Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2015-11-17 – KR.mp3
UUID: f3e13dcf-bdc2-41e1-8c19-9cb10a803d7c
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Emptiness (Khensur Rinpoche)
Date: 2015-11-17
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 1h 29m
Words: 4,919
So regarding the issue of the two truths, conventional ultimate truth being of one nature but different isolates, It is difficult for us to understand ultimate truth, emptiness in other words. But it is important for us to be aware of the fact that if we reflect on it over and again, we will eventually gain understanding. It is understandable since our introduction to emptiness has generally occurred in the context of Lamrim, the graduated stages of the path in which we hear repeatedly of these three principles of the path, definite emergence, bodhicitta and the correct view, the correct view of emptiness that we should think that it is impossible to generate an understanding of emptiness without either having generated definite emergence or bodhicitta before. This is not the case. For definite emergence and bodhicitta are necessarily generated in sequence.
In other words, it is not possible to generate bodhicitta without first having generated definite emergence. There is no certainty regarding the order in which the view of emptiness is generated. The view of emptiness can arise in beings who have not generated definite emergence within their mind stream. It can arise after having generated definite emergence or it can arise after having generated bodhicitta. So it is definite that to generate bodhicitta one must have previously generated uncontrived renunciation.
The issue is regarding the sequence in which emptiness or the realization of emptiness must be generated. As was said, it does not have to be generated after generating bodhicitta nor does it necessarily have to be generated after generating definite emergence. The issue which arises is does it have to be generated at least after having turned away from the vanities of this life or not? And there are two positions here. Some would say that it can only be generated after having turned away from the vanities of this life, but there are a few arguments in favor of this and there is considerable scriptural argument and rational argument indicating it can be generated without even having turned away from the vanities of this life.
It is really important to reflect on the passage from Maitreya’s Abhishamyamlamka, The Ornament of Realizations which is Suddhara Lama quoted at the Blue Mountains and which reads as follows. First realization, then the two truths and then the jewels and so forth. This verse, this instruction encapsulates the sequence of training. First realization refers to the realization of the two truths, conventional ultimate truth. Then the truths refer to the four noble truths and the triple gem and so forth refer to all subsequent realizations.
So as Je Tsongkhapa says, after generating the wisdom arisen from thinking regarding emptiness generate the wisdom arisen from meditation and turning away from the elaborations of this life retire in solitude. Now the elaborations of this life refer to the vanities of this life. This passage implicitly indicates that there are beings who have not turned away from the vanities of this life but who nonetheless are able to gain realization of emptiness. So as is taught, initially one generates an ascertainment, arisen from thinking regarding emptiness and on this basis an ascertainment arisen from meditation. Now, once one has generated an ascertainment arisen from thinking, in other words, an inferential valid cognizer, Normally one would turn away from the vanities of this life, the elaborations and retire in solitude.
But as the passage of Je Tsongkhapa indicates, it is possible for beings who have not done this nonetheless to gain realization of emptiness. The issue arises in the lumbering since the implicit question is, is it possible to gain direct realization of emptiness without having initially attained calm abiding? Normally, is attained by means of calm abiding but if it were possible to attain realization of emptiness without having attained calm abiding, since the attainment of calm abiding necessarily implies that the being who has attained calm abiding has turned away from the vanities of this life. Since calm abiding involves an inner withdrawal of the mind turning away from the five sensory objects. Then if it was possible to attain direct realization of emptiness without calm abiding, this would suggest that beings who have not turned away from the vanities of this life can gain direct realization of emptiness.
In brief, the consensus of practitioners and scholars as well as all scriptural sources indicate that it is possible to gain realization of emptiness with a coarse mind of the desire realm. Whether such a realization of emptiness is able to act as an antidote to counteract totally ignorance is another issue altogether. It is not probably possible without calm abiding in addition. Therefore, coarse minds of the desire realm such as ours can definitely ascertain emptiness by means of a valid cognizer. However, this is not a stable ascertainment.
It is one which is easily lost unless repeated familiarity with emptiness occurs. So this is a topic of considerable debate in the great monasteries when these topics are studied. Some assert quite casually that it is necessary to have turned away from the vanities of this life to realize emptiness. But one needs to have a reason for this a rationale. Now what actually does it mean to have turned away from the vanities of this life?
It means to have relinquished coarse minds such as the ones we have at present, which rely exclusively on exterior sensory input and to turn the mind inwards. Why precisely would this be related to the realization of emptiness? There is no obvious reason. If it were the case that one could only realize emptiness after having relinquished the vanities of this life, then ours would be a very difficult situation since it is actually very difficult to relinquish the vanities of this life. Turning away from the vanities of this life is rather difficult.
