2 h 11 min · 3,960 words · Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Audio recorded at Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide. Transcript auto-generated and AI-corrected; may contain errors.
About this talk. In this 131-minute teaching on Tibetan Buddhist epistemology, instructor Ilia S. Durovic examines the foundational divisions of valid cognition from Pubuchok’s commentary on Lorig. He begins by establishing why understanding mind is central to all Buddhist practice, then methodically walks through opponent objections to the system’s core claim: that valid cognition divides into two types—that which ascertains by its own power, and that which depends on another. He presents concrete examples: a perceiver seeing fire from a distance but unsure whether it is actually fire, a child recognizing their father’s form, a being encountering an Utpala flower for the first time. The teaching covers five subdivisions of self-ascertaining cognition, three subdivisions of other-dependent cognition, and explores how conceptual mind can act as a valid cognizer only when grounded in prior direct perception. A Q&A session follows, addressing the relationship between valid cognition and inference, the role of testimony, and the Buddha’s omniscient mind. Pitched at serious practitioners familiar with Buddhist philosophical terminology.
File metadata (for organising)
File: Line in 0236.mp3
UUID: 51ba9b80-8853-4ef0-b8a0-9a6aa380a929
Teacher: Ilia S. Durovic
Collection: Awareness and Knowledge
Recorded at: Tibetan Buddhist Institute, Adelaide
Words: ~3,959
So as usual, we will generate, the motivation to listen to these teachings on Lorig, on mind and awareness. And these the motivation should be to reflect on the fact that the very foundation of the understanding of the triple gem of the four noble truths and of almost all the key elements of the Buddha’s teachings is an understanding of how mind functions. And with this as a motivation, the motivation of attaining full enlightenment for the benefit of all, we should listen to these teachings on the mind. So, as you remember last time, Geshe la had explained the two subdivisions of or valid cognition, which is valid cognition which ascertains by itself, a valid cognition which ascertains through another. Generally speaking, in the broader presentation of mind, the mind is divided into valid cognition and nonvalid cognition.
And the valid cognition itself has numerous divisions, including a division into direct perception and inferential cognition. What is presented last time was the alternate division of valid cognition. And the root text which defines valid cognition is, the Pramāna Vartika. And the presentation of valid cognition, in terms of a division into valid cognition which ascertains by itself and valid cognition which ascertains through another is done to respond to a doubt which is expressed by an opponent to, Dharmakīrti in Pramāna Vartika, who says there is no rationale or there is no reason for your presentation of valid cognition. And the rationale or the reason for the presentation of valid cognition, its divisions, is that valid cognition itself does not necessarily ascertain by its own power, its object precisely because there is such a thing as valid cognition which ascertains through the power of another.
Now the source for all of the material we are studying here is to be found broadly speaking in Dharmakīrti’s Pramānavārttika and Asaṇga’s, Abhidharma Samuchaya. And as you remember last time, a quote from the, ornament, of cognition on page 22 bottom of page 22 of your English translation was, given, which defined, valid cognition which ascertains by itself or what your text called self ascertained valid cognition. And Geshe la says, as you remember last time, when the meaning was clarified, it was pointed out that valid cognition which ascertains by itself is a valid cognition with which there is no associated doubt. This doubt is not part of valid cognition, but an associated doubt with respect to its object of cognition. Whereas valid cognition, which ascertains through the power of another, has an associated doubt with respect to its object of cognition.
So these two were explained. And at present, we have reached the point in, Pubuchok’s presentation of Lorig where opponents who disagree with the key points of our system throw their debates, at Pubuchok. And, the reason for the presentation of these alternate views is first that they clarify our own position. And in addition, they make explicit those positions which we cannot accept. So moving on with the debates at the bottom of page 22, one asserts this is an opponent who does not accept our system.
Both valid cognition, which ascertains by itself and valid cognition which ascertains by another have both respectively direct perception and inferential valid cognition. Now this position is not acceptable because although a valid cognition which ascertains by itself does have both of these, in other words, has both direct perception and inferential valid cognition. Valid perception or valid cognition which ascertains through the power of another is necessarily a direct or valid cognizer. And moving onwards with the root text of Lorig, the text says, moreover, this is on page 23 of your English translation. Moreover indicates that, there is a second doubt which is, brought up.
