Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 77-minute teaching, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen presents a detailed explanation of the two truths in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, with particular emphasis on their inseparability and mutual implication. He begins by contrasting how different Buddhist schools posit conventional and ultimate truths—from Vaibhāṣika, where the two truths cannot be posited on one basis, through Sautrāntika and Cittamātra, to Prāsaṇgika, where they become each other. Using the example of the self, he walks through the analytical investigation required to understand how emptiness (the unfindability of inherent existence) and conventional reality (the I existing as mere name and concept) are two facets of the same phenomenon. He addresses the critical challenge of Prāsaṇgika philosophy: maintaining the understanding that the I is not established from its own side while simultaneously asserting its conventional validity. A Q&A session follows, addressing questions about the aggregates, the pitfalls of nihilism and eternalism, and the role of imputations in conventional existence. Pitched at serious practitioners engaging with advanced Mādhyamika philosophy.
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File: 2015-08-11 – KR.mp3
UUID: 8cfbf95d-c770-4c29-916a-22e0a138faf5
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Entering the Middle Way
Date: 2015-08-11
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,238
Motivation for receiving these teachings. So the way we shall proceed is I shall explain the topic of the two truths and then you shall generate a motivation in keeping with that topic. At that point we shall engage in the recitations and there is no reason for which you cannot think of the topics while you engage in the recitations. Then after this we shall have the question and answer session and then the discussion. Within Jetsunpa Drakpa Gyaltsen’s tenets treatise, the presentation of tenets is subdivided into two groups, the body of the tenets and the subdivisions.
The body, as far as Prāsaṇgika is concerned, is subdivided into establishing the view, a presentation of the two truths, and dependence on the supremacy of this view. So the presentation of the two truths within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is one in which they are inseparable. This means that the two truths are posited on one basis or if you prefer that whichever basis in other words whichever phenomenon the two truths are posited upon they intersect mutually. Then this presentation in which each of the truth becomes the other is perhaps the uncommon feature of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. It is difficult, awkward to see how this could be posited for Svatāntrika Mādhyamika.
So it’s good to explain this a little bit before and to understand why the presentation of the two truths in Prāsaṇgika is uncommon. So within Vaibhāṣika it is not possible to posit the two truths on every single base. In other words, all phenomena do not qualify for the positing of the two truths. For instance, within Vaibhāṣika, conventional truths are all phenomena which can be destroyed, either physically destroyed or at least destroyed mentally through a mental process. So the building we are in or objects in general are conventional truths.
On the other hand, ultimate truths are all phenomena which cannot be destroyed. For instance, space, in other words, the empty portion cannot be mentally destroyed. It is clear therefore that it is impossible to posit conventional and ultimate truths on one basis within Vaibhāṣika. They are mutually incompatible. Then the Sautrāntika system is extraordinarily odd.
In Sautrāntika ultimate truths are composite phenomena or impermanent phenomena, in other words phenomena which disintegrate instant by instant. Whereas conventional truths are uncomposite phenomena such as uncompounded space, in other words an empty portion. It is obvious therefore that in Sautrāntika conventional and ultimate truths cannot be posited on one basis nor can they be said to be indissociable. Now moving upwards to the Cittamātra system, it is difficult to posit phenomena under the sway of the two-ness of phenomena in Cittamātra apart from form. It is for instance difficult to posit this for persons and so forth.
Now regarding the positing of the two truths within Svatāntrika Mādhyamika, should one wish to posit ultimate truths, one needs to view emptiness and here one needs to identify the opposite of emptiness, in other words its object of refutation. The object of refutation within Svatantika Mādhyamika is a phenomena being established within their own uncommon mode of abiding without being imputed by mind. Now within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the formulation of the two truths is radically other. They are indissociable, in other words the one becomes the other and reciprocally. When they are posited they can be posited on the basis of all phenomena without exception and as was mentioned the one becomes the other and reciprocally they are therefore not incompatible in the slightest.
