Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 48-minute session, Kyabje Rinpoche opens with a sharp question: why does our motivation for virtuous deeds seem weaker than for non-virtuous ones? He shows how non-virtuous deeds promise immediate results while virtue’s fruits ripen only in future lives. From this practical ground, he explores what transmigrates between rebirths—consciousness in earlier Buddhist schools, or the imputed ‘person’ in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. The session’s core focuses on the object of negation in selflessness meditation: how to isolate the subtle self-grasping that must be negated from the conventional self that remains. He also traces how Tibetan traditions, especially Je Tsongkhapa’s Gelug school, differ from Sakya, Kagyu, and Nyingma in their understanding of emptiness and dependent origination. Pitched at serious practitioners and philosophy students with Buddhist background.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2014-10-04 – KR.mp3
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Karma
Date: 2004-10-14
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~6,093
Then I will do my best to answer your questions on this difficult topic, so don’t be surprised if we don’t understand as much as we’d like to. Sorry? So I’d be delighted to answer your question. Thank you. To answer questions on these difficult topics, but don’t be surprised if we don’t understand as much as we’d like to.
Can I just ask a question about the motivation? Motivation? Yes. And if they think that I may have misunderstood what Geshe-la was saying. On the other hand, I think I’ve heard him say this before, that we do virtuous deeds, but our motivation is weak.
Whereas with non virtuous deeds, our motivation is strong. And why, he asks, because our motivation with virtuous deeds is limited to this life or presumably the immediate future. Why is our motivation in relation to non virtuous deeds to be the inference seems to be that if the motivation for that is strong, that it is a significantly more permanent motivation, I mean, a motivation that continues through to a future life. Yes, I mean if we take an example it’s pretty obvious. Let us take a very common non virtuous deed adultery.
Then the benefits of adultery are immediate, aren’t they? You get a sexual partner you would not get otherwise. So you can see that the motivation is defined by an immediate result, which you would experience in a couple months, a couple of years. Theft the same thing, you need money instead of struggling to earn money, it can be direct brutal theft breaking into a bank, or it can be the more sophisticated thefts like breaking into JP Morgan’s accounts, which has happened as you know, 76,000,000 accounts compromised, right? Then the benefit is immediate, right?
You get money. Our motivation is very strong because you see the result. Then obviously when we speak of virtuous deeds in a Buddhist context, the maturation of a virtuous deed, normally unless the deed is extremely powerful, occurs in a future life. We don’t see the result. So as a result, non virtuous deeds are complete deeds.
Motivation is powerful because we know there is a result, if we steal we get the money, If we seduce a married partner, we get the partner we want. The deed is performed and the completion of the deed occurs. With a virtuous deed, it’s all very tentative. Yes, if past and future lives exist, probably you know, because I donate money to Médecins Sans Frontières, in a future life I may gain some benefit. It’s very fragile.
I thought Geshe-la’s analysis was very strong myself. Do you have other questions? Translation. In verse six it says by grasping at it the childish, but I’m wondering what the it refers to because in the fifth verse, it says, what excellent instruction can there be more amazing than this proclamation? Is the ‘it’ talking about the subject of the previous verse, this proclamation?
Geshe-la will talk about that. No, it isn’t. I mean, the text is subdivided into a series of outlines. The promise to compose, then the initial praise, and then praise in terms of eliminating the extremes. So if Geshe-la comments in detail verse six that will arise, and I must say in verse six Geshe Thubten Jinpa’s translation is a bit unclear.
It’s much clearer in the Tibetan than there. So it’s a problem of English grammar, not of of the text. And I have only one other question. In verse 39, it says, alas, your teaching is such insoever ears it falls they will attain peace. So who would not be honoured to uphold your teaching?
I was wondering why alas is used because that’s usually a sign of dismay or something. So I have wondered too. The Tibetan is kehu which means alas indeed. Then there’s quite a bit of a gloss over this one. Again it’s something which Geshe-la will cover.
It’s a good question. 39. 39 verse 39. Please. Geshe-la was talking about lower schools having a belief in a subtle self and I was wondering if they meant that in a relative sense as it exists when there is the aggregates and or if they meant that in an ultimate sense.
