Awareness and Knowledge

1 h 8 min · 3,062 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge (Khensur Rinpoche)
Awareness and Knowledge
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Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.

About this talk. In this 68-minute teaching, Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen explores the Buddhist philosophical analysis of mind and awareness, moving systematically through the sevenfold classification that encompasses both valid and invalid cognitions. After reviewing direct and inferential valid cognitions, he focuses on the remaining divisions: subsequent cognizers, conviction, inattentive minds, doubt, and wrong views. The talk examines doubt in detail—defining it as a mental factor that wavers between two possibilities—and distinguishes three types: factually concordant doubt, equal doubt, and factually discordant doubt. Geshe-la then turns to wrong views, the most fundamental misapprehension, illustrating sensory and conceptual errors with vivid examples: the eye mistaking a stationary roadside for motion while in a moving car, or the classical Buddhist logic example of wrongly conceiving a rabbit’s horn. He addresses a philosophical puzzle: whether color appearing in dreams counts as form or matter, and resolves this through different Buddhist philosophical schools. The teaching concludes by situating doubt and wrong views within broader frameworks of mind—conceptual versus non-conceptual, reflexive cognizers, and the relationship between main minds and mental factors. Intended for students already familiar with Buddhist epistemology and the Lorig framework.

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File: Line in 0242 – KR.mp3

UUID: 3fd33fbb-3f2b-40b8-8e6b-c3e7f594ae01

Teacher: Geshe Jampa Gyaltsen

Collection: Awareness and Knowledge

Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide

Words: ~3,058

So Geshe-la would like to ask us to meditate for a couple of minutes on generating a motivation, which wishes to be free of suffering and to attain happiness, and this not merely for ourselves, but which wishes that all sentient beings be free of suffering and attain happiness, a state of unalloyed happiness, a state of full enlightenment. And within the broad presentation we have covered the two subdivisions of mind, MIND into MIND which are valid cognizers and MIND which are not valid cognizers. And within MIND which are not valid cognizers, we have presented a fivefold subdivision into subsequent cognizers, convictions, inattentive minds, doubts, wrong views. Of these, the three first have basically been covered. Regarding inattentive minds or minds to which phenomena appeared but but which do not ascertain them, examples of these would be for instance, a mind which concentrates on something which is being heard and therefore does not notice what it sees or conversely a mind which concentrates on something which it is seeing and therefore does not hear a sound which is nonetheless present.

And then, we should try to focus on the broad divisions of minds more than on the details. So the broad divisions are not only the divisions into minds which are valid cognizers and those which are not valid cognizers, but also between conceptual and non conceptual minds. Likewise, between minds which are reflexive cognizers and minds which are not reflexive cognizers. However, here at present, Geshe-la would like to cover the final part of the fivefold division of minds which are not valid cognizers, and address minds which are doubtful minds or doubt. Doubt is a state of mind which hesitates between two possibilities.

For instance, the doubt whether a human being is permanent or impermanent within the continuum of another being. Now this doubt is not the mind, it is that state of mind which is uncertain about whether a human being which is being considered is permanent or impermanent. And then, doubt is specifically a mental factor from within the twofold division of minds into main minds and mental factors. As a mental factor, it can accompany a main mind in the same way as the fingers, for instance, surround the palm of the hand. And it is a mental factor which oscillates or hesitates with regard to its object of ascertainment.

And as mental factor, it colors the other minds which surround it. In the same way as other mental factors such as for instance wisdom or Samādhi will color or will influence the main minds which they are the mental factors of. For instance, when wisdom increases within the mental continuum, then all of the other minds are, as it were, influenced by wisdom. Likewise, when Samādhi or concentration increases within the mind stream, all of the other minds are influenced by this and become more powerful. So the mind or the mental factor of doubt, which is present, is always accompanied by feeling and several other mental factors.

Doubt in turn is divided into three. Factually concordant doubt, equal doubt, and factually discordant doubt. We are on page 32 of your English text. Factually concordant doubt would be for instance that state of mind which reflecting on sounds being impermanent thinks, yes, probably sound is impermanent. Since sound is an impermanent phenomenon, such a doubt is said to be a factually concordant doubt because it is in keeping with reality.