And as Je Tsongkhapa says in Lamrim Chenmo, all those who have an understanding of emptiness, a capacity or an interest in emptiness are far from uncommon. What is exceptionally difficult is positing the object of ascertainment which is not established from its own side, in other words positing conventional truths. It is easy to talk and understand meaninglessly about emptiness but it is very difficult to gain such an understanding. So, well, from our side, we all have an interest in emptiness in the Prāsaṇgika view and we have an understanding that this refers to the fact that under ultimate analytical investigation phenomena are unfindable and we understand this unfindability. This is not the difficult part of the view.
The difficult part of the view is instead to be able to posit objects of ascertainment on the basis of non establishment from their own side. In other words, the difficult part of the Prāsaṇgika view is positing conventional truths and from our side this is not something which will come easily. It is however inappropriate to say this is difficult and I shall not engage in it. Instead, we should think, reflect over and again, meditate over and again and an understanding will dawn. So what is difficult therefore in the Prāsaṇgika view is on the basis of an understanding of phenomena not being established from their own side or on the basis of their emptiness to understand positing phenomena as mere nominalities.
In other words, it is difficult to understand the relationship between the two truths and likewise it is difficult to understand on the basis of phenomena being merely posited as name and as conception their giving rise to emptiness. These two, conventional and ultimate truths, are mutually implicative, they become each other and they are not incompatible. So when we speak of the inseparability of the two truths in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, we must be very clear about what is referred to here. For instance, when we are referring to conventional truths, are we actually referring to the table which is in front of me, to the house and so forth or not? We are not.
We are referring to a subtle mere nominality, a subtle mere terminologically imputed phenomenon. This is what has to be understood. So how precisely in Prāsaṇgika are the two truths posited on one basis? Let us take an example that of the person, in other words the I initially before engaging in this approach we must understand what the I is and we must have the certainty that the I exists. The I exists because someone sleeps, someone walks, someone works, and someone gets angry.
So when we say I am comfy, I am happy, we have to identify this I and its mode of existence. What is its mode of existence? Its mode of existence is one of intimate relationship with a basis of imputation, which are the aggregates. And at this point, we must identify it within the aggregates. Normally, we would assume that if it exists within the aggregates, it is findable within the aggregates.
Then we must seek for it and endeavor to find it. The I has no relationship whatsoever with exterior physical entities. Instead, it entertains an intimate relationship with what? With our five aggregates. When we say I, I, this is what we point at.
Then we must seek for it within the aggregates and endeavor to find it. So when we say I, I, we have the sense of an origin of this I within oneself. This is obviously a wrong view from the standpoint of Prāsaṇgika but it must be investigated because there is something which is an agent and which performs actions. Then clearly, if this I exists within the aggregates, then it is within the aggregates that it must be found and therefore we should investigate to see if it is findable within the aggregates. Just as for instance, if we were to say the eye is within my hand, then it has to be somewhere inside the hand.
If it is not findable, it’s not there. So we should proceed initially with the form aggregate and all of its components asking ourselves is this I within any part of the form aggregate, in other words the body? Obviously it is not. Then, is it within any of the remaining four aggregates? In other words, sensation, discrimination, compositional factors and consciousness.
Then all of these four aggregates are pure consciousness, We should investigate to find if the I is there or not. It is not. And since this I cannot be found within the aggregates, on top of the aggregates or beneath the aggregates, then we investigate, investigate and realize its unfindability. The unfindability of the I does not mean that the non existence of the I has been found. It is the unfindability of the inherently existent or truly existent I which has occurred in this process of investigation.
At this point, the only thing which probably appears to the mind is the emptiness factor and we focus upon this. Then when we refer to phenomena in general, if we analyze it is really just words which refer to things and this is what is meant by conventional truths. So when we investigate to try to find this I, ultimately it is unfindable. We focus the mind on this unfindability or the factor of emptiness. And at this point, most probably only the factor of emptiness appears.
