45 min · 2,764 words · 23 June 1992
Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. The talk teaches meditation on emptiness through the reasoning of freedom from one or many, using a four-point analysis. It explains the object of negation, the inherently existent self, through the rope and snake example, and shows that a self cannot be the same as or different from the aggregates. The talk ends before the fourth point, freedom from many, is treated.
File metadata (for organising)
Date: 1992-06-23
Duration: 45 min
UUID: 57a5a2ef-5f6d-4c59-80c7-5f3d7e73ee61
Words: 2,760
We’re going to be discussing the way in which we meditate on emptiness through reasoning. So there are many methods of reasoning in order to meditate on emptiness, cultivating and understanding of emptiness. But for those who are beginners, the most effective, the most readily understood is the reasoning which is termed freedom from one or many. In meditating on emptiness using this type of reasoning, make use of a four point analysis. The first of these four points is identifying the object of negation.
The first is ascertaining the object ascertaining ascertaining the object in negation. The second is ascertaining the pervasion. The third is ascertaining freedom from one. And the fourth is ascertaining freedom from many. So the first of these four points ascertaining the object of negation is understanding what in fact phenomena are empty of.
Phenomena are empty of the object negation that we’ve explained this previously. In order to understand what phenomena are empty of, we have to identify what this object negation is. Then we analyze. Once we’ve identified it, we analyze it and we find that this object negation does not exist. Thereby we understand the emptiness of the object negation.
So the object negation. There are many mutually inclusive terms that we’re making use of. Is synonyms. We’re making use of terms like self, the object which is self-defined, object which is naturally existent, object which is truly existent, an object which is objectively existent from its own side and is not merely imputed by conception. These all are synonyms.
It is said that if we’re able to understand what is meant by merely imputed by conception, That is how is conception imputing the object? What does it meant when we say that objects are merely imputed by conception? If we know this, if we understand this, then we can understand the opposite of that. That is, say, an object which is not merely imputed by conception. And this is, therefore, it’s very beneficial to understand what we mean by merely imputed by conception in order to understand what we mean by not merely imputed by conception thereby being able to identify the object of negation.
So, by way, an illustration will help us to understand what we mean by merely imputed by conception. In this illustration, we imagine ourselves to be walking along. And to the side, there is a coiled rope, coiled striped rope. And it’s dusk. It’s becoming dark.
It’s not clear. Things aren’t readily visible. And we, upon seeing what is in fact a coiled striped rope, we conceive of a snake. That is that we label that object snake. And we think, Oh, snake, snake.
So, the snake has arisen in dependence upon a basis that is the coiled rope due to conditions of being at dusk, and the low degree of visibility, and our concept which designates or labels snake. So, in dependence upon a rope, the snake, the appearance of the snake arises merely in dependence upon conception. Now, there is nothing about the object upon which we’re labeling which has a quality of snakeness. If we were to look at it, analyze it, take it apart, if we look the various stripes, the various colors, the shape, the collection of the rope, there’s nothing within that object which is a snake, has the quality of snakeness. That it is the snake is merely arising from the side of the mind, merely being imputed by the mind.
Merely through an imputation by means of concepts. The word merely here means only. Merely. Only by the force of imputation by concepts does a snake appear to the mind. And we do not know that that object is in fact not a snake.
We do not know that it’s not a snake. But the snake appears to us and it appears merely only by the force of imputation or labeling process of conception. There is nothing from the side of the object in in its parts or whatsoever. It is a rope, but it appears through the force of conception to be a snake. So, similar to this example that we’ve just given, the I is merely imputed to the five aggregates.
That the I arises in dependence upon the five aggregates. The collection of the five aggregates. The mere collection of the five aggregates. Just as the snake is imputed to the rope, the I is imputed to the five aggregates. The I is merely imputed by the force of conception, only imputed by the force of conception.
Each of those aggregates is not the I. The collection of those aggregates is not the I. There’s not even the slightest I within the collection or within each of the aggregates. But the I, the collection of the aggregates serves as the basis of imputation upon which the I is designated, labeled. Just as there is nothing from the side of the rope which is snake, likewise, there is nothing from the side of the basis of the imputation, the aggregates, which is an I.
