1 h 6 min · 749 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 66-minute session, Kyabje Rinpoche works through a foundational debate in Buddhist philosophy: how do we account for the existence of composite phenomena? He focuses on the critical difference between Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Cittamātra—whether the mind’s positing of something is necessary for its existence. Cittamātra asserts that phenomena are truly established simply by arising from causes and conditions, even without mind’s positing, while Sautrāntika Mādhyamika argues that this is insufficient; the mind must actively posit them as objects. Rinpoche then applies this debate to a concrete question: is form composed of indivisible particles or partless entities, and how does this affect our understanding of true existence? He uses clear examples of how the mind imputes concepts. For those with grounding in Buddhist philosophy.
File metadata (for organising)
File: 150428 001 (1 – KR.MP3
UUID: 64a1ad59-bb82-4159-a082-f02a40244549
Teacher: Kyabje Rinpoche
Collection: Emptiness
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~740
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:00:00-00:01:02] [unclear, 42 s] It is important to understand the differences between propounders of Chitamatra cats and propounders of Sattadika Magamica cats. [end unchecked]
04/28/2015. tenets occasionally jump, and
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:01:24-00:04:55] Although those are propounders of great vehicle tenets, the main difference lies within the fact that one propounds true establishment and the other is not. That, I am going to be the Thakamakura channel. The Thakamakura specifically consider that all composite phenomena, in other words, all things, all impermanent phenomena, are truly established, whereas Satanteca Badiamica considers that no phenomena is truly established. In debates on these topics, which position should we take at present as foundation? For the discussion, we should not take both the Gita Matra and the Svartantika Madhyamika positions as foundations at the same time. Instead, at present, we should take the Svartantika Madhyamika position as foundation. Otherwise, great confusion ensue. Then if the distinction lies between accepting and not accepting true establishment, then should I ask what is the reason for which Chita Matra accepts the true establishment of composite phenomena? [non-English speech, 2 s, detected zh 0.44] The Chittamatras assert that composite phenomena, things, in other words, other, the other power of nature, is established by its own characteristics, to the mere fact that it arises in dependence on causes and conditions. [end unchecked]
transfer. Through the mere fact that it arises in the
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:05:08-00:05:31] In the Chikamatra system, through being established by its own characteristics, composite phenomena are established by their own characteristics, excuse me, through a rising independence on causes and conditions, and merely that, composite phenomena are established by their own characteristics, inherently established and established from their own side. [end unchecked]
sense of causes and conditions
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:05:59-00:06:01] Now we go to our next country, Canada, America. [end unchecked]
. Does Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, which acknowledges that composite phenomena arise independent of causes and conditions, conclude thereby that composite phenomena are truly established or not. They do not.
Since the mode of establishment of composite phenomena in that case would not only be that they arise in dependence on causes and conditions, but in addition, that they are not posited in dependence on mind
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:08:08-00:08:16] Therefore, and this is a critical point, the mode of existence of composite phenomena [end unchecked]
. in dependence on causes and conditions, but in addition, they’re being posited by mind, their occurring in dependence on mind. It is through the concatenation of these two that composite phenomena for that matter or phenomena can be said to exist. Cittamātra School, on the other hand, asserts that composite phenomena are truly established because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions without being posited by mind. In other words
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:09:29-00:10:28] posited by lying. In other words, they abide within their uncommon mode of abiding. Then, the dark which is presented within Je Tsongkhapa’s clarifying the thought is inasmuch as Chika Matra acknowledges that all phenomena are established by a valid cognizer. [end unchecked]
, are established by a valid cognizer, does this not entail that Cittamātra acknowledges that all phenomena are posited by mind?
