Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 2014-10-04 – KR.mp3
UUID: 9b5a4df7-bca5-41db-a9de-341470596853
Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen
Collection: Emptiness (Khensur Rinpoche)
Date: 2014-10-04
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Duration: 1h 32m
Words: 3,604
So, I shall teach for a couple of minutes and then we will have an extensive question and answer session. And I would like to ask you to please feel free to ask any questions on the topic you might have. Don’t be embarrassed, even if it sounds silly, it is the only way forward, it’s the only way to understand. So as said, So as says, the root of the afflictions is the perishing the view of the perishing composite. The yogi who understands this counters this through a correct view.
The correct view here refers to both the view of the selflessness of persons and of phenomena, which in turn is twofold. Be careful. Listen carefully. Let’s be careful. Yeah.
Let’s be careful. I think it’s somebody somebody, I think. Somebody’s nodding off these little things. So the self which is refuted is this I which is perceived as autonomous. In other words, which is perceived as existing without depending on causes and conditions.
This has been taught by Buddha Shakyamuni to be a mistaken consciousness, to be a wrong consciousness. In this respect, other religious systems are unsuitable or inappropriate since they teach, perhaps without exception, the existence of a self which is permanent, one, and independent. The non Buddhist Hindu philosophers assert as an accumulator of karma and an experience of the fruition of karma, in other words, ourselves, a person which is the master or the overlord of the basis of imputation. Such a person, which is asserted by the non Buddhist Hindu schools, does not depend on the aggregates, whereas the aggregates actually depend on it, and such a person is therefore seen as permanent. So the position of the non Buddhist Hindu philosophers or Indian philosophers is that it is inappropriate to posit a person which exists independence on the aggregates.
Since after one’s death, one’s aggregates, in other words, one’s body and so forth, are incinerated in the or on the funeral pyre, and therefore, as they become nonexistent, the person itself would become nonexistent. From their standpoint, the only possibility or the only entity which can be posited as a person is an overlord of the aggregates, and this has to be permanent. These non Buddhist Indian philosophers accept the existence of past and future lives since if they didn’t accept the existence of past or future lives, the person would then cease at death. However, they assert that this person, the Atman, in other words, is permanent, one, and independent. The viewpoint of the non Buddhist Indian philosophers is, from our standpoint, profoundly at odds with reason and rationality.
Since the person is obviously dependent on the aggregates, this becomes obvious if we look at the development of an infant from the stage of embryo until birth, there is change and transformation, then after birth, the infant progressively becomes a child, then a teenager, a young adult, and eventually grows old. This process of change is a process which can only occur on the basis of the aggregates. Now, in the cases case of the basis of imputation the aggregates, we will say for instance, someone is eating a meal independent on the fact that a part of that person, in other words, their mass, is consuming food. This clearly illustrates the irrationality of the position of the Indian Buddhist philosophers, non Buddhist philosophers, in their assertion of the existence of a person which is permanent, one, and independent. This position is at odds with reality, and it is reality which is the criterion we should adopt.
So, clearly, if such a person existed, it would either be one with one’s body, which is obviously not the case, or one with the mind, which obviously is not the case either, as this has been clearly explained to be a mistaken consciousness. However, all of the Buddhist lower schools of tenets from Vaibhashika up to Svatantrika Madhyamika teach the existence of a person whose instance is given as the mental consciousness within the aggregates. This is a fairly natural viewpoint since rather intuitively when we examine ourselves, we tend to posit something within the mind as our person, whether it is the mental consciousness or another component of the mind. For this reason, one of the Buddhist schools of tenets, Beneath Svatantrika Madhyamika included, affirm that while there is no permanent one and independent self, it is the mental consciousness which can be given as an instance of the person. For this reason, all of the schools of tenants beneath Prasanika Madhyamika, so Vaibhashika to Satanika Madhyamika assert that when one searches for a person, one finds it within the aggregates, and this person is the mental consciousness.
For this reason, the Prasadika Madhumika view, which is considered to be the ultimate view as taught by Ayat Chandrakirti, asserts that if it were the case that one could indeed find a person or an eye under analysis, this person and this eye, which is the accumulator of karma and which is the experience of the fruition of karma, would then have to be positive. Now clearly in this case, there is a mistake we have to avoid, which is that of setting the person on one side and the aggregates on the other. In this context, what we are talking about is a situation where the person and the aggregates are related. Now from the standpoint of Prasangika, when one speaks of I, it is legitimate to speak, for instance, of myself, Gesheera, Chris, or Medhi. In other words, the name.