However, even though a coarse mind of the desire realm can realize emptiness, it is difficult for such a coarse mind of the desire realm realizing emptiness to counter the ignorance grasping at a self. For this, one needs a subtle mind realizing emptiness, specifically one needs a mind of calm abiding realizing emptiness or at the very least single pointed samadhi. Discussions such as these on emptiness are extraordinarily beneficial since if we want to realize emptiness, we must initially have studied emptiness. In other words, we must have heard about emptiness and then independence on this, one can give rise to the wisdom arisen from thinking which leads to a valid cognizer realizing emptiness. So returning to our topic which is the two truths being of one nature but different isolates and analyzing this from the standpoint of the Prasangika madhyamika system.
Clearly to understand the two truths being of one nature but different isolates, one must understand the two truths and specifically ultimate truths, in other words emptiness. Emptiness in Prasangika madhyamika refers to phenomena being mere conceptual imputations out there. It is one thing to understand phenomena being mere conceptual imputations out there. It is something very different to understand how on this basis, all the objects of ascertainment such as the experiences of pleasant and unpleasant sensations and the varieties of phenomena can arise. To understand what is meant by Prasangika Madhyamika’s statement that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there or are mere conceptual imputations, we have to apply this to the I and to the self of others.
Now it is rather difficult to understand what is meant by one’s own I being a mere conceptual imputation imputed by innate conceptuality. It is somewhat easier to understand what is meant when we say that other persons are mere conceptual imputations. Listen carefully. Let’s take some examples. When we see someone driving along the road in a car or riding a motorbike or a bicycle, every time when we look at them we think, ah, so and so is driving a car, so and so is driving a motorbike, so and so is on a bicycle.
Now this is nothing else that then imputing by a conception within our mind personhood on that perceived phenomenon. This is all it is. Or if Tenzil Hamo, Anila Tenzil Hamo comes into the temple, we say, Ah, Tenzil Hamo has arrived. Then this is nothing else irrespective of whether we know Tenzil Hamo or not, then imputing the name Tensile Hano on the observed phenomenon. So this is what is meant by conceptual imputation by the innate conception, nothing else than this in the case of Tensile Homo.
If we know Tensile Homo, we impute the systems in Homo on the experience of seeing Tensile Homo. Then when this is applied to our own self or our own I, things get a bit more difficult because we are imputing this I ness with a conception which is also within ourselves. So it’s a bit more awkward at least for me. I don’t know whether that’s the case for you or not. All of us are different.
We have different constituents, different dispositions. This is explicitly taught in Buddhist scriptures. We also have different karmic predispositions. So we have different outlooks on this for myself. It is more difficult to understand conceptual imputation of my own I than upon an exterior entity.
For yourself, you should check. In Tibetan, this is called or in Tibetan in English it is called stand or table. But in either case, you have a process of imputation of a name or a conception on the observed entity by the observing person. When you observe it, do you think a table or the table? And for myself these problems was the definite and the indefinite article in English are a big problem but yourselves as English speakers don’t have this problem.
Of any way, all the different countries have their own language, their own way of expressing things. Tibetans call this table duncho, when I look at it, I see a duncho, Westerners call it table. But the object referred to is the same. You see it’s very awkward when we say that in Prasangika all phenomena are mere conception imputations and then we can’t really explain what that conception is. So once we have asserted that in Prasangika Madhyamika all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations.
As Je Tsongkhapa says in Gompa Rapsal in elucidating the intent, the greatest difficulty for Prasangika Madhyamika is at that point to explain activity or operation on such a basis. And this is the position of Nagarjuna, of Aryadeva, of Buddhapalita, of Shantideva who all assert that phenomena are mere conceptual imputations and that activity or operation can be postulated on that basis alone. So it is clear that irrespective of whether we are talking of the person, of the I or of an object in every single case, they exist independence on conceptuality, they are mere conceptual imputations. Now, if we take the case of the person, when it is asserted that the person is a mere conceptual imputation, In other words, that the person is a mere conceptual imputation on the basis of the aggregates, what exactly is refuted? What is refuted is a person being established from the side of the aggregates.
Now, when we meet somebody whether it is a man or a woman, the thought this is a man, this is a woman, this is so and so, this isn’t so and so, arises within our mind. It should therefore be evident that such a person is a mere conceptual imputation, and that there is nothing from the side of the aggregates, which is establishing it. This fact that the person is a mere conceptual imputation, that nothing is established from the side of the aggregates. This is emptiness or ultimate truth. And therefore, the person is a mere imputation on the basis of the aggregates.
