Emptiness — 2014-10-05

1 h 50 min · 5,496 words · 5 October 2014 · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Emptiness (Khensur Rinpoche)
Emptiness (Khensur Rinpoche)
Emptiness — 2014-10-05
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. This 46-minute Q&A explores a critical distinction in Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka: whether emptiness is an implicative negation (negation that implies something) or non-implicative (negation that stands alone). Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen explains that emptiness and dependent arising are synonymous, and that all phenomena exist as “mere imputation”—mental designation with no inherent nature. He identifies the two key difficulties: correctly identifying the object of negation (a frequent Tibetan error causing nihilism), and having something functional remain after negation. Through examples like the person as an intersection of imputations—a substantial continuum changing moment-to-moment—he explores how phenomena lack independence yet function coherently. The session addresses how natural laws operate within this view and how direct realization of emptiness deepens progressively. For practitioners with philosophical grounding.

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File: 2014-10-05 – KR.mp3

UUID: 4e0c393a-0675-44ff-9a19-e8c4e0e42745

Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche

Collection: Emptiness

Date: 2014-10-05

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~5,496

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

This transcript was generated using AI speech recognition and correction

File: 2014-10-05 – KR.mp3
Collection: Emptiness
UUID: 4e0c393a-0675-44ff-9a19-e8c4e0e42745

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This transcript was generated using AI speech recognition and has been reviewed for Buddhist terminology accuracy. Some inaccuracies may remain. Please refer to the original audio recording as the authoritative source.

# 01-141005_1330.mp3 > **Collection:** Audio Recordings — Emptiness > **Duration:** 46.0 minutes > **Words:** 5,499 > **Model:** Deepgram Nova-3 > **Corrections:** 11 Buddhist terminology fixes > **Transcribed:** 2026-03-02 20:42 — So if you didn’t have questions it would be astonishing. Please Well that’s a difficult question, right? Any other requirements? There’s got to be some as well. If you’ve got…

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# 01-141005_1330.mp3

> **Collection:** Audio Recordings — Emptiness
> **Duration:** 46.0 minutes
> **Words:** 5,499
> **Model:** Deepgram Nova-3
> **Corrections:** 11 Buddhist terminology fixes
> **Transcribed:** 2026-03-02 20:42

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So if you didn’t have questions it would be astonishing. Please Well that’s a difficult question, right? Any other requirements? There’s got to be some as well. If you’ve got a lot of minutes to do it.

That’s a difficult one. Basically, Geshela taught it here a couple of weeks ago. In a nutshell, an implicative negation is a negation which after the negation implies something else. For instance, I mentioned to Susan and her husband yesterday, if you say of somebody, the wealthy man who has no money in his bank account, you’re basically this is a negation, you are denying that he has money in his bank account, but it is an implicative negation because you’re implying he has money elsewhere in real estate or whatever. That’s an implicative negation.

A non implicative negation is a negation which implies nothing. The man who has no money whatsoever would be a non implicative negation. Then this is an extremely important distinction for understanding emptiness. It’s an ongoing debate certainly in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, maybe in ancient India. The majority opinion, the consensus I would say, that emptiness is a non implicative negation.

In other words, when you have negated the true existence, the inherent existence of phenomena, that’s it. This does not imply anything. Then as Geshe-la mentioned today, there is however a strong debate in Tsongkhapa’s commentary on Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, Chandakirti’s clear words, in which Tsongkhapa says, if emptiness and dependent arising are basically synonymous, and if any understanding of emptiness which does not lead to an understanding of dependent arising or amounts to succumbing into nihilism, then emptiness must be an implicative negation, since emptiness implies dependent arising. So I hope that goes towards answering your question. I think Pamela, who was in a straight line behind you, had a question as well.

How my understanding is that a name is a sound, a sign or a concept. How does a name accumulate karma? That’s a big question, right? I think Geshe-la put it in a simplified form when he said a mean, a mere name remains, I think it is more accurate to say that mere nominal imputation remains, because a name is sound, so Obviously if you say that I am a sound, that is silly, I am not a sound. But if you say that I am imputed technically by name or sign, by name in other words a word or sign for instance, I point at somebody that’s semiotic implication, then that is from a strict normal standpoint acceptable, then how that is able to operate is the crux of the difficulties of Prāsaṇgika.