The Tibetan rejoinder is that this is not the case since establishment by a valid
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:11:00-00:11:56] [non-English speech, 31 s, detected zh 0.43] And therefore, the temperature rises and is expressed by the exponent. Isn’t it the case that phenomena are nonetheless posited by mind? And how does one identify being posited by mind within Chika Matra? [end unchecked]
cognizer
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:11:56-00:17:10] Being posited by mind within Chitta Matra is not identical with being established by a valid cognizer, since what is a mind is not necessarily pervaded by being valid cognizer. Not all minds are valid cognizer. Within Chitta Matra, it is only other-powered phenomena which can be said to arise in dependence on causes and conditions. So, being posited by mind is not referred within Chitamatra to being established by a valid cognizer, nor is it for that matter referred to being understood by an omniscient mind. omniscientumize, carbonize all phenomena, both composite and non-composite. Now, within this Atlantic pandemic system, when it is asserted that war phenomena occur at the intersection of being established from their own side and being posited by mind. What precisely is this mind by which phenomena are posited? Is this a mind which is present within the continuum of all sentient beings or not? There is a very beautiful dart here which I would like to present from the standpoint of the Svartade Tabadermika School. To begin, we should point out that true establishment is, from the standpoint of Certificia Mediamica, an object of negation. In other words, not being merely posited by mind, but dwelling within one’s uncommon mode of abiding, is, from the standpoint of Certificia Mediamica, an object of negation. [non-English speech, 22 s, detected ko 0.73] Then this very evident doubt Irwin has followed. There are deserted places throughout the world in which there is no human, no sentient being. In these deserted places, there are nonetheless things. There’s earth, there are trees, there are flowers, there are fruits. Now, are those things and so forth truly established in those deserted places? One could debate and say, [end unchecked]
One could debate and say, the trees, fruits, and flowers in deserted places, it follows that they are truly established because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions and are not posited by mind
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:17:46-00:20:23] When one debates on the object of negation, these are the special debates which arise. [non-English speech, 16 s, detected ja 0.41] Then, these are the difficult debates which one has to address when we debate the object of negation within Svetladeca La Dramica. Specifically, how does one identify the mind which posits phenomena? Is this mind present within the continuum of all living beings? If it is present within the continuum of all sentient beings, then the previous debate becomes effective. in a deserted area in which there is no second being, there are things. These things arise from causes and conditions. They have their own uncommon mode of abiding and do not depend on being posited by a mind. Therefore, they are truly established. Therefore, to establish what exists within certain determinants. [non-English speech, 2 s, detected id 0.58] And even if one is born, a personal tenant stance is not the Satanaika-Madyavika stance. When one studies and debates Satanaika-Madyavika, one of those responds from the standpoint of this school, and this position is a difficult one. [end unchecked]
. Then if this doubt arises within your mind, since this is the main doubt
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:20:43-00:21:29] Then, if this doubt arises within your mind, since this is in main doubt, in the context of the Great Seats regarding the Sotanika Madhyamika view, one can say your understanding of Sotanika Madhyamika is good. [non-English speech, 21 s, detected ja 0.62] [end unchecked]
this is the crucial difference between Cittamātra and Sautrāntika Mādhyamika. In Cittamātra, composite phenomena exist and are said to be truly established because they arise in dependence on causes and conditions. In Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, on the other hand, mere arising in dependence on causes and conditions is insufficient to warrant the existence of composite phenomena. In addition
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:22:08-00:27:24] is insufficient toward the existence of the composite phenomena. In addition, they must be posited by mind. And the question which arises is, by which mind? Then, from the standpoint of Svatantrika Madhyamika, in addition to the established independence on causes and conditions, composite phenomena must also be posited by mind. They arise at the confluence of these two. From the standpoint of Prasangika Madhyamika, on the other hand, phenomena are not established in the slightest from their own side. They are merely posited by mind. Therefore, the Satannika-Madyamika view is of tremendous benefit to understand the Prasannika view and leads incrementally to it. Irrespective of whether I explain the Santoteca Majority of you in detail or casually, the core is this one? Then on page 26 of your English translation, which is as you can get us into tenets, The Sotanika Madhyamika school is subdivided into two second paragraph, the Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika and the Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamika. The definition of the Sotanika Sotanika Madhyamika is a Madhyamika who proclaims a presentation of conventional phenomena, mainly in keeping with the Sotanika school. The definition of Yodhacharya Sotanika Madhyamika is… [unclear, 6 s] Instances or examples, if you wish, of these two schools for the Sartanika Madianika. The main propounders would be Bhava Viveka and Jnana Dharma. And for Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamika, the main propounders would be Shadarakita and Kamarashida. And since in the great seats, there are J and others, we studied the presentation of the 20 pre-theases on Abhisamayalamkara in the light of Haribadha’s presentation. We consider Haribhadra to be proud of Yogacara Svatantrika Madhyamika. Now, within the definition of Southlandica, Southlandica, Madhyamaka, it is said that Southlandica, Southlandica, Madhyamaka is a Madhyamaka who propounds a presentation of conventional phenomena, mainly in keeping with the Southlandica school. What is meant by propounding [end unchecked]
, What is meant by propounding mainly in keeping with the Sautrāntika?