The I cannot be found within that basis of imputation. It does not exist within the basis of imputation. So the I, we think I, I. I is merely being imputed by conception. Similar to the snake which is imputed to the rope.
There is no I, just as there is no snake from the side of the object. Likewise, there is no I existing from the side of the aggregates. That there is no I which is not merely imputed existing from its own side. This is what we mean when we say that the I does not inherently exist. It does not inherently exist in the object.
It does not truly exist. It is not being the I is not self defined. It does not exist by nature within the object. These all mean the same. Non establishment from its own side, that is to say, from either the parts or the collection, The object is not established from its own side in terms of its parts or collection but is merely imputed by conception.
This is the meaning of that example. But we have to distinguish within these two examples. The snake is being imputed to the rope. The snake appears to an awareness. It only appears to a mistaken awareness.
In fact, there’s no snake there. But there appears to exist a snake to a mistaken awareness. So, distinguishing that from the other example that we were giving by way of that the I is merely imputed to the aggregate. But the I in fact exists. The I is imputed to the five aggregates and exists.
So when in using this example these two examples in order to understand we’re we’re using these two examples in order to come to an understanding of what we mean by merely imputed by conception and only that. The snake is merely imputed to the rope. The I is merely imputed to the aggregates. The only only the factor we’re only trying to understand by means of these two examples what we mean by merely imputed. So, it is the I which is which is not merely imputed but which exists from its own side.
It is the I which is not being merely labeled or imputed but but in fact exists exists from its own side which is the object of negation. This is an inherently existent I. This is the object of negation. This does not exist. So there is the merely imputed I which exists.
The merely imputed I exists. And dependent upon that merely imputed I, we conceive of an I which is not merely imputed but which exists from its own side. So in dependence upon the merely imputed I which exists, in dependence upon that, we conceive of a not-merely-imputed I which exists from its own side. This is the object of negation. This is what we have to ascertain in the first point of the four points.
Ascertaining the object and negation. And then we proceed to analyze this object once we’ve identified it. This is the way we proceed in our meditation on emptiness. Now we proceed if, if now this I does not exist. If it existed, what faults would there arise?
What faults would there be if we hypothesize that it does exist? If it existed, then it would have to be either the same as the aggregates. You know, I translate it as one or many. We can also translate them as same or different, okay? Freedom from same or different, freedom from one or many.
If this I did exist, it would have to either be the same or one with the aggregates or it would have to be different or many with the aggregates. We’re hypothesizing. So in general, if an object is a phenomenon, that is to say if something exists, it must be either one or many. It must all phenomena must be either if they exist, they must be either one or they must be many. By many, it means two or more.
So if something exists, and you hear the plural, it doesn’t show up in the Tibetan, so we say somethings or something means the same. If something exists, it’s one or it’s many. It has to be one of these two. So in general, a phenomenon, that is to say an existing object, must be either one or many. It must be one of these two.
It must be either one or it must be many, more than one. That is, say two or more. Likewise, with respect to a truly existing I or a self defining I. If truly existing I exists, it must be one or it must be many. And likewise, if self defining I exists, it must be one or many with the basis of imputation, the aggregates.
So if the I exists, it must be either the same or different than the aggregates. So, if the truly existent I must be either truly existently one with the aggregates which are the basis of the imputation of the I or they must be truly existently different. So, the truly existent I. It must be truly existently the same as the aggregates which are the basis of the imputation of the I or it must be truly existently different. There’s no other excluded middle.
There’s no other possibility. It must be either truly existently the same or truly existently different than the aggregates. There’s no other possibility that it this is pervades all phenomena. And this is what is meant by the second point of these four points, ascertaining the pervasion or sometimes called the entailment. With respect to the third point, which is freedom from oneness or sameness.
If the I, the self defining I, the truly existent I, is truly the same or one with basis of imputation, with its basis of imputation that is, say, the aggregates. If they’re truly existently one, then they must be one, they must be the same, they must be identical in all and every way. There is no difference whatsoever between the truly existent I and the basis of imputation, the aggregates. There’s no difference whatsoever. They’re truly existently the same, identical, they’re one.