And an equal doubt would be a doubt which wonders equally whether sound is impermanent or permanent, and simply cannot decide at all between the two. What a factually discordant doubt is a doubt which thinks, well, most probably sound is permanent. And since sound is impermanent, then this is a doubt which errs, Geshe-la says, on the side of wrong views. And we will now pass to the presentation of wrong views, which is on a little bit further in the English text. Wrong views are those states of mind which see that which is not as existing or that which is as not existing.

It is the final of the five fold subdivision of minds which are not valid awarenesses. And to the difference of doubt, all of the minds which are associated with wrong views become or with the mental factor of wrong views become in and of that fact alone, wrong views themselves. This is not the case for doubt for instance. When the mental factor of doubt was present, while it did influence indeed the other mental factors which are present in the mind, they did not become doubt thereby. They were merely influenced by the mental factor of doubt.

In the case of wrong views, such as the wrong view apprehending sound as permanent when in fact it is impermanent, all of the mental factors associated with wrong views become themselves wrong views. Such as for instance, the five omnipresent factors, feeling discrimination, intention, mental engagement, and contact. On page 36 of Mind in Tibetan Buddhism. Generally, mistaken consciousnesses or wrong views are divided into conceptual and non conceptual wrong views. Non conceptual wrong views in turn are divided into sensory and mental wrong views.

So an example of sensory wrong views would be for instance, the eye consciousness which sees the roadside as moving when one is driving along in a car, whereas in fact it’s a car which is moving with respect to the roadside. Or for that matter, Geshe-la says most probably the eye consciousness which sees one’s face in a mirror is a mistaken eye consciousness and a wrong view because one’s face is naturally not in the mirror. And with respect to conceptual wrong views, The one of the examples would be that conception which apprehend sound as permanent, but the traditional example given in texts on Buddhist logic, in Pramāna texts, is that conception conceiving of the horn of a rabbit. And this arises from the fact that rabbits have long ears, and from a distance one might be led to think that those two long ears on a rabbit or a hare are actually one horn. Hence the example.

Now a great Tibetan scholar, Changkya Rolpai Dorje, in the eighteenth century, was asked point blank by another great scholar who had nothing better to do with his time. Why it was said that the horn of a rabbit did not exist since it was in Tibet a creature which was a rabbit, which had one single horn on its crown. To which Jangkya Rolpai Dorje responded, this is not a rabbit or a hare. This is a particular variety of the lynx in Tibet. And then a doubt arises in our text regarding the dream consciousness perceiving the color blue.

In a dream, it is quite possible for the color blue to appear very clearly to a dream consciousness. And to the dreamer, this color blue which appears in the dream state is indeed the color blue. Now if it were indeed the color blue, it would have to be form, and in as much as the Sautrāntika School considers that form and matter are synonymous, it would have to be matter also, which means it would have to be constituted of atoms, which most obviously the color blue appearing to the dream consciousness apprehending the color blue is not. However, from the standpoint of the Cittamātra and the Prāsaṇgika schools, in as much as for these schools form and matter are not synonymous, then it is possible to assert that the colour blue appearing to a dream consciousness apprehending the colour blue is form, even though it is not matter. Is, Geshe-la feels, a much more congenial position.

As a result of the equation of form and matter for the Sautrāntika school, the dream consciousness apprehending the color blue as blue for the Sautrāntika school is necessarily a wrong consciousness, since it apprehends a factor of appearance to a dream consciousness as matter, which most obviously it is not. And generally speaking, it is not possible to have matter without having the eight constituents of matter, which are the four elements, earth, water, fire and air, and four of the five sense objects, which are form, smell, taste and objects of bodily sensation, or tactile objects. Sound is not included. So if these eight are not present, one cannot say that matter is present. Therefore Geshe-la feels that it is not possible to consider the color blue appearing to the eye consciousness apprehending blue in the dream state as an instance of matter.