I didn’t understand how they could be that difference between the schools, highest Prāsaṇgika and Mādhyamika didn’t didn’t believe in that. It’s a very good question. You see, I mean, we all accept that the Buddhist traditions teach selflessness, but we don’t think too much what selflessness is. Now basically, it’s very helpful to put oneself in the intellectual context of ancient India to understand the debate. Everyone believed in reincarnation.
The question was what reincarnated and what experience in future lives a maturation of Karma. Everyone believed in this, so Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, with the exception of the materialists, it is a universal view in ancient India, just as it’s a universal view in the Semitic religions, that there is a creator who has created a material world in which we are placed, and within which we must aim for salvation, then there’s disagreement about what salvation is, and the means to salvation. So you have these universal world views within a given cultural area. In ancient India, the universal world view was that all beings without exception reincarnate from life to life. These the cycle of lives is illusory of the nature of Maya, and is of the nature of suffering, it is something to be escaped from, that escape is called by the non-Buddhist moksha, by the Buddhists nirvana.
They only disagreed about how to escape, and how to escape was contingent on what reincarnated. So all the schools but the Buddhist schools said that there had to be some sort of inner core which passed from life to life, and this inner core they call the self or the Ātman. The Buddhists are the only religious tradition in ancient India, which say that there is no such inner core which transmigrates, and this inner core is understood by the non-Buddhist traditions as something which is permanent, in other words it doesn’t change instant by instant, it is one, in other words it has no parts, and it is independent, in other words it corresponds exactly to the Christian understanding of the soul. So if you speak of the Ātman as a soul reincarnating from life to life, from the Hindu standpoint you are dead on. Now the Hindus critique the Buddhists by saying, if you don’t accept a soul, if you don’t accept an Ātman, what reincarnates?
Something must be must reincarnate and something must carry the karmic imprints. What carries the karmic imprints if there is no Ātman? It’s a very strong criticism. Then the various Buddhist schools have answered it in different ways. All the schools of tenets from the Vaibhāṣika to Svatāntrika Mādhyamika say that, well, there is no self which is permanent one and independent, in other words there’s no Ātman, there is nonetheless something within the aggregates, which can be labeled a person and which transmigrates from life to life, and that is consciousness, and it is a very strong position, it’s an intuitively strong position.
If you ask an educated person what is your eye, normally people say my mind. I mean if I look into myself to find the eye, the first candidate is certainly not the body, it’s my consciousness. It is only the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika school which says that consciousness is not a suitable candidate for being the person which transmigrates. So all of the schools of tenets which asserted consciousness is the person which transmigrates basically accept a person within the aggregates. Okay?
So they don’t accept what Prāsaṇgika calls the subtle selflessness of the persons. They say that if you want to point within the aggregates, in other words form, sensation, discrimination, compositional factors and consciousness, At what reincarnates, you point at consciousness, that’s your instance of the person. Prāsaṇgika says no, if you want to give an instance of the person, can only give a normal imputation. Now it’s a very difficult position, because you are saying that it is a mere the mere attribution of a name is all you can point out or point at that reincarnates. So I must say for instance, I think one of my old friends Khensur Rinpoche once said to me, and it’s a very very frank statement, he said look, we teach Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, but I myself frankly, I am much more comfortable with a Svatāntrika Mādhyamika view, because the Prāsaṇgika view is a view which is very very profound and very difficult to understand.
So I hope that answers your question. Ilya, could you, just following on from your answer to Andrew’s question, could you just go over this subtle selflessness and the nominal imputation and this bit that does transmigrate? So we’re calling that the mere I, is that right? Mere eye. You see, the basic problem, and Geshe-la will cover this this afternoon I think, is to identify the object of negation in selflessness.
This is where all the Buddhist traditions disagree. When we speak of selflessness, what is being negated? And the problem is if you do not negate enough, you have not basically satisfied the requirements for liberation. You’re falling what is known as the extreme of eternalism, and if you negate too much, you can fall into the extreme of nihilism. Now, with the exercise which Geshe-la gave us this morning, the basic problem is that if I’m sort of overreaching myself here, but if you basically search for the mere I through the aggregates, and thereby you negate it because it is unfindable, what have you done?
You have negated the conventional eye. Now is the conventional eye the object of refutation? Because if you’re going to negate the mere I like that, then you can negate anything on that basis. So with lines of reasoning apply to vases, to chairs, to cars, to everything you want. The basic problem, and this is I think the thrust of Je Tsongkhapa’s Lam Rim Chenmo, it’s perhaps the sharpest point, is the emphasis on the identification of the object of negation.