In other words, the person is not established in the slightest from the side of the aggregates. The fact that the person is not established in the slightest from the side of the aggregates, this is emptiness. This is the ultimate truth of the person. Here, the term mere in mere conception imputation exclusively precludes the person’s being established from the side of the aggregates. Now, the person’s being in mere conception imputation on the other hand, this is the conventional truth of the person.
Now the eyes not being established in the slightest from the standpoint of the aggregates is the ultimate truth of the eye. The eye being a mere conceptual imputation is the conventional truth of the eye. When we say that these two are of one nature, but different isolates, what do we mean? We mean that when we think of the one, there is some sort of a feeling of the other and when we think of the other, there is some sort of a feeling of the first one. There are numerous understandings of the technical term being of one nature but different isolates.
In the context of the two truths, what this means is that when we think of one of the truths, there is an inkling of the other truths. When we think of the other truths, there is an inkling of the first truth. So as Nagarjuna says in Vidogav Yaghtani, he who teaches dependent arising, he teaches the middle way. The meaning of this stanza is that the teaching of dependent arising entails a teaching of ultimate truth. Since the middle way is none other than the middle way between the extremes of permanence and of nihilism.
So this is the meaning of being of one nature and different isolates. Now regarding the I, it is easier for some to understand the I as a mere conceptual imputation as far as others are concerned and it is easier for some to understand it as far as themselves or oneself is concerned. In either case, what is meant by the conventional truth of the I or the person is the person’s not being established in the slightest from the standpoint of the aggregates. What is meant by the ultimate truth of the person, excuse me, what is meant by the conventional truth of the person, that was the ultimate truth. What is meant by the conventional truth of the person is the I being a mere conceptual imputation on its basis of imputation.
When it is said that these two are of one nature but different isolates, what is meant is that understanding the one, one can understand the other and reciprocally. Now when we present Plasangika Madhyaamika, we can say that the dependent arising and emptiness are to be understood as synonymous and this is the meaning of being of one nature but different isolates. Now taking the table as an example to understand in another context what is meant by being of one nature but of different isolates. This table is an impermanent phenomenon. This table is also a product.
Being a product or the tables being a product and the tables being an impermanent phenomenon are of one nature, but different isolates. This simply means that they refer to the same thing under different names. Likewise, we all know people who have had numerous names. One name as a teenager, another when they were ordained, another name when they were lay people, but this name always refers to the same underlying entity. So you have to understand here what is meant by different, different names.
Now let us take for instance, a person who has two names, my own case for instance, then some know me as Tensitempa, some know me as Ilya. Another party who only knows the name Tensitempa but does not know the name Ilya, when Ilya is mentioned will not know who that is but when Tensitempa is mentioned will know who that is. The two names are therefore different. Now let us return to a variant of the example of the table. When we refer to the impermanence or the disintegrativeness of the table, we are referring to entities which are of one nature, but different isolates.
This is the case because when we say that the phenomenon such as a table disintegrates, what we mean is that it does not abide for even one instant. That not abiding for even one instant when it is understood leads immediately to an understanding of the table’s impermanence and reciprocally. So this is what is meant by these two being of one nature but different isolates. They have different names but they have the same meaning. Maybe the best example is that of one person bearing two names such as your translator.
So for someone who knows both names Ilya and Tensintempa, when he or she hears Ilya, he understands Tensitempa. When he or she hears Tensitempa, he or she understands ilea. He or she understands that these are two names referring to one person. It is an instance of one nature and two isolates. This is exactly the relationship which the two truths conventional and ultimate truths have with each other.
And that is a joy. Then if you have questions, could you ask your questions? So Chris’ question was in a nutshell, what is the meaning of innate within innate conception? And Gesheva said, innate here means uncreated. By uncreated we mean that such a conception has always been there.
It is not the product of tenets. It is not created by tenants. The normally existing I. That’s the question you should ask. As Je Tsongkhapa said, the biggest difficulty is understanding how the activity of entities which are mere conceptual imputations in Prasangika can occur.
It is not that easy to understand that the I or the person is a mere conceptual imputation, but it can be understood. And once one has understood that, it is quite straightforward to understand that such a person or an I does not exist in the slightest from the standpoint of the aggregates. Then at that point, it’s quite straightforward to understand that the I which is a mere conceptual imputation and the I which does not exist in the slightest from the standpoint of the aggregates, in other words the conventional and the ultimate truth of the I are of one nature and different isolates. That is quite straightforward. But what is difficult to understand is how such an eye can operate.
