s a given. Then impermanence, as I see it, this is my private view, don’t ask Geshe-la, it’s completely out of our field.

Impermanence is another name given to entropy. Entropy. Entropy. E N T R O P Y. Second law of thermodynamics.

Do you have other questions? Please. Okay, my question relates to something that was mentioned earlier in relation to karma and causality. Geshe-la made the comment that when explaining karma and causality that if people didn’t behave as if there was a knowledge of karma and causality, that they’d behave like animals. But in the wider Western world, very few people have any knowledge of karma and causality, and yet they still behave ethically.

Even a lot of people who don’t have any spiritual beliefs or spiritual training still behave ethically. The keyword there is eventually. Right? People who have no spiritual training function on the basis of past life habituations and education. Alright?

Then on the basis of past life habituation, there were Christians in past lives, Buddhists, or Muslims, you know. Then there is there are strong ethical karmic imprints. The person is predisposed to behaving ethically. But if ethics in some form is not taught, then eventually those imprints disappear. Right?

And also, frankly, what I’ve seen many times is even with strong ethical karmic imprints, the person is wide open to non ethical suggestions. I remember a young Israeli at Sarnath, you know, there’s lot of Israeli soldiers, they come to India after they finish their military service on furlough, you know. And we were talking once and he said to a group, actually, he said, you know, I stole something at the monastery. I said, why? And he said, Well, you know, it wasn’t a lot, but I wanted to see what it felt like to steal something.

Right? There was no ethical foundation. He was a nice person. No ethical foundation. And eventually, the temptations overrode whatever imprints he had.

Then in our cases, I think, let’s say in Australia, the pressure is off. People don’t have hard lives. People may think they do but compared to the rest of the world, no. But once you put the screws on, you know, unless you have a very strong ethical foundation, you will steal. You will lie.

It’s just a matter of putting the screws on. You know? There’s a counter argument to that that sort of says that people living in groups will behave ethically towards one another because that maximizes the cooperation within the group. And so that people can, I suppose, behave ethically because it works well to behave so That’s a sociobiological justification of ethics? So the problem with that line of reasoning is it only it’s based on game theory.

It only works if the group is stable in the long run. Otherwise, there is no particular interest in behaving ethically. You behave ethically if you’re a member of a group based on sociobiology because down the line there will be rewards coming back your way, right, in terms of your reputation in the group. Then, let’s say, if you take trade, for instance, others will trust you and trade with you. But if you don’t have a stable group, which let’s say in the West is standard, right, our societies no one basically is able to constitute a stable community anymore, then that type of justification for ethics disappears.

You know? And we do see in the West, I mean, it seems anecdotal, but for such rich societies, unethical behavior is quite high. High. I mean, I often was surprised that in India, which is much poorer than here, most people are far more ethical than here. It’s really surprising, you know.

But think about it. Think about it, you know. Geshe-la said that, you know, if we could see the world, how the world would be a marvelous place if everybody were free from afflictions and thinking if only all beings were free from suffering and he said at that point we would have generated great compassion. Now I can understand that in a Buddhist context, but you know there’s some people like John Lennon whose song was about I can’t remember the words, but you know, if I know Imagine. Imagine.

Sorry? Imagine. Imagine, okay. And so obviously that’s not a spontaneous continuous wish that would qualify but I just thought it Why couldn’t John Lennon have had moments of compassion? Well that’s the question I guess that in conventional terms that would qualify for, I mean that would be compassion perhaps not great compassion.

If great compassion is spontaneous, continue and was the word? So would that be the difference? I don’t know the song but if the song runs along the line of imagine if all people were happy, is that what it is? Obviously that would only extend to human beings and not all beings but if he had extended it to all beings, then how would that not be great compassion? Uncontrived?

No. Right? So it’s not fully characterized great compassion. But there’s no reason John Lennon cannot generate great compassion. Or any one of us.

Right? We have those imprints. Do you know? Uncontrived? No.

Uncontrived means it is unproduced. It’s continually present naturally. Then, obviously, that, the person’s life, would be very different. Right? Then we don’t have that much time.

Maybe one question, two questions, then we have to stop. Can we have uncontrived bodhicitta without dealing with the afflictions? To enter the great scope without having dealt with your afflictions you wouldn’t be able to attain fully characterized? What do you mean without dealing with the afflictions? I’m Bodhisattvas have afflictions.

