Sun Radiance – Thought Transformation

1 h 23 min · 4,267 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Sun Radiance - Thought Transformation (Khensur Rinpoche)
Sun Radiance - Thought Transformation (Khensur Rinpoche)
Sun Radiance - Thought Transformation
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 83-minute teaching, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen guides students through a detailed philosophical analysis of bodhicitta, the compassionate determination to achieve enlightenment for all beings. He examines the relationship between bodhicitta, great compassion, and definite emergence in terms of substantial causes and cooperative conditions—a distinction central to Buddhist epistemology. The discussion becomes increasingly Socratic: Geshe-la invites students to reason through examples using clay, pots, tables, flames, and consciousness itself, probing whether each has a substantial cause and why. He then turns to the Eight Verses of Mind Training, touching on the fourth stanza’s practice of viewing beings of harmful temperament as teachers, and the fifth and sixth stanzas on accepting loss and harm with forbearance. Throughout, he emphasizes rigorous debate as a method for deepening understanding, celebrating students’ sharp disagreements and encouraging them to hold their positions firmly until disproven. This is pitched at practitioners already familiar with Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and debate conventions.

File metadata (for organising)

File: 8 Verses (D2S2 – KR.mp3

UUID: 76ebf686-7dc0-4d5c-a611-1ae1832fac10

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Sun Radiance – Thought Transformation

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~4,260

How was the lunch, How was lunch? How was lunch? Good. So bodhicitta, which as you remember is a special mind endowed with two characteristics, has as its cause great compassion, which is the first characteristic, the mind focused on the welfare of others. However, great compassion is not the substantial cause of bodhicitta.

It is a cooperative condition, a condition of bodhicitta. Then what is the cause of great compassion? As was mentioned, it is definite emergence. Is definite emergence the substantial cause of great compassion or not? Yes, it definitely is.

Since the only difference between definite emergence and great compassion is the object of observation. The aspect of both great compassion and of definite emergence is the wish to rid from suffering. So the mind of great compassion is a cause, a condition of bodhicitta, but it is not the substantial cause of bodhicitta. It is a cooperative condition. However, why is great compassion not the substantial cause of bodhicitta?

Do you have an answer? What is your own position? Is it or isn’t it? What what are you thinking about? Know?

What do you think about? Well, disagree. And so I know this is wrong, but what are you disagree? Sorry. Disagree.

What’s wrong? Sorry, Geshe-la. But well, great compassion is an uncontrived mind which wishes to free all beings as vast as space. Then bodhicitta you ramp it up a bit quite a bit and go for I will definitely work to free all beings as vast as space. So it’s the it the next thing is the resolve.

Okay. I think maybe the resolve is important as a substantial cause for bodhicitta. Great result. So first you disagree then you wilt basically. Oh, totally.

I think it is a condition not a cause, because great compassion is one of the specs of bodhicitta. bodhicitta is a special mind in that with twin aspirations. Think great compassion is one of the aspirations. Simply because it exists concurrently with. They can stay together, they can coexist.

Okay. Not a substantial cause because the objects of observation and aspects are different. Yes. Very good. And mother, delicious.

Was it not the substantial cause because it is paired with the other aspiration of desiring liberation so that you can have great compassion for all sentient beings in time and space? You know, sweet tea. Is tea. Sweet. Good.

Very delicious. Not a substantial cause because great compassion isn’t similar in type to bodhicitta. Think by yourself independently, whether great compassion is the substantial cause of bodhicitta or not? Chris. Chris?

No no. Can you I need you to find but you think about yeah. That’s good, thank you. I was thinking about how the the great compassion is like the cooperative condition because it’s like the manure for the plants, for the seed, for the wind and the rains. They have a cooperative condition because propels the mind wishing for enlightenment.

It’s like an activator for the mind striving for enlightenment for the benefit of all beings. Can you think of great compassion as a stage in your mind stream as you progress from definite emergence where you are looking towards, articulating your own achieving your own happiness. Then you think of others. And you think, why not them? But it isn’t until you realize that your own happiness depends on the happiness of everybody else that you then arises in you the thought that in order to achieve my own happiness, I also need to achieve everybody else’s happiness.