Moreover, this is unsuitable because, direct valid cognition, has both of these. However, if something is an inferential cognizer, it is necessarily a valid cognition which ascertains by itself. And then reading directly from your English text, the following debate. Again, one asserts, this is another opponent. Sense perception holding a distant bright red color.
While conception doubts whether it is the color of fire when the object, it is the color of fire, is other ascertained awareness. Now opposition, Pubuchok says this is unacceptable. Why? Because there is no conception doubting whether something is the color of fire when that object is the color of fire. So Geshe la says here, the debate is slightly different from the previous ones because what is being, asserted as a rejoinder is that there is no conception which doubts that that fire which it perceives is fire.
That follows. Why? Because there is no conception doubting whether something is a color of fire or not. Because if something is the color of fire, conception would be comprehended to be the color of fire. And then in the middle of page 23 of our text, positing our system, this is a course
Which is accepted by the author of the Lorig text. If what we have called direct valid cognition which ascertains by itself is divided, then there is a fivefold subdivision. The first is valid sense perception ascertaining function. The instance given a sense perception holding a fire to function to burn dry wood. It shows us for instance, when you see fire burning wood, you understand that the function of fire is to burn wood.
Likewise, the second example is valid sense perception which is familiar with its object of apprehension. For instance, sense perception holding the form of the father in the continuum of the son. This is a case because a son through habituation, through familiarity, becomes aware of the fact that he descends from his father. And the other, three forms of valid cognition are those which have already been explained. So valid self perception, which we have called, valid reflexive cognition, valid yogic perception, and valid inference.
And then the examples of these five subdivisions are given in the following passage. They’re listed after each one of the English text, but separately in Tibetan. The first, an instance of the first, is that sense direct cognition which, apprehends the capacity to perform the function of burning dry wood in fire. The second is the sense direct perception, which apprehends the understanding of the form or the body of the father within the continuum of the child. The third is that direct reflexive cognition which experiences an eye consciousness.
The fourth is that omniscient mind which becomes a wisdom consciousness cognizing another’s mind. And the fifth is that inferential cognition which realizes that sound is impermanent. Regarding the fourth example, Geshe-la says that generally speaking, while all of the Buddha’s consciousnesses are omniscient, and for instance, his eye consciousness is an omniscient mind. Nonetheless, his eye consciousness would not be a yogic direct, valid perceiver, but would be a sense direct valid perceiver. And then moving onwards, we are in the bottom part of page 23.
If one divides valid cognition which ascertains through another, in terms of formulation, there is a threefold division into initial direct perception, undirected direct perception, and direct perception which has causes of error. The examples are given forthwith. The first example is one which Geshe la has already given to you in the past and it is a, sense, cognition which apprehends the color of an Utpala flower within the continuum of a being who has never actually seen an Utpala flower before. So this, Geshe-la says, would refer to a being, in whose who has never experienced seeing an Utpala flower before, who sees an Utpala flower for the first, time, and who is certain that this is a flower. That is sure.
Now within the continuum of that being, if the doubt arises, is this an Utpala flower or not? Then such a mind would be a valid cognition which ascertains through, another. On the other hand, if that being remain satisfied with his initial assessment that this is a flower and there is no doubt whether this is an Utpala flower or not, then it is a valid, cognition which ascertains by its own power since it has ascertained that this flower is a flower. An instance of the second, which is undirected or unfocused direct perception would be the sense perception which apprehends sound within the continuum of a being who is possessed by powerful desire for a beautiful visible form. Geshe la says, as a matter of fact, this example clearly illustrates that the threefold division of, valid cognition which ascertains through the power of another is one in terms of formulation because this second example obviously is not a valid cognition.
It is not a valid cognition since it is an inattentive mind. A mind which apprehends sound in the continuum of a being whose power, if powerfully attracted to a beautiful form, is a mind which actually or to which actually sound appears, but which does not engage sound. So it cannot be said to be a valid cognition with respect to that sound. And the third example given on the paragraph from the bottom, second paragraph from the bottom of page 23 is the example of direct perceptions which have the cause of error within themselves and which are terminologically called valid cognitions which ascertain through the power of others. The example given here is a sense perception which apprehends the color of a mirage giving thereby rise directly to the imputation on the basis of the mirage of the apprehension of water.