This is the most difficult point. The Mādhyamika reasonings are easy to apply after that. What is it we are negating? So when we’re negating a self, we are negating something which appears to the mind in terms of the coarse self of the persons as something permanent, one and independent, and in terms of the subtle self of the persons as something which is the owner of the aggregates, right? Now when I say, Natalie, I address you like that, do you immediately get a sense of being permanent one and independent?
No. Do you? Well, if you do, it must be a very profound karmic imprints. Normally people don’t. If I say Natalie, or you say Ilya, you hear a name, you respond to the name.
Then you don’t obviously get a very powerful sense of what is permanent one independent. You may or may not get a sense of something which is the owner of the aggregates. So the problem is then, what is this object of negation? When we speak of the inherent the existing I in Prāsaṇgika, what is negated? And how do we make it manifest?
Now, this is the way my teachers taught me. Geshe-la always emphasized that in ordinary beings, until the level of the path of seeing, the nominal eye which exists, Richard, Natalie, Lily, Mark, you’ll be be assured to hear you exist. The nominal eye in the inherently existing eye are inexorably mixed like water in milk. So when I say Natalie to you, a mixture comes to mind. But the problem you have is how do you isolate the element of the mixture which is the object of refutation from that which is not.
Now in chemistry you would centrifugate, right? You have a mixture of oil and water, you centrifugate, then the oil is normally lighter than water, right? Right? Yes, it rises to the surface and the water goes to the bottom. So we need the equivalent of centrifugation psychologically, to separate the normal eye in the inherently existing eye, and the centrifuge is powerful emotions.
It is when we have powerful emotions like anger, desire, envy, that moment the inherently existing I increases, and the normal eye dwindles. It’s not absent, but it dwindles. It is at this point you can identify the object of negation, when you are training and meditating on the selflessness of persons. So you cannot apply these reasonings of the one in the multiple for instance without identifying the object of negation. And to do that we must use the opportunities where strong emotional reactions occur.
You know? Which is why the Geshe’s would train and just put themselves in situations where there are objects of contempt for instance. There was a Geshe I knew of, very remarkable Geshe actually, when he started training, meditating on emptiness, he basically presented himself in Dharamsala pretty much as a beggar. And people looked down on him a lot. And this was of extraordinary benefit for his practice, because obviously each time this happens, the eye, the inherently existing I, not a normal eye rises up, and then you can identify the object of negation, and once you have identified it, you will say, well, is it one with its parts or not?
Both or neither? Whatever line of reasoning you choose to adopt. So this is the most difficult point. The big mistake which is made in Tibet is that the Mādhyamika reasonings were applied to conventional phenomena. Then as a result there was a negation of conventional phenomena, and it became impossible to establish the validity of karma and causality.
Was this? Was this? Up to Je Tsongkhapa’s time. Up to time? Up to well up to this time nowadays, yes, these lines of reasoning are still taught.
I mean there is a fundamental disagreement in the Tibetan traditions regarding emptiness. This is where the big disagreement occurs between the reformed Geluk view, which sees itself as rooted profoundly in Nāgārjuna, Ārya Deva, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, and I’d say all the other traditions, Nyingma, Kagyu and Sakya, which consider Je Tsongkhapa as an innovator, a dangerous innovator. So the core disagreement in Tibet is precisely on this and there’s a I was mentioning to Geshe-la over lunch, there is a great Sakya polymath, but don’t mention it during the teaching, it’s highly controversial in the fifteenth century, who basically composed a rejoinder to Je Tsongkhapa’s praise of dependent origination. It’s called a frank talk, dpal gtam, a frank talk about the praise of dependent origination. Precisely because of the level of disagreement.
Right? So, if you want, I can divide this a little bit. The fundamental difference is Je Tsongkhapa’s tradition considers nothing abrogates the law of the excluded middle. In logic, what that means is, like if I say, Chris is either man a man or not a man, there is no third possibility. Now, Je Tsongkhapa in the Gelug tradition assert that this is the case as far as emptiness is concerned.
In other words, emptiness is the object of rational investigation. The other traditions assert this is not the case, so they assert that when Nāgārjuna taught the Chatushkoti, the Tetra Lemma, things are not one, not many, not both, and not neither, he meant it literally. He meant literally that phenomena either neither one nor many nor both nor neither. Then from the Gelug tradition, is absurd. These are contradictory statements.