Then upon examination of this body and its limbs as well as our aggregates, we will find that such an I is unfindable within them. The question which arises at present is whether the unfindability of this I within the body and its components is emptiness or not. As I alluded before lunch, historian Mr. Dalai Lama has said that this is not really emptiness. It would be difficult to posit this as emptiness.
The question which then arises is what precisely do we understand by emptiness? In other words, once one has under analytical investigation, established the nonexistence of the object of negation, then one is in the following situation. It is clear on the one hand that the I or the person does exist. However, how does it exist? It exists as a name and as a mere sign.
In other words, it exists as a mere imputation on the basis of the basis of imputation. This is all that can be posited. This is why Buddha Shakyamuni himself said, probably in a Hinayana Sutra, just as the chariot is posited on the basis of the components of the chariot, Likewise, he is the person posited on the basis of imputation of the aggregates. Likewise, Buddha Shakimuni teaches that just as the person is imputed on the basis of imputation of the aggregates, likewise can all phenomena be understood as imputed on their basis of imputation. So within the presentation of emptiness being a dependent arising, which enables one to avoid succumbing to the extreme of nihilism, we can clearly understand here that the assertion that the person is a mere imputation on the basis of imputation of the aggregates prevents one from succumbing to the extreme of nihilism.
So you understand this a little bit better at present. If, as you have seen, the I or the person is unfindable under analysis, then it is clearly blended or mixed with the aggregates which are its basis of imputation. In other words, it depends on them. Is that not the case? I.
Tibetan language in Tibetan language. In English language. Then if you take eye in Tibetan and you investigate this I, is it unfindable? This is what you have to understand. Isn’t it the case that when you try to find where it is, you can’t find where it is?
Likewise, with the small table in front of me, if one investigates, someone asks, is this table the top of the table? Is it the legs of the table? Is it the underside of the table? It is none of these. Then the table is a mere nominal imputation on this basis.
Then under investigation, under analysis, the eye and the self disappear. However, it is evident that there is an accumulator of comma and an experience of the results of karma. So what do you propose as the mode of existence of this entity? So on investigation, you can’t find it. It doesn’t exist.
But it does exist. So what is its mode of existence? It’s okay. Yes? So what Geshela is saying is when you analyze, when you investigate, you cannot find the I.
It’s nowhere to be found. Yet, we all experience its functioning in daily life. So what is its mode of existence then? The truth feeling. Which three three?
The truth feelings. Which ones? So you’re giving Geshela the object of refutation here. It isn’t the way it appears to you. Obviously, otherwise, it wouldn’t be an object of negation.
The question is a mode of existence. I’d like to give you an example. If someone says, you’ve got no money in your bank account but you’re wealthy, then you’ve got no money in your bank account but if he says you’re wealthy, it means you’ve got money elsewhere. Right? It’s the same thing here.
The self doesn’t exist independently, but it does exist nonetheless. So how does it exist? It exists as a mere name. So it exists as a mere name which is imputed or designated. Then the basis of designation or the basis of imputation is necessary for the designation to occur.
Whether the basis of imputation helps the designation or not is another affair. This is why JFK says in verse five of In Praise of Dependent Origination, whatsoever depends on conditions that is devoid of intrinsic existence, what excellent instruction can there be more amazing than this proclamation, amazing precisely because of the link between interdependence and emptiness. So whatsoever depends on conditions that is devoid of intrinsic existence intimates that all phenomena through merely depending on causes and conditions are thereby empty of inherent existence. Then in stanza six, by grasping at Itta Chardis strengthen strengthen bondage to extreme views, referred to the schools of Buddhist philosophy beneath the prasanika, so from Vaibhashika to Svatantrika Madhyamika, who grasp at dependent origination, and this strengthened thereby their bondage to extreme views. Therefore, the schools of tenets the lower schools of tenants from Vaibhashika to Svatantrika Madhyamika rely on the reason of dependent arising to establish the inherent existence, the existence by its own characteristics, and the existence from its own side of phenomena.
The prasadika rely on exactly this reason, the reason of dependent arising, to establish the non inherent existence, the nonexistence from its own side, and the nonexistence by its own characteristics of phenomena. Hence, in stanza seven, since this teaching is not seen elsewhere, you alone are the teacher. There are no other teachers who impart these teachings on dependent arising. All composite phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions. Then persons and the self are composite phenomena, they are impermanent phenomena.
They therefore arise in dependence on causes and conditions. I’d like to ask you a question. If the person is an imputation on the basis of imputation, which are the aggregates, is the basis of imputation, the aggregates, the cause of the person or not? This is very important. Since the person or the self is a composite phenomenon, it arises independence on causes and conditions.
If its basis of imputation or designation of the aggregates are not its cause or conditions, independence on which cause and conditions do does it arise. Everybody. So all of us, let’s try to understand. Does a person arise from the aggregates or not? Would you please repeat your question?
I thought was talking about the aggregates and the cause of the imputation. So I was expressing it in different ways, but not asking is the question, what is imputing the imputation from the aggregates? Is not who is the imputator of the imputed phenomenon, the basis of imputation. That’s not the question. Then to Judy, your answer that resistance arises from ignorance is a very problematic one.
First, because ignorance is wrong, and then since the result is concurrent with the cause, we would be wrong and we are not. And secondly, because ignorance is consciousness and consciousness is a basis of imputation, whereas persons are imputed phenomena, then for a basis of imputation to give rise to an imputed phenomenon seems very awkward. It seems to me you need a consciousness positiveness sign and basis of imputation which is usually the aggregates but the problem I have is that the consciousness is also part of the aggregates so I go around in circles. Please answer my question. My question is, if the I is the result of causes and the I is posited on the basis of imputation, is the basis of imputation a cause of the eye?
Yes or no? It’s an eye cause. The cause. So is it a cause or not? Think what is the relation between a cause and an effect.
So the question is, if the eye is a composite phenomenon, it’s a result of causes and conditions, then we said the I is an imputation on a basis of imputation, right? Is the I the result of this basis of imputation or not? Why? Then if the I arises in dependence on causes and condition, you can give other causes and conditions. Please give them.
So I’ll repeat the question. Very simply. Prasangika says that the I is an imputation on the basis of imputation. The basis of imputation are the aggregates, form, feeling, discrimination, compositional factors in consciousness. Is the I a result of the basis of imputation?
In other words, are the basis of imputation a cause of the I or not? How could the basis of imputation be the cause of the person indeed? But then what is the cause of the person? But I said to Deshara, you basically summarized the teachings on conception. This is important.
Right? Very important, I think. So the way to proceed when this sort of difficult question is answered is through experience. Well, initially, you should investigate the I. When you investigate the I or the self, it is unfindable under analysis or investigation.
Yet, the moment you stop investigating, it it reappears. And when it reappears, you should ask yourself, on the one hand, it is unfindable under analysis and investigation, yet when I do not investigate or analyze, it is there. What is its cause? What are its conditions? And then at this point, a glimmer of an answer may arise.
So in this context, is no difference between the eye and the near eye. The question is, if the basis of imputation is a basis of imputation of the I, is it or is it not a cause of the I? If it is not, what are the causes and conditions of the eye? I think sorry. I I I cannot accept that answer.
It seems to me that it is crucial to an understanding of the question as to what you mean by I as to whether in the context of the question is the base of imputation the cause of the I as to whether I in this context means the mere I but not the nominal I or whether it means means the eye which is the object of negation because if it means the mere I well then it would seem to me that the answer to the question is the basis of imputation the cause of the I. Well the answer is no. The cause of the eye is a necessary precondition to the MirrorEye that there be aggregates on which to impute the MirrorEye, but in itself it is not the cause of that designation. Then let let us take the case of the mirror eye to simplify things. My question is, is the basis of amputation the cause of the mere I or not?
No, because the apprehension of a self or self grasping is the same thing as the ignorance which apprehends a self, then since the cause must be concordant with the effect, since ignorance is a mistaken mind, then the result, the person will be mistaken as well. So the way to think about this is every component of the basis of imputation is also a basis of imputation in its own right. For instance, my hand is a basis of imputation of myself. Because if I do something with my hand, like writing, you will say Geshela is writing. Then if this is the case, how could such a component be the cause of the person?
I was trying to find a cause of I would be a previous imputation of I Sorry. I’m giggling. I’ll take this a little bit. I’m really confused with this. Basis of imputation If you have questions now?
Yes. The imputer of the name, the nominalizer if you wish, is a conception. A conception is consciousness. Agesha, we’ll take your questions now. And when I’m thinking about it, sometimes it seems like emptiness definitely has its own inherent existence and sometimes it seems that it doesn’t.
So I’ve written down four short lines of reasoning and I was wondering if Geshe laude could comment on that because there’s two reasons that I can use, that emptiness is not inherent and then there’s two reasons against. Thank you. This makes my life easier. I’m a bit confused with your thinking. Reasons for emptiness not itself being empty, empty of what?
I think I read it. First two would probably be incorrect what is incorrect? Sorry I didn’t know the first two would be reasons for emptiness having inherent existence and the second two would be reasons against Los. Sorry, the first line, I shouldn’t have written it that way. Los.
So, basically, emptiness is non inherently existed in the Prasangika system because it depends on something else. Well, there’s no other reason apart from the fact that just as when we search for the I, it is unfindable. Likewise, when we search for emptiness, emptiness also is unfindable. Therefore, it is not inherently existent. Another question?
Death and being reborn. This designation of I is to the very subtle mind, as I understand. If that is correct, what is the distinction to be drawn between the very subtle mind and the consciousness that the Satantrikas and lower schools believe transmigrate, is the accumulator in this minimized set of aggregates, the very subtle mind and the vehicle for the karmic imprints, is it the mere I which is that accumulator and vehicle or is it the very subtle mind? Can I ask you to reformulate your question shortly? Because I think you started with one question and you ended almost with another one.
Could you rephrase that? Understand what the distinction is between the consciousness, the mental consciousness that is the accumulator and vehicle Mhmm. Of the karmic imprints Mhmm. Between death and rebirth and the very subtle mind on which is imputed the the mere I. Mhmm.
I think is a big difference between ordinary consciousness and the mind of clear light. Ordinary consciousness is the consciousness which engages in our daily reflections. The fundamental mind, on the other hand, is that mind which manifests after cause death and which is supported or vehicled by a subtle wind. So the nominalizer is a mere conception. Then until conceptual activity has occurred, it is within.
Then after that, it is a different affair. So the reason is the following. The fundamental mind cannot be the support for physical experiences and so forth. On the other hand, it is clear when we speak of a person that generally speaking, we’re speaking of a physical entity. Thank you.
To say the fundamental mind manifests after course death infers that it is in an unmanifest state before course death. So I thought that there’s two ways of looking at the fundamental mind. One is like the bottom of the mind and it’s always there, and when in the clear light you just strip off the other layers of mind. The other way would, for it to be similar to you know the mind of anger which arises and then, becomes unmanifest. In which way does this fundamental mind exist?
Well, the fundamental mind is a tantric topic. Having said this, the fundamental mind is something we at present are completely unable to use. When we are able to use it, it becomes manifest in one of two fashions. At the time of death, it becomes spontaneously manifest or it is possible to cause its manifestation through various meditative techniques. We shall stop here for today.
He has start today. Cat. Cat is coming here. This is a very important topic and specifically one’s understanding of emptiness being independent arising. Now here, I would encourage you when you return home after taking a shower to relax and to think a bit on the near eye.
It is clear that under investigation, the near eye disappears. It is just as clear that the uninvestigated near eye exists and functions. Therefore, what is the mode of existence of the mere I? This is something we should investigate for ourselves.
Key terms in this teaching
- atman dag (Tib)
- Self; as opposed to anatman (no-self), the Buddha’s explanation of selflessness in the Four Noble Truths Sutra. LYWA
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- clear light ö sel (Tib)
- The extremely subtle mind which is directly recognized as the culmination of successful tantric practice, and is also accessible or recognizable to ordinary beings at the time of death. LYWA
- dependent origination pratityasamutpada (Skt); ten drel (Tib)
- Also called dependent arising. The way that the self and phenomena exist conventionally as relative and interdependent. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- self-grasping dag dzin (Tib)
- The mind that apprehends the self as inherently existent. This refers to both the self of persons and the self of phenomena. LYWA
- Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
- The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.