Geshe-la is not terribly sure whether there are mirages in Australia or not, but he thinks probably there are with the heat you have. A mirage is the appearance of something akin to water in the distance. And, if we analyze the mental processes involved in the apprehension of a mirage, probably Geshe-la says the first instant of the eye consciousness apprehending a mirage is a valid direct cognizer since it is apprehending correctly the color of this mirage. Then obviously, such a mind does not understand by its own power that a mirage is a mirage. It can only understand that a mirage is a mirage through the power of another valid cognizer.
So it therefore apprehends this mirage wrongly as water. Then what the nature of this mind apprehending the mirage wrongly as water is is open to some debate. Some might say it is an inattentive mind, a mind to which phenomena appear but are not engaged or ascertained. Geshe la from his side feels it’s a conceptual wrong consciousness since it’s conceptually wrongly imputes. This is a mirage, this is water on a basis which is not appropriate for such an imputation.
And then we have, an alternate, or another, terminological, division of, valid cognition which ascertains through another. These divisions, obviously, are divisions which are purely terminological. It doesn’t mean that everything which is included within these divisions is a valid cognition which ascertains through the power of another. So at the bottom of page 23 of your text, So then the first subdivision is valid cognition which is ascertained by itself regarding appearance, but ascertained by another regarding the truth of the phenomenon. Example given is sense perception holding a distant bright red color, in doubt as to whether it is the color of fire when the object is the color of fire.
And the second example which is given is valid cognition which is ascertained with respect to itself regarding the general or the generality of the phenomenon, but which is ascertained by another regarding its specific features. For instance, sense perception holding wood with branches, leaves, and flowers. in doubt whether it’s an Aloe tree when the object is an Aloe tree. So this would be a mind apprehending a specific tree which actually understands that this object apprehended is a tree in general, that it has branches, leaves, flowers, and roots, but which is actually unable to define the specie of the tree or the category of the tree in this specific case, an Aloe tree.
And the example which is given is explained somewhat further by Geshe la by saying that the first category considered here, which is valid awareness, which ascertains by itself regarding the appearance, but ascertains to another regarding the truth would be, for instance, that valid awareness which sees the color of a flame in the distance and has two components. There is one component which actually ascertains that the color of this flame in the distance is red. This is ascertained by a valid cognition which ascertains by itself. It does need not need any additional information for this. However, the valid cognition which is perceiving this flame in the distance is not able to determine whether or not it is a flame.
So with respect to whether or not it is a flame, then it ceases to be a valid cognition which ascertains by itself and becomes a valid cognition which ascertains by another since it depends on another valid cognition to realize that this object is an actuality of flame. And the second example, Geshe la says, is an excellent example of, in general, a valid cognition which ascertains through the power of another. Obviously, it is a valid cognition which is, which ascertains to its own power regarding the general state of the phenomenon considered, but which ascertains to another regarding its specific state. And this would be, for instance, the Aloe tree, what I think in English is an Aloe tree according to your translation. It’s a specific type of long lived tree which can be seen from a distance.
Now, for the perceiver of an Aloe tree, who knows that this is a tree, but it is is not sure whether or not it is an Aloe tree. The, valid cognition which apprehends it as a tree understanding that it has branches, leaves, fruits, and so forth is a valid cognition which which ascertains through its own power or by itself. Or the valid cognition which apprehends it as an Aloe tree is a valid cognition which can only apprehend it through the power of another. And the third example, which is at the top of page 24 of your English translation, is an example for a valid cognition which is a valid cognition through the power of another with respect to the appearance of the object. And the example given for this would be, for instance, the sense perception which apprehends the color blue and recollects doubt about whether or not the color blue has actually been seen.
Now this would happen, for instance, in the case where with an inattentive mind, we actually observe the color blue and then later on wonder whether or not we actually did see the color blue. And moving onwards in our text, second paragraph of page 24. These are distinguished either as actual or nominal, in other words, as, being valid cognitions which ascertain through the power of another in actuality or mere nominally imputed mere valid cognitions which ascertain through the power of another by name without being such an actuality. Because the first two subdivisions are actual. The, latter is nominal.