If something is not one, then it is many. Nothing can be both one and many, and probably nothing can be neither except non existent phenomena. So the Gelug tradition is asserting that the topic of emptiness independent arising is subject to analytical investigation. All the other Buddhist traditions in Tibet, unless they have become very sympathetic to the Gelug viewpoint, view the subject of emptiness as something which is experienced almost mystically transcendentally. Now this is Sakya Chokden’s critique of Je Tsongkhapa, Gorampa says, Nāgārjuna said that emptiness or phenomena is neither one nor many nor both nor neither and that’s what he meant.
Je Tsongkhapa qualifies these statements to make them logically tenable. For instance, he would say emptiness is neither inherently one nor inherently many. Why? Because it’s not inherently existent, therefore you know it doesn’t fall in either of these categories. So this is the crux of the debate in Tibet regarding the view to the present day.
Does that help a little bit? Are you saying that the other, schools of Buddhism, don’t accept dependent origination? No. They accept dependent origination, but they don’t understand it in the same way. Now, there are two, I suppose, these matters I think one has to speak frankly.
There are broadly speaking two Gelug positions regarding the other traditions. The first is, I would say, pretty much the mainstream Gelug tradition, which considers that the original masters of Sakya, Kagyu, Nyingma had a perfect understanding of emptiness. For instance, it is asserted that Milarepa had a perfect understanding of emptiness, so did the great Sakya masters Sakya masters, so did the great Nyingma masters, and then the traditions degenerated and the understanding of emptiness got lost, so that by the time Je Tsongkhapa himself was born in 1357, the understanding of emptiness was basically the sort of mental hiatus, which occurs when you meditate on something being neither one nor many nor both nor neither. It was something akin to trance. And then Je Tsongkhapa basically resurrected the authentic understanding of emptiness.
This is the presentation you find for instance in Thuken Chökyi Nyima’s. It’s called the crystal mirror of tenets in English. It’s a very nice, I’d say non sectarian presentation of tenets. Because the problem is that if the correct view of emptiness in the Prāsaṇgika system is indispensable to attain liberation, then if nobody in the other traditions had it, nobody attained liberation, let alone full enlightenment, which seems very difficult to us to say. It’s very difficult to say.
So, Milarepa attained full enlightenment, then great masters such as Sakya Pandita had doubtless a perfect understanding of emptiness, but over the centuries this understanding dwindled and disappeared. And what is unique in Je Tsongkhapa’s contribution, apart from the inspiration from Mañjuśrī, is perhaps from my standpoint more importantly the emphasis on reason. Je Tsongkhapa is very clear in this matter, emptiness is an object of rational investigation. Does that answer your question? Emptiness is amenable to reason within the threefold subdivision of phenomena.
It’s amenable to reason. It can be analyzed. Mhmm. Led to an understanding through Well, I use the term mystical, I mean I shouldn’t have really because it’s sort of something it’s a term which has such a powerful Western connotation, but basically emptiness is a product of logical analysis. It is a mere absence, there’s nothing extraordinary or uncommon about it.
The mind realizing emptiness, when it realizes it by the means of calm abiding and insight, is single pointedly focused on this object, then such a mind shares the features of what we call mystical experience in the West. In other words, bliss, single pointedness, and at the level of the path of seeing, non-conceptuality. But this is not due to anything holy about the object. The object is not holy. The mind realizing it is.
The object is understood through study and logic. So the way one meditates on emptiness is first one studies it, typically one would study for instance that Sera Jetsunpa Chökyi Gyaltsen’s presentation of emptiness, then move to the great treatises, Je Tsongkhapa’s works, and through repeated study one would gain an intellectual understanding of it. Then we would meditate on this intellectual understanding, they became deeper, deeper, deeper, and eventually the object dawns nakedly. And what is holy about this mind is it acts as the antidote to all the delusions. Does that make sense?
It does. But the thing that keeps rattling around in the back of my head is 84,000 paths, 84,000 different types of dispositions. I mean, are you suggesting that some copies method I mean, you know, I find it beautiful and, you know, I hope that my mind is well suited to it. But I can understand that there are some people who just can’t come at it at all, and might find something useful in Dzogchen or something like that. That’s different.