And that you get a very strong feeling that you need to work hard to achieve this. Yes, precisely both bodhicitta and great compassion are minds by which one’s own welfare is accomplished in a subsidiary or ancillary faction fashion. All one is working for the welfare of others, one accomplishes one’s own liberation in the process. Could could you liken the cooperative causes of great compassion to to the fuel that runs the electricity for the generator? Why are you talking of the cooperative conditions of great compassion?

Yes, so I said earlier that the substantial cause does not exist at the time of the result, whereas the compassion exists at the same time, therefore, a bodhicitta. Therefore, it cannot be a substantial cause. All composite phenomena Mhmm. Arise in dependence on causes and conditions. Okay.

So great compassion is the mere cause of bodhicitta, It is not the substantial cause of bodhicitta. It is a condition of bodhicitta. This is because great compassion does give rise to bodhicitta, but when great compassion gives rise to bodhicitta, if great compassion turned entirely into bodhicitta, then when bodhicitta was present within our minds, there would be no great compassion, which would be a very strange state of affairs. Then great compassion is therefore a condition, a cooperative condition of a bodhicitta just as Anila said, one of you said, when they mentioned that great compassion was akin to the manure out of which bodhicitta arose, and as Candrakīrti says in his Madhyamakāvatāra, great compassion enables one to be called fortunate at the beginning, the middle and the end, therefore great compassion is present throughout. Then since bodhicitta is a composite phenomenon, it has both substantial causes and cooperative conditions.

What do you give as its substantial cause? You’ve got to give a substantial cause. A You need one. So here you don’t rely on scriptures, but on reasoning. And if exterior phenomena, exterior forms necessarily have substantial causes and substantial cooperative conditions, you have to be able to give a substantial cause.

Keshav, please give. Okay. So I’m going to go for great resolve because once one has achieved great compassion and has liberated one’s own mind and sees the suffering of everyone else, one wants to achieve full enlightenment for the benefit of all beings. And so you have to have that great resolve to say I alone will take on that job. And so that great resolve then is the substantial cause for bodhicitta.

Next. Our thought of clay is not a substantial cause of the clay pots, I would say substantial cause for bodhicitta is the previous moments of bodhicitta. Clay is not the substantial cause of the clay pot. I want to clarify that as well please. You accept or you don’t accept?

I accept compliance with Why not? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

Yeah. I think I I’ll contradict your So what are the others saying? What are the other answers? Can I just say one thing? I just want to say because I I I think I sort of contradicted myself after I heard Mark said because clay and clay pots, exist concurrently.

So therefore, it is not a substantial cause. So to start with clay and clay pot are not simultaneous. How can you pause Yeah. Is it is it any dry clay? Yeah.

No. In Chinese, we call that clay as well. Because it is called a clay pot because the pot the pot arises out of clay. So there then it is a substantial cause because clay is not in the pot. Yes.

Everyone agrees except you. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Agree.

So we have to be very clear here. Sometimes I wonder whether you were referring to clay in general as being the cause of pot in general. That is not what is being said here. What is being said is that the globe of clay, which you turn into a pot, that is the cause of pot, the substantial cause of pot. So can I withhold my answer to the great bodhicitta?

It’s not the previous moments of bodhicitta. I’ll take it back. So you shouldn’t change your good position. It is indeed the case that the previous moment of bodhicitta or the previous instance of the substantial continuum of bodhicitta So you should first think carefully based on reasonings. And then once you have a position on accept something you accept, you shouldn’t be like something in the world when changing all the time like this.

You should put your position aside and stick to it unless it is disproven. You you need to be stronger, you know. Yeah. I was going to say in the same way as the substantial cause of Geshe-la’s table, his previous moment of table in the same way the previous moment or the substantial cause of bodhicitta is the previous moment of bodhicitta. Then what is the substantial cause of the first instance of bodhicitta?

That’s a good question. What Natalie said is a good answer. The the substantial cause of the first instance of bodhicitta would be the supreme resolve. Because the supreme resolve precedes bodhicitta, and when the supreme resolve increases in power, it turns into bodhicitta. Can a substantial cause also be a a cooperative condition?

So that’s a good question. If you put a basis, in other words, Geshe-la’s table, then the substantial cause of Geshe-la’s table and the cooperative condition of Geshe-la’s table cannot have a common denominator. They’re different. It’s just that I was thinking that clay can also be a cooperative condition in the formation of the vat. From the discussion, understand that for something to be a substantial cause, it needs to be not in existence at the time of the result.