This is the most difficult part. The problem I was talking with Krishna over lunch is not the elimination of the object of negation, that’s quite easy actually. I mean, there are two difficult points really, at the beginning and at the end. The difficult point at the beginning is identifying correctly the object of negation. This is the biggest difficulty Tsongkhapa pointed out.

So in Tibet, it was misidentified. Typically, the Tibetans negated too much. So they negated all conventional phenomena, then karma and causality collapse, and you end up in a situation where anything goes, basically this is nihilism. So at the beginning, the first problem is negating correctly, identifying correctly the object of negation. But then the big difficulty if you’ve identified it correctly, is to have something left at the end of the process of negation.

If you have something left, however fragile that is, that can be conventional phenomena. If there’s nothing whatsoever left, then everything is however I wish it to be. Which is what is said. Generally normality is not introduced because the concept is so demanding, know. Generally the way Rinpoche always presented it was through the royal reasoning.

All phenomena are empty of inherent existence because they are dependent arising. This is the simplest and safest way to study emptiness. Safest because there’s no risk of falling into the extreme of nihilism. Things are empty because they are dependent arisings, they are dependent arisings because they’re empty, it’s synonymous. Because if you’re saying it’s an imputation on something, you’re saying that something is doing an imputation.

And even if you end up with a, you know, a non implicative negation, you still got an imputation In Prasanika, you have nothing to stand upon. This is the problem when one enters in-depth in the Prasanika view, there’s nowhere where it stops. It’s not as if, like when we talk of the basis of imputation, I think for most of us the idea is you have the imputer here, the basis of imputation, let’s say the aggregates there, and the imputer imputes in the aggregates, and the aggregates somehow are the sort of base of concrete on which things happen. This is actually the Svatāntrika Madiamica view, it’s a much more comfortable view, it stops at the aggregates. From the Prasanika standpoint I finished this and I’ll then address your question again.

So from the Prasanika standpoint, this basis of imputation is also not inherently established, so it actually never stops anywhere. So why can’t we just live with them? That I can’t answer. That I think you know. I can’t answer as I said, you know that’s really, it’s not a name, so that was a simplified presentation, it is imputed by name, concept or sign.

Then imputed means it is called literally. Called. Do we have other questions? Yes. Sign would be, well let’s say my pointing at something or for instance, you have a lot of signs like stop signs on the road which are not words, right?

That would be a sign which actually designates something. The quarrel, in other words the imputre, would be a conception. That conception itself is also an imputation on a base, right? And whatever imputes that conception is an imputation as well. So that is where the Prasanthika view is both very profound and very difficult.

The Satanika view is much more comfortable. The Satanika say that conventionally phenomena are defined by their own characteristics. So what do they mean by that? They mean that there is actually in the process of imputation something from the side of phenomena. So we have the mind doing the imputing, on the base of imputation, and the base of imputation has some characteristics in its own right, and these two meet, and at this meeting point the imputation occurs.

Prasadika says there is no characteristics from the side of the phenomenon. So the problem is the Prasadika view, the problem is not so much refuting the object of negation, the problem is establishing conventionalities, this is a big difficulty. The problem is establishing conventionalities, this is a big difficulty. Please? You’re asking of the cause of relation between phenomena?

Those questions aren’t asked. They’re simply not asked. You could ask them, but it would be a I think if you ask them for Magheshi, would be a strange question. Would be like It’s not a question which would arise, let’s put it that way. So it’s accepted that all things are functioning things?

For instance, an impermanent phenomenon is impermanent because it itself arises from another impermanent phenomenon. This is the nature of impermanent phenomena. It’s a bit dizzying, isn’t it? I mean, the approach to the views is the following, and I think it’s much more helpful to proceed like this. To start with the Vaibhāṣika school and move upwards in one’s studies until one encounters something with which one is profoundly comfortable.