This refers to propounding the existence of exterior objects
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:27:24-00:28:13] mainly in keeping with the Sautrantika school. This refers to propounding the existence of exterior objects. Then, regarding acceptance of exterior objects within the four schools of tenets, obviously the two lowest schools of tenets, Vibashika and Saltanica, accept the existence of exterior objects. and within the higher schools of tenets, Svartantrika Madhyamika accepts them also. [end unchecked]
. It does accept the existence of exterior objects
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:28:37-00:28:52] Then Prasanika Madianika does accept the existence of exterior objects, but does not accept the existence of exterior objects in the sense Vaivashika and Sautranika use for exterior objects. [end unchecked]
, this is understood within the description of the interior and the exterior. The exterior here refers to exterior forms, which include visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and if we look at the definition of Sautrāntika Mādhyamika on paragraph three of page 26, a Mādhyamika who propounds a presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in keeping with the
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:30:38-00:31:31] If we look at the definition of Sautrantika, Svatantrika, Madhyamika, on paragraph 3 of page 26, in Madernica, who propounds a presentation of conventional phenomena mainly in keeping with the South-Atlantica school, does this definition imply that South-Atlantica, South-Atlantica, Madernica accepts exterior objects in the same way as Vaibhashika and South-Atlantica does or not? I have not verified carefully in Jatagropodology’s antennas. But, certainly, it is such a guilty instance, later on it is said, Salkantika Svatandika Madhyamika accepts the existence of forms which are different from the consciousness of perceiving them and which are composed of indivisible qualities. If this is the case, then they accept the existence of exterior objects in accordance with Salkantika. [end unchecked]
Sautrāntika and which are composed of indivisible
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:31:53-00:33:28] And there is a passage in Jensetsuki Gelsen’s tenant system in which he says, consciousness receiving them and which are composed of indivisible qualities. Regarding this passage in Zizu-chukhi-giritsis, the tenet in which he says, Sautrantika Svatantrika Madhyamika asserts a [end unchecked]
particles. Form is separate from the consciousness perceiving it and that form is constituted of the conglomeration of subtle indivisible particles. There are scholars within these three seats who say that this position is not the same as that of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika since Sautrāntika Sautrāntika Mādhyamika asserts that form is composed of extraordinarily subtle particles
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:34:27-00:35:35] [non-English speech, 35 s, detected ko 0.44] Then, this done arises in particular regarding Bava Viveka, the formal Satyadika, Satyadika Madhyamika, and its formulation is as follows. Should Bava Viveka accept indivisible particles in keeping with the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika view, then Bava Viveka will have to accept indivisible particles. If he accepted indivisible partless particles, he would accept particles without parts, which is incompatible with non-true existence. [end unchecked]
.