Now you’re talking of tantra. That’s a completely different category. That I don’t enter into. Tantric. I mean, I think there are It is different.
There there are teachers that that just deal with the with the mindfulness aspect. I mean, the the basically being present in attention with the with the present moment, and, you know, there there are teachers that deal with that without the tantric sign. The Dzogchen is very particular then. There is a form of Dzogchen practice, even acknowledged, which is perfectly legitimate from the Geluk standpoint. But the Dzogchen path, the Tantric path is a shortcut.
Then you’d have to ask a great Dzogchen practitioner, I have only had preliminary teachings in Dzogchen, but fundamentally my personal viewpoint, and I think it’s sort of very simple rather square Geluk viewpoint, is that without the Prāsaṇgika view of emptiness, there is neither liberation nor full enlightenment. And it’s based on something very simple. The root of bondage in cyclic existence is attachment or anger. Now these arise because some aspect of the object is seen as existing from its own side. Anything but the pure Prāsaṇgika view has that.
If you for instance a Cittamātra, a Cittamātra view is very helpful, the mind only view. But the Chitamatrans consider that the mind basis of all exists from its own side, that it’s truly established. The mind basis of all becomes an object of attachment, and this hinders liberation. To take a much simpler case, the reason for which a Buddhist would assert that the practitioner of a monotheistic tradition could never gain full enlightenment or liberation, is exactly what we are seeing now in Iraq and Syria. If you believe there is one God, who exists from his own side independently of creation, and he has revealed his law, and you are a mere manifestation of his will, if this is what you believe, and you assure of his law, you have to do whatever the law teaches, right?
Then from a Buddhist standpoint such an object, which is God in other words, who is set to exist from his own side inherently, independently of the observer, is a very powerful object for the generation of desire and hatred. Very powerful, And indeed, the wars of religion and the monotheistic traditions have been particularly savage. I mean, if we look at the history of Christianity, it’s quite appalling what Protestants did to Catholics and reciprocally. I mean, I used to read French poetry from the sixteenth century. One of the greatest French poets in the sixteenth century was Agrippa d’Aubigné.
He was a Protestant, an aristocrat, French lieutenant, and in his spare time between writing marvelous poetry, he would basically occupy Catholic villages with his men and dispose of everybody. And he glorified in the fact, you know. So from a Buddhist standpoint, the moment you have an object which is asserted to be inherently existing, existing from its own side, you have the potential presence of desire and anger. Therefore, unless you are able to totally deny this, you cannot attain liberation of full enlightenment. So this is why I do not believe it is possible without the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika view to attain liberation or full enlightenment.
Then that does not mean that members of the non Geluk tradition did not attain liberation of full enlightenment. There are many members of the non Geluk tradition who based on their own tradition gained a perfect understanding of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika or who discovered it independently. It’s perfectly possible to discover the Prāsaṇgika view all by oneself without relying on texts. So does that answer your question? Do you have any other questions?
I have attended teachings by His Holiness at Gelugpa Monasteries and on occasions, obviously, when all the other traditions have been present. And being the ignorant sort of person that I am, I haven’t noticed a distinction or a difference being drawn by His Holiness in His approach with regard to teachings on emptiness. It’s not. It’s not done publicly. Sorry?
It’s not done publicly. It’s not done publicly. But if you study, you come to text for instance, the foremost teacher let’s say of the view in the Sakya tradition is Gorampa Sonam Sengge. Gorampa Sonam Sengge wrote basically in the late fifteenth early sixteenth century, so it’s a century and a half after Je Tsongkhapas death. It’s some 20 volumes, I had them in my private library at CRJ, then they were forbidden from being published in Tibet, you know.
So some of the top Geshes would come to see me to consult them privately, because the arguments are very strong and you have to know how to answer them. But there is a fundamental disagreement, and it’s a fundamental disagreement I think one has to be aware of. His Holiness is head of all the Buddhist traditions in Tibet, so I think he does not want, and it would be inappropriate for him to point out these differences. But, you know, the masters in all the traditions are fully aware of them. And for us our goal is to gain a profound intellectual understanding of these topics, and then we have to look at the truth, you know.
And I think we have to ask very honest questions is for instance Je Tsongkhapa’s presentation correct? Always Gorampa Sonam Sengge’s presentation correct? There’s only one way to do this, which is to study, right? But there’s no middle ground there. There’s no middle ground.
