1 h 7 min · 2,854 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 67-minute teaching, Kyabje Rinpoche guides practitioners through the Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika philosophy that all phenomena exist solely as conceptual imputations. He contrasts this radically non-dualistic view with lower schools of Buddhist philosophy that claim phenomena are “established from their own side.” Using vivid contemporary examples—a figurine mistaken for a person in an Australian shop, an unelected candidate who can perform the Prime Minister’s duties—Rinpoche demonstrates that conceptual imputation alone is insufficient; the object must also perform its designated function. He systematically dismantles how the mind creates the sense of “I” and “eye,” then invites practitioners into a debate about which mode of existence they find most congenial. Pitched at engaged students ready to examine philosophical assumptions through reason and discussion.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 06092016Salam 2 – KR.mp3
UUID: 74c07b9d-4309-4840-81dd-782caab1c410
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Emptiness
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~2,853
So as Ārya Nāgārjuna says in an extensive stanza of the Ratnāvali, the precious garland, which I shall not quote in full, all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there. The stanza reads, this world is merely imputed by conception. So as you know, Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka asserts that all phenomena without exception are mere conceptual imputations out there. None of the other schools, the lowest schools of tenets, in other words, the schools of tenets from Svatantika Mādhyamika downwards accept this for that matter. They consider this view to amount to succumbing to an extreme of nihilism.
So within our mind stream, obviously there are conceptions. However, what we do not understand is the means or the method by which conceptions impute spontaneously something on phenomena, and this is the Prāsaṇgika explanation. Now regarding this innate conception or conceptuality, which proceeds to imputation, This is not something we should think of as exterior to us. It exists within our own continuum. So here, when we refer to existence, we refer to terminological existence.
And Geshe-la was asking me whether you use the term existence for phenomena. I said, you definitely do. Then for to say that someone something exists is to say that it is a mere conceptual imputation out there. Now here, there are only two possibilities. Either the mode of existence of phenomena is in accordance with Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika or the mode of existence of phenomena is in with the schools beneath Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika.
These two modes of existence in accordance with Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika and in accordance with the schools beneath Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In other words, there is no third possibility. And therefore, an extremely important point here is to understand that whereas Prāsaṇgika Madhyamaka explains the mode of existence of phenomena in terms of the innate conception which dwells within us. And here, one must distinguish the innate conception is an ideation, but there are numerous different types of ideations, the lowest schools of tenets do not. So here it is important to understand that when we refer to the lowest schools of tenets beneath Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, this extends to the non-Buddhist schools of Indian tenets of ancient India.
Now regarding the view, whereas Prasanika Mādhyamika asserts that phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there. This is not accepted by the lower schools of tenets. And on the other hand, the view of the lower schools of tenets such as for instance, asserts that, excuse me, let me rephrase this. For all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there and this viewpoint is rejected by Svatantika Mādhyamika in turn rejects the viewpoint of Cittamātra according to which, a composite phenomena specifically forms are said to be truly established. Cittamātra in turn rejects a view of both Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, according to which phenomena, specifically composite phenomena and form are established as composed of insecable particles.
And this is very elegant, basically, because as one moves downwards in the schools of tenets, the lower schools are said to succumb into two extremes of eternalism. So moving upwards at present, the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika assert that within composite phenomena, all forms are composed of indivisible or inseccable particles, whereas Cittamātra asserts that all composite phenomena and forms are truly established and we shall set aside Svatantika Mādhyamika’s view, which is quite difficult to understand. Likewise, each of the lower schools of tenets consider that these schools of tenets superior to it have succumbed to an extreme of nihilism. For instance, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika, which assert that forms constituted of indivisible particles, consider that Cittamātra, which refutes this to assert a certain non duality, has succumbed to an extreme of nihilism. Cittamātra in turn, considers that Svatantika Mādhyamika, which asserts that no phenomenon is truly established, has succumbed to an extreme of nihilism.
Svatantika Mādhyamika in turn considers that Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, which asserts that no phenomenon is established from its own side, has succumbed to an extreme of nihilism. Each school considers that its own view is supreme. Sautrāntika considers that its own view is supreme and that it has not succumbed to either of the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism and therefore is the middle way. Cittamātra also considers that its view is supreme and that it has not succumbed to either extreme of nihilism or eternalism, and that its view is supreme. Svatantika Mādhyamika considers that it is the middle way and has not succumbed to either extreme, and so does Let’s take for instance the case of Svatantika Mādhyamika.
Svatantika Mādhyamika considers that it holds to the middle way, which has not succumbed to the extreme of eternalism, which is Cittamātra, nor to the extreme of nihilism, which is Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. Now let us take Prasanika Mādhyamika. When Prasanika Mādhyamika refers to the terminological existence phenomenon as the mode of existence, this terminological existence is said not to succumb to either the extreme of permanence or nihilism. Now, you have to reflect for yourselves what this mode of existence by means of conceptual imputation asserted by Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is. It cannot be something which is rooted in other systems of tenets.