There’s no particular reason for which we are held to have what the Gedug tradition calls the highest view. We need a view which is compatible with us, and as I mentioned yesterday, I think many Geshe’s I know are Sattankaras. In other words they really want something from the side of phenomena, maybe not a lot, but something, right? Then the Prasadhika view that from the side of the basic designation there is nothing, This is not a view we are necessarily comfortable with them, we don’t have to accept it. One can go very far with just the Vaibhashi Kavyuh frankly, mean we saw in tenets one can be a bodhisattva with the Vaibhashi Kavyu which is a lot.

Do we have other questions? I’ll take maybe Natalie’s question yes? Could you elaborate a bit on your doubt? Well, in the Sotantica view that the instance of the person is a mindstream, that’s how it’s formulated technically, is probably the most comfortable view. Then I thought Karen’s comment this morning was very very sharp.

She asked whether it was correct that she was basically at the intersection of a series of imputations. The imputation my daughter by her parents, the imputation my mother by her daughter. That’s exactly it. That is the prosangika understanding of the person. The person is at the intersection of a multitude of imputations from oneself, like I impute my name upon my body, or depending on the moments of the day, after a very long teaching I impute it on my knees, you know, it’s I impute therefore the aggregate of feeling, you know, but I am also at the intersection of the imputation of others, and the sum of these intersections or the intersection of all of these imputations is the person.

Then this we would say is the conventional reality of the person. From the prasanika viewpoint there’s nothing more than this. Then the big question, as Pamela was saying, is how does this function? Right? And more importantly not so much how does it function as how is it possible if such is the nature phenomena that everything doesn’t produce everything, In other words, we know in the universe we have physical laws, for instance, that’s a given in physics.

Now if you drop an object, let’s say on earth, close to the surface of the earth, will accelerate at 9.8 mss2, and that is it’s not going to change whether you do it in Adelaide or you travel to Victoria at the same height, it’s not going to start accelerating at five mss2. You have natural laws, Newton’s first, second and third laws. Now if the Prosthymical viewpoint is correct, how is it possible that there are natural laws? You see this is the problem, built in a nutshell. How things could produce each other you could see, but why is there consistency and regularity?

Right? It would seem to me that, and you talked about quantum physics and classical science, that, the idea of, consciousness causing, you know, that can happen, like past and future for relativity of time. So that it seems to me somehow the importance of the motivation and the whole concept of shared or collective karma. I’m just reading in the back of Jim Tucker’s book, he’s got a bit of a summary. And you’re talking about the mind blowing illogical nature I remember that, yes.

How the quantum world works and somehow incorporating the conventional world. In other words, it’s there because we want it to be there and hence the importance of taking responsibility for the purification of our own karma. Somehow there seems to be somehow a fit between the conventional and the ultimate and what is happening in the scientific world? This is my feeling, precisely this is very much my private viewpoint, I wasn’t going to go into this today, because it’s not Geshele’s teaching, but privately I feel that there is probably a very close correlation between the Prasanthika viewpoint and, what’s known as the orthodox theory of quantum mechanics, von Neumann theory of quantum mechanics, and that this describes the ultimate nature of phenomena, and that the Geluk understanding that the conventional nature phenomena are best described by Sauthantika would correspond to classical physics, which is an approximation of quantum mechanics at the macroscopic level, and also an approximation of the theory of relativity when speeds are low. So classical physics basically works, Newtonian physics works, mean, if we go to Mars, we go to Mars thanks to Newtonian physics, but it works if the speeds are a fraction of the speed of light, in other words, you don’t have relativistic effects, and it works as long as you are above the quantum classical boundary, and where you place the quantum classical boundary is always a very complicated affair, basically depends on the size of the object considered, broadly speaking.