The latter, in other words, is not a real, valid cognition. And then in brief, our text reads. This is the third paragraph of page 24. Whatever is a valid cognition which ascertains through another is not necessarily, excuse me, is necessarily a valid cognition. However, if something is a valid cognition which ascertains through the power of another with respect to a given phenomenon, it is not necessarily a valid cognition with respect to that phenomenon.
This is a case because if something is a valid cognition with respect to a phenomenon, it is necessarily a valid cognition which ascertains by the power of itself, by its own power with respect to that phenomenon. And then we have yet another formulaic or nominal division. If one divides valid cognition in terms of formulation, one has a threefold division into beings who are Pramanas or who are valid cognizers, speech which is a valid cognizer, and consciousnesses which are valid cognizers. An instance of the first would be our teacher, the Buddha Śākyamūni, for instance of the second would be the turning of the wheel of the law of the four noble truths. An instance of the third would be, for instance, direct or inferential, valid cognition.
So generally speaking, Geshe la says, this is a a terminological division because the, first and second subdivisions, beings which are valid cognizers, speech which are valid cognizers are called valid cognizers, but obviously are not valid cognizers in actuality. They are derivative valid cognizers because they are said to be valid cognizers dependent on the fact that they manifest the activities of minds which are valid cognizers. And these minds which are valid cognizers, direct or inferential valid cognition, are in actuality valid cognizers. So we will, stop here for today, and we have, as usual, a five minute tea break and then half an hour discussion, and then Geshe-la will return after half an hour and answer our questions.
We got some very bright questions from the ladies in the back. Uh-huh. Inferential Valid Cognition. Yes. Several questions.
So regarding the, first question you have, which is a relationship between a valid cognizer which ascertains to the power of another and an inferential valid cognition. Geshe-la says he will present his own understanding of the matter. This is not something which actually is found in the text. It’s not covered in the material. His personal understanding is as follows.
If we were to take the example of the flickering orange color in the distance, a perceiver of that flickering orange color in the distance is not able to ascertain whether or not this is a fire by himself. He has to rely on the testimony of another, specifically on the valid cognizer of another person to know that this is a fire. So as he walks on the road towards this object with which he has a doubt whether or not it is a fire, were he to encounter someone who has had direct valid cognition of it as a fire, and were that person to tell him this is a fire, his doubts with respect to that object would be lifted. Now the mind which apprehends at that moment, the conceptual mind which apprehends at that moment, the distant, flickering orange light in the distance as a fire, Geshe la thinks would not be an inferential valid cognizer because it is actually conceptual mind which arises in dependence on another valid direct cognizer. So he thinks it would probably be a subsequent conceptual cognizer.
However, we have to posit an inferential valid cognizer with respect to this object. And the inferential valid cognizer with respect to the object would be the inferential valid cognizer which is aware of its color red. Now that would qualify as an inferential valid cognizer. Regarding your second question, which is the, conditions which lead to the arrival of an inferential valid cognition such as a valid cognizer which ascertains through another and so forth. Geshe la says if we were to take the example of the syllogism, the subject sound, it follows that it is impermanent because it is a composite phenomenon.
Then the inferential cognition which realizes that or the inferential valid cognizer which realizes that the subject sound is impermanent, in other words, that the subject is the predicate, actually arises proximately in dependence on two causes which are called the minds which ascertain the reasons. These are respectively in this specific example, the mind which ascertains that the subject sound is the reason of the syllogism which is composite, in other words, that the subject sound is composite. And the second mind which ascertains that everything which is composite, in other words, everything which is a reason is necessarily impermanent. In other words, it’s necessarily the predicate. It is in dependence on these two minds as proximate causes that the inferential valid cognition, the subject sound is impermanent arises.
And then, obviously, there is a chain of other valid cognitions which precedes these, which ultimately lead to a direct valid cognizer. Are there other questions? Yes.