Are there examples of other, you know, traditions coming across to Gelug as a result of such of study? No. People are very rooted in their tradition, but there are are masters who have been in between. It’s generally not terribly helpful to be in between. Right?
Someone who’s ecumenical end ups neither fish nor fowl. So if the goal is really understanding of emptiness, then it’s a bit like mathematics. The question is, is a theorem true or false? If emptiness is amenable to reason, this is something which should be decidable. Which could throw some into a bit of a crisis if they are within one tradition, then I’d have to keep that quite secret, would imagine, if they came if they studied the text of There’s there’s a fair number of Nyingmas who study with Geshe-la Rinchen.
So the the Nyingmas from the Namdroling Monastery study Candrakīrti with Geshe Rinchen at Sera. Then how much they take on board, I don’t know. It seems like a fair bit, you know. But for instance, we see among our Western students, it’s been a problem over the years, that people will attend centers from one tradition without realizing that the presentation of the view is quite different from that of other traditions. And there’s this big split in Tibet between basically Je Tsongkhapa and his disciples, which have returned to the ancient Indian texts and logic.
And in Je Tsongkhapa’s case, the inspiration of Mañjuśrī, and the other traditions regarding the view, big difference. Everything else, basically as far as tantra is concerned, there’s no difference except regarding Dzogchen which is different. But as far as tantra is concerned between Kagyu, Sakya and Geluk, the differences are nominal. As far as the method side of the path is concerned, there’s no difference at all. As far as the wisdom side of the path is concerned, there are substantial differences.
So I was telling Geshe-la over lunch, it’s in my opinion a pity that the religious quarrels in Tibet in recent years have been over protectors and not over the view, because protectors are not important, but the view is. I thought he was very nice. Was very happy. So do you have other questions? His Holiness is saying that any exploration of emptiness that doesn’t take dependent origination is not complete.
You know, to be honest with you, I mean, we study dependent origination emptiness, but all this is so far removed for us, isn’t it? Right? I mean, in our cases, you know, we don’t really study, we don’t really meditate, and this is more case of basically training the mind for the future. So in this matter, there’s no difference between the traditions. As far as the fundamentals are concerned, there’s no considerable difference, but if you are a monk who wants to gain liberation, there is a huge difference, Because dependence on the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika pure view, you will gain liberation.
And probably dependence on other views, will not gain liberation. But we are not in that situation. I should point out there’s a very famous Thai monk, he has now passed on — Mun, there’s a lot of admiration for him, who it seems single handedly in Thailand developed the Cittamātra view. And his friend has visited him. So it goes to show you can basically in one tradition, you can be a Theravāda monk and have the Cittamātra view.
There’s no reason you should be a Theravāda monk and not have the Prāsaṇgika view. I forget his name right now. You have to ask me a day. He’s a monk of Thai origin, you know. And therefore you can perfectly attain liberation in the Theravāda tradition or in any tradition.
But without the pure view of Nāgārjuna, it seems difficult. Do you have any other questions? In this translation there are a lot of uses of the word essence, devoid of essence. Is that word simply another way of expressing intrinsic existence, nothing more? It is.
It is. It’s actually the term I have chosen for my own translation of Bodhicittavivarāna, because I think inherent existence is one of these forms of Buddhist English which have become consecrated by usage. But we have in English a very nice distinction between essence and nature, it goes back to ancient Greek philosophy, which we can draw upon to explain the Mādhyamika view and it’s legitimate. Then Thubten Jinpa does it. There are other problems in his translation, for instance, he uses the term savior instead of Lord, which I think is unnecessary.
Savior has a very particular connotation for Western audience, you know. So I give you a list of things I would suggest that you correct. You prefer essence because of the distinction between essence and nature. I prefer essence fundamentally because it really conveys the meaning of rang shin. Rang in Tibetan means self, and shin originally meant face.
So rang shin, which we translate as inherent existence, means one’s own face. The own face of phenomena. Now what’s the own face of phenomena? It’s their essence. Then the Tibetans use another term, rang bzhin, which corresponds pretty much exactly to nature.
You find the same thing in Sanskrit, rang bzhin in Sanskrit is Svabhava, Sva is self, so that translates rang, then Bava Sanskrit is always much more abstract than Tibetan, Bava is being, right? So own being, Then the Tibetan own face I think is very powerful. You’re negating the own face of phenomena, in other words you’re negating phenomena’s existing from their own side, they’re having a face of their own. It’s rather nice. Does that make sense?