It must be something which is innate to us. So let us analyze at present the positions regarding terminological existence of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika in the lower schools of tenets. And lower schools of tenets here refer to schools of tenets from Svatantika Mādhyamika downwards. Regarding the I, the schools of tenets from Svatantika Mādhyamika downwards assert that the I is established from its own side. What is meant by establishment from its own side?
It means that it is findable under ultimate analysis. So what do we mean when we say that the schools of tenets from Svatantika Mādhyamika downwards considered that the eye is established from its own side. What is meant is that the I is findable when one investigates existence or non existence under ultimate analysis, in other words. And this, please listen carefully, is, something which is rooted in our own experience. We have an experience that the I exists and when we try to investigate, we find there is a feeling of the I within us.
Now, this sense, that there is an I which is findable within the five aggregates, is what leads the lower schools of tenets to say that this eye must be consciousness. Do you understand? Yes. 100%? No.
There is an I. Yes. Now you’re now you’re there. When say I, no one ever pops his finger on his skull pointing at the brain. We point here, don’t we?
Why? So the first point we should reflect upon is that all the lowest schools of tenets, without exception, assert. Based on the fact that we have this feeling of an I within ourselves, that there is something called the I which is established from its own side, which is findable within its basis of imputation when it is sought for. Just as the I all phenomena are said to be by the lower schools of tenets established from their own sides. In other words, findable when we investigate whether they exist or not.
Now for Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, no phenomenon is established from its own side. And when we analyze, we can get a better sense of what Prasanika is dealing with. Let us take an example. When we wake up in the morning, some of us may have had a good night sleep, whether we slept, I don’t know, five, six, seven or eight hours. Some may not.
But when we wake up, we have this sense of an I. Then after this, we have breakfast. We enjoy our breakfast, and who enjoys this breakfast? I do. So at that point, really there is no I apart from that thought which thinks, I have had a good night’s sleep or alternatively, if one is tormented by insomnia and spends one’s night thinking about other things and ends up sleeping only one or two hours, then that thought which thinks, I have had a bad night’s sleep, Then for all me being such as us, if we haven’t had a good night’s sleep, since our consciousness depends so heavily on the five sensory consciousnesses, it’s very difficult when we get up in the mornings to do whatever we have to do, to study, to read, to go to work, etcetera.
Whereas if we had a good night’s sleep, it is very easy to do whatever you wish to do. So, at present, clearly, we have conceptions in our mind which are able to impute the I and the question I would like to ask you is what type of mind is able to impute the I? At this point, the basis of imputation is required, isn’t it? Do you understand?
So in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika, the I is imputed on the basis of imputation, which is the five aggregates. Now on which basis does the mind which thinks I impute this I? So here, the mind that imputes I, it’s this innate conceptual idea which thinks I. What I’m asking you is on what basis, because we need a basis of imputation, does this occur? Relation to memory or recollection.
There’s no relation to recollection. We said that this innate conception which imputes an I on the basis of the basis of imputation proceeds with this imputation. Then during sleep, who who or what does this imputation? So when we say, I sleep, then sleep as you know is a mental factor. So within the five aggregates, it would have to be within the fourth of compositional factors, right?
Okay. Interesting. A bit strange, isn’t it? So, at present, we should reflect first on the two modes of presentation of the mode of existence of the I according to the lower schools of tenets from Svatamika Mādhyamika downwards and according to Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika. Both have reasons, but the reasons of the Svatantika Mādhyamika and lower presentation of the I are not correct reasons.
In addition, this approach has numerous lines of reasoning which harm it. On the other hand, the presentation in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika is a correct line of reasoning and has numerous lines of reasoning which corroborate it. Therefore, as one thinks or reflects about it, this mode of positing the I becomes clearer and clearer. So, at present regarding the assertion in Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika that all phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there. Let us understand first that the imputations of the I can occur on any of the five aggregates.
The form, sensation, discrimination, compositional factor and consciousness aggregates. And let us take an example. You are all taking very careful notes. Then as you take your notes, you think my hand is writing and is writing very carefully these notes. What exactly is the conception my hand imputed upon?
It is imputed upon a basis of designation, the hand. Therefore, my hand is imputed on the basis of designation, which is the hand. This is quite straightforward to understand. It’s a simple example. So this is a Prāsaṇgika viewpoint according to which the I is a mere conceptual imputation out there, and this is extended to all phenomena.
All phenomena are mere conceptual imputations out there. Now, is it the case that if something is a mere conceptual imputation out there, it necessarily exists? No. It is not the case. In addition, from the side of the object, a functionality is necessary.