Then I really feel that Tsongkhapa’s synthesis, you basically consider that conventional phenomena are understood in terms of the Sattrankika school, which is what we study when we study, for instance, Abhidharma, in the monasteries, but that their ultimate nature is to be understood in terms of Prāsaṇgika, is a very close fit to what we’ve ended up with in physics now, which is that conventionally we do use classical physics, classical Newtonian physics, with the very clear sense that it is a very, very coarse approximation, and ultimately the moment we’re dealing with, for instance, subatomic phenomena, then causality as we understand it doesn’t function in the same way we know it. It’s not that there isn’t causality, but it’s a causality which implies the observer to such a degree that it is not causality as we know it. And then, you know, the relationship between ultimate this is my private understanding, so, you know, just take it for what it is, but the relationship between ultimate and conventional phenomena is a difficult one to posit. Please, please, whichever of you wishes to go first. Richard.

I appreciate that your concern about getting into the subject matter of fundamental mind, so you’ll cut me short if appropriate. Is fundamental mind or very subtle mind a conventional phenomenon? Is it the subject of dependent arising from moment to moment in the same way as one mental state in a coarse mind is the cause of the next mental state and is it in turn the subject of the imputation or is it the object of the imputation on which you impute I? That’s an excellent question. Then basically the position of Vedanta is that what we call the fundamental mind, is core in Hinduism the Ātman, is an ultimate phenomenon.

This is a position of Vedanta, which we would say is probably the pinnacle of Hinduism. Then the fundamental mind is only accepted in tantra, right? So we cannot so much speak of it within the four schools of tenets, because there were practitioners of the four schools of tenets who were not tantric practitioners. You can practice tantra normally on the basis only of the citta mantra and the, Mādhyamika view. Now if we take Prāsaṇgika madhyamika as our system of tenets, for Prāsaṇgika madhyamika, the fundamental mind for a tablet practitioner certainly exists.

It’s an impermanent phenomenon, it changes instant by instant. It’s a phenomenon which depends on causes and conditions. It is an imputed phenomenon, although it can also be the basis of imputation of the person. Imputed phenomena and basis of imputation are not mutually contradictory, right, and it is a conventional phenomenon. Now your question is a very sharp one because in Tibet the Jonangpas came very close to asserting that the ultimate mind, the fundamental mind was an ultimate phenomenon.

Then this view was banned because it was considered to be a form of Hinduism, which it probably is. Maybe not the view of Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen himself, but some of his followers basically if you look at the view they were Hindus. Does that answer your question? Pamela? Well as you said Karen is no more.

Karen is obviously her own object of imputation, so as she’s walking down the street, know, she imputes Karen hood on whatever is happening at the moment, if you’re walking typically it’s on the sensations, right? So the sensation of the body, then at the time of the accident probably there would be great pain, so the imputation would once again sorry Karen for the example so it might be eating in a restaurant. There’s a strong imputation on that basis, and then, and this is the problem, the question you’re asking is how one establishes conventional phenomena in Prāsaṇgika, it’s a very complex issue. Then for me, the criterion adopted by Prāsaṇgika is worldly repute. From the standpoint of worldly repute, Karen ceases to be.

Now, is still a person somewhere. Oh yes, yes, yes. I mean then you would impute Karen on another basis. In this case, probably the mind of the death state, you know, but you probably could not impute Karen on that basis, you would have to impute a Bardo being on that basis, you know. So the Buddhist understanding as a person is something your friend at the University of Adelaide asked me, it was a very sharp question from a physicist, he hit the nail on the head, he said how do you preserve the identity?

Because the problem is the Buddhist understanding of the person is that the person changes literally instant by instant, so our five aggregates, we have one physical and four mental aggregates, and every instant, which our Buddhist standpoint is a Abhidharmika standpoint, one three-hundred-sixtieth of a second, some schools say one sixty-fifth but onethree hundred sixtieth of a second, changes instant by instant. Then the question is what connects this, right? I mean, how is it that everything doesn’t become everything else? And from the Buddhist standpoint, what connects these instants of a person is what we know as the substantial continuum. It’s simply the fact that one instant is the effect of the previous instant and the cause of the future instant.