Right? So the goals differ. If you are on the Hīnayāna path, your goal is to free yourself of the afflictions. Right? That is your priority.

Others are not a priority. It’s a natural goal for us. The natural step upwards from being a practitioner of the small scope is being a practitioner of the middling scope. Most serious Western Buddhist practitioners, when they talk, talk as practitioners of the middling scope. They speak of my practice.

This interferes with my practice. My practice, this might This is a talk of someone with middling scope. Others are an interference. Right? Then a being If you talk like that, if you think like that, so and so is interfering with my Sadhana, etc, you are at best a being of the middling scope, whatever Sadhana you might be practicing.

Then, a Bodhisattva’s priority is other. Then, as a result, because the goal is full in utter enlightenment, the Bodhisattvas still abandon the afflictions, but normally they abandon them on the eighth ground. So much later than a Hīnayāna practitioner. And Bodhisattvas do have afflictions until the eighth ground, not cause afflictions like us, but they do, you know. And for that matter they use the afflictions.

The priority for the great Bodhisattva is skill and means in helping others. Right? Then, for the sake of skill and means, you can go drinking, you can do a lot of things. So great compassion is not the same as characterized great compassion? Compassion occurs once, twice, but if it’s not fully characterized, it’s sporadic.

Fully characterized great compassion is continually present. Just like for instance, let’s say the instinct of survival is continually present in us. It’s automatic. And if a car comes towards you, you jump out of the way. Right?

Then for a great Bodhisattva with great compassion, if the opportunity to help others arise, the Bodhisattva automatically helps. There’s no thinking. So you can do that. You can have great compassion, still have some afflictions. Great compassion?

The afflictions are not incompatible. You enter the Mahayanas regenerating great compassion on the path of accumulation. On the path of accumulation, bodhisattvas still have afflictions. They try to fight against the afflictions, but they still have. Yes?

It’s gonna have to be a short question because we have a little minute. So, if a monk of the lower scope has achieved liberation then he has the wish to teach the path to others so they also achieve liberation is this then when the practitioner, the monk enters the highest scope? Does he enter the Mahāyāna? Is that what you’re asking? Well, he’s already a Mahāyāna if he’s trying to achieve liberation, isn’t he?

Of Mahāyāna, not of the highest scope. So, if he’s trying to achieve liberation for himself Yeah. Then he achieves it. Yes. And then he wants to show others how to achieve it because now he knows how to achieve it.

Yes. So now he has confidence to show So others the then does that make him then a practitioner of the higher scope? Not necessarily. He must it’s not because Hīnayāna practitioners help others. I mean, these are great beings.

Right? It’s very dangerous to start making extreme characterizations. What is the criterion for entering the Mahāyāna? You all know now. Technically, yes.

What is bodhicitta? Striving for full enlightenment for the sake of others. So would such a monk have that? Because he’s He’s not. May even think that it is not possible or too difficult to attain full enlightenment.

So he is not on the Mahāyāna. Then I must apologize. We have to resume in fifteen minutes. Thank you very much.

Key terms in this teaching

atman dag (Tib)
Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
Hinayana theg mäen (Tib)
Literally, Small, or Lesser, Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. The Hinayana practitioner's motivation for following the Dharma path is principally the intense wish for personal liberation from conditioned existence, or samsara. LYWA
Mahayana teg chen (Tib)
Literally, Great Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. LYWA
mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
path of merit sambhara-marga (Skt); tsog lam (Tib)
The first of the five paths leading to buddhahood. Usually translated as path of accumulation. Lama Zopa Rinpoche’s preferred term is path of merit because the activity of this path is the accumulation of merit. LYWA
principal consciousness vijnana (Skt); nam shë (Tib)
The main cognition posited by means of apprehending the entity of its object. Synonymous with main mind, it is one of the two divisions of mind, the other being mental factors. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
two extremes tha nyi (Tib)
Eternalism, seeing things as having an intrinsic reality, and nihilism, seeing things as having no reality at all. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Questions answered in this teaching

What is a Josephson junction, as mentioned in the teaching?

The Josephson junction is something used in electronics, and it has become very important. Basically, it triggers non-local behavior in a particle. Like an electronic switch, the particle goes from one side of the junction to the other, but it never actually passes in between. The junction is a physical barrier, yet the particle does not physically cross it and still appears on the other side. When Buddhist topics are brought into such discussions, the key is to make sure they match reality, and this is something to think about.

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