For instance, if I impute man on something, a functionality from the side of that object is necessary. For instance, if we impute if man is imputed out there by means of mere conceptuality, is that upon which man is imputed necessarily man? No. So why don’t you give us an example? Think for yourselves.
Examples of something which is merely conceptually imputed out there but does not exist. But in terms of your experience, ghosts appear as human beings? Identity. So in Australia, you have a numerous, stores and shopping centers. Then, obviously, there’s a lot of people, men and women shopping there.
From a distance, when we see a figurine in the window wearing clothing, we might think that is a man. But when we come closer up, we realize it’s not a man. It’s just a figurine. This is a good example. So when we see this from a distance, the mind which thinks this is a man arises.
But when we come closer up, then if we ask a question, is this able to perform the function of a man? The answer is obviously no. Therefore it is not a man. So, the fact that something is a mere conceptual imputation out there does not definitely indicate that it exists. In addition, the object must be able to perform its function.
So at present, we’re generating the motivation. Let us reflect on whether the position of the school of tenets from Svatantika Mādhyamika downwards regarding the mode of existence of phenomena is better than that of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika or not. Okay. Please open the paper, page one. We recite one b, two, three, four, and also the page five.
Number six, mental offering. First one and three. So therefore, we should reflect on the following points. It is insufficient to just impute conceptual conceptually man onto something for that to be able to be a man. In addition, that must perform the function of a man.
Moreover, take the example of the small stand in front of Geshe-la. It is not sufficient for an object to perform the function of a small stand to be a small stand. So let us take the example of the Australian Prime Minister. It is not because one has the capacity to perform all the tasks or the functions of Australian Prime Minister that one is an Australian Prime Minister, is it? So therefore, it is not sufficient to be able to perform the function of a prime minister to be a prime minister.
Likewise, it is insufficient for a conception to impute prime minister out there for that object to be a prime minister. Instead, both criteria are necessary. Then you understand, Someone who is able to perform all of the functions of a prime minister is not necessarily a prime minister. What example do you give? Ah, cool.
Okay. He says he can do all the jobs of a prime minister. Okay. But but yeah. Yeah.
I do it. Good. Thank you. Vote for Jampa too.. Yeah.
I think next year, you know. Therefore, in addition to having the capacity to perform all the functions of a prime minister, the competence one must be nominated, literally inaugurated in that position. And let’s say, if our friend Jampa Chöpel, who has all these competencies, was in addition inaugurated as prime minister, then when we saw him, we would say, mister prime minister. So this process depends on numerous factors. For instance, it will be insufficient for me alone to recognize Jampa Chirpel as prime minister.
Numerous others must be involved. So therefore, in addition to phenomena being mere conceptual imputations out there, they must be able to perform their function for them to exist as that as which they are imputed. Now if you take the example of the stand in front of Geshe-la, just being able to perform the function is insufficient, isn’t it? So what example would you give them of the team? It’s easy.
Very easy. The new model, is it? That stable? Is that stable and Yeah. So give me an example of something which can perform all the functions of a stand in front of Geshe-la, but is not such a stand.
Good job. Easy to give. Sorry? A box? Okay.
That’s enough. Let’s let’s give some examples here. And the example of the prime minister is a very good one. Jampa Chirpel was able to perform all of the activities of a prime minister, but he’s still not a prime minister. What other examples would you give?
Chef. Cool. Who? Which? Natalie is a chef.
Oh, Natalie. You can do everything a prime minister must do. Can I do anything the prime minister can do? Yes. Oh, I would want to.
The question is not one of wish, but of competence. So what we should think about is the fact that it is not sufficient that a man be imputed out there by a mere conceptual imputation, but in addition that such an entity must be able to perform function of a man. These two conditions are both necessary. So is it? Can one say it’s an identical trick?
And that is supposed to be what? An example of Not really. So at present, we will have a debate or discussion as we call it here, and the topic is, which is the mode of existence you feel the most congenial for yourself? That which is taught in the lower schools of tenets from Svatantika Mādhyamika downwards or that of Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamika? Okay.
Yeah. By pairs, by twos.
Key terms in this teaching
- basis of imputation dag zhi, tag zhi (Tib)
- Also called “basis of designation” or “basis for labeling”, the object or valid base on which a label is placed as part of the third and most subtle level of dependent arising. LYWA
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- dualistic view
- The ignorant view characteristic of the unenlightened mind in which all things are falsely conceived to have concrete self-existence. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- Prasangika Madhyamaka u ma thäl gyur pa (Tib)
- The Middle Way Consequence school, a sub-school of the Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy. The Consequence school accepts mere consequences known to others and does not assert true establishment even conventionally. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- two extremes tha nyi (Tib)
- Eternalism, seeing things as having an intrinsic reality, and nihilism, seeing things as having no reality at all. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.