So Geshe la says the no, actually. The valid cognitions which ascertain through another ascertain through another sentient being who generally speaking, he says, perhaps in the majority of cases would actually, provide conceptual formulation for something which would then act as the motor for ascertainment within the mind of the person who has doubts or reservations with regards to one aspect of the phenomenon perceived. It would not be the case that another mind within the continuum of that person could be the other which actually is the source, for such ascertainment. Are there other questions? So Geshe la says the, title of these texts, actually is opening the gateways of logic and analysis.
One opens the gateways of logic and analysis and one then endeavors to understand the mind which is that which performs analysis. The reason for this is because even though our goals are liberation and, the state of enlightenment which is a state of omniscience. Nonetheless, to get there, we need to use the mind and to use the mind, we need to understand the varieties of mind. Now, all the different varieties of mind, the one category of mind we must rely upon to attain both liberation and full enlightenment is valid cognition of Pramāna. This is the foremost of mind, so we have to understand what it is.
Are there any other questions? Most of the Buddhist schools of philosophy accept true existence. Accept true existence, accept true existence, and the accept true existence. So, Geshe la, I would like to point out that the divisions we have been covering such as the divisions of valid cognition into valid cognition which ascertains by itself and through another, are subsidiary divisions which are presented in the light of debates which are addressed to the Buddhist logicians of the period. And that the fundamental division of valid cognition is a division between direct valid cognition and inferential valid cognition.
This is a core division. No. The truth of cessation of the continuum of an ārya being is not a Pramāna. It doesn’t fall within the etymological or the terminological division of Pramanas into beings which are valid cognizers, speech which is a valid cognizer, and minds which are valid cognizers. So the truth of cessation is a permanent phenomenon.
It’s not an impermanent phenomenon. It is a permanent phenomenon because what it represents is the actual cessation or the absence of all of the afflictions in the mind of an ārya being. And if we wanted to understand the truth of cessation, precisely, we could say that it is the emptiness of the mind of an ārya being which has attained liberation. The emptiness of that mind is a truth of cessation. That emptiness is a permanent phenomenon.
So it cannot be a Pramāna which is a mind. So this explanation, Geshe-la says, is much more in keeping with Prāsaṇgika, is the ultimate view. You have a question? So Geshe-la says this was his main job at CJRJ. This is all he did.
And although it is not easy, he feels that some of the most difficult points and the most important points are in logic. And oddly enough, he says the deeper you go into things, the greater the dangers. Okay.
Key terms in this teaching
- four noble truths denpa zhi (Tib)
- The subject of the Buddha's first turning of the wheel of Dharma. The truths of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path to the cessation of suffering as seen by an arya. LYWA
- lorig
- Awareness and knowledge, the study of mind and mental factors, in order to understand and control the delusions. LYWA
- sentient being sem chen (Tib)
- Any being who has not abandoned the two obscurations. LYWA
- Three Jewels triratna (Skt); kon chog sum (Tib)
- Also called the Triple Gem or the Three Rare Sublime Ones. The objects of Buddhist refuge: Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. Lama Zopa Rinpoche prefers “Three Rare Sublime Ones” as a more direct translation of kon chog sum. LYWA
- true existence den par yö pa (Tib)
- The concrete, real existence from its own side that everything appears to possess; in fact, both self and phenomena are empty of true existence. LYWA
- valid awareness pramana (Skt); tshema (Tib)
- A new non-deceptive cognition. There are two types: valid perception, such as the eye consciousness seeing a flower, and valid inference, such as inferring fire from seeing smoke. LYWA
Definitions adapted from the Lama Yeshe Wisdom Archive glossary, as taught in the Gelug tradition.
Questions answered in this teaching
What conditions give rise to an inferential valid cognizer, such as the one realizing that sound is impermanent?
Taking the syllogism "the subject sound, it follows that it is impermanent because it is a composite phenomenon," the inferential valid cognizer realizing that sound is impermanent arises mainly in dependence on two proximate causes, the minds which ascertain the reasons. The first is the mind which ascertains that the subject, sound, is the reason, that is, that sound is composite. The second is the mind which ascertains that everything which is composite, in other words everything which is a reason, is necessarily impermanent, that is, necessarily the predicate. There is also a chain of other valid cognitions preceding these, which ultimately leads back to a direct valid cognizer.