So something can’t be a substantial cause if it’s still in existence at the time of the result. Is that correct? Yes, necessarily at the time of the substantial effect, its substantial cause will have ceased. Okay, so then with bodhicitta you’ve got the saying that great resolve transforms into bodhicitta, But great compassion remains as great compassion. And so that while you need both to achieve bodhicitta, one is the substantial cause and one is the cooperative condition.

I don’t understand why it is that the concept is that one transforms into bodhicitta and one supports bodhicitta. To my mind, they are both important elements that combine to produce bodhicitta. So when we say that great compassion substantial cause of bodhicitta, and that the supreme resolve is its cooperative condition, we are not saying that great compassion is more Yes. The other way around. When we say that great compassion is a cooperative condition of I was checking you out.

No way you can sleep now. No. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

Yeah. You’re okay now. So now that I know you’re awake, We are saying that great compassion is a cooperative condition of bodhicitta, and the supreme resolve is the substantial cause of bodhicitta. And these two statements do not refer in any way to the relative importance of great compassion and the supreme resolve. They refer to the substantial continuums of these two.

The substantial continuum of supreme resolves becomes bodhicitta. The substantial continuum of great compassion does not become bodhicitta. I think. I’m not enough in English, So now very, how is it, very big opportunity. So please reflect carefully on the relationship between bodhicitta, great compassion and definite emergence from the standpoint of substantial causes in cooperative conditions and ask you lots about your translator who has an extremely sound understanding of these topics.

It is an uncommon opportunity because my English is not good enough to allow me to explain this clearly. But one day, you know. However, this topic of substantial cause and cooperative conditions is an extremely important and difficult topic. It’s a topic which we debate about quite sharply in the great monasteries. So I would like to congratulate.

Okay. Sorry to get slowed by Deb, but just given, especially what Chris said, isn’t the substantial cause of the clay pot, the previous instance of a clay pot? That’s what we’re saying about bodhicitta and the table. First instant or previous instant? So to make it simple, the first instant of the clay pot is the substantial cause of the second instant of the clay pot.

Mhmm. Because the second instant of the clay pot is a substantial cause of the third instant of the clay pot. So it’s correct to say that the substantial cause of the clay pot is the first instant of the pot? It’s not a clear statement, you understand. The first instance of the clay pot is a substantial cause of the second instance of the clay pot.

Took some of the Really? Yeah. We just said that the clay is the substantial cause of the clay. You understand the logical problem in your presentation. You are taking a course which is linked to time for the when you give the instant and a general statement about the timeness of the pot.

There are problems with that. That’s not really what I’m saying. I I’m saying that I heard very clearly that just now Mhmm. That the substantial cause of the clay pot is is the clay. The lump of clay.

The specific lump of clay. Yes. That is true. That’s a substantial cause. That’s true.

So then why can’t we say I’ll rephrase it. The substantial cause of the table is the lump of wood. Lump of wood. If you want to be precise, the way it is formulated this, the substantial cause of the table in front of Geshe-la is the wood, which is a substance turned into that table. No.

Fine. No problem. Really? No problem. Okay, dear.

So what’s the problem then with the clay pot? There’s no problem. Let me do it in there. All kids. We seem to be giving different definitions to clay, pot, and table and bodhicitta.

But now Alright. Okay. Don’t change your position again, okay? I don’t have a position in this one. Just a simple question.

Yes. Okay. Thank you. So in what circumstances we use, we say, for example, the table, we say that the substantial cause of the table, the present table is the previous moments of the table. When do I actually use that?

When do I say that’s the substantial cause of the table? Can Can we say that? Or we can’t really say that? When? What do mean when?

I mean, in the case of the table now, we’re saying the substantial cause of the table is a lump of wood as we just clearly understood. And then there was a, I think in the morning Vishal was talking about the substantial cause of the table is also the previous moments of the table. That’s where I’m just not So I will put it precisely. Excuse me. The best way to put this is in terms of instant.

The first instant of the table is a substantial cause of the second instant of the table. The second instant of the table is a substantial cause of the third instant of the table. As to whether the first instant of the table has a substantial cause or not, that you have to examine. What is the cooperative condition of the table? Exactly.

So I’d like a question to ask you, what is a substantial cause of the supreme resolve? The substantial cause has no limit. So what exactly do you posit here a substantial cause for the Supreme Resolve? Great. Great compassion.