It is however possible to apprehend it as an instance of form. This is what leads one to the conclusion that all indeed form does exist at the level of full enlightenment. At that level matter does not exist. Matter does not exist because if it were to exist, then the four elements which are the product of contaminated karma would exist, which would be inappropriate. So we have completed the presentation of the sevenfold explanation of minds and awarenesses, which is a very body of Lorik.

And this sevenfold explanation, this sevenfold subdivision of minds and awarenesses, is a division into valid cognizers, which are direct perceivers, inferential valid cognizers, in other words, two first subdivisions of valid cognizers, followed by subsequent cognizers, conviction, inattentive minds, doubt, and wrong views. And they are presented in this sequence because while it is indeed true that for us, the most beneficial state of mind is the second state of mind, which is inferential valid cognizers. Nonetheless, the first state of mind, is direct valid cognizers, is that state of mind which characterizes full enlightenment. Therefore, this is what is presented first. Then, inferential valid cognizers are presented.

And immediately after them, subsequent cognizers are presented, since these three form one whole, subsequent cognizers arise after inferential or direct valid cognizers. And after this, minds are presented in terms of their benefit. Conviction comes after, then inattentive minds are still presented because they are not wrong views, then doubts, and finally, views. So the broadest and most extensive presentation of mind and awarenesses is the seven fold presentation, which includes all of the main minds which are to be studied. Alternatively, there is a succinct two fold presentation which we have covered, dividing minds into minds which are valid cognizers and minds which are not valid cognizers.

And there is a final three fold division of mind and awarenesses into the explanation of those conceptual minds which apprehend by means of an apprehended object which is a meaning generality. And the explanation of those non mistaken, non conceptual minds whose apprehended object is a specifically characterized phenomenon, which refers to an impermanent phenomenon, or a thing literally. And finally, the explanation of those mistaken non conceptual minds which apprehend as object of apprehension a clearly appearing non existent. And then, regarding the definition of a conceptual mind. A conceptual mind is defined as a conceiver which apprehends through being able to mix a sound and meaning generality.

What this means here is that conceptual minds apprehend phenomena by the intermediary either of a sound generality or a meaning generality, or through mixing the two of them together. Specifically, a conceptual mind which has had the experience of vase previously, and which hears the term vase again, will experience the arising of the meaning generality of vase, in dependence on this sound generality. And as such, this conceptual mind is said to apprehend vase through the mixing of a meaning and a sound generality. On the other hand, in the continuum of a being, who has actually never seen a vase in his life, and who only knows the term vase, the name vase. When one says the term vase, something appears to the mind which does not actually correspond to a vase since he has no experience to it.

But this something which appears to the mind is said to be the sound generality of vase. And on this basis, the conceptual mind apprehending vase within the continuum of that person, apprehends whatever it can of vase. Likewise, in the continuum of a being who actually has experienced a vase, has seen a vase, but does not know the name of a vase, does not know that this object is called a vase. When he recollects what he or she has experienced, what dawns to the mind is a conceiver which apprehends vase through the mere meaning generality of vase without relying on the sound generality. And then, conceptions are therefore divided into three broad categories.

Conceptions which rely only on sound generalities, conceptions which apprehend only through a meaning generality, and conceptions which apprehend through both a sound and a meaning generality. There is an alternate definition of one alternate division of conceptions into conceptions which affix names and conceptions which affix meaning. An instance of the first would be for instance, a conception which apprehends phenomena as being momentary. Since momentariness is actually the very meaning of impermanence, then that conception which apprehends phenomena as momentary can be said to be a conception which understands through affixing a name. Impermanent momentariness is the actual definition of impermanence.

On the other hand, the conception which apprehends someone who is holding club as the club holder is a conception which apprehends that me that being through meaning, since being a club holder is actually the meaning of the term club holder. Club holder is defined or is explained as one who is actually holding a club. Likewise, as you remember, direct perceivers are defined as non conceptual, non mistaken minds, or can be defined as non conceptual, non mistaken minds. The non mistaken here refers specifically to the fact that these minds perceive their their perceived object without relying on a meaning generality. Therefore, they are said to be non mistaken.