First, one has to understand clearly what is meant by the statement that the eye is a mere conceptual imputation. Otherwise, it is mere fancy speech to talk about such an I being able to engage in activities. Then once one has understood what is meant by the I being a mere conceptual imputation, it is possible on that basis to understand rather simply what is meant by the statement that the I does not exist in the slightest from the standpoint of the aggregate. And it is fairly evident that these two statements are mutually implicative. Then once we reflect carefully on how they are mutually implicative, it is possible to understand how such an I can operate.
Another. Then ask your questions, if you have no questions, we start with discussion. So there’s no shame in having questions and if you don’t have questions, then we just start discussion. Just earlier, Kishilay, you mentioned calm abiding and single pointed Samadhi and I was just wondering what the difference between those two was. Yes, there is a difference.
We can speak of single pointed concentration at the level of the eighth and the ninth mental abiding in the process of generating calm abiding. These are very subtle levels of mind, but it is not yet calm abiding. Calm abiding is something different altogether. Another? Ralph, have you question?
Really? Oh, wait. So emptiness is supposedly my understanding from a Prasangika perspective, non implicative negation. If that’s the case, then nothing can be implied from it. So if we say that the object does not have characteristics from its own side, then that cannot lead the mind to come to any other conclusion.
Yet we then basically have to make a jump to say, no, in fact, the object is a mere conceptual imputation. That to me sounds like an assertion based on the non implicative negation in which case it becomes an implicative negation. So it is true that the I is not established from the standpoint of the aggregates and that this is what is understood as its emptiness. It is also true that this non establishment of the I from the standpoint of the aggregates implies that the I is a mere conceptual imputation but that is not sufficient to turn the I’s non establishment from the standpoint of the aggregates into an implicative negation. If it were the case that the eyes not being established from the standpoint of the aggregate was an implicative negation, if it were the case, then both the sound expressing it and the conception which realizes it would imply its opposite.
In other words, would imply that the I is established from the set standpoint of the aggregates which is obviously nonsense. Yours is a very good doubt. It would make one dizzy if one hadn’t thought about it. Sorry, we’ve been thinking about this for a long time. I’m joking.
Take the example of Devadatta, the fat Devadatta who does not eat by day. This is a classic example of an implicative negation. Such an implicative negation not only negates the fat Devadatta’s eating by day, but it implies an affirmative statement, which is that the fat Devadatta eats by night, otherwise he would not be fat. In other words, it implies both the refutation of its object of negation and an affirmative phenomenon. Same thing as the As the example, the mountainless plain which is a classic example of an implicative negation.
So if you take the mountainous plane, the mountainous plane is an implicative negation because it implies the existence of planes. So most implicative negations imply the existence of such an affirmative phenomenon. Now initially when one gains experience of emptiness, that experience of emptiness implies an experience of dependent arising. It is however open to discussion whether as the mind becomes subtler and more experienced with meditation emptiness, this still occurs at all. Yep.
If it is true that all phenomena can be subdivided into the two truths, how is it that the innate conceptual mind is not a product of tenets? How is it that what? That the innateness that Geshela referred to before is not created by tenets. If all phenomena can be divided subdivided into the two truths across all schools, Geshela said that the definition of innate is something that has always existed. It’s not a product of tenets.
Cannot innate therefore fit into one of the two truths because it fulfils that definition that all phenomena can be divided into one or other of the two truths. Innate is a conventional truth. What’s the problem? Innate conceptions are conventional truths. No, obviously.
For instance in Sautrantika, innate conceptions are ultimate truths because they are impermanent, only impermanent phenomena are ultimate truths. So as you remember, the presentation of the two truths in Vaibhashik and Sautrantika is a course of presentation and the presentation of the two truths in Chitamatra and Madhyamika which ushers the concept of two truths being of one nature but different isolates is more subtle. I have a question from the last week. So I always have a problem with that statement. It is that having infinite many previous rebirths, it implies that every sentient being has been our father or mother.
And this this actually is not true. This requires a second assumption. So for example, suppose a person always get rebirth with a similar set of father and mother. Sorry. It’s not a good thing.
So one person always get get a father or mother but doesn’t say the identity of this father and mother has to be different or the same. I’m sorry. I really don’t understand your question. I can explain it more precisely in mathematical terms, but I don’t want to do it. So Well, actually, I’ve studied math and so has Ralph, so go ahead.
Okay, so could I try? Okay, imagine Markov chain. Imagine that from a Markov chain, there’s a transition matrix. It has columns and rows and columns represent the child and row represent mother and father. And in order to in order for the in order to say that having infinite rebirth implies that every sentient being has been our parent for for the past life.