There’s no difference whatsoever in all ways. Just as for example, we say the flower and in Tibetan language this is called a mehtok. So the mehtok and flower, only difference between them are the terms, the name, language. The object to which they’re referring to are exactly the same object in all ways, identical, just different in terminology. So this is the third of the four points in the ascertaining sameness, freedom from sameness. So in this third point, we’re analyzing whether the I and the aggregates are the same.
Now if they were the same, let us say by same it means exactly in every single way, every characteristic, exactly identical. If the truly existing I and the aggregate were the same, then three faults would arise. Three faults would accrue. This as the I or the self is conceived of as a partless one. Likewise, the five aggregates would necessarily have to become one.
Or on the other hand, because there are five aggregates, there would have to be five I. So, the I is a singularity or a unity. You know, the I which we say, I go, I stay. This I is single, a unit. If the I were identical with the aggregates, that is say if the I were no different in any characteristics to the five aggregates.
By the five aggregates we mean the aggregate of forms, feelings, perceptions, mental constructions, and consciousnesses. If the I were identical to these five aggregates, then because the I is unitary and singular, the five aggregates would have to be unitary and singular. There would only be one. The second thought which would accrue is the five aggregates are the objects of appropriation. The objects which are grasped or taken, appropriated.
We appropriate the five aggregates. The I is the appropriator, the agent which is doing the appropriating. But if they were truly existently one, then the appropriated and the appropriator would be the same. They would be no different. The five aggregates are appropriated in the course of taking rebirth.
And it’s said that the process of taking rebirth is expressed in the grasping to or the appropriation of the five aggregates. That which is doing the appropriating, the agent, is the I, the self. The I is that which takes rebirth. And the taking of rebirth is the appropriating of five aggregates. So, is the I which appropriates the five aggregates.
But if they were in fact that is to say we have an agent, we have an action, and we have an object of action. If the I and the five aggregates were identical, then the agent and the object of the action would be identical. They would have to be one. If the self by self is synonymous with I. If the self were one with the aggregates, the aggregates being the aggregates of forms, feelings, perceptions, mental constructions and consciousnesses.
But for this argument specifically the aggregate of form, that is, say, the body. If self were one with the body, then upon death, when the body is burnt, is cremated, then the I would be cremated and would be destroyed just as the aggregate forms is destroyed. And therefore, there would be no future life. But in fact the I does transmigrate to a future life. On the other hand, if the aggregates are appropriated in the course of this life, the aggregates, our present set of five aggregates do not come from a previous life.
But the eye but the eye in fact comes from a previous life. If but in if the I and the five aggregates were identical, then the I could not come from a previous life and therefore there would not be a previous life. Therefore, if the self and the aggregates were identical, there would be no coming from past lives and there would be no transition to future lives and there would be this fault. Going further, if the self and the aggregates were identical, one, and specifically if the self and the aggregate of consciousnesses were identical, one. The self or the I and the aggregate of consciousness were one because the consciousness, the aggregate of consciousness does not become cold, does not become hot, does not become hungry.
Therefore, the I itself would not become cold, hot, or hungry. So, there are many faults which accrue in this fashion upon analysis. If we hypothesize that the self, that the truly existent self is identical with the aggregates. In pursuing this analysis and seeing the many faults which arise based upon this hypothesis, we come to the conclusion, ah, the self and the aggregates are not inherently the same. They are not identical because there are so many faults which accrue if they were.
So, we come to some conclusion. This conclusion represents the ascertainment of freedom from oneness or freedom from identity, freedom from sameness. But then having come to this ascertainment arises some doubt in our mind. Well, it’s not inherently one but maybe they’re inherently different. So then we have to move on to the fourth point of this analysis, the freedom from multiplicity or many.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- merely labeled tag tsam (Tib)
- The subtlest meaning of dependent arising; every phenomenon exists relatively, or conventionally, as a mere label, merely imputed by the mind. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.