Then as you remember, direct perceivers can be divided into four broad categories. Sense direct perceivers, reflexive direct perceivers, mental direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers. So this completes the presentation of the two fold subdivision of minds into conceptual and non conceptual minds. And moving onwards a bit, we are jumping quite a few sections. There is another division of minds into minds which are reflexive cognizers, and minds which are not reflexive cognizers.

You remember from the beginning of the presentation of Lorig, that reflexive cognizers are those minds which cognize a component of themselves. All minds which are not reflexive cognizers, in other words, all other minds, are simply minds which fall in the category of non reflexive cognizers. And we have now reached the division on which Geshe-la would like to insist a little bit, which is a division of minds into main minds and mental factors. This is an inclusive division, all minds fall into the category either of main minds or mental factors. Main minds are like the principal mind, like the palm of the hand, and mental factors are those mental components which are associated with a main mind.

So we are on page 39 of your English translation. And the definition of a main mind is a consciousness which is principally posited in dependence through apprehending the nature of its object. So the distinction between a main mind and mental factors is that in the initial process of apprehension of a phenomenon, the main mind apprehending for instance the cover on Geshe-la’s table, apprehends the actual nature of this object, of this cover. And then it is only after the nature, the core of the cover is apprehended, that the principal activity of the mind is transferred to the mental factors whose function then is to apprehend other elements of the object, in this case, the cover. And there are four terms for main minds, which are synonymous and I’ll give them all in Tibetan and in English because when it comes to terms of Buddhist psychology, we often don’t have exact equivalents in English.

These are: Gyushi is main mind, Sem is mind, Yi is sometimes translated in English as awareness, and Namshé is consciousness. These all are synonymous, in other words, their meaning is the same even though the terminological qualification is different. And the terms used are different because they emphasize different aspects of the same reality. Main minds are known as main minds principally because they are contrasted with the mental factors which are secondary and subsidiary, and which accompany them. They are also known as mind, contrasting them with the numerous mental factors.

We have one single main mind as opposed to a large number of associated mental factors. The term Yi, which is sometimes translated as consciousness in English, refers to the fact that the mind actually cognizes the object from its own side, from its own or with its own power. Or the term consciousness here indicates that the mind cognizes the object in a variety of different ways. And then dividing these in terms of nature, one has a six fold division of consciousness into the five consciousnesses and the mental consciousness, or to put things briefly, between sense consciousnesses in general and mental consciousness, a twofold subdivision. Moreover, the set of consciousnesses on the one side and mental consciousnesses on the other side are two sets which intersect but neither includes the other.

This is the Tibetan concept of mu. I will translate this in terms of set theory in English. Mu means possibilities. So the text literally reads, consciousness and mental consciousness have four possibilities. There is something which is a mental which is a consciousness and which is not a mental consciousness.

This is the visual consciousness. There is something which is a mental consciousness and is not a consciousness. This is feelings which accompany a mental consciousness. There is something which is both, in other words, the intersection of the two sets, which is mental consciousness itself. And there is something which is neither.

In other words, the phenomena which belong to neither of the two sets and those are the feelings which accompany visual consciousness. Therefore, these sets in Tibetan are said to have four possibilities. Something which is both one and not the other, the other and not the one and neither.

Key terms in this teaching

Cittamatra sem tsam pa (Tib)
The Mind Only school, one of the two Mahayana (Great Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Mind Only school does not accept external objects but does assert truly established self-knowers. LYWA
lorig
Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
mental factors chaita (Skt); sem jung (Tib)
Literally arising from the mind, a mental factor is a cognition that apprehends an attribute of its object and accompanies any principal consciousness that is concordant with it. LYWA
principal consciousness vijnana (Skt); nam shë (Tib)
The main cognition posited by means of apprehending the entity of its object. Synonymous with main mind, it is one of the two divisions of mind, the other being mental factors. LYWA
Sautrantika do de pa (Tib)
The Sutra school, one of the two main Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) philosophical schools. The Sutra school accepts both self-knowers and external objects. LYWA

Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.

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