All the same. It can’t be great compassion because great compassion doesn’t as the result of substantial cause doesn’t disappear. I would posit the Mahāyāna motivation. The Mahāyāna motivation. All sentient beings, same type, same type.

As substantial cause of the great resolve. Yeah. I don’t don’t think I can hold that position. Then Being suppressants, they’re beings. Right?

I would argue is the common influence of the similar type, which because in Cittamātra, we’ve been taught in Sorry, in? In Cittamatra teachings on Tuesday, basically if we talk about the Chitamantra view here, is everything exists by exhaustion or exhausting of karmic imprints. So therefore, karmic imprints is exhausted by the time gradual result comes about. So therefore, they don’t concurrently exist. That’s just my Then it’s possible you didn’t have to specify the Cittamātra tradition.

This is not specified in the Buddhist treatises. The Buddhist treatises didn’t say, don’t give the substantial cause of every single of the great minds which are created. So this is something we must investigate and determine by ourselves. However, definitely neither definite emergence nor great compassion can be the substantial cause of the supreme resolve. However, the supreme resolve can be seen as arising from parts of other minds or karmic imprints, both are possible.

That is the way to look at it. Can it arise too from Can it arise too from a realization of a noble truth of suffering? Yes, but it will be a cooperative condition. So I am. I am absolutely delighted at the understanding you have of substantial causes and cooperative conditions and how you are able to use the concept.

There are real results to this teaching. Otherwise, if whenever I talked of the substantial cause of bodhicitta, your face is dulled down and your eyes started to sink, then it will be very awkward. As it may, all composite phenomena have substantial causes and cooperative conditions, and initially, you should try to understand how this operates with exterior phenomena, and then progressively apply this to interior experiences, such as states of mind. Good. Things went very well.

Good results, you know. Krishna, I just wanna clarify something because in the morning I heard you saying not all phenomena are compensated for sorry, let me just not all composite phenomena has a substantial cause. Sorry, can you repeat? No, not all phenomena has a substantial cause. I said this morning that not all composite phenomena are substantial causes.

So what’s the substantial cause for a flame? We have a disagreement. He’s asking me the previous moment I think, no hurry. I think tonight and tomorrow, no hurry. The reason I asked that is just I just wondering, do you really have to give a substantial cause for everything?

We’re talking about great result. Maybe there isn’t a substantial cause. So Geshe-la says yes. Yes. Translation say no.

For example, you know, I don’t know. So I think that leads to what Geshe-la was going to talk about consciousness. The substantial cause of of first instance of consciousness. Is there has to be is there does what’s the sorry, I’m better than grammar. So is there a substantial cause for the first instance of consciousness?

Yes. If you take, when you speak of that, you’re speaking of the first instance of consciousness within our continuum, then the substantial cause of that could be given as potencies or karmic imprints. What is your name, the gentleman with a beard? So Geshe-la told me that the first instant of the flame of a match has a substantial cause, because its substantial cause exists, because the black substance, in the igniting substance within the match is a substantial cause. And I told him it is not a substantial cause, because that black substance does not have the same characteristics as a flame, you know.

Then that’s your position. Right? I’m giving you a crown and you say, My position was that chemical energy is transformed into light in the flame. So it’s a very sharp debate, you should have cast. He said well if you take then driftwood, are you asserting that the fire which arises from driftwood does not have driftwood as its substantial cause?

I said yes. Why? Because the fire is of a different type than driftwood. Then he said, in this case, are you stating that smoke is not a substantial result of fire, as fire is not a substantial cause of smoke? And I said yes, and he told me this is not true, because it is well known that smoke is the substantial result of fire, and I said it is not because something is well known that it is true.

In this case, the type of fire and the type of smoke are different, because there is never fire without heat, but there can be smoke without heat. Geshe-la says it’s very good that I look at the substantial continuum like this. This is how people debate, right? Yeah, that’s good. How are karmic imprints and consciousness of a similar type when karmic imprints are considered non-associated compositional factors?

What is the first instance then of the? Substantial cause of the of the first instance of. In the case of the Alaya Vijñāna, it never becomes anything else in consciousness. Therefore, the substantial cause of the first instant of the Alaya Vijñāna is simply the consciousness preceding that first instant. If the Alaya Vijñāna were to become anything else in consciousness, then the presentation of karmic imprints in Cittamātra will become very strange.