With non true
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:35:57-00:36:54] [non-English speech, 3 s, detected ko 0.36] Then, in this context, these scholars consider that when South Africa, South Africa refers to individual particles, what is actually referred to [end unchecked]
existence. Of partless particles whose directions can be isolated. Instead, they say that for these, reason for which the
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:37:26-00:39:09] The first, the second, the third, the third instrument over the body. Then we will start here. If you have questions, please ask your questions. Concise questions. Don’t drag on. In short, please. So, we should ask yourself, do Vajrashika and Satranika accept partlessness? If they do, what is meant by partlessness? This is a way to think about it. Then, are there school defendants which accept the existence of progress? Yes, the Satranika and the Vibashika. What about Sautrantika, Svatantrika, Madhyamika? Does this school accept the existence of progress or not? [end unchecked]
particles If it does accept the existence of partlessness, then it becomes impossible to demonstrate non true existence on the basis of being constituted of parts. At this point, this is incompatible with the teachings of non true existence
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:39:52-00:43:23] Is the answer that I do not? Can you elaborate? Because shall I elaborate? No, they don’t. If they did, the debate would run, then they accept the opposite of liberation, since they accept a view which is compatible with that of Vaivashika and Sautantika, which those accept partlessness. I’ve been talking a little bit before, and I couldn’t really figure out the difference between the Sanskrit term Dhammata and Shamiyata. Shamiyata was [non-English speech, 3 s, detected ja 0.21] No, there is no difference between chunyata and darmata. emptiness and darkness. In Svatanika Madhyamika, there is no difference between Shunyata and Dhammata in all the schools which accept Shunyata. Just one school. That’s it. Thank you. It was seen to collapse them, given that the presentation, consistent with the child view, is that there is his own mind at the basis of the part of the rest of the Tatra, is that there is any use of the part. [end unchecked]
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:43:57-00:52:36] This is a question, is it? This is a question. The difference between these two schools is accepting or not accepting our projects. And, yeah, I think. Yeah, yeah, I think. Second. Yes. Thank you. And could Keshila talk a little about the difference between the exterior and interior objects? We discussed the exterior object. Can you hear some examples and some explanation of an interior object from that? Something else. An interior object. So the difference between outer and interior phenomena is hinges on whether they are subsumed, whether they continue or not. An example of interior phenomena, we don’t say objects, would be for instance aggregates, a form aggregate, a sensation aggregate, compositional factors, discrimination and consciousness. Yeah, Amy. Thank you. So Anna and I were discussing last week’s teaching earlier, and we concluded that the transcription was correct in that specialists said the subtle selflessness of persons, or the Sotrantic Imagining, is not an emptiness. This seems… It kind of makes sense with the text, didn’t it? Yeah, it kind of made sense in the text. But then it says that suchness is an ultimate truth. Now, if the subtle selflessness of persons is a conventional truth and not an emptiness… It doesn’t seem to make sense because they have said that suchness is not true. And of course it’s not true. [non-English speech, 3 s, detected de 0.33] So that is precisely the Svatantrika Madhyamika view. For Swatandaika Madhyamika, the surface of persons, in other words, persons being empty, of being a substantially distinct autonomous entity, is not an emptiness, it is not a suchness. It is not a non-affirmative negative. Then, if you wish for an example of emptiness or suchness, the emptiness, an example of emptiness, would be, for instance, known through establishment. Yeah, yeah. And also, have you got a question? Do you have a question? I’m not quite sure how that applies to that particular example. I understand what respect to space and the mirror or the stones and magicians. [unclear, 3 s] [non-English speech, 19 s, detected fr 0.63] [unclear, 2 s] As long as you understand the fundamental example, a metaphor, for the mode of existence within Prasangika Madhyamika, which is that of the magician’s illusion formulated on the basis of pebbles and sticks, you don’t need to understand the other examples. I gave them just in case you didn’t understand the fundamental example. [non-English speech, 15 s, detected zh 0.90] [end unchecked]
. So, at present, we will have a discussion as usual, and the two topics are, first, the mode of being posited by mind within Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and what this mind is.
And secondly, does Sautrāntika Mādhyamika accept
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:53:17-00:53:51] indivisible particles, partless particles or not. If it does, is this in keeping with Vaibachica and Sautrageta or not? And why do Vaibachica and Sautrageta accept the existence of indivisible particles? By pairs, different than last time. Repeat the second time. [end unchecked]
Alright. Well, I haven’t got a clue either. Did you bring me back? Never mind. Get it.