Now, this has to be justified and it can best be understood in terms of an example. If we have an extremely expensive piece of jewelry, let us say a diamond ring or a gold ring, then wherever we put it we are mindful of it because if we’re not mindful of it day and night then it may disappear and we will have lost something of great value. Then, if we have misplaced it and we are seeking for it, we will think only about this precious jewel and seek, seek, seek until we have found it and focus upon it. Likewise, when we are investigating whether the I can be found within the aggregates, in other words when we are investigating the meaning of emptiness we seek, seek, seek, we analyze, we investigate and when we have found it is unfindable we focus upon this unfindability, this factor of emptiness. It is critical before engaging in this investigation to have a clear sense of how the I exists and how it functions.
Otherwise, when we engage an ultimate analytical investigation trying to find an I and we find it is unfindable under investigation, under analysis and focus upon this unfindability, we risk to succumb to the extreme of nihilism which thinks there is no I whatsoever and at this point one wonders well is there such a thing as causality? However, if we have had at the beginning a strong sense of the actual mode of existence of the I at the point of unfindability under ultimate analysis of the I, the thought arises when it does exist. So how precisely does it exist? What is its mode of existence? And therefore, when under ultimate analytical investigation we realize that the I is unfindable, this sense of the existence of the I nonetheless arises and this is how the two truths are linked, the ultimate and conventional truth.
Then clearly such an I is intimately linked to the basis of imputation, the five aggregates. How could it be linked? It is linked as a mere nominal, conceptual or sound imputation on the basis of imputation. Now clearly, if name, conception or sound existed alone without a basis of imputation, such an imputation would be invalid. Likewise, if the basis of imputation from its side existed without the imputation, likewise we would have no process, so we have a concatenation of the two.
Then, once under ultimate analytical investigation, we have ascertained the unfindability of the I, in other words ultimate truth, how precisely do we establish conventional truth, how does the I exist, in other words? It exists merely in dependence on name, merely in dependence on conception, merely in dependence on sound. This I exists in dependence on both name and aggregates. It does not exist just in dependence on name, just on name. This is a very strange mode of existence.
So on the one hand, we can see that the imputer, in other words name and sound, imputes on a basis of imputation and this is how one proceeds from conventional to ultimate truths. On the other hand, we can see that when under ultimate analytical investigation the unfindability of the ‘I’ is ascertained, then in dependence on this, the existence of the I or the person as mere name or sound, can be inferred. This is how conventional truths are established in dependence on ultimate truths. In brief, to summarize, the unfindability of the I within the aggregates under ultimate analytical investigation is none other than the ultimate truth, whereas the fact that through sound, through name and through conception the I can be imputed on the basis of imputation of the aggregates is the conventional mode of existence of the I. So we can think about all phenomena in the light of the two truths.
So let us at present think for some five minutes or so on the meaning of the two truths in the light of what was explained and after this I will take your questions. Please simple, clear, concise questions. And let us start with the recitations. Please ask your questions. Could you please ask, Geshe-la?
We have heard the four aggregates that are not form are pure consciousness. Does that mean consciousness is Is consciousness is formed upon four aggregates? Is that what what he means? Is consciousness formed by or upon five aggregates. Is that he means?
If we take the case of the aggregate of sensation or for that matter the aggregate of discrimination or composition of factors, We cannot say that they arise from the aggregates but we certainly can say that the aggregate of sensation arises from the continuum of previous instance of the aggregate of sensation. Instance, previous instance of time of the aggregate of sensation. Was that your question? Geshe-la said, you cannot say that the aggregates, that consciousness arises from the aggregates but if you take the aggregate of sensation, the aggregate of sensation arises from previous moments, previous instance of the aggregate of sensation within therefore the continuum of the aggregate of sensation. Thank you and I will contemplate on that answer.