Yes. I can hear where you’re coming from. I have to say that I think that I’ve lost the grasp of that word over time. Of essence as opposed to inherent or intrinsic existence, which seems to be emphasizing certain concepts that I can Very already helpful for us because we do have in Western philosophy a distinction between essence and existence, which can be carried over into Mādhyamika philosophy. Existence is affirmed, essential existence, in other words inherent existence, is denied.
If I say essential existence to someone who has a bit of a background in Western philosophy, means something quite clearly. The person has a very clear sense we’re talking of something perhaps a bit Aristotelian, you know. And if one contrasts essential existence in existence, a person can actually hear what you’re talking about. Then inherent is not wrong, but it just doesn’t seem to correspond to anything in our tradition. Sorry, Pamela.
You had a question. I can’t be absolutely sure that objects outside me exist, that sort of stuff. It’s it’s it’s a position that’s been reached again and again and again in Western philosophy that has to be overcome. Was it ever reached in Tibetan philosophy? And and and if so, how is it overcome?
The the but I’m I’m more interested in nature and nature and essence. Well, nature essence dichotomy, obviously the distinction depends on the philosopher, right? I mean So I mean if you if you look at Aristotle, have one distinction, if you look at Plato, you have another. Then if you look at medieval philosophy, the distinction broadly speaking seems to be that essence is a more fundamental component of an entity. It abuts on its fundamental essence, which is existence, and nature, for instance, would be, let’s say the nature of sugar is to be sweet.
It is a contingent distinction. Now regarding radical solips solipsism, I actually don’t know of a single Buddhist thinker for whom it’s been a problem. So I don’t know it’s just it’s never addressed, you know, it’s never addressed. Do you have other questions? Please.
The proposed rule of thought, is it only the Tibetan tradition or Well, the Tibetans claimed they existed in India. Then frankly of the four, if you analyze carefully it’s not clear that all four existed as we understand them, it’s more of a mental framework to understand certain thinkers. Vaibhāṣika certainly existed, there were numerous Vaibhāṣika sub schools. With Sautrāntika we run into a problem, which is actually it’s very difficult to give any single great Sautrāntika Indian philosopher. Cittamātra was the dominant viewpoint in India, especially in the later period before the Muslim invasion in the tenth century, and Mādhyamika the distinction between Svatāntrika and Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is a distinction which is made by the Tibetans.
It’s not clear that in ancient India, Bhāvaviveka or Buddhapālita would have recognized the distinction. They would have felt something separated them, they would have felt they were not in agreement. Bhāvaviveka was heavily indebted to Buddhist logic, to Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, Buddhapālita was not, but I’m not sure they were using the names. So to answer your question, yes, some elements of the distinction are present in ancient India, but it’s not present present completely. Much in the and I maybe stop with this, I’d encourage all of you in addition to studying Buddhist philosophy, study the history of Buddhism.
A lot of things become clear when you look at the history of the transmissions. For instance, the reason for which Mādhyamika is the dominant Buddhist philosophical tradition in Tibet is historical. It’s due to the date of the transmission. The reason for which Cittamātra is a dominant Buddhist philosophical system in China is historical. It’s used the fact that Cittamātra was dominant between basically the third and the, let’s say, seventh century of our era, where most of the transmissions of Buddhism to China occurred.
The transmissions to Tibet occurred much later, basically from the late seventh to the eleventh century, where there was a huge revival of Mādhyamika, and as a result Mādhyamika became dominant in Tibet. Now which of these is the ultimate view? That is something I think we have to determine through logic, through our own analysis. But the fact that for instance, Mādhyamika is dominant in Tibet is a historical phenomenon. Phenomenon.
Then thank you very much. I’m sorry we have to stop now.
Key terms in this teaching
- atman dag (Tib)
- Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
- Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
- dzogchen
- Literally "Great Perfection", the practice to attain the mind's natural, primordial state. LYWA
- Gelug
- The Virtuous Order. The order of Tibetan Buddhism founded by Lama Tsongkhapa and his disciples in the early fifteenth century and the most recent of the four main schools of Tibetan Buddhism. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Nyingma
- The old translation school of Tibetan Buddhism, which traces its teachings back to the time of Padmasambhava... LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.