There is nothing else, there’s not an underlying nature there, hidden someplace, like if you wish a steel wire, which gives continuity to little bits of concrete. So that was this gentleman’s question, and it was very sharp and he asked me, would you would you say that the person is different at each instance? I said yes, a Buddhist standpoint, if we debate, you know, wouldn’t say that to you in public, I wouldn’t say that you were different from the gentleman I spoke to one hour ago, but from a Buddhist instance, we are speaking, there is a substantial continuum with a series of different persons I am interacting with. The person of the first instant is not the person of the second instant, nor the person of the third instant. Now this viewpoint, without even meditating in emptiness, is very powerful for our minds.

It reduces attachment to oneself and to others in a very powerful way. If you think that the person you thought you were in love with is disappearing instant by instant, and you who are the one falling in love with is also disappearing instant by instant, what basis is there for any of these emotions? And the emotion itself is changing instant by instant, and one of you are very experienced people, and you know that the one accusation which gets cast in your face at the end of a relationship is, you have changed. Right? You have changed.

Now this is the realization of the collapse of an imputation, right? So in the relationship the person is permanent, and the person keeps changing, but the permanent imputation is maintained with every great effort, eventually it collapses, and the poor third party who had nothing to do with the change process is accused, Right? So do we have other questions? Yes, Lily. Basically, these are not mutually exclusive.

Right? When we say imputation, I mean, I have often used the terms designation, the meaning is the same, but imputation corresponds better to the Tibetan. The Tibetan is very pretty. The word is or literally when it’s pronounced correctly, which means to put a feather on top of something. Then when you fall in love it’s not a feather, right, it’s a ton of land, but you’re putting something on something else, right?

Now this process occurs with respect to all phenomena, so the basis of imputation would be for instance if we take this table, the components of this table. Now the first time I see this table, as a child, without ever having been taught what a table is, what appears to my mind are the basis of imputation. That’s it, right? I may not even be able to dissociate the table from the environment. That is an open question whether to the mind of our dogs, Bobby and Meedy, the basis of imputation of the table is dissociated from the environment or not.

Once my parents teach me that this is used to support something, it is called table, I designate or impute on these components a name table and a function, capacity to bear something. That imputation accompanies me throughout my life, and from the classical standpoint that is all there is to table. Now if you were to encounter an extraterrestrial, on planet whatever Krypton, zorg, things like this are called chairs, and they are the support for very very light extraterrestrial beings, that extraterrestrial will go through the same experience I did as an extraterrestrial child, will be taught that this is called a chair, and it’s used to sit upon, will become accustomed to sit upon it, and for him it will be a chair. It being a chair for him, his imputing chair on what for him are the basis of designation of chair, and my imputing table on the basis of designation of table for me are not contradictory. Makes sense.

It is odd, I think it’s best to understand that if you observe your own mind. Now I don’t know if some of you have had this experience, I mean as Westerners our minds are very cluttered, it’s very conceptual, but there are moments where either due to great happiness or wandering, for instance in the forest, or great fatigue after great intellectual effort, conceptuality stops or is dramatically reduced, and you notice at that point that things up around you appear with a very particular freshness. It’s as if you are in a different world, if it is very pronounced, for instance at the end of a meditative retreat, you will almost not recognize the world you’re moving in. Now, this is simply due to the great reduction of imputation. Phenomena are appearing much more nakedly.

They still appear as inherently existent phenomena, it’s not to say they don’t appear as existing from their own side, but the mental labeling process is dramatically reduced. I think this is a lot what is referred to in Chan as one of the satoris, right? I always felt that the satori in Chan, the Chan awakenings, because there are many awakenings in Chan, was something of this nature, because the specific goal of Chan is the interruption of conceptuality. And it’s true that when you interrupt conceptuality, naturally or artificially, things appear in this very very fresh, luminous, almost naked way. Now that gives one a sense of the amount of space imputation takes in our relationship to daily life.

I think for instance, for people in our age group, it is possible to go through a day without really relating directly that closely to exterior phenomena, we’re functioning almost completely in a conceptual world. We don’t see the chair when we sit down, we sit because we know that’s that’s where the chair is supposed to be, right? So that that I think starts to explain what imputation is. Then I was going to bring an example, but it’s complicated to bring the projector and everything just for this, but you can check it on the Internet when you’re home. All of you have probably seen these drawings made with points, you know, of black and white or black and white points, which if you look at them, depending on the person, either appear like a nineteenth century lady or a bearded man.