You Got back? Another page. I’ve got it. Okay. Is is Is she still recording?
I think she is. Okay. The mode of being posited by mind, let me just talk to you. What is meaning? The way, In the
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:56:43-00:57:02] Oh, the intersection. So there’s a characteristics of the thing. The mind, positivity. [end unchecked]
ex so in the exam, the twigs and the pebbles, they’re not actually posited as twigs and pebbles.
They’re posited as elephants or whatever. So let’s see. And let’s look at this. So the way that the mind imputes something. This is this is my concept.
I I know somehow now what chair is. You can tell the chair, the chair is a wall. There’s no confusion to me
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:58:33-00:58:56] So I learned what characteristics a chair has. And now I can know a chair. However, I didn’t know what it was. I can still sit on it. Like the baby can sit on it. [end unchecked]
. So when is a valid cognizer for the Sautrāntika Mādhyamika, would that mean that there is something that the thing from the side of the object and the thing posited by the mind marry up. They’re in harmony
[Unchecked machine transcript 00:59:32-01:01:29] So you get a valid cognizer of the inner body coming in the distance. Whereas if the things on the side of the object and the imputation don’t marry up, then you think you see the mirror in that, but actually it’s difficult. So you don’t have a valid cognizer. But then, actually, that’s sort of what I would think they could say. Yeah. But you’re still there. So what is the mind that it needs? Well, it’s got to be a consciousness. It has to be a consciousness. And all consciousnesses belong to some sentient beings. You don’t get consciousnesses that are not related to the sentient beings, do you? It seems to me it could be conceptual or non-conceptual. Because I think we’re told that… valid cognition of the sense of, like, the quiet senses and touch consciousness. Because, like, the valid cognition of touch and touch consciousness, that’s not conceptual. Later, if you then do conceptuality or over the chocolate or something. Like, when I touch something, there’s no conceptuality [end unchecked]
.
When I touch something there’s no conceptuality involved in me validly cognising that there is tactile contact there. There’s no conceptuality. Oh, immediately, I would inform ideas about what I’m touching. But the touch itself doesn’t require conceptuality to me.
[Unchecked machine transcript 01:02:07-01:06:14] Like the sound doesn’t require conceptuality. The sound can’t be known by conceptuality. How can sound be known by conceptuality? Are there valid cognisers that can be non-conceptual? But there’s no conception of me involved in listening to music. [unclear, 7 s] I’m trying to figure out the implications from the side of the mark, and now I’m going to add them with the ballot submission section. Thank you. On the one hand, they have their own . And they also have to cause it to buy a money because actually, those kids have to do this. And then, if they need example, they need to desert them first. So there’s no need to be as many of them to do this. Then if someone went there, it’s just something to do with these. [unclear, 3 s] Oh, okay. All right, so that’s not the same thing. Right, I thought it was the same thing. Thank you. I don’t know. I haven’t really thought of that. I don’t know. I have the list. It’s actually an active imagination. That concept. Their presence are always nice. We can’t. We can’t know anything weird. [end unchecked]
Key terms in this teaching
- Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
- The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
- Madhyamaka u ma (Tib)
- The Middle Way school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Middle Way school does not assert true establishment even conventionally. There are two divisions of the Middle Way school: 1) Autonomists and 2) Consequentialists. LYWA
- object of negation gag cha (Tib)
- An object to be refuted or eliminated. There are different objects of negation in different contexts, but when meditating on emptiness according to Prasangika (the Middle Way Consequence school), the object of negation is inherent existence. LYWA
- Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
- The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA
- Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
- The Sutra Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Sautrantika (Sutra school). LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
- Vaibhashika jedrag mawa (Tib)
- The Great Exposition school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Great Exposition school asserts truly established external objects but does not assert self-knowers. LYWA
- Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika
- The Yogic Middle Way Autonomy school, a division of the Svatantrika (Autonomy school) of Buddhist philosophy. The proponent asserts a presentation of conventionalities through mostly conforming with the Cittamatra (Mind Only school). LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.