So in the case of composite phenomena, what we can say that composite phenomena are beginningless. They do have an end. It is the mode of their ending which is a topic of discussion, whether is a coarse or a subtle disintegration. This is something we will talk about tomorrow. Today, we are running out of time.

What is the difference between the causes of bodhicitta and great compassion? No, sorry. Because bodhicitta has a substantial cause too, which is the supreme resolve. So in that case, in that respect, they’re the same. They both have a substantial cause.

So the question is, what is the difference in nature between bodhicitta and great compassion? The difference in the nature is that the great resolve is the difference in nature because great compassion doesn’t have that great resolve whereas bodhicitta does. Mhmm. When I’m asking about the difference in nature between great compassion and bodhicitta, I’m asking about the difference in terms of object of observation and aspect. So you can see that for bodhicitta, both the object of observation and the aspect are full and utter enlightenment, whereas for great compassion, the object of observation is sentient beings.

What is the difference now between the nature of definite emergence, the thought of definite emergence and great compassion? Whenever you are addressing the issue of similarity or difference of nature between two consciousnesses, you have to analyze this in terms of the object of observation and the aspect. Now the object of observation of definite emergence and of great compassion are different, but the aspect is the same, being free from suffering. So at present, the fifth stanza of the Eight Verses of Mind Training, may I take upon myself the loss and defeat, accepting berating and slander on account of the envy of others and prefer victory to others. So here, when out of the envy of others we are scolded or even beaten, then we should take the loss.

The loss here refers to the suffering upon ourselves and prefer victory, in other words, to others. To practice this in actuality is very different, so we visualize it. So the the sixth stanza — thank you. The sixth stanza — even should some whom I had great hopes of helping most wrongfully harm me, may I view them as holy spiritual teachers. Some here refers to someone whom we had helped greatly.

And even though we helped greatly in the fifth stanza, they harm one most wrongfully. In in other words, they harm one in a profoundly inappropriate and painful fashion. Nonetheless, may I view them as holy spiritual teachers? In other words, may I practice forbearance with respect to them. Then do you have questions at present directly related to the eight verses of mind training?

If you do, please ask them. If you don’t, we will stop for today. Mhmm. I’ve got two questions in relation to verse four and verse five. So verse four, I wanted to understand a bit more about, when we’re beholding sentient beings of an evil nature.

That seems like a really strong thing to say about other sentient beings that they have an evil nature. And the example of leprosy was given this morning which is not a really common experience for us in the West to actually experience. So could Geshe-la speak about that one and then I’ll relate my other question later. Here, when we refer to sentient beings of an evil nature in the fourth stanza, this is from a mundane standpoint, and it refer refers to their predicament. Then from a Buddhist standpoint, they have good nature.

There’s no leprosy in the West. You can choose, you know? You can take cancer if you prefer. Just got a question for stanza four. Geshe-la suggested we can practice breath of giving and taking.

Taking other. Giving and taking. So my question is what if you by practicing that other people suffering really, what if other people suffering really right In our case at present, we can only do this through visualization. It is only when we are highly realized that we can cause the sufferings of others to mature upon ourselves. Okay, and a question on verse five, on account of the envy of others, would it be more general to say on account of the anger of others?

Because not always, know, are people going to berate you and slander you because they’re envious of you. They might be just angry with you. It’s just an example. This also happens under the power of anger and so forth. Some of these stanzas refer to anger, some of these stanzas refer to pride.

There are various instances which are given. Okay. After we hear today,

Key terms in this teaching

bodhicitta jang chub sem (Tib)
A principal consciousness that combines the two factors of wishing to free all beings from suffering and of wishing to attain enlightenment in order to achieve that; the spontaneous altruistic mind of enlightenment can be either aspirational or engaging. LYWA
Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
Mahayana teg chen (Tib)
Literally, Great Vehicle. It is one of the two general divisions of Buddhism. LYWA
thought transformation lojong (Tib)
Also known as “mind training” or “mind transformation”. A powerful approach to the development of bodhicitta, in which the mind is trained to use all situations, both happy and unhappy, as a means to destroy self-cherishing and self-grasping. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Questions answered in this teaching

What is the substantial cause of the first instance of bodhicitta?

The substantial cause of the first instance of bodhicitta is the supreme resolve. The supreme resolve comes before bodhicitta, and when it increases in power, it turns into bodhicitta. In this way, the supreme resolve is what gives rise to bodhicitta when it first arises.

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