It requires the matrix to be non reducible to block matrix. When one speaks of mother sentient beings in Buddhist treatises, one refers to the fact that there is not a single sentient being who cannot be said to have been one’s mother or one’s father at one time. Then the debate you’re addressing is actually one Ralph and I had a while back. But I think Ralph disagreed with me. I don’t understand your explanation.
I think the first key is to understand the idea of a mental continuum composed of a subtle mind which is beginningless. And it is on this basis that one can gain understanding of how every sentient being would have had to have been one’s mother in a previous life. Maybe maybe I didn’t using you did not get my you didn’t you do not understand my attack on the question. It requires a second assumption that is I think it should be called ergodicity assumption, ergodicity matrix in in Markov chain. But let me try another example.
So let’s imagine an infinite Emptiness. No. Infinite. Me try using numbers. So we have rational numbers.
Rational numbers repeat. The digits always repeat. And we have we have irrational numbers. For irrational numbers, the digit don’t repeat. And in order to so they both have infinite number of digits attached to to the, yeah, they both have infinite number of digits.
But in one case, for the rational numbers, it always repeats. And for the other case, it doesn’t repeat. And this implies that this actually implies that infinity having infinite many digit doesn’t mean that so you have you can have 8.3333 repeating. Every infinite length doesn’t mean that you have to have the same you have to have every different mother and father among the sentient beings. You can have only one, If I understand you correctly, your question is could we have the same mother over and again?
Is that your question? I’m saying that infinity doesn’t imply infinity doesn’t imply that every sentient being has necessarily been our parent. So I think it will be clearer if I repeat the basic predicate which is every one of us has a subtle mind, you have a subtle mind. Then because you have a subtle mind, you have infinite previous rebirths. In most of those rebirths you have had a father or a mother.
Therefore, we can extrapolate and conclude that all living beings must have been your father or your mother at some point in the past. Is your doubt that you you’re saying that we could have had the same parent over and over again? I don’t see I’m not mathematical at all, but I don’t see how that could be because you are reborn after forty days. Well, my mother died thirty years ago. So how could I possibly But I don’t think I can’t see how it would be possible in Buddhist terms to have the same mother over and over again.
Maybe sometimes, but not over and over again. Geshela, how does the realization of emptiness once you’ve realized emptiness, how do you then use that to benefit sentient beings? To what? Benefit sentient beings. So in addition to having a direct realization of emptiness, one needs in the background either, one needs in the background bodhicitta since there are beings who have a direct realization of emptiness, independence on definite emergence such as hearers or solitary realizers who do little to benefit others.
Now once one realizes emptiness with the motivation of bodhicitta, then since as a result of the realization of emptiness, one experiences great inner happiness, one then sets forth to teach others how to gain these realizations in such a way does one help. If your doubt is that when one gains direct realization of emptiness during that realization one is in a meditative equipoise, then how could one in such a benefit in such a case benefit others? Then indeed, in a state of meditative equipoise on emptiness, one cannot benefit others in any way. It is the physical and verbal actions which arise independence on this after which benefit others. This is one of the ways of explaining it.
Yeah. When we started learning the Prasangika view, Geshela spoke about the significance of autonomous syllogisms within the Svatantrika and the consequentialist. And I didn’t understand the significance of consequentialist, I’m not even sure of the term. Is it a syllogism within Prasangika? So we’ll get a bit dizzy if we enter into this now.
Are other questions on the back burner such as your question regarding the distinction between the innate conception and the afflicted mind in Chitamatra. I’ll cover them the next times.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- conventional truth samvriti satya (Skt); kun dzob den pa (Tib)
- As opposed to ultimate truth, which is the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality (emptiness), conventional truth is what is true to the valid conventional consciousness. LYWA
- desire realm kamadhatu (Skt); do kham (Tib)
- One of the three realms of samsara, comprising the hell beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, asuras (demi-gods) and the six lower classes of suras (gods); beings in this realm are preoccupied with desire for objects of the six senses. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- sentient being sem chen (Tib)
- Any being who has not abandoned the two obscurations. LYWA
- shamatha zhi nä (Tib)
- Calm abiding; a state of concentration in which the mind is able to abide steadily, without effort and for as long as desired, on an object of meditation. There are nine stages in its development. LYWA
- two truths den pa nyi (Tib)
- The two ways of relating to phenomena, as conventional or all-obscuring truth, the truth to a worldly mind, and ultimate truth, the truth to a mind engaged in ultimate analysis. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.