Have you seen that? I think you’ve already have, right? Now what is interesting is when you first look at it, it’s just a drawing, right? And then at a certain point one of these two appearances will occur, it’s at that point that imputation occurs, right? So let’s say it appears as a nineteenth century lady, a Victorian lady, then the moment you look at it, the more that Victorian lady is clear, until it becomes impossible to see the bearded man, right?

If at this point you want to change to the bearded man, he must be habituate your mind from the Victorian lady, and eventually the bearded man will appear, and the more you look at this representation of the bearded man, the more obvious it is that it can only be a bearded man. So what you see here is from the drawing side nothing is said, right? This is a prasangkha view. The drawing is neither a bearded man nor a Victorian lady. It is exclusively the mental imputation but you see how powerful the mental imputation is because there’s a point where if you’re shown this drawing even a couple days later, that’s a Victorian lady, it’s clear.

And we see this in our relationship with people where we can impute very powerful emotions on people, you know the same person which is the object of tremendous attachment becomes rather rapidly the object of tremendous hatred. In back, but from the standpoint of the person what is there? So does it begin to help a bit, Lilly? The imputre is complicated, imputre is a conception, right? So the imputre is within the set of the aggregates, right?

Then imputor itself is obviously, as I mentioned, a basis of imputation the moment you examine it for another impute, another consciousness. Here when we speak of conceptuality it’s not to be understood in this alternative sense. It’s a much more profound understanding of conceptuality. Imputation is not the basis of imputation for the first imputation. Ah, it can’t be. But when you have this process of imputation, you have the basis of imputation, the imputed phenomenon and the imputer, they are mutually dependent.

Without the basis of imputation there can be no imputed phenomenon, without the imputed phenomenon there can be no imputer, then without the basis of designation there cannot be an imputor either, and without the imputor there can be no basis of designation, they cannot in other words be isolated. Well it’s a difficult topic, I mean there are fields in the fields in physics and mathematics which come very close to this, like chaos theory or fractal theory, where you are dealing with a fractal theory is the fact that phenomena replicate each other on a larger and larger scale, and in KLC you’re very much dealing with feedback loops, right? So here you have the ultimate feedback loop, a conceptual feedback loop. Set the philosophy aside a bit and check your own mind. Check how the process of imputation works for you, then see that you can impute completely different things which seem to be almost completely unrelated to anything from the standpoint of the object.

So when Prasamika says that its conventional phenomena exist as mere imputation, this is not something which is impossible. It happens certainly in our emotions every day, and then see what is imputing. I think it’s a way forwards. Do you have other questions? Please.

So the mind stream is a substantial continuum of the mind, but this table is a substantial continuum of the table. Right now when I touch it, I’m touching one instant of this substantial continuum, but as long as the table is in existence, the substantial continuum will be here. If it were to be smashed, that substantial continuum would cease to exist. Then that substantial continuum, which is changing instant by instant, is labeled, and even though it’s changing instant by instance, is seen as a permanent phenomenon, which it is not. It is seen as a unitary phenomenon, instead of being composed of billions, maybe even trillions of atoms, which it is not.

It is seen as an independent phenomenon which it is not. So if we train our minds to see everything as substantial continuums, we’re very much on the right path. The only thing which would not be a substantial continuum with an impermanent phenomena would be a phenomena which lasted only one instant, then we don’t encounter too many of those. Does that answer? Oh yes, certainly from the standpoint of the all the lower schools of tenets, it is a substantial continuum which accumulates karma, then what part of the substantial continuum?

The mind. All the schools of tenets from Vaibhāṣika to Svatāntrika assert this. Then the prasamika have this very difficult to understand perspective that the mind itself is also an imputed phenomenon, it is a phenomenon which lacks existence from its own side, and really all you can point at is a name which is affixed to the mind or to the person. As this name changes, the accumulator of karma changes. For instance, in my own case, my life is the product of someone who he must have behaved pretty well in a previous life, but then who he is, I don’t know.