Thank you. On finding the unfindability of the I, is that where the danger of nihilism is? And if that’s so, when does the danger of eternalism come in? At what point? There are those, to answer the first part of your question, who upon discovering the unfindability of the I succumbed to an extreme of nihilism which prevents them from asserting causality, in other words the accumulation of karma and the experience of the fruition of karma.
Then within this context there is no problem with the view of eternalism. The view of eternalism is precisely that apprehension of the person as permanent, one and independent, which does not occur here. For us during our meditation, as we investigate, the I, how do we discern the difference between the unfindability and not its absence? So they both are quite similar subjects, but how do we discern the difference between the two? There is no difference between the unfindability of an I established from its own side and the findability of the non existence of an I established from its own side.
When we investigate using ultimate analytical investigation to try to find this eye established from its own side and we find it is unfindable, we have also found its unfindability and found its non existence. Could Geshe-la please describe what is going on in a non verbal creature like an ant or a worm in terms of name, sound and conception? Ants do have an innate grasping at their own self. The difference between ants and living beings is more one of the intensity of the grasping at the self and its modalities. For instance, if we poke an ant, let’s say with a blade of grass, the ant retracts, the ant clearly is endeavoring to protect itself.
So it does have self grasping. Blade of grass without name, without sound, without a conception. So I don’t know. I think the ant knows. The ant has to have such an interesting gesture to ask me.
I don’t know. To what extent do we create the world through imputations? I guess what I’m asking is if you say that we just create the world through imputations you fall into the idea of is it solipsism where you create everything? So to what extent do we do that? To what extent through our imputations do we create the world?
It’s a good question. The answer is no. If you take the world, the world does not arise exclusively on the basis of imputation, it arises with imputation on a basis of imputation. It’s a good question. If you take the eye, the I arises as a nominal and conceptual imputation on a basis of imputation which are the aggregates.
So far so good. Then if you ask where does the eye arise from? You probably do not want to assert that it arises in dependence on both the nominal imputation and the basis of imputation. So here there’s a lot of food for analysis. So you can see that when you say for instance a sprout arises from a seed, a very strong sense of the inherent existence of sprout and seed is present in that statement.
Now when you say that the ‘I’ is a mere nominal or conceptual imputation on a basis of imputation which is the aggregates, you have to analyze what that arises from so as to prevent the arrival of this sense of inherent existence. With regard to the four aggregates that are not form, is mind the imputation which arises on the basis of those aggregates? So no, the consciousness here is not an imputed phenomenon, it is a basis of imputation, It is a basis of imputation of the I which thinks my consciousness or for instance I think. But it is also a label. Insofar as it’s a label, is it the correct label to be ascribed to the four aggregates?
Consciousness is a label. Consciousness. Yes. Not the aggregate of consciousness. Consciousness.
I I said mind, but I’m happy to go with consciousness. Consciousness is not a name because in Buddhist treatises all names are sounds and consciousness is not sound. So regarding Pamela’s question about the ant, actually who posits antness? It is not the ant itself. It is another person.
It could be a human being, it could be a god, it could be a Buddha, it could be a being whose mind is affected by tenets or a being whose mind is unaffected by tenets. However, the ant from his own side definitely has self grasping. The difference is the greater or lesser intensity of that self grasping. So we have little time for discussion. There’s only one topic today, which is the two truths within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika and taking the case of the eye, how the two truths can be posited on one basis.
How specifically on the basis of the ultimate truth, posited on the basis of the eye, we can derive the conventional truth and reciprocally. In addition, within Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the two truths are indissociable and become each other, the one becomes the other and reciprocally. Therefore analyze carefully how positing ultimate truths on the basis of the eye indirectly leads to the generation of conventional truths.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
- As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
- lamrim
- The graduated path. A presentation of Shakyamuni Buddha’s teachings in a form suitable for the step-by-step training of a disciple. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- self-grasping dag dzin (Tib)
- The mind that apprehends the self as inherently existent. This refers to both the self of persons and the self of phenomena. LYWA
- two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
- The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.