1 h 27 min · 3,195 words · 2 October 2011
Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. The teaching concludes a series of four talks on Geshe Langri Thangpa’s Eight Verses for Training the Mind. It explains the eight worldly concerns, then the selflessness of persons in the Indian non-Buddhist, lower Buddhist and Prasangika Madhyamaka views, using the rope-and-snake example and debate-style questions to students. It ends by encouraging daily recitation of the verses.
File metadata (for organising)
Duration: 1h 28m
UUID: 8c734163-c096-4276-81cc-d6a2a1faf4eb
Date: 2011-10-02
Words: 3,191
We’ll address our questions. And if there aren’t any, since we have put a lot of work, then we may separate early. If we do not do any recitations, that will be fine. No need to do the recitation. Apologies for the glasses.
It is a result of more than twenty years of study at the monastery, and it started when during the summer retreat at Sera Je, he spent the summer retreat studying a great Chinese commentary and then was printed on a very white paper and it started irritating his right eye. So he has to wear glasses these days. There was a great Chinese treatise on divination when he was young in his time off. These were things you were allowed to do. So it was in Tibetan characters even though it was a Chinese treatise.
Because Geshe-la does not know Chinese characters. So I was telling Geshe asked me what we talked about. I told him I had shown you charts which show that there is no correlation, automatic correlation between prosperity on the one hand and happiness on the other. And Geshela said indeed, material prosperity satisfies the senses, but happiness is actually a mental experience And for changing the mind, there is nothing but dharma. And the final stanza, the eighth stanza, may all this remain undefiled by the stains of the eight mundane concerns, and may I, recognizing all things as illusion, devoid of clinging, be released from bondage.
The two first verses here are the verses Geshela will comment at present. They concern the eight mundane concerns. The two last verses are dedicated or concern emptiness. Here, the eight mundane concerns relate to concerns arising from pride, anger, and desire. So what do we mean here by undefiled by the stains of the eight mundane concerns or the eight worldly dharmas?
If we take the example of meditating on patience or forbearance, of which Geshela talked this morning, It means somebody who meditates on patience with a mind affected by the eight worldly concerns would meditate on patience thinking, if people know I meditate on patience, I will gain a good reputation. They will praise me and think highly of me. Or he will think, if I put on a good show of meditating on patience, then people will give me donations, money will come my way. These are contaminated motivations. And why is this practice of patience with those two motivations is said to be contaminated by the worldly dharmas?
Because it is a practice for this life. It does not move beyond this life. It can only yield results of happiness within this life, if at all. Likewise, if we meditate on love or on compassion with a motivation contaminated by the eight worldly dharmas, this is not dharma practice. This is merely a practice for this life.
At the least we should meditate on love and compassion without it’s there being contaminated by the eight worldly dharmas and the preoccupations of this life. Therefore, at the very least, we need a motivation striving for future lives, which is a motivation of a being of small scope. And this is a meaning therefore of the second verse, undefiled by the stains of the eight mundane concerns, unmixed with the eight mundane And the final two verses, in may I, recognizing all things as illusions, devoid of clinging, be released from bondage is the other two verses related to the view. And then regarding the view, the view is a most fascinating topic. Geshela will try to explain it as best he remembers.
And then he will ask you whether you understand emptiness. And here, when one speaks of meditating on emptiness, the emptiness which is initially referred to is the selflessness of persons. What is meant by person in this context? It is what Geshela explained previously, the three terms which are synonymous person, self and I can be understood either as the basis of imputation for the term person or the experience of the various experiences one undergoes or the accumulator of the various types of karma which one accumulates. Or in addition, the person can be understood as the ground of the foundation on which virtue and non virtue is accumulated.
Then as Je Tsongkhapa says in his The Essence of Eloquence, The non Buddhist, and this refers mainly to the Hindu non Buddhist or the Indian non Buddhist, searching for an experience of karma and of experience postulate a self within the aggregates. The meaning of this quote is that the non Buddhist philosophers which can be subdivided into two, those who have a view of their own and those who have no particular view, both searching for a self which is permanent and subsists beyond death for the aggregates are and specifically the body are left behind postulate a self which is a permanent and autonomous entity. And in addition, Je Tsongkhapa in his essence of eloquence in his book points out that to counter this view of the non Buddhist philosophers of ancient India, The Buddhist schools of tenets ranging from the Vaibhashika to the Svatantrika Madhyamika school assert collectively either that the mental consciousness is the person or alternatively that it is the mere five aggregates which are the person. And therefore, though there are differences within the Sautraticas and differences as well within the Chitamatras, the majority of the lower schools’ tenets ranging up to the Svatantrika Madhyamica affirm that the conventionally designated person is none other than the mental consciousness.
And in the prasanghika system, the Madhyamika prasanghika system on the other hand, there is no such thing which is given as a conventionally designated person since the person is understood to be inherently non existent. And therefore, in the same way as the schools of tenets ranging from the Vaibhashika to the Svatantrika Madhyamika, refute the view of the non Buddhist Indian philosophers asserting the existence of a permanent and autonomous self and affirm the existence of a person which is none other than the mental consciousness, or alternatively the mere five aggregates. Likewise, the Prasangika refute or take as an object of refutation the view of all of the lower Buddhist schools of tenets from Vaibhashika to Svatantrika Madhyamika and affirm that the person is none other than the mere nominal and conceptual imputation on the basis of the appearance of the person as the composite of both body and mind to the perceiving recipient. So Geshela has now explained the understanding of the self in the non Buddhist Indian schools as well as the understanding of the person in the lower Buddhist schools ranging from the Vaibhashika to the Svatantrika Madhyamika, and he has explained the understanding of the nominally imputed person in the Prasangika Madhyamika school.
He will now give us five minutes, during which he will ask us to reflect from our own side on the meaning of the self. What is the self according to these various schools so that we ourselves gain some personal understanding of this. Okay. So we have meditated for a little bit less than five minutes on the self or the I. And it is a central concept throughout the eight verses.
Since we can see in almost every single verse, the I, the Tibetan term Da, is mentioned. In the first verse, the first stanza is at the end of the stanza, may I hold them there at all times. In the second verse, May I view myself as the lowest amongst all? And in the before last stanza, it is the third verse, May I secretly take upon myself? So, at present, Geshela, I would like to ask you what the result of your contemplation on the I, the self or the person is during these four or five minutes.
Give it succinctly, something short, not long. While it is true that when it is searched for under it is not found, nonetheless the I exists as the basis of both virtue and non virtue, you must posit it. Next. So, Paul, what you say is true that it is difficult to find the person. Disha, I would like to ask you to investigate in your own body, in your own mind, whether Kathy is your head or Kathy is your feet or is somewhere in between, then clearly there is such a thing as Kathy.
It’s a good way to look at things. It’s a beneficial way to look at things because as a result of that outlook, the ignorance which sees a person as mistakenly existing from its own side will be reduced. Are there other contributions? So we’re talking here of the conventionally existing or designated I. The automata is an object of refutation.
It is what is refused. This conventionally existing I is what we say when we say I as little children. We say I, I, me, me. That is what we’re talking about. Broadly speaking, these answers are pretty similar.
In every single case what we see is that there is an eye which is established by a valid cognition, a prime cognizer. Yet in the system of Arya Nagarjuna, this I is a mere nominal and conceptual imputation from the standpoint of the imputer on the basis of the aggregates. Are there any other contributions? Yes, Anila. What do you mean by that?
Jenny, what were the other things you said? Excuse me. Well, not independent, not separate, not autonomous, but there’s there is a profound connection between Are there other contributions? Yes, Shay. It felt like there were two functions happening where two occurrences of mind where one felt like physical sensation and the other felt like a labelling and negating process.
And negating process. A do you mean by label negating? What do you mean by negating a label? Any other answers? Are there other?
Yeah. Yeah. I have. Any other, thoughts, contribution? Yes.
None of you answered Geshela’s question. Geshela’s question was not, what is the object of refutation, which is what every one of you answered, saying that indeed there is no self existing ultimately. What Geshela’s question was is what is the conventional self, the nominally designated self? In other words, what can you posit as the unanalyzed self? When you don’t analyze, when you don’t think.
There is a self. What is it? So Geshela was not asking you, for instance, what the ultimate nature of his table is, where indeed under ultimate analysis we can see the table is not any one of its corners There is no table existing apart from its parts. What he was asking us was what is just the conventional table? Just as in our case, what is the conventional self, which does exist.
This this is a system of the lower schools of tenants, indeed. Yes, Richard. So yes indeed, that is the system of the lower schools of tenets, which all of you have presented, when you were asked to present the design and eye. However, from the standpoint of the Prasangika school, unfortunately, all of this has to be discarded. So we take then Jamba Tenzin as an example, Ani Jamba Tenzin, and you are all saying that Jambatansin is a person.
I hope you all agree that she’s a person. Then if she is a person, according to you, she is a mind. Are you all saying that Jabba Tenzin is a mind only? So if you say that, what are the problems? This is how it debates.
So Geshe is afraid he has refuted your position. Yeah. So this is what harms your positions. If Jamba Tenzin is a person and a person is a mind, then what are you going to say when you say Annie Jamba Tensen walks and eats and lies down and sleeps? Her mind doesn’t do that.
So Geshela apologizes for misrepresenting And your he is contesting the viewpoint that the person is the mind. Then it is a viewpoint that many of us have within ourselves. Since when we think of ourselves, we think I am this mind, and many of you formulated that, which experiences. So that’s a viewpoint which is being refuted. This is how monks who study Buddhist philosophy in the great seats proceed to analyze a viewpoint.
So if Geshela were to have a position of his own, an assertion, then you from your side would have to search for what contradicts his assertion and present these contradictions to him. I understand your question. There’s definitely a relationship between one’s past memories and experiences on the one hand and the person. Clearly. So are you comfortable asserting that the consciousness within the continuum of Ani Jamba Tenzin is the person Ani Japatinsen or not?
Debate style, yes or no, it will be clearer. So do you mean therefore that we cannot see any job potential? We do see Annie Japatinsi, don’t we? Do you see the mental consciousness within the continuum of Annie Japatinsi? Then to say that So it’s good to think in these ways.
The lowest schools of tenets are basically saying that if you have to give an example of Ani Jamba Tenzin, you give the consciousness of Ani Jamba Tenzin as an example. Then if we look at it from the standpoint of the Prasangika view and we see how things appear to us, then when you look at Geshela, generally speaking, a Geshela is always a person, he’s always a sentient being. So if you look at Geshela, how does he actually appear to you? He probably appears to you either as the owner of the aggregates or as something who is surrounded by the aggregates. And Geshela from his own side, when he says I, Geshela, with a strong sense of I, has this same sense.
And even though ultimately from this, the I does not exist, nonetheless it has a close relationship with the aggregates which are its basis of designation. As is said in the Heart Sutra, apart from the aggregates, what I is there? Then if we look at the basis of imputation of the I, which is the five aggregates, in other words the aggregates of form or matter and the four remaining aggregates which are all consciousness, feeling recognition, volition and consciousness. Then we can see that they are all similar in that every single one of them has both parts and previous and later instance. And therefore, we can see that for the nominally designated, the designated conventional I exists when it is unexamined and unsearched for under examination and analytical investigation, it disappears and becomes non existent.
This is the actual state of affairs and this is what is meant when one speaks of the non inherent existence of the self. The best example for the Prasangika view is the example of the piece of multi colored rope in the grass mistaken for a snake. So this piece of multi colored rope in the grass mistaken for a snake, when unexamined, looks to us like a snake. However, it appears as a snake only because of the mistaken imputation of snakeness from the side of the mind apprehending it onto a multi colored piece of rope in the grass. Actually, when one investigates the components of this multi colored piece of rope, one finds nothing related to a snake in it.
It is the same thing with all phenomena. And this is the meaning of the two verses at the end of the eight stanzas, and may I recognize all things as illusion devoid of clinging be released from bondage. When one actually under analysis realizes that there are no phenomena apart from the mental and conceptual imputations from the side of the imputer. And in turn phenomena appear to the mind as illusions, then progressively the innate ignorance which apprehends the true existence of phenomena decreases. Whereas as long as this innate ignorance which apprehends the true existence of phenomena is there, as it gives rise to desire to anger and ignorance, they can only increase over time.
So causing this ignorance to decrease will cause the progressive and steady decrease of all of the delusions which grow out of it. And therefore, when one investigates, for instance, Geshela performs investigation on himself where Geshela himself dwells, is he any of the five aggregates or is he one with the five aggregates? There are the numerous contradictions which you have been taught, such as if he is one with all five aggregates, then there are several Geshela’s, actually five Geshela’s and so forth. And as a result of this, one can say that unfindability under ultimate analysis of Geshela within his aggregates is none other than Geshela’s emptiness. This is what is meant when one speaks of Geshela’s emptiness.
It does not in any way demonstrate that Geshela is existent, what it demonstrates is that Geshela’s inherent existence is non existent. So this is a presentation of the ultimate nature of Geshela, then the difficulty we struggle with is that most of our experience is sensory through the five sense consciousnesses. Then obviously ultimate truths are not sensory experiences. They’re not being sensory experiences and they’re being mental experiences in no way implies that they are non existent. So this is ultimate truth.
Are you tired? You see, with the explanation of ultimate truth and meditation on it, the time has elapsed. Then we will think about this again in the future. Krishna, we’ll take only one question. So the key before devising a program of study like this is to check one’s own faculties, one’s own capacity.
If one is of sharp faculties, intelligent, very intelligent in other words, His Holiness says it is then ideal to start directly with the prasanika madhyamika view. If however one is not of sharp faculties, then it is better to start at the bottom with the Vaibhashika view then move upwards to the Sattrantika, Chitamatra, Svatantika and eventually Prasanika view. Otherwise, there’s a risk of problems down the road. Since we have time in the future together, Geshela hopes sincerely that we will be able to study the various presentations of selflessness in the various schools of tenets and the presentation of the subtle selflessness of persons in the various cognitive tenets. So Summa Sumarum, we have covered over the last two days in four teachings the presentation of Geshe Langri Thangpa’s eight verses.
Geshela from his side put great effort, we from our side put great effort. We should dedicate these waves of merit to all sentient beings reaching the state of full enlightenment. And secondly, this text, these eight verses of Geshe Langri Thangpa was composed by Geshe Langri Thangpa based on his own experience. Therefore it is a text which is difficult for us to understand and to put in practice. However, Geshela hopes that we will take it as a commitment and we will recite it every day because there will be real benefit for us if we do so.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- sentient being sem chen (Tib)
- Any being who has not abandoned the two obscurations. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
- Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
- The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.