To say that I am the same person as him is ridiculous, but we are related as part of one, certainly one substantial continuum of the fundamental mind, that yes. That yes. Then he bore or she bore one name, I bear another name, he was one person, I am another person, there still is a relationship. More than that there is not. Then I think we have time for another question, please.

Oh, it’s a comment, yes? When someone achieves direct realization of emptiness is that is it then permanent? No, it is not permanent. Do they then have to keep on attaining that or is it they will then for the rest of their life see have a direct realisation? Is something that comes and goes you have to work on?

When you attain the direct realization of emptiness, in other words you attain the path of seeing, whenever you enter into meditative equipoise on emptiness, you will see emptiness directly. When you are not in meditative equipoise on emptiness, you will not see emptiness directly, but you will see conventional phenomena as illusions. It is called a subsequent attainment. Then if you just stop there, you will not progress in your realizations, or you at that point you must meditate ever deeper on emptiness so that you can abandon the innate apprehension of the inherent existence of a self and a phenomena. And then at that point, you will have reached either the state of liberation or the state of full enlightenment, depending on your motivation.

So prasanika says that the view is the same whether you are a Hīnayāna or a Mahāyāna practitioner, you cannot attain according to prasanika, according to Nāgārjuna, you cannot attain liberation without the prasanika view, you cannot attain full enlightenment without the prasanika view but the great difference is the motivation that’s the only difference. Does that answer your question? Please. No, no relation. When I say stop imputing altogether, that’s an exaggeration, it’s just very, very reduced conceptual activity.

If that were a realization of emptiness then it means that animals who have limited conceptuality would be much closer to the realization of emptiness than we are. Then I’ve never heard of highly realized bears, so you know. What happens is that we as Westerners have extremely busy minds and much of our suffering is mental. It arises from this recollection of the past and this constant fear and anticipation of the future. When you reduce conceptuality dramatically, there’s a reduction in the overall amount of mental suffering as a result.

You experience the world as an animal, there’s nothing to be particularly proud about. Like my dog’s experience of the world is much closer to that, limited conceptuality. And then I think this goes a long way to explain the popularity of Buddhist techniques of meditation which lead to a sharp reduction in conceptuality, like insight meditation or some forms of Chan, simply because so much of the suffering of an educated modern Westerner is mental. But this in no way would be a realization of emptiness, because phenomena to my dog still appear from their own side as inherently existed. I can vouch for the fact that my dog has craving for cream.

Does that answer your question? Then I’m sorry we have to stop here, but you can ask your other questions from Geshela. Thank you very much.

Key terms in this teaching

atman dag (Tib)
Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
insight meditation vipassana (Pali); vipashyana (Skt); lhag tong (Tib)
The principal meditation taught in the Theravada tradition. It is based on the Buddha’s teachings on the four foundations of mindfulness. It is sometimes called mindfulness meditation. LYWA
Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
object of negation gag cha (Tib)
An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
right-seeing path darshana-marga (Skt); tong lam (Tib)
The third of the five paths to buddhahood; attained with the direct perception of emptiness. Also called the path of seeing. LYWA
tantra gyü (Tib)
Literally, thread, or continuity. The secret teachings of the Buddha; a scriptural text and the teachings and practices it contains. Also called Vajrayana or Mantrayana. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

Questions answered in this teaching

Is the fundamental mind, or very subtle mind, a conventional phenomenon or an ultimate one?

In Vedanta, the fundamental mind is the Ātman and is an ultimate phenomenon. The fundamental mind is only accepted in tantra, so it cannot be addressed within the four schools of tenets alone, since some of their practitioners were not tantric. Tantra can be practiced on the basis of the Cittamātra or Madhyamaka view. For Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka, the fundamental mind certainly exists for a tantric practitioner. It is impermanent, changing instant by instant, and depends on causes and conditions. It is an imputed phenomenon, though it can also be the basis of imputation of the person, and these two are not contradictory. It is a